

Péter Tusor

THE BAROQUE PAPACY
(1600–1700)



Sette Città

2016

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© 2016 edition of SETTE CITTÀ
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ISBN: 978-88-7853-715-6
ISBN ebook: 978-88-7853-595-4

Finished printing in May 2016

The project was conducted in the frame of the 'Impetus' Church History Research Institute of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and the Péter Pázmány Catholic University and was sponsored by the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (MTA TKI).

This book was published by the 'Impetus' Church History Research Institute in collaboration with the Centro Studi sull'Età dei Sobieski e la Polonia Moderna (University of Viterbo).

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Preface

In the third volume of the series *Storia del cristianesimo* edited by EMANUELA PRINZIVALLI, VINCENZO LAVENIA pointed out that the brief Modern Age ranging from the Sixteenth to the Eighteenth Century cannot be characterized by the debate between Reformation and Counterreformation, but by the common endeavour of Protestants, Catholics and Orthodox to impose the obedience to one single Church on any single European territory and in this way to create a homogenous credo on territorial level, as well as by the hope of the European Christian Churches to control the New World after its discovery.¹ Former works, while having shared this approach, suggested however a more detailed chronology. For example, the same period is discussed in two separate volumes of the Cambridge History of Christianity: in the sixth, the *Reform and Expansion 1500–1660* edited by RONNIE PO-CHIA, and in the seventh, the *Enlightenment, Rearwakening and Revolution 1660–1815* edited by STEWART J. BROWN and TIMOTHY TACKETT.² In the present book, PÉTER TUSOR deals with the history of the Papacy even more in details. In fact, the Hungarian scholar proposes the return to an older historiographical model, according to which the Medieval Papacy was followed by a Renaissance, then a Baroque, and an Eighteenth Century Papacy. Such return, however, is not slavish, but is based on the same historiographical approach as LAVENIA'S: the idea of a European Christianity characterized by confessionalism, by the denominational differences and by Christian expansionism in the overseas territories and in the areas beyond the Ural and the Caucasus Mountains.

The method applied by TUSOR: the combination of the traditional reflection and of the recent approaches is determined by the chosen field of observation. Namely, while the above mentioned works aim at drawing such picture about the history of the European Christianity, which takes into account equally each denomination, TUSOR focuses on the Catholic component, more specifically on its pontifical leadership. The baroque era, the period between the pontificate of Clement VII (1592–1605) and Innocent XII (1691–1700), is for him the interval in which the above mentioned phenomena, confessionalism and colonialism, pushed the Holy See to the margins of the European political situation.

¹ *Letà moderna* (Storia del cristianesimo 3), ed. by VINCENZO LAVENIA, Roma 2015.

² *Reform and Expansion 1500–1660* (Cambridge History of Christianity 6), ed. by RONNIE PO-CHIA, Cambridge 2007 and *Enlightenment, Rearwakening and Revolution 1660–1815* (Cambridge History of Christianity 7), ed. by STEWART J. BROWN–TIMOTHY TACKETT, Cambridge 2006.

In the background there was the fact that between the Peace of Vervins (1598) and the Peace of Westphalia (1648) the new Protestant and Catholic powers refused unanimously to allow the papacy any spiritual or political superiority. As a consequence, in the second half of the century the Holy See had to content itself with being a small Italian state and was not being able to compensate its political and military inferiority invoking the divine power. As ANTONIO MENNITI IPPOLITO pointed out, in those decades the word of the pontiff was even hardly heard in ecclesiastical matters and was certainly not respected if not within the borders of Rome.³ The apparent weakness of the Papacy decreased its universal power; hence, Rome could not be regarded as the head of the national Catholic Churches that more and more exclusively were oriented towards the local sovereigns.

This later topic was the core of the project that has been led recently by TUSOR and me,⁴ the antecedent of which are the chapters of this book. This way, while I am writing about their content, I cannot remain neutral.⁵ On the contrary, I regard it important to mention my friendship with the writer and to narrate its origin. Our friendship was born from the common work in the Roman and in the Vatican archives, as well as from the common respect of the late ISTVÁN TÓTH, one of the greatest Hungarian scholars of the European Catholicism.⁶ Between the end of the first and the beginning of the second millennium, TÓTH collaborated with two professors of the Tuscia University, where I work, and participated in various researches under the direction of GIOVANNA MOTTA, who was then the full professor of Modern History, and GAETANO PLATANIA, who was then the associate professor of History of Eastern Europe.⁷ PLATANIA was obviously interested in the Hungarian history for reasons related to his discipline, but MOTTA also took into account the Hungarian affairs in the course of her research.⁸

In the frame of the above mentioned Italian-Hungarian cooperation TÓTH urged his compatriots to conduct research in Roman and Vatican archives to find documents relating to those centuries, when the Hungarian archival material perished as a result of the Ottoman occupation. Collaboration had already then started between scholars of the two countries to find the missing documentation *in loco*, to redefine the relationships between the centre and the Eastern peripheries of modern Catholicism and to restudy

³ ANTONIO MENNITI IPPOLITO, 1664. *Un anno della Chiesa universale. Saggio sull'italianità del papato in età moderna*, Roma 2011.

⁴ *Il papato e le chiese locali. Studi – The Papacy and the Local Churches. Studies*, ed. by PÉTER TUSOR–MATTEO SANFILIPPO, Viterbo 2014.

⁵ See also earlier: *Gli archivi della Santa Sede e il Regno d'Ungheria (secc. 15–20)*, ed. by GAETANO PLATANIA–MATTEO SANFILIPPO–PÉTER TUSOR, Budapest-Roma 2008.

⁶ *Ab imo pectore. In memoria di István György Tóth*, ed. by GAETANO PLATANIA–MATTEO SANFILIPPO, Viterbo 2005.

⁷ *I turchi, il Mediterraneo e l'Europa*, ed. by GIOVANNA MOTTA, Milano 1998; *Mercanti e viaggiatori per le vie del mondo*, ed. by GIOVANNA MOTTA, Milano 2000; *L'Europa centro-orientale e il pericolo turco tra Sei e Settecento*, ed. by GAETANO PLATANIA, Viterbo 2000; *Conflitti e compromessi nell'Europa "di centro" fra XVI e XX secolo*, ed. by GAETANO PLATANIA, Viterbo 2001.

⁸ See the *Storia dell'Ungheria*, ed. by PÉTER HANÁK, translated by Giovanna Motta–Rita Tolomeo, Milano 1996.

how the borders that divided the various regions and Christian denominations had been redrawn by these connections, especially in Central and Eastern Europe.⁹ These efforts affected the first researches of PÉTER TUSOR and of ANTAL MOLNÁR, who is presently the director of the Hungarian Academy of Rome.¹⁰ Since then, both of them have helped the Italian researchers to elucidate the consequences of papal diplomatic and pontifical decisions in Hungary and in the Balkans and stressed out the Hungarian presence in Rome, even if through simple agents.¹¹

In the meantime TUSOR carried out his research in the Archives of the Holy See, coordinated the activity of many Hungarian scholars working in Rome and edited the *Collectanea Vaticana Hungariae* series in the frame of the Péter Pázmány Catholic University and of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences.¹² Besides, he also worked personally on filling the gaps of the history of the Hungarian Catholic Church and of Hungary itself, responding to a centuries-old demand of the Hungarian historiography.¹³ In such context he also deepened our knowledge of Cardinal Pázmány, who was the primate of Hungary and at the same time the greatest promoter of the local Counterreformation and of the relaunch of the Hungarian language.¹⁴

From what I have written it can be clearly seen the reasons of my esteem for PÉTER TUSOR, who is a tireless and keen scholar, and also the characteristics of his work in the archives: he has always found a dynamic equilibrium between the examination of the political situation of Catholic Hungary (and of the wider Habsburg area) and the examination of the universal aspirations of the Roman Church. This specific dual perspective

⁹ See about it for example: *Frontiers of Faith. Religious Exchange and the Constitution of Religious Identities, 1400–1750*, ed. by ESZTER ANDOR–ISTVÁN TÓTH, Budapest 2001.

¹⁰ ANTAL MOLNÁR, *Le Saint-Siège, Raguse et les missions catholiques de la Hongrie Ottomane 1572–1647*, Roma–Budapest 2007 and [IDEM], *Eine Handelsgesellschaft aus Ragusa im osmanischen Ofen. Geschichte und Dokumente der Gesellschaft von Scipione Bona und Marino Bucchia (1573–1595)*, Budapest 2009.

¹¹ *Papato e politica internazionale nella prima età moderna*, ed. by MARIA ANTONIETTA VISCEGLIA, Roma 2013; *Papacy, Religious Orders, and International Politics in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries*, ed. by MASSIMO CARLO GIANNINI, Roma 2013; *Innocenzo XI Odescalchi. Papa, politico, committente*, ed. by RICHARD BÖSEL–ANTONIO MENNITI IPPOLITO–ANDREA SPIRITI–CLAUDIO STRINATI–MARIA ANTONIETTA VISCEGLIA, Roma 2014; *Ad ultimos usque terrarum terminos in fide propaganda. Roma fra promozione e difesa della fede in età moderna*, ed. by MASSIMILIANO GHILADRI–GAETANO SABATINI–MATTEO SANFILIPPO–DONATELLA STRANGIO, Viterbo 2014.

¹² See the Index of the series and the links of the volumes that are available online at: <http://institutumfraknoi.hu/cvb>.

¹³ PÉTER TUSOR, *Magyar történeti kutatások a Vatikánban [Hungarian Historical Researches in the Vatican]* (Collectanea Vaticana Hungariae I/1), Budapest–Roma 2004, and [IDEM], *The Papal Consistories and Hungary in the 15th–16th centuries, To the history of the Hungarian Royal Patronage and Supremacy*, Budapest–Roma 2012.

¹⁴ PÉTER TUSOR, «*Dynastic Politics, Diplomacy and the Catholic Church: Péter Pázmány's 1616 Appointment as Archbishop of Esztergom*», A Divided Hungary in Europe: Exchanges, Networks and Representations, 1541–1699, II, Diplomacy, Information Flow and Cultural Exchange, ed. by Szymon Brzeziński–Áron Zarnóczyki, Newcastle upon Tyne 2014, 149–182 and [IDEM], *Pázmány, a jezsuita érsek. Kinevezésének története, 1615–1616. (Mikropolitikai tanulmány)* [Pázmány, the Jesuit Prelate. His Appointment as Primate of Hungary, 1615–1616. (A Micropolitical Study)] (Collectanea Vaticana Hungariae I/13), Budapest–Roma 2016.

stands out from the present volume, in which the synthesis of the results of the international historiography on the Holy See is accompanied by the clarification offered by the archival material. Besides focusing on Rome, which is the obvious centre of this work, it also pays attention to the importance of the local scenarios; see the chapter about the relations of the Papacy and the national Churches. At this point, I can stress how balanced is the arrangement of the material in the volume, which is divided into twenty chapters and a short conclusion (the seventh part). From what I have written above, it is obvious how functional is his choice to arrange the material in a historical and historiographical introduction, in an overview of the political rule of the Papacy in Europe, in an analysis of the economic-social state of the Papal State and its division in terms of leadership (the question of nepotism, but also the mechanism of *decision making*). After all, I could ask rethorically: if Tusor did not manage to find the way to explain what was the Seventeenth Century Papacy, who would be able to do so?

MATTEO SANFILIPPO

Prologue

The *Baroque Papacy* “takes place” in a most exciting period of European history. It was often called as the age of Protestant Reformation and – on the authority of HUBERT JEDIN’s synthesis¹ – as the age of the “Counter-Reformation and the Catholic reform”.² In the past decades the theory of „*Konfessionalisierung*” has become generally accepted, which emphasises the parallel phenomena occurring in the development of the Christian confessions, moreover it considers this evolution as the main force behind Western modernisation.

WOLFGANG REINHARD revealed numerous parallel features and characteristics of the confessional self-identity’s formation in the early modern period; for instance, the elaboration of a clear religious perception, – such as the Augsburg Confession (1530), or the dogmatic resolutions of the Council of Trent, – and the propagation and establishment of teaching in such institutional forums like councils and canonical visitations. Every denomination internalizes their doctrines, especially by means of founding schools and seminaries but also by the wide-ranging use of communicational tools and methods – such as propaganda through print as well as censorship to hinder others’ propaganda. Employment of disciplinary methods, such as permanent control over the religious communities; excommunication; the oversight of services; and the development of a particular church language, was, however, a common characteristic.³

¹ *Katbolische Reform oder Gegenreformation?*, Luzern 1946.

² On the usage and historiography of the concepts of “Counter-Reformation” and “Catholic reform”, which focus on inner revival: GIUSEPPE ALBERIGO, *Dinamiche religiose del Cinquecento italiano tra Riforma, Riforma cattolica, Controriforma*, *Cristianesimo nella Storia* 6 (1985) 543–560; KATALIN PÉTER, *A katolikus megújulás és a protestáns reformáció [The Catholic Revival and the Protestant Reformation]*, [IDEM], *Papok és nemesek. Magyar művelődéstörténeti tanulmányok a reformációval kezdődő másfél évszázadból* (A Ráday Gyűjtemény tanulmányai 8), Budapest 1995, 5–14. JEDIN’s criticism: JOHN W. O’MALLEY, *Was Ignatius Loyola a Church Reformer? How to look at Early Modern Catholicism*, *Catholic Historical Review* 77 (1991) 177–193.

³ WOLFGANG REINHARD, *Gegenreformation als Modernisierung. Prolegomena zu einer Theorie des konfessionellen Zeitalters*, ARG 68 (1977) 226–252; latest edition: *Ausgewählte Abhandlungen* (Historische Forschungen 60), Berlin 1997, 77–102; [IDEM], *Konfession und Konfessionalisierung in Europa and Zwang zur Konfessionalisierung? Prolegomena zu einer Theorie des konfessionellen Zeitalters*, *Ausgewählte Abhandlungen*, 103–126 and 127–150; [IDEM], *Reformation, Counter-Reformation and the Early Modern State. A Reassessment*, *Catholic Historical Review* 75 (1989) 383–404; the latest explanation of his ideas: [IDEM], *Was ist katholische Konfessionalisierung? Die Katbolische Konfessionalisierung. Wissenschaftliches Symposium der Gesellschaft zur Herausgabe des Corpus*

Supporters of the theory regard the foundation of the denominations as the most significant factor in the development of the modern state, since denominations provided the unity of the citizens or subjects and instilled in the wider social strata readiness for the *disciplina* and loyalty towards authority. Moreover, HEINZ SCHILLING and on behalf of the English-speaking historiography RONNIE PO-CHIA HSIA, both differentiate between confessionalism (the self-development of the denominations) and confessionalisation (the influence exercised on the society by the denominations, especially on the development of the modern state).⁴ Already REINHARD emphasised and highlighted the manifold influence of the confessions on modern societies in regard to the exceeding of individualism, rationalisation, social disciplines and the European ethnocentrism (mainly in case of Catholicism).

The results of this research go beyond the paradigm of Reformation *versus* Counter-Reformation and Catholic reform. As a consequence, one can state that there are five significant answers, pointing in the same direction and historically equal though different in type, to the challenge of the social and cultural changes in early modern Europe: Lutheranism, Anglicanism, Calvinism, Unitarianism (in Transylvania and Poland), and Catholicism.⁵

The Baroque Papacy introduces the reader to the centre of Catholicism of the early modern period or rather after the Council of Trent.⁶ Its direct and indirect interpretation actually tends to show the problem why the centre of Catholicism, which proved an unprecedented modernisation in the second half of the sixteenth century, began to decline in the critical decades of the following century. In a wider sense, through the model of papacy, this book discusses how the development of the state, society, science and culture continually pried apart the very confessional frameworks that gave rise to their existence, giving place instead to the charms of the absolute *raison d'état*, secularisation, Enlightenment and rationalism, though, they possessed almost all elements in

Catholicorum und des Vereins für Reformationsgeschichte 1993 (Schriften des Vereins für Reformationsgeschichte 198, hrsg. v. Wolfgang Reinhard – Heinz Schilling), Heidelberg 1995, 419–452.

⁴ HEINZ SCHILLING, *Die Katholische Konfessionalisierung* (Reformationsgeschichtliche Studien und Texte 135), Münster 1995 and more comprehensively: [IDEM], *Die Konfessionalisierung von Kirche, Staat und Gesellschaft. Profil, Leistung, Defizite und Perspektiven eines geschichtswissenschaftlichen Paradigmas, Die Katholische Konfessionalisierung*, 1–49; and RONNIE PO-CHIA HSIA, *Social Discipline in the Reformation: Central Europe 1550–1750*, London 1989.

⁵ On the above-mentioned problem of terminology, there are two outlines with additional literature: ROBERT BIRELEY, *The Refashioning of Catholicism 1450–1700. A Reassessment of the Counter Reformation*, Washington 1999, 1–8; RONNIE PO-CHIA HSIA, *The World of Catholic Renewal 1540–1770* (New Approaches to European History 12), Cambridge 1998, 1–9; on the numerous other aspects of confessionalisation: legal, political, spiritual, moral, cultural, poetic, music, organisation-technical, see also MARTIN HECKEL, DIETMAR WILLOWEIT, MARC VÉNARD, ANNE CONRAD, H.C. ERIK MIDELFORT, HERIBERT SMOLINSKY, RAINER A. MÜLLER, HARALD DICKERHOF, MARIANNE DANCKWARDT and ANGELO TURCHIN's studies: *Die Katholische Konfessionalisierung*, 184–241. 258–383. 394–404. – I do not touch on the partial criticism of the English-speaking historiography related to the theory of confessionalisation.

⁶ On the usage of the concept BIRELEY, *The Refashioning of Catholicism*, *loc. cit.* Cf. also JEAN DELUMEAU, *Catholicism between Luther and Voltaire. A New View of the Counter-Reformation*, London–Philadelphia 1977.

themselves. As a historical concept, the usage of “Baroque” in the title mainly symbolises the restless unity of these processes.⁷

*

Apart from this, my work is not devoid of a certain textbook-character, as it contains the material for one of my seminars held in the Institute of History at the Pázmány Péter Catholic University. I found the explanation and the detailed demonstration of certain fundamental phenomena, institutes and their function, in brief the compiled summary of the international research’s results important mainly to make the younger colleagues’ studies easier.⁸ With the unconcealed purpose that adequate replacements for the reviving researches in the Vatican – whose centre of interest is the seventeenth century – would be educated at the most competent university. However, I endeavoured to construct this volume to separate the outlining (sub)chapters, which touch upon the annals history claiming general interest, from those which have more detailed analyses; moreover, I employed similar divisions within certain chapters.

⁷ Out of the related literature, mainly on the basis of the effect of the classical work of CARL J. FRIEDRICH, *The Age of the Baroque 1610–1660* [The Rise of Modern Europe (5)], New York 1952, where the time limit – not in an art historical approach – was in a way expanded. Cf. also the end of the *Introduction*.

⁸ Namely, there is only a brief secondary literature on the history of the papacy in Hungarian, which covers chiefly two millennia. For example: JENŐ GERGELY, *A pápaság története* [The History of the Papacy], Budapest 1982 (latest edition: 1999); KONRÁD SZÁNTÓ, *Akatolikus egyház története I–II* [The History of the Catholic Church I–II], 1983–1985 (related chapters); BATTISTA MONDIN, *Pápák enciklopédiája* [Encyclopaedia of the Popes] (Dizionario enciclopedico dei Papi, Roma 1995, translated by Ilona R. Vida), Budapest 2001; HARALD ZIMMERMANN, *A középkori pápaság* [The Medieval Papacy] (Orbis Universitatis, Történettudomány), Budapest 2002. The works, which utilized the data of the Liber Pontificalis and mainly the results of the grandiose syntheses of the German historiography, mostly focused on the annals history, partially on the history of the institutes. The mentioned syntheses relating to the discussed period: LUDWIG VON PASTOR, *Geschichte der Päpste im Zeitalter der katholischen Restauration und des Dreißigjährigen Krieges. XII: Leo XI. und Paul V. (1605–1625)*, Freiburg im Breisgau 1927; [IDEM], *Geschichte der Päpste im Zeitalter der katholischen Restauration und des Dreißigjährigen Krieges. XIII: Gregor XV. und Urban VIII. (1621–1644)*, Freiburg im Breisgau 1928; [IDEM], *Geschichte der Päpste im Zeitalter des fürstlichen Absolutismus. XIV: Von der Wahl Innozenz’ X bis zum Tode Innozenz’ XII*, Freiburg im Breisgau 1929–1930; Franz Xaver Seppelt–Georg Schwaiger, *Geschichte der Päpste... V: Das Papsttum im Kampf mit Staatsabsolutismus und Aufklärung von Paul III. bis zur Französischen Revolution*, München 1959². A complex analysis was not available in Hungarian on any periods. However, the masterpiece of LEOPOLD VON RANKE, the creator of the modern historiography constitutes a significant exception. The *Pápák története az utolsó négy évszázadban* [The History of the Popes in the last four centuries] deals mainly with the sixteenth-seventeenth century, and represents a useful source even from a distance of some one and a half centuries. The Hungarian title of the work published originally in 1834–1836, but put on Index in Rome in 1841: LEOPOLD VON RANKE, *A pápák története* [The History of the Popes], Budapest n.d. [1936] [translated by Zoltán Horváth]. On RANKE: HEINRICH LUTZ, *Leopold von Ranke e il papato*, Rivista di Storia della Chiesa 16 (1962) 439–450; ULRICH MUHLACK, *Ranke’s Päpste auf dem Index und die deutsche Geschichtswissenschaft. Ein Beitrag zur katholischen Geschichtskultur im Deutschland des 19. Jahrhunderts*, RQ 96 (2001) 163–180.

The assistance of the scientific orientation accounted for the seemingly abundant use of the secondary literature. The literature applied on different levels and depth is obviously only the top of the iceberg; it only introduces the reader into the well-documented bibliography of the history of the papacy.⁹ During my researches in Rome and Vienna in 1996–1998, and as a completion in 2001–2002–2003 I made an effort to put the focus on such works, which often appear in the basic, latest international bibliography, but unfortunately unavailable in Hungary. The consequent employment of this aspect was naturally somehow altered by the difficulties of finding certain works.¹⁰

Apart from the limits caused by the necessarily restricted extent and purposes – since, with the title of the *Baroque Papacy* a whole series of bulky volumes could be written – the inadequacy, which derives from the lack of the ecclesiastical approach, is way more apparent. The only reason for this is that I do not have the theological competence adequately to present aspects of salvation history.¹¹

*

With the passing of ten years, within the scientific framework of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences–Pázmány Péter Catholic University ‘Impetus’ Church History Research Institute, the English version of this edition, which was published in Hungarian in 2004 at the Publishing House of Gondolat, was completed now. The reason for the translation taking plenty of time and energy was to make this book useful at other non-Hungarian universities. On the other hand, the detailed history of the institutes written in Part V can be a useful synthesis for the international researches. Namely,

⁹ The bibliography of the annual (from 1963) journal of the Pontificia Università Gregoriana’s faculty of church history, the *Archivum Historiae Pontificiae* about the history of the papacy, which has been edited by a Hungarian Jesuit for decades, has to be mentioned; as well as from 1900 the *Revue d’Histoire Ecclésiastique’s* bibliography of broader topics. A similar orientation is given by the grandiose work of the latest times, the *Enciclopedia dei Papi. III: Innocenzo VIII – Giovanni Paolo II*, a c. d. Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana, Roma 2000, on the seventeenth century: 267–269. 276–277. 292. 297. 317–321. 334–335. 346–348. 357–360. 367–368. 393. 388–389. 403–404 (its praising review with some correction by MARIO FOIS: AHP 39 [2001] 291–315, 314); and ALEXANDER KOLLER–PETER SCHMIDT, *Bibliographie zur päpstlichen Politik und Diplomatie (1500–1800)*, Kurie und Politik. Stand und Perspektiven der Nuntiaturreportsforschung (BDHIR 87, hrsg. v. Alexander Koller), Rom 1998, 413–493.

¹⁰ The dissimilar analysis of various topics caused further disproportions, furthermore, the fact that I carried out an extended collection concerning the history of the institutions – for the sake of the archival basic researches – and made more careful and extensive notes. Yet, at the annals- and social history within one chapter – besides the information of the secondary literature – with the proportion of the notes I tried to emphasise from where I borrowed the given fact, analysis, evaluation, history, etc. Not as a genuine basic research but a comprehensive summary, at times I was satisfied only with the indication-like and not philological notations.

¹¹ A nice example for the transcendent interpretation of the history of the papacy at the time: BENVENUTO MATTEUCCI, *Il papato di fronte all’assolutismo (1605–1774)*, I Papi nella storia. I: Da S. Pietro (30 d. C.) a Innocenzo VIII (1492). II: Da Alessandro VI (1492) a Pio XII (1958) (a c. d. Pio Paschini–Vincenzo Monachino), Roma 1961, 669–766, especially 669–672 (*Diorama politico, culturale, ecclesiastico dei secoli XVII e XVIII*).

the knowledge of the function of the Roman Curia in the early modern period serves a main guide to the remaining sources' exploration and naturally not only in the Hungarian relation.

My work is actually a unique synthesis of the illustrious experts' basic researches and results (without aiming at completeness: HUBERT JEDIN, GEORG LUTZ, KONRAD REGEN, ANDREAS KRAUS, JOSEF METZLER, JOSEF GRISAR, THOMAS FRENZ, LAJOS PÁSZTOR, CHRISTOPH WEBER, KLAUS JAITNER, MICHAEL F. FELDKAMP, JOSEF SEMMLER, LUDWIG HAMMERMAYER, WOLFGANG REINHARD, JOHANN RAINER; RENATA AGO, MARIA ANTONIETTA VISCEGLIA, ANTONIO MENNITI-IPPOLITO, ALEXANDER KOLLER, GAETANO PLATANIA, GIOVANNI PIZZORUSSO, OLIVIER PONCET, MATTEO SANFILIPPO).¹² Some of these authors and naturally also others have published a series of important basic works lately. These volumes further shade, colour and enrich the picture of the papacy's history in the Baroque era.¹³ I have not found their incorporation and direct usage my duty, and I am satisfied with calling the curious readers' attention to them – along with the noted sources.

¹² See the bibliography at the end of the volume.

¹³ Only some examples: MASSIMO CARLO GIANNINI, *Loro e la tiara. La costruzione dello spazio fiscale italiano della Santa Sede (1560–1620)*, Bologna 2003; SILVANO GIORDANO (a cura di): *Le istruzioni generali di Paolo V ai diplomatici pontifici 1605–1621 I–III (Instructiones Pontificum Romanorum)*, Tübingen 2003; Kaiserhof – Papsthof (16.–18. Jahrhundert) (Publikationen des Historischen Instituts beim Österreichischen Kulturforum in Rom 12), hg. v. RICHARD BÖSEL–GRETE KLINGNESTEIN–ALEXANDER KOLLER, Roma 2006; WOLFGANG REINHARD (Hg.), *Römische Mikropolitik unter Papst Paul V. Borgbese 1605–1621 zwischen Spanien, Neapel, Mailand und Genua* (BDHIR 107), Tübingen 2004; *Offices et papauté (XIV^e–XVII^e siècle). Charges, hommes, destines* (Collection de l'École Française de Rome 334), éd. par ARMAND JAMME–OLIVIER PONCET, Rome 2005; MARTIN FABER, *Scipione Borgbese als Kardinalprotektor. Studien zur römischen Mikropolitik der frühen Neuzeit*, Mainz 2005; *Die Außenbeziehungen der römischen Kurie unter Paul V. Borgbese (1605–1621)* (BDHIR 115), hg. v. ALEXANDER KOLLER, Tübingen 2008; SERGIO PAGANO (a cura di), *I documenti Vaticani del processo di Galileo Gallilei (1611–1741)* (CAV 69), Città del Vaticano 2009; WOLFGANG REINHARD, *Paul V. Borgbese (1605–1621). Mikropolitische Papstgeschichte* (Mit CD-ROM: Mitglieder und Positionen der Kurie Pauls V.) (Päpste und Papsttum 37), Stuttgart 2009; PHILIPPE LEVILLAIN (ed. par), „Rome, l'unique objet de mon ressentiment”. *Regards critiques sur la papauté* (Collection de l'École française de Rome 453), Rome 2011; OLIVIER PONCET, *La France et le pouvoir pontifical (1595–1661). L'esprit des institutions*, Rome, École française de Rome, 2011 (*Bibliothèque des Écoles françaises d'Athènes et de Rome*, 347), Rome 2011; ALEXANDER KOLLER, *Imperator und Pontifex. Forschungen zum Verhältnis von Kaiserhof und römischer Kurie im Zeitalter der Konfessionalisierung (1555–1648)* (Geschichte in der Epoche Karls V. 13), Münster 2012; ROTRAUD BECKER, *Der Skandal um den Rombesuch Kardinal Pázmány im Spiegel der Nuntiaturberichte des Jahres 1632*, 92 (2012) 381–429. – The same holds for the secondary literature on the theory of confessionalisation.

I.

Introduction

The Tridentine Papacy

The Council of Trent clearly differentiated the Catholic and the Protestant teachings, laid down the main practical agendas by which significant moves were made towards the final establishment of the Catholic confession and its European, then worldwide, expansion. Orders concerning the Papacy and the ecclesiology were not given, only proposals. Although, many teachings were condemned as heresy, the “heretics” were not named, thus leaving open the possibility of conversation with the Protestants.

The Papacy immediately embarked on accomplishing the decrees of Trent. The control and development of the council’s interpretation was maintained. As a consequence, Rome’s prestige and centralization evolved causing on and off conflicts with the council’s bishop-centred, episcopal concept. Pius IV (1559–1565) orally confirmed the resolutions of Trent during a secret consistory on 26 January 1564; however, the papal bull with the same date, the *Benedictus Deus*, was not issued until 30 June. The curial opposition wanted to ensure the right of interpretation to the Papacy and many of them were afraid of losing their incomes due to the regulations on the obligation of residence. Pius IV pledged to introduce these resolutions, yet he wanted to supervise the cases and was reluctant to be only the executive body of the regulations of Trent. In the bull, the right to interpret the resolutions was bestowed on a separate institution of the Holy See.¹

¹ I would not like to deal with the actual history of the Council which was called the “milestone of European history”, I will detail only its decrees in context of their execution. Out of the numerous literatures, I quote only the latest publication of the decrees: *Conciliorum Oecumenicorum Decreta*, ed. IOSEPHUS ALBERIGO–IOSEPHUS A. DOSETTI PERIKLE–P.I. CALUDIUS LEONARDI–PAULUS PRODI, Bologna 1973, 633–775; more publications on the newest approach to the Council, see: KLAUS GANZER, *Das Konzil von Trient und die theologische Dimension der katholischen Konfessionalisierung* and DOROTHEA WENDEBOURG, *Die Ekklesiology des Konzils von Trient*, *Die Katholische Konfessionalisierung*, 50–69 and 70–87; on the problem of the Council’s universality: KLAUS GANZER, *Vertretung der Gesamtkirche auf dem Konzil von Trient? Die Stellung der Prokuratoren abwesender Bischöfe auf der dritten Tagungsperiode des Konzils (1562–1563)*, *Ecclesia Militans. Studien zur Konzilien- und Reformationsgeschichte Remigius Bäumer zum 70. Geburtstag gewidmet*. I: *Zur Konziliengeschichte*. II: *Zur Refomationsgeschichte* (hrsg. v. W. Brandmüller–H. Immenkötter–E. Iserloh), Paderborn–München–Wien–Zürich 1988, I, 253–277.

It was followed by other papal orders which continued the functioning of the council. After a decade of initiatives, the focus of the development of Catholicism in the early modern period was moved to Rome for good. The *Index* was released in March 1564. In November the so-called Tridentine Creed was established. It summarized the teachings of the council and amplified it with the term of obedience towards the pope. The creed had to be taken by all bishop candidates and by those professors who received a Catholic university chair.

Inspired by Trent, (Saint) Pius V (1566–1572) edited the Roman catechism, which was far more moderate than the ones of Saint Peter Canisius of 1555, 1558, and 1566. In contrast to those of Canisius, it was not imbued with anti-Protestantism, namely, it did not mention indulgences and paid little attention to the Blessed Virgin Mary. Moreover, it was more open to dialogue than the council was. While Canisius identified Christian to Catholic, the new catechism spoke only about the Christian people and Christianity in order to show its willingness to an agreement with Protestantism. Nevertheless, the conciliatory tone did not become absolute. The Roman catechism was mainly composed for pastoral use; it was a simple handbook for preaching and the administration of the sacraments.² In 1566 the Roman breviary was created; the Roman missal by 1570. These books are characterized by incredibly meticulous regulation. Flexibility can only be found concerning the special prayers, relating to certain events. Those rites that were not older than two hundred years were repealed at the stroke of a pen.³

In the creation of the overall view of Catholicism in the early modern period, the Apostolic “reviews”, the visitations proved to be the most effective tools in Italy, and the Mediterranean, as well as in the Balkans and the parts of Hungary under Turkish rule. In the main churches of Rome, the pope himself – in other territories, his legates – scoped the situation out, and where it was necessary they took measures to initiate the reform decrees. Apostolic visitors were made unnecessary by the coming generation of bishops, who were taught in the spirit of Trent. By the end of the sixteenth century we can find numerous ordinaries, who complied with their own pastoral work as the head of the dioceses. The incident was not exclusive but general.⁴ Pius V, in the spirit

² BIRELEY, *The Refashioning of Catholicism*, 58–59; WENDEBOURG, *Die Ekklesiologie des Konzils*, 74–75; ERNST KOCH, *Die deutschen Protestanten und das Konzil von Trient* and GOTTFRIED MARON, *Die nachtridentinische Kodifikationsarbeit in ihrer Bedeutung für die katholische Konfessionalisierung*, *Die katholische Konfessionalisierung*, 88–103, 101–102 and 104–124, 112–113.

³ On the liturgical reform: HUBERT JEDIN, *Das Konzil von Trient und die Reform der liturgischen Bücher*, [IDEM], *Kirche des Glaubens. Kirche der Geschichte. Ausgewählte Aufsätze und Vorträge. I: Kirchengeschichtsschreibung. Italien und das Papsttum. Deutschland, Abendland und Weltkirche. II: Konzil und Kirchenreform*, Freiburg–Basel–Wien 1966. *Kirche der Geschichte*, II, 499–525; MARON, *Die nachtridentinische Kodifikationsarbeit*, 104–124.

⁴ JOHN P. BEAL, *The Apostolic Visitation of a Diocese: a Canonico-historical Investigation*, *The Jurist* 49 (1989) 347–398; the latest *Visita apostolica e decreti di Carlo Borromeo alla diocesi di Brescia. I: La città (Brixia Sacra. Memorie Storiche della Diocesi di Brescia)*, a c. d. ANGELO TURCHINI–GABRIELE ARCHETTI, Brescia 2003, XIX–LXXI; on the Italian enforcement of the Council’s decrees: GIUSEPPE ALBERIGO, *Studi e problemi relativi all’applicazione del Concilio di Trento in Italia*, *Rivista Storica Italiana* 70 (1958) 239–298.

of the decrees of the council, took the necessary steps towards increasing the severity of the examination of the bishops' appointments, a establishing a separate body to examine the suitability of the nominees of Rome. As a consequence, the role of the apostolic visitors was gradually taken over by those bishops who were imbued with the necessary knowledge and spiritual abilities. According to the council, the reinforcement of the reforms depended on them.⁵ The first representatives of the bishop ideal of Trent were the archbishop of Milan and Bologna, (Saint) Charles Borromeo, Gabriele Paleotti, or later, the bishop of Geneva, (Saint) Francis de Sales. Borromeo, for instance, held eleven diocesan and six provincial councils between 1565 and 1584, founded many seminaries, Jesuit and Theatine colleges, and made regular, personal visits.⁶

The fundamental spheres of the introduction of the reforms were the local councils, in which the decrees of Trent were announced including resolutions, concerning the establishment of seminaries and the tightening of discipline of the religious orders of women. The differences in various regions were significant. In the German States, provincial councils were rarely summoned; there were two held in Salzburg in 1569 and 1573. In Mainz, for instance, there was neither a provincial, nor a diocesan council. The provincial, which was summoned every third year, and the annual diocesan council did not become widespread in the Church, with some exceptions, mainly in Italy. Both the Papacy and the individual States did their utmost to keep the councils of the clergy under their control. The early synods usually sent their resolutions to Rome to have them confirmed. This had already been ordained in a bull of Sixtus V (1585–1590) in 1588. In Spain, Philip II (1556–1598) summoned the councils, yet perhaps apart from Catalonia, these did not become regular, either. These councils became the theatre for the conflicts between the archbishop-metropolitan, who ruled the ecclesiastical province, and the bishops, as well as the representatives of the ecclesiastical middle layer. In the debated questions they turned to Rome, which strengthened the authority of the Papacy. The councils, which became the scene of communication between the bishop and his

⁵ HUBERT JEDIN, *Das Bischofsideal der Katholischen Reformation. Eine Studie über die Bischofsspiegel vornehmlich des 16. Jahrhunderts*, Kirche des Glaubens. Kirche der Geschichte II, 75–117; ROBERT TRISCO, *The Debate on the Election of Bishops in the Council to Trent*, *The Jurist* 34 (1974) 257–291; GIUSEPPE ALBERIGO, *L'episcopato nel cattolicesimo post-tridentino*, *Cristianesimo nella Storia* 6 (1985) 79–91; and JEAN BERNHARD, *Das Konzil von Trient und die Bischofswahl*, *Concilium* 16 (1980) 478–483, especially 482–483. – From the antagonism of the “Papalism”, Gallicanism, Episcopatism and Presbyterianism unanimously the first became victorious, however there were some problems: the lay and State influence, moreover the vagueness of the episcopal sovereignty remained the still perplexing and troublesome characteristic of Catholicism.

⁶ The literature on Borromei is easily available. On the less known Paleotti: PAOLO PRODI, *Il Cardinale Gabriele Paleotti (1522–1597) I–II*, Roma 1967. – Although, compared to the above mentioned prelates, he cannot be regarded as exemplary. The Church administrative activity of Ludovico Madruzzo, the leading figure of the curial imperial party, is typical, especially in terms of the political projection of the reforms' execution. See on this: CECILIA NUBOLA, *Conoscere per governare. La diocesi di Trento nella visita pastorale di Ludovico Madruzzo (1579–1581)*, Bologna 1973; BERNHARD STEINHAUF, *Giovanni Ludovico Madruzzo (1532–1600). Katholische Reformation zwischen Kaiser und Papst: Das Konzept zur praktischen Gestaltung der Kirche der Neuzeit im Anschluß an das Konzil von Trient* (Reformationsgeschichtliche Studien und Texte 132), Münster 1993.

clergy, were celebrated only in France from the second half of the seventeenth century. In contrast, the other States hindered the existence of the councils, or they put them to their own use. The establishment of the decrees of Trent went smoothly perhaps only in the overseas missionary fields.⁷

The relatively long pontificate of Gregory XIII (1572–1585) was no less significant in terms of the roaring success of the Catholic confessionalisation than Pius V's. His indisputably notable result was the introduction of the reform idea through the nunciatures. Apart from the diplomatic tasks, the main purpose of the papal legates became the "restoration of religion, cult and the administration of the Church", i.e., modernization. It was true for the representations in the Catholic courts – imperial, Spanish, French, Portuguese, Polish, Venetian, Florentine, Savoyan – and even more so for the nunciatures, founded especially to control and harmonize the reforms of Trent in the German States, in the Old Swiss Confederacy and in Austria. The institutions, which employed only a couple of members at the beginning, played a similar role as the Apostolic visitors in Italy, and along the initiatives the nunciatures were established in Luzern in 1579, in Graz in 1580 and in Cologne in 1584. A sign of the special attention being given to the German States was the German Congregation, established in Rome in 1561 to control the persuasion of the "northern heretics" (*heretici ultramontani*), which had its height under Pope Boncompagni.⁸

Apart from the reform nunciatures, the other great achievement of Gregory XIII's pontificate was the development of the college system. He was encouraged by the partially political, mainly financial difficulties of certain States around the execution of the decree of Trent concerning the seminaries. Pope Boncompagni expanded the already existing colleges, e.g., the Jesuit College in Rome, which still bears his name, and made their sole purpose the education of priests. The new German, Hungarian, and English colleges, as well as the Greek Sant'Atanasio (a Maronite and Armenian college), were established with the aim of increasing the number of clergy, the latter in hope of uni-

⁷ Out of the numerous partial studies, the following stands out: PIETRO CAIAZZA, *Tra Stato e Papato: Concili provinciali post-tridentini* (Italia Sacra. Studi e Documenti di Storia Ecclesiastica 49), Roma 1992, 9–49. 107–175. 177–254, especially 228.

⁸ A milestone for the history and research of the nunciature: *Nuntiaturreportage und Nuntiaturforschung. Kritische Bestandsaufnahme und neue Perspektive. Beiträge von Heinrich Lutz, Gerhard Müller, Hubert Jedin, Helmut Götz, Georg Lutz*, hrsg. v. Deutschen Historischen Institut in Rom, Rom 1976 [The first publication of the studies: QFIAB 53 (1973) 152–275]; furthermore WOLFGANG REINHARD, *Katbolische Reform und Gegenreformation in der Kölner Nuntiaturreportage 1584–1621. Aufgaben und erste Ergebnisse eines Editionsunternehmens der Görres-Gesellschaft (Nuntiaturreportage aus Deutschland. Die Kölner Nuntiaturreportage I–V)*, RQ 66 (1971) 8–65; JOHANN RAINER, *Die Grazer Nuntiaturreportage 1580–1622, Die Gegenreformation in Innerösterreich als politisches, kirchenpolitisches und theologisches Problem* (hrsg. v. France M. Dolinar–M. Liebmann–H. Rumpel–L. Tavano), Graz–Wien–Köln 1994, 289–294; [IDEM], *Katbolische Reform in Innerösterreich*, RQ 84 (1989), 258–269. On the *Congregatio Germanica* which was reestablished in 1591 and whose duties were taken over by the Sacred Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith in the seventeenth century: JOSEF KRASENBRINK, *Die Congregatio Germanica und die katbolische Reform nach dem Tridentinum* (Reformationsgeschichtliche Studien und Texte 105), Münster 1972, especially 74–248.

fication as well. Not only did Rome become the centre of administration, but also the centre of theology and the education of clergy. The foundation of the central colleges was followed by the establishment of the northern papal college system (Vienna 1574, Prague 1575, Graz 1578, Olomouc 1579, Kolozsvár (Cluj) 1583, Fulda 1584, Dilinga 1585), with a German centre. The intellectual expansion of the reformed Papacy was symbolized by the initiation and spreading of the calendar reform that also preserved the name of the pope.⁹

One of the important phases of Sixtus V's rule was the settlement of the papal budget, which not only meant the reinforcement of Gregory XIII's numerous establishments but also the accumulation of a "contingency fund"¹⁰ of 3 million *golden scudi* and 1.5 million *silver scudi*.¹¹ The other main accomplishment was the reorganization and the radical reformation of the Roman Curia in the spirit of the Tridentine decrees. The main element of the reorganization was the abrogation of the cardinal-oligarchy: their number, which was determined by the Council of Constance (1414–1418) at twenty-four, was increased to seventy. As a consequence the "assembly" of the cardinals, the consistory, lost its previous importance in the everyday administration of the Church, its role as a real senate was fading. The process that started with Nicholas V culminated at the end of the sixteenth century; the papal monarchy paid no regard to the bishops' or the cardinals' collegiate relations. The cardinals, once influential advisors with whom the pope regularly met during the consistories, evolved into dignified bureaucrats. Clement VIII (1592–1605) already expressly refused to discuss the decisions of great importance in the consistories, preferring to speak only to his confidants. The consistories, which earlier had two or three sessions a week, were reduced by the year 1600 to two meetings a month.¹²

Similar tendencies can be recognized in the case of two altered medieval central offices: the authority of the Apostolic Camera, which focused only on the administration of the Papal State's incomes, and the Apostolic Chancery, which simply issued docu-

⁹ KLAUS JAITNER, *Die päpstliche Kirchenreformpolitik von Gregor XIII. bis Gregor XV. (1572–1623)*, Die Gegenreformation in Innerösterreich, 280–288, 280–282; LÁSZLÓ LUKÁCS, *Die nordischen päpstlichen Seminarien und Possevino (1577–1587)*, AHSI 24 (1955) 33–94; on the Roman papal colleges' lasting effect an example: ERWIN GATZ, *Das Collegium Germanicum und der Episkopat der Reichskirche nach 1648*, RQ 83 (1988) 337–344.

¹⁰ On the value and change of the often occurring *scudo*, used in silver in the registers and everyday life, see the *Appendix*. If it is not specifically mentioned, the *scudo* always refers to the *silver scudo*.

¹¹ On its significance and occasional use: F.S. TUCCIMEI, *Il tesoro dei pontifici in Castel S. Angelo. Erario vecchio, erario sanziore, I. e II. moltiplico, denaro di S. Pietro*, Roma 1937, 8–27, 18.

¹² HUBERT JEDIN, *Vorschläge und Entwürfe zur Kardinalsreform*, Kirche des Glaubens, Kirche der Geschichte, II, 118–147; WOLFGANG REINHARD, *Kardinalseinkünfte und Kirchenreform*, RQ 77–78 (1982–1983) 157–194; HELMUT JASCHKE, „Das persönliche Regiment“ Clemens' VIII. *Zur Geschichte des päpstlichen Staatssekretariats*, RQ 65 (1970) 133–144; PAOLO PRODI, *Lo sviluppo dell'assolutismo nello Stato Pontificio. I. La monarchia papale e gli organi centrali di governo*, Bologna 1968, 87–107; KLAUS JAITNER (Hrsg.), *Die Hauptinstruktionen Clemens' VIII. für die Nuntien und Legaten an den europäischen Fürstentöfen 1592–1605 I–II* (Instructiones Pontificum Romanorum), Tübingen 1984, I, LXXXII–XCv.

ments.¹³ The reform of the Papal Penitentiary was realized under Pius V. Its authority was restricted to the field of conscience, to the *forum internum*, which put an end to the dumping of the applications for exemption under the regulations and ceased many corrupt practices.¹⁴

The essence of the curial administrative reform was to trust the supervision of different administrative territories with separate cardinal committees. There were some permanent offices developing from them: the Supreme Sacred Congregation of the Roman and Universal Inquisition from 1542, being responsible for the theological questions, the Sacred Congregation of the Council from 1564, which oversaw the application of the Council's decrees, the Sacred Congregation of the Index from 1571, which composed the list of the prohibited books and the Sacred Congregation for Bishops from 1572. The systematic reorganization of Sixtus V expanded this process. On 22 January 1588 he established fifteen permanent congregations with circumscribed competence and of official nature, among them there were also the already existing ones modified. Six congregations dealt with the affairs of the Papal State and nine with the affairs of the universal Church.¹⁵

The regulation of Sixtus of 1585, that the bishops regularly had to visit Rome (*visitatio liminum*) and make a report on the situation of their diocese, served for the realization of a more efficient papal control. This provided to Rome an earlier inconceivable view into the local relations and can be regarded as a milestone in the papal centralization of Church administration. The other significant motion of Sixtus V's pontificate was the official publication of the *Vulgata*, Saint Jerome's Latin translation of the Bible, however, the final and complete text was only issued under Clement VIII.¹⁶

Out of the three popes who succeeded Sixtus V (Urban VII 1590, Gregory XIV 1590–1591 and Innocent IX 1591) only Gregory XIV excelled in the reformation of the process of appointing a bishop, the *processus informativus*. This also proved to be an effective tool for the papal centralization; as a consequence it represented the other most important source of information, besides the *ad limina* visits about the situation of the dioceses. Likewise, it had decisive importance to appoint suitable people to the bishops.¹⁷

¹³ The changed scope of duties of the Apostolic Camera is introduced by GUGLIELMO FELICI's rather obsolete work (*La reverenda Camera Apostolica. Studio storico giuridico*, Roma 1940) and by the thorough study of MARIA GRAZIA PASTURA RUGGIERO (*La reverenda Camera Apostolica e i suoi archivi [sec. XV–XVIII]*, Roma 1984).

¹⁴ FILIPPO TAMBURINI, *La riforma della Penitenziaria nella prima metà del sec. XVI e i cardinali Pucci in recenti saggi*, *Rivista di Storia della Chiesa in Italia* 44 (1990) 110–129, 116–121.

¹⁵ On the system, establishment and competence of the curial offices: NICCOLÒ DEL RE, *La Curia Romana* (Sussidi Eruditi 23), Roma 1970.³ (I could not use its latest publication [1998].)

¹⁶ I only quote here and in the next note a current summary of the rich literature: VICENTE CÁRCEL ORTÍ, *Estudio histórico-jurídico sobre la visita «ad limina Apostolorum»*, *Relaciones sobre el estado de las diócesis Valencianas I–III* (ed. por Milagros Cárcel Ortí–Vicente Cárcel Ortí), Valencia 1989, I, 21–212; moreover another excellent publication: *Le visite «Ad limina apostolorum» dei vescovi di Bergamo. I: 1590–1696*, a c. d. ERMENEGILDO CAMOZZI, Bergamo 1992.

¹⁷ DANTE GEMMITI, *Il processo per la nomina dei Vescovi. Ricerche sull'elezione dei Vescovi nel sec. XVII*, Napoli–Roma 1989. – The two methods of the Roman centralization, as well as most of the related questions of the *Introduction* are detailed later.

Considering the personality of Clement VIII, he absolutely met the requirements of the Catholic reform's bishop ideal. The Catholic reform triumphed with the celebration of the Jubilee of 1600 under his pontificate (there were 1.2 million pilgrims in Rome, which in its ratio, outnumbers the 30 million visitors of the Jubilee of 2000).¹⁸ Nevertheless, the progress of the renewal started to lose its impetus. The signs of which were the sentence of Giordano Bruno, the debate of grace among the Dominicans and the Jesuits.¹⁹ The marks of the defensive policy could be seen in the reformed Papacy, the observances of the new regulations became routine-like and, moreover, the first hair-cracks of the relations between the Papacy and the Jesuits occurred. The annulment of numerous medieval *exemptio*, privileges at the particular Churches proved to be more and more of an unsolvable task. In the instructions given to the nuncios such orders seldom occurred which were related to the renewal of the local religious life. On the other hand, as the regulation of the absolutions maintained only for the pope shows, those regulations which served the centralization of the Church administration became more and more strict.²⁰

The reform of the Curia – in spite of the institutional change of structure – was not realized the way it was circumscribed by the late medieval critics and the way many council fathers imagined. Naturally, it did not mean that there had not been any improvements. From Paul IV (1555–1559) on there was a significant change in the lifestyle of the popes and cardinals. The demand for personal piety, the *pietas*, was put in the focus. No matter whether most of the Roman prelates could not accomplish the ideal of Saint Philip Neri and – the scholar historian – Cesare Baronio, through their examples, the requirements towards them became even greater. Among the members of the Curia, finally, the (value) pluralism became restrained, whereas, the moral and ascetic life became dominant. On the other hand, the obligation of residence – despite, 113 bishops who lived in Rome under Paul IV were spectacularly sent back to their residence in vain – was disregarded in the case of papal officials (for instance, the diocesan bishop,

¹⁸ On its significance: STEFANO ANDRETTA, *Devozione, Controversistica e Politica negli anni Santi 1550–1600*, RMC 5 (1997) 335–376.

¹⁹ See in more detail in Chapter VI.

²⁰ Cf. JAITNER, *Die Hauptinstruktionen Clemens' VIII.*, I, xxiii–xxxii. lxx–lxxxii; WOLFGANG REINHARD, *Kirchendisziplin, Sozialdisziplinierung und Verfestigung der konfessionellen Fronten: Das katholische Reformprogramm und seine Auswirkungen* and KLAUS GANZER, *Die Trienter Konzilsbeschlüsse und die päpstliche Bemühungen um ihre Durchführung während des Pontifikats Clemens' VIII*, *Das Papsttum, die Christenheit und die Staaten Europas 1592–1605. Forschungen zu den Hauptinstruktionen Clemens' VIII.* (BDHIR 66, hrsg. v. Georg Lutz), Tübingen 1994, 1–13 and 15–33; FLAVIO RURALE, *Clemente VIII, i gesuiti e la controversia giurisdizionale milanese*, *La corte di Roma tra Cinque e Seicento. «Teatro» della politica Europea. Atti del Convegno Internazionale di Studi* (Roma, 22–23 marzo 1996) (Biblioteca del Cinquecento 84, a c. d. Gianvittorio Signorotto–Maria Antonietta Visceglia), Roma 1998, 323–366; JOSEPH GRISAR, *Die Reform der „reservatio casuum“ unter Papst Clemens VIII*, *Saggi Storici intorno al Papato* (Miscellanea Historiae Pontificiae 21), Roma 1959, 305–385; STEFANIA MACIOCE, *Undique splendent. Aspetti della pittura sacra nella Roma di Clemente VIII Aldobrandini (1592–1605)*, Roma 1990, 3–28. On the pontificate of Clement VIII, see more: J.A.F. ORBAAN, *Rome onder Clemens VIII (Aldobrandini) 1592–1605*, Gravenhage 1920, especially 1–24.

who complied with the duties of the nuncio). Cardinal Roberto Bellarmino – who was canonized in the twentieth century – in his memoir of 1600 objected to the absence of the decrees of Trent in the Roman Curia.²¹

Notwithstanding, a generation was enough for the Church to radically change its face. By putting the decrees of Trent in the centre, the Papacy succeeded not only in unifying but in liberating the available religious forces. The authority of Rome was re-established, although not in the territory of the medieval Christian States, the *Respublica Christiana*, but only in those States which remained to be Catholic. The restoration and modernization of the Papacy was not the triumph of the curialism, but it was the natural consequence of the success of the confessionalisation. The new papal centralism was not based on the centralization, aiming at the medieval fiscal policy, but on a religious-spiritual basis. The Papacy performed the goals of Trent: the unity, based on one Bible (*Vulgata*), on one certain liturgy (the Roman) and the mutually agreed system of norms.²²

The Baroque Papacy

The undeniable success of the reformed Papacy was the organization of the new – dissimilar to medieval Christianity – Catholic confession. In spite of this, the tendency of the Church administration and the structural development of the Papacy – due to the conservative, radical character of the Catholic confessionalisation – were determined by continuity. The conversion of the renaissance Papacy of the fifteenth-century into baroque monarchic Papacy by the initiation of the Protestant reformation and the Catholic reform was a continuous process. It started from Martin V (1417–1431) to Urban VIII, until the Papacy formed into an absolute monarchy and decorated Rome in its splendour as the residence of the popes. There are two main tendencies in this progress: 1. The religious and secular fields were mingled, however, the pope's two – head of the Papal State and the universal Church – roles sometimes proved to be incompatible. (“Two spirits within one body”) 2. The alteration of the Papacy – accompanied by the

²¹ KLAUS JAITNER, *De officio primario summi pontificis. Eine Denkschrift Kardinal Bellarmins für Papst Clemens VIII. (Sept.–Okt. 1600)*, Römische Kurie. Kirchliche Finanzen. Vatikanisches Archiv. Studien zu Ehren von Hermann Hoberg I–II (Miscellanea Historiae Pontificiae 45–46), Rom 1979, II, 377–403.

²² HUBERT JEDIN, *Das Papsttum und die Durchführung des Tridentinums (1565 bis 1605)*, Reformation. Katholische Reform und Gegenreformation (Handbuch der Kirchengeschichte 4, hrsg. v. Erwin Iserloh–Josef Glazik–Hubert Jedin), Freiburg–Basel–Wien 1967, 521–560, 533. – In this introductory chapter, I do not quote separately the following surveys, yet I continuously utilize their findings and methods in a concise synthesis of the partial studies: PO-CHIA HSIA, *The World of Catholic Renewal*, 92–97; BIRELEY, *The Refashioning of Catholicism*, 57–66. 70–71; JAITNER, *Die päpstliche Kirchenreformpolitik*, 279–288; JEDIN, *Das Papsttum und die Durchführung*, 521–560; and BURKHARDT ROBERG, *Rom und Europa im Zeitalter der katholischen Reform*, Rom in der Neuzeit. Politische, kirchliche und kulturelle Aspekte (hrsg. v. R. Elze–H. Schmidinger–H.S. Nordholt), Wien–Rom 1976, 53–71.

centralization of the administration within the Papal State, which was built on the service of the ambitious civil elite and the feudal noblemen – into absolute monarchy basically determined the development of the Roman Curia, as well.²³ The Curia contrasted and remained an absolutistic social-political system in contrast to the spirit of Trent, concerning the inner logic of the baroque. To put it bluntly: the central body of the Church administration was a typical baroque court with many contemporary characteristics. We can think here of the originally well-organized administration's over-bureaucratization and of the formation of court life.

In the character of the ruling pope, the spiritual and secular powers were specifically fused. The Papal State itself was not only the centre of Catholicism of the early modern period, but the participant and often the pioneer of the modern State's development. The complaint of the reformers about the secularization of the Papacy was actually rooted in such development of the Papal State, rather than in personal abuse of authority. There were two basic reasons for the papal consolidating policy. Firstly, there was the realization that the Papal State had to take part in the maintenance of the Italian peninsula's inner balance of power. This required the establishment and operation of an efficient State apparatus with the maintenance of a permanent army. Secondly, the papal financial system, which was formed in its completed form in Avignon and was based on the Church incomes of all of Europe, practically collapsed. The States prevented the significant sums' flow into Rome; as a consequence, the income of the Papacy could derive only from the territory of the Papal State. The utilization of this situation was only by the assistance of a well-operating State apparatus. Furthermore, due to the Protestant confessionalisation a notable part of the Continent ceased to be a source of income. By 1600, in contrast to the late medieval times, more than three-quarters of the papal income came from the territory of the Papal State! While these States were the least taxed territories around 1500, by 1600 its opposite was true. The significant ecclesiastical income came only from Italy and Iberia.

By the end of the sixteenth century the popes had already administratively led their State just like, or more efficiently than other European monarchs. Notwithstanding, the reason why the Papal State remained behind in general development by the end of the seventeenth, beginning of the eighteenth century was partly due to the negligence of social and economical growth. Namely, there did not emerge a wide-ranging merchant and civil middle class, moreover almost all important administrative positions were gradually filled with clerics. The power for development and resources was spent on the donation of the ecclesiastical and (related) secular aristocracy. A unique manifestation of the Papal State's organization was the expansion and exercise of power over the local clerics, which was against the canon law and the ecclesiastical immunity and privileges. It was clearly illustrated by Paleotti's, the archbishop of Bologna, desperate clashes with the local papal governor in the second half of the sixteenth century.

²³ A complex analysis: C.F. BLACK, *Perugia and Papal Absolutism in the Sixteenth Century*, *The English Historical Review* 96 (1980) 509–539.

The main force behind the filling of the officials' position with clerics was the elimination of such conflicts and contradictions.²⁴

Apart from the advanced bureaucracy, the other characteristic of the Papal State's organization in the early modern period was the extensive diplomatic system which, as we saw, reached its height under Gregory XIII. The popes in Church matters – instead of preferring the local bishops and councils – got in touch with the secular monarchs through their nuncios, who were primarily the Papal State's rather than the Church's officials.²⁵ The Papacy usually arranged the ecclesiastical affairs by concordats, concluded over the head of the clergy, or by occasional contracts with the single States. However, this aroused further conflicts and gave a breeding ground to the movements against the Roman centralization.²⁶

The character of the renaissance Papacy had already been of Italian nature, in the baroque's, apart from the Italian trait, the aristocratic character became determinant. This is proved by the geographical and social origin of the twenty-nine popes who ruled between 1540 and 1770. From the territory of the Papal State twelve, from Tuscany eight, from Milan four, from Naples three and from Venice two, acceded Saint Peter's

²⁴ In detail: PAOLO PRODI, *The Papal Prince: One Body and Two Souls. The Papal Monarchy in Early Modern Europe*, Cambridge 1987, especially 1–36. 102–122. 182–185 (it was originally published in Italian: *Il sovrano pontefice. Un corpo e due anime: la monarchia papale nella prima età moderna*, Bologna 1982, I used the English translation); [IDEM], *Lo sviluppo dell'assolutismo nello Stato Pontificio*, especially 70–86; and JEAN DELUMEAU, *Political and Administrative Centralization in the Papal State in the Sixteenth Century*, *The Late Italian Renaissance 1525–1630* (ed. by Eric Cochrane), New York 1970, 287–304; WOLFGANG REINHARD, *Papstfinanz und Nepotismus unter Paul V. (1605–1621). Studien und Quellen zur Struktur und zu Quantitativen Aspekten des Päpstlichen Herrschaftssystems I* (Päpste und Papsttum 6 I), Stuttgart 1974; JOSEPH GRISAR, *Päpstliche Finanzen, Nepotismus und Kirchenrecht unter Urban VIII*, *Xenia Piana (Miscellanea Historiae Pontificiae 7)*, Roma 1943, 205–366; PETER PARTNER, *Il mondo della curia e i suoi rapporti con la città*, Roma, la città del papa. Vita civile e religiosa dal giubileo di Bonifacio VIII al giubileo di papa Wojtyła (Storia d'Italia. Annali 16, a c. d. Luigi Fiorani – Adriano Prosperi), Torino 2000, 203–240, 208–217.

²⁵ Some case studies: KLAUS WITTSTADT, *Atilio Amalteo (1606–1610). Bemühungen eines Nuntius um Katholische Reform*, Von Konstanz nach Trient. Beiträge zur Geschichte der Kirche von den Reformkonzilien bis zum Tridentinum. Festgabe für August Franzen (hrsg. v. Remigius Bäumer), München–Paderborn–Wien 1972, 695–711; KONSTANTIN MAIER, *Die Luzerner Nuntiaturn und die Konstanzer Bischöfe. Ein Beitrag zum Verhältnis Nuntius und Ordinarius in der Reichskirche. Zur Erforschung der Luzerner Nuntiaturn, Papsttum und Kirchenreform. Historische Beiträge. Festschrift für Georg Schwaiger zum 65. Geburtstag* (hrsg. v. Manfred Weitlauf – Karl Hausberger), St. Ottilien 1990, 513–536; PATRICK BRAUN, *Der Lausanner Bischof Jean-Baptiste de Strambino (1662–1684) im Urteil der Luzerner Nuntiaturn*, Kirche, Staat und katholische Wissenschaft in der Neuzeit. Festschrift für Heribert Raab zum 65. Geburtstag am 16. März 1988 (hrsg. v. Albert Portmann-Tinguely), Paderborn–München–Wien–Zürich 1988, 59–84.

²⁶ The text edition of the concordats in the period: *Raccolta di Concordati su materie ecclesiastiche tra la Santa Sede e le autorità civili. I: 1098–1914*, a c. d. ANGELO MERCATI, Città del Vaticano 1954, 168–233. 233–261. 261–282. 282–572. Although their next heyday after the conciliarism was in the eighteenth century; their significance, the priority of the State relations are emphasized by: MATTEUCCI, *Il papato di fronte all'assolutismo*, 673–676, 674, n. 4.

throne. There were six who were members of an aristocratic family,²⁷ there were seven noblemen²⁸ and fourteen who were ambitious patricians (banker, lawyer, professor, merchant, official and notary).²⁹ The election of the two popes of poor origin (Pius V and Sixtus V) was held just after Trent, during the impetus of the Catholic reform.³⁰

After the death of Sixtus V in 1590, the succession to the papal throne became the sole and exclusive right of the Italian elite. One could enter the College of Cardinals only with a decent family background, wealth, relations and talent. A typical career in the Church in baroque times looked like the following: the young candidate from a family with good relations studies law after his secondary education. His first official position in the Curia is acquired by a relative or a patron through inheritance, resignation or purchasing. The young protégé, the client, slowly starts to rise in the hierarchy: he is a member of a more and more important office, or a curial body, or he becomes the head of a smaller nunciature or bishopric which later he replaces with a more significant one. The next step is the cardinal's hat. Hereupon, the political relations that he is building for a lifetime, accompanied by appropriate character and abilities could exalt to among the *papabili*, from where there is only one step to the top.³¹ As a result of the long official careers, in the fifteenth century the average age of the popes was 55,7, in the sixteenth century it was 55,6, whereas in the examined period of time it was 66,6.³²

Naturally, there are some exceptions. Paul III (1534–1549) became a cardinal through the intervention of his sister, Giulia Farnese, who was a confidant of Alexander VI (1492–1503). He still represented the renaissance Papacy. While Pius V, who became known in the

²⁷ Namely, Paul III (Farnese), Paul IV (Carafa), Leo XI (de' Medici), Gregory XV (Ludovisi, his father was the *conte di Pompeo*), Innocent XIII (Conti), Benedict XIII (Orsini).

²⁸ Urban VII (Castagna), Clement IX (Rospigliosi), Alexander VIII (Ottoboni), Innocent XII (Pignatelli), Clement XI (Albani), Clement XII (Corsini), Clement XIII (Rezzonico).

²⁹ Julius III, Marcellus II, Pius IV, Gregory XIII, Gregory XIV, Innocent IX, Clement VIII, Paul V, Urban VIII, Innocent X, Alexander VII, Clement X, Innocent XI and Benedict XIV. (The rough time limit of the analysis is the first phase of the Jesuit order's history which is perfectly suitable for the chronological modelling of Catholicism in the early modern period. That is why, Clement XIV, who acceded to the throne in 1769, is not on the list. The other time limit, which is often used in this volume, the 1500–1800 is more arbitrary than the previous one but it speaks for itself.)

³⁰ WOLFGANG REINHARD, *Herkunft und Karriere der Päpste 1417–1963, Beiträge zu einer historischen Soziologie der römischen Kurie*, Medelingen van het Nederlands Instituut te Rome 38 (1976) 87–108, especially 88. 93–94. 95. 98.

³¹ Cf. WOLFGANG REINHARD, *Papal Power and Family Strategy in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, Princes, Patronage and the Nobility* (ed. by R.G. Asch–A.M. Birke), Oxford 1991, 329–356; [IDEM], *Freunde und Kreaturen. „Verflechtung“ als Konzept zur Erforschung historischer Führungsgruppen. Die römische Oligarchie um 1600* (Schriften der Philosophischen Fachbereiche der Universität Augsburg 14), München 1979, 45–49 (Ausgewählte Abhandlungen, 289–310). The example of Paul V's family, the Borgheses' is very typical, see more at WOLFGANG REINHARD, *Amerlaufbahn und Familienstatus. Der Aufstieg des Hauses Borghese 1537–1621*, QFIAB 54 (1974) 328–427; the same briefly, set into French and German parallel incidents: *Kirche als Mobilitätskanal der frühneuzeitlichen Gesellschaft*, Ständische Gesellschaft und soziale Mobilität (hrsg. v. Winfried Schulze), München 1988, 333–351, 335–340 (Ausgewählte Abhandlungen, 53–76).

³² It was later stabilized. The average age was in the eighteenth century, 64, in the nineteenth century 63,1 and in the twentieth century 66. REINHARD, *Herkunft und Karriere der Päpste*, 99.

course of the Roman Inquisition, could owe his rise to his zeal, with which he symbolizes the ascetic Papacy. Yet, the majority followed a successful official course in the papal administration and diplomacy, consequently they gained legal knowledge: there were nineteen popes who were doctors of canon and Roman law, five who had a classical education and there were only three who were experts in theology. Nevertheless, their private lives were not overshadowed by scandals. In the baroque period, the secular clerics formed the majority of the popes in spite of the fact that in the early modern period the new and renewed orders were not to be dismissed in the shaping of the new face of the modern Catholicism. Most of the popes coming from religious orders reigned in the second half of the sixteenth century: Paul IV was the cofounder of the Theatines, Pius V was Dominican, whereas Sixtus V was Franciscan.³³

The vigorously secular: the humanist, scandalous renaissance Papacy which was led and ruled by wealthy families, patronizing art, was replaced by the ascetic, short-lived reformed Papacy which privileged theology and inquisition. This period was followed by the baroque Papacy. At that time, the career of the popes was strictly reduced to their official careers. The Curia became the centre of the growth of the aristocracy, the patricians and the social rise. This change is the result of that institutional continuance which linked the renaissance period with the baroque in Rome. The papal absolute monarchy can hardly be understood without the awareness of the Italian leading classes' family-strategy.³⁴ The ambitious middle-class had the leading part in this period, as the origin of the popes also shows. Generation by generation, they advanced their family-relations and the ecclesiastical career of the family-members to enable one to reach the throne of Saint Peter. This is exemplified by the Farneses, Boncompagnis, Sfondratis, Aldobrandinis, Borgheses, Barberinis, Pamphilis, Chigis, Altieris and Ottobonis. The system of nepotism outlived Trent by some one and a half centuries.³⁵

National States, Churches

As there is more or less continuity between the renaissance and baroque Papacy and as the determinations of the baroque Papacy hindered the spread of the reform, it is also true to Rome and the national Churches' relations which were controlled by the State. The gradual but unstoppable evolution of the modern States and the dissolution of the medieval *Respublica Christiana* are such manifestations of the early modern

³³ REINHARD, *Herkunft und Karriere der Päpste*, 87–108.

³⁴ Out of the latest genealogical literature, the six bulky volumes of the papal and cardinals' families' thoroughly analysed genealogies, in which the whole relational system can be traced back, emerge: CHRISTOPH WEBER, *Genealogien zur Papstgeschichte I–VI* (Päpste und Papsttum 29 I–VI), Stuttgart 1999–2002.

³⁵ This is also the central conception of WOLFGANG REINHARD'S study which is rich in detail and covers all aspects of his earlier works. *Reformpapsttum zwischen Renaissance und Barock*, *Reformatio Ecclesiae* (hrsg. v. Remigius Bäumer), Paderborn 1980, 779–796 (Ausgewählte Abhandlungen, 37–52); [IDEM], *Nepotismus. Der Funktionswandel einer papstgeschichtlichen Konstanten*, *Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte* 86 (1975) 145–185.

Europe, with which the Church and especially the Papacy were continuously confronted. The relations of the States towards Rome from the fourteenth century, into the fifteenth and early sixteenth century were determined by the Conciliarism and the Italian regional policy; moreover it made the pace of change more intensive.³⁶

The Papacy of the sixteenth century rephrased its universal needs in the light of the European overseas expansion and the Reformation. Theology created the theory of the indirect papal power (*potestas indirecta*), which synchronized the papal needs with the development of State autonomy. Its root can be traced back to Boniface VIII's (1294–1303) theory of the two swords, which clearly differentiated between the spiritual and secular power of the popes and derived the authority of the monarchs from the pope's. This tradition served as a ground for Nicholas V in 1455 to "grant" the western territories of Africa to the Portuguese and for Alexander VI in 1493 to divide the New World among the Spanish and Portuguese crowns, with the obligation of baptizing the natives. By the granting of the Spanish *Patronato* and the Portuguese *Padroado*, the patronage, the Papacy, which focused mainly on Europe, paradoxically executed its own self-restraint in the New World.

Apart from the theory of Boniface, the theory of the State by Saint Thomas Aquinas, based on Aristotle, had a much greater effect on the modern thought. According to this the State is based on natural law; its aim is to achieve public good and the earthly happiness. In this way, the State is an autonomous, legally independent institution. However, its functioning is under the eternal life's transcendent formula whose accomplishment was the mission of the Church. The duty of the monarch is to lead his people to both aims. If the monarch hinders the achievement of the transcendent aim, the Church has the right and duty to intervene. This right and duty is the *potestas indirecta* of the popes in secular affairs. The view was popularized and represented in the early modern period by Francisco de Vitoria, the father of international law, and by the most noted theologians, Francisco Suárez and Roberto Bellarmino. In parallel to the Papacy and the Church's universal needs' rephrasing, Rome accepted the new world of the sovereign States and succeeded in adapting it for a little while, however – mainly due its own policy – it was excluded from the century-long determining new European order which was being formed in Westphalia.³⁷

From the middle of the fifteenth century through the seventeenth century, the States increased their controlling role over religion in three fields: the appointment of higher dignities, levying a tax on the clergy, and the secular juridical jurisdiction over clergymen. The leaders of the States more and more often intervened in the reformation of the clergy and the Christianization of their people. Their reference to the Christian monarchs' taking responsibility considerably hindered the Church's autonomous mani-

³⁶ On the process: JOHN A.F. THOMSON, *Popes and Princes 1417–1517. Politics and Polity in the Late Medieval Church* (Early Modern Europe Today [1]), London 1980, 3–53 and 114–142.

³⁷ BIRELEY, *The Refashioning of Catholicism, 71–95* (*The Church, the State and Religious Wars*); MACIOCE, *Undique splendent*, 31–46 (*Bellarmino e la Monarchia pontificia universale*).

festations. The Papacy, though, could not identify itself with such development at first, but in practice it was accepted. In return, they required royal support against the Conciliarism which threatened its authority, furthermore, even before the Reformation, Rome tried to control the relations between the Church and the State with concordats. This process accelerated during the Reformation. After its unfolding, the confessionalisation of the State and society became the subject matter. The European monarchs often headed the fight against “heresy”; they strived to prevent its spread, moreover, they even seized weapons for the sake of their confession’s defence. Although there were still conflicts between the Papacy and the States but the popes basically approved the intervention of the State into the religious affairs. They were aware of their dependence on the secular authorities not only in the struggle against Reformation – within certain States, or on an international scale – but in the mission organizations overseas, as well. The increasing involvement of the State in religious life crucially contributed to the consolidation of the State itself: the State engaged in confessionalisation, religion in politics.³⁸

The cooperation, which was based on mutual interests started to disintegrate in the first half of the seventeenth century. The sole and exclusive leading principle of the stabilized, absolutist, secular powers became the national interest. The uniform, totally controlled religion was regarded as optimal by the absolutist State. The result of the process was the decline of the papal power, which could hardly deal with the opposition – with the repeated clashes and legal disputes –, and the evolution of the Catholic State Churches in the European *ancien régimes*.³⁹ The clearest formation of this tendency was the so-called Josephinism, which emerged at the end of the eighteenth century. The direction of the development corresponded with that of the Protestantism’s, namely with the State Churches of the German Lutheran territorial principalities or with the Anglican Church. In case of Catholicism the existence of Rome, a central Church government, could hardly alleviate the total inferiority by the eighteenth century. As a reaction against the emerging centralization and unification of the Roman Church government after Trent, the local Churches, as such, rather supported than hindered the establishment of the State Church’s structure.⁴⁰

From the seventeenth century, the Papacy could efficiently and notably meet its pastoral duty only in the world missions’ field whose importance is sophisticatedly modelled by the initiation and extension of the Sacred Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith. The same process in Europe proved to be more problematic due to politics-Church policy and Church governmental issues. The baroque Papacy could only be

³⁸ BIRELEY, *The Refashioning of Catholicism*, loc. cit.

³⁹ An analysis of the politics’ secularization in the context of the history of the Papacy: CARL CONRAD ECKHARDT, *The Papacy and World-Affairs*, Chicago 1937; on the origins: HUBERT JEDIN, *Religion und Staatsräson. Ein Dialog Trajano Boccalinis über die deutsche Galubensspaltung*, HJ 53 (1933) 305–319.

⁴⁰ As the behavior of the Josephinist prelates clearly illustrates. KNUT WALF, *Das bischöfliche Amt in der Sicht josephinischer Kirchenrechtler* (Forschungen zur kirchlichen Rechtsgeschichte und zum Kirchenrecht 13), Köln–Wien 1975, especially 61–67; ELISABETH KOVÁCS, *Die österreichische Kirche am Ende des alten Reiches (1790–1806). Reflexionen zum „Josephinismus“*, AHP 33 (1995) 335–349.

compensated for the losses after the Reformation by organizing missions, with which it could preserve the impetus of the reformed Papacy until the middle of the eighteenth century.⁴¹ In spite of the fact that its relations with Spain and Portugal were not smooth, with stabilizing the modern Catholicism in America, Asia and Africa, the Papacy created the first global manifestation in the modern world's history.⁴²

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At the beginning of the seventeenth century, the relations of the local Churches were not tightened to the reformed but to the baroque Papacy. For being able to understand all of the details of the whole history of the baroque Papacy, which was continuant with the renaissance and parallel to the development of the nation-States, one has to examine thoroughly five main fields. **1.** the Holy See and the European politics; **2.** the economical, social and financial relations of the Papal State; **3.** a closely related topic, the problem of nepotism; **4.** the structure and function of the papal decision making; **5.** the Church government and policy, namely the relations between Rome and the main particular Churches (French, Spanish, German), or in a wider sense the question of the universal Church's direction. The sole and compact analysis of the period of 1600–1700 is justified by the fact that the narrowing of the Papal State's political role and opportunities, the over-bureaucratization of the administrative system, the halt of the Catholic reform and the forming baroque Papacy and its characteristics – despite the continuity – clearly separated this period from the previous centuries' practice. As a consequence, the course of Rome was charted, which had to be followed in the eighteenth century.⁴³

⁴¹ JOSEF METZLER, *Päpstlicher Primat als pastorale Verantwortung und missionarischer Auftrag in frühen Dokumenten der Propaganda-Kongregation*, Konzil und Papst. Historische Beiträge zur Frage der höchsten Gewalt in der Kirche. Festgabe für Hermann Tüchle (hrsg. v. Georg Schwaiger), München–Paderborn–Wien 1975, 373–386; the latest GIOVANNI PIZZORUSSO, *Agli antipodi di Babele: Propaganda Fide tra immagine cosmopolita e orizzonti romani (XVII–XIX secolo)*, Roma, la città del papa, 479–518, 479–483 and 483–489. – The first signs of the focus on the missionary orientation could already be seen under the pontificate of Pope Aldobrandini. Cf. JOSEF METZLER, *Die Missionsinitiativen und Unionsbemühungen in den Hauptinstruktionen Clemens' VIII*, Das Papsttum, die Christenheit und die Staaten Europas 1592–1605, 35–51.

⁴² PO-CHIA HSIA, *The World of Catholic Renewal*, 6–7 and 165–193; [IDEM], *Mission und Konfessionalisierung in Übersee*, Die katholische Konfessionalisierung, 158–165. A monograph covering all aspects: *Sacrae Congregationis de Propaganda Fide memoria Rerum. 350 anni a servizio delle missioni 1622–1972. I 1–2: 1622–1700*, ed. JOSEF METZLER, Rom–Freiburg–Wien 1971–1972. I utilized only some elements of this work as well as the huge amount of literature on the history of the missions, despite the unavoidable attention to mission organization. On this topic and its Hungarian relations, see a further thorough publication: ISTVÁN GYÖRGY TÓTH, *Litterae missionariorum de Hungaria et Transilvania (1572–1717) I* (Bibliotheca Academiae Hungariae – Roma, Fontes 4), Roma–Budapest 2002, 68–80; ANTAL MOLNÁR, *Katolikus missziók a bódolt Magyarországon. I: 1572–1647* (Humanizmus és reformáció 26) [*Catholic Missions in Ottoman Hungary*], Budapest 2002, 477–518.

⁴³ The separation of this period clearly appears in the following two works: MASSIMO PETROCCHI, *Roma nel Seicento* (Storia di Roma 14), Roma 1970; and MARIO CARAVALE–ALBERTO CARACCILO, *Lo Stato Pontificio da Martino V a Pio IX*, Torino 1978, 415–448 (*Il Seicento: magnificenze e depressione*).

II

The Holy See and the European Politics

“While the Papacy was still known as the political centre of Catholic Europe in 1623, by 1644, when Urban VIII came to power, it became an average state among the Italian States. According to the Catholic States of the Old World, the Papacy was seen as no more than a tradition and the preserver of the ceremonial functions”, declared Konrad Repgen, the expert of the papal foreign policy of the Early Modern Ages. He emphasized the phenomenon of the alteration of the Papacy’s power politics in the early seventeenth century. The procedure of fading power can be understood in light of the actions of Pope Barberini in the course of the ‘Thirty Years’ War (1618–1648),¹ namely, that policy which still determines the religious map of Germany.²

In the first phase of the ‘Thirty Years’ War, military operations were considered to be a war of religions by both the Catholics and the Protestants;³ however, this was only one of the factors. The contemporaries were aware of the danger of the war which was rooted in the more and more acrimonious and ceaseless conflict between Austria-Spain and France. Seemingly, the real stake was authority over Europe. Any changes of the *status quo* had a great effect on Rome, since its interests as an Italian State, were clearly highlighted. On the other hand, the conflict of the Catholic States endangered – at least literally – the pope’s aim that of the Catholic alliance against the Protestants and the Turks. The main dilemma of the Holy See in the sixteenth and seventeenth century was the diversity of the confessional and political interests, which seemed an almost unsolvable

¹ Out of the related lavish literature, I only use those works which deal with the Roman role. See the others: *Bibliographie zum Westfälischen Frieden*, hrsg. v. HEINZ DUCCHARDT (Schriftenreihe der Vereinigung zur Erforschung der Neueren Geschichte 26), Münster 1996.

² KONRAD REPGEN, *Die römische Kurie und der Westfälische Friede. Papst, Kaiser und Reich (1521–1644) I 1–2* (BDHIR 14–15), Tübingen 1961–1965, I 1, 164.

³ ROBERT BIRELEY, *The Thirty Years’ War as Germany’s Religious War*, Krieg und Politik 1618–1648. Europäische Probleme und Perspektiven (Schriften des Historischen Kollegs, Kolloquien 8, hrsg. v. Konrad Repgen – Elisabeth Müller-Luckner), München 1988, 85–106. – The war of religions is actually a war against the heterodoxy. For the sake of the military solution to the confessional problems, all the four great confessions made use of it during the early modern period. It should not be confused with the crusade, since as compared to the wars of the old Europe, it brought something absolutely new. KONRAD REPGEN, *Was ist ein Religionskrieg?*, Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte 97 (1986) 334–349.

problem during the course of the German war. The simplified view according to which there is a direct connection and coherence between the sacred and secular deeds (*cose sacre e profane*) became slowly a thing of the past.⁴

From Vervins to Westphalia The Stages of the Papal Power's Fading

The Pope of the "Long Turkish War": Clement VIII

In the course of the Spanish hegemony of the sixteenth century, the Papacy was able to keep its autonomy by relying on the financial supply of the renaissance Italy and, moreover, it could hold the strength of Catholic Europe together by ignoring its own inner interests. Rome's important place in the power politics is proven by the triumph of the papal-Spanish-Venetian League over the Turks in Lepanto, 1571.⁵

The position of the Papal State in the field of the European and Italian politics until the pontificate of Clement VIII remained constant, or it might have gained strength, as well. After the extinction of the Estes in Ferrara, the sovereignty of this territory fell to the pope as to a liege lord. The occupation of the principality in 1597–1598 was without any obstacles.⁶ Besides the enlargement of the territory, there occurred a new ally, Henry IV (1590–1610). The essential condition of the Catholicized and crowned French monarch's legitimacy – who was excommunicated by Sixtus V in 1585 – was the absolution of Clement VIII in 1595.⁷ The one-sided linkage to Spain was gradually ceasing after this gesture due to the long hesitation. It was an important result, no matter how stable a support Philip II was to the Papacy. The improving French relationship did not involve the alienation of Spain. On the very day of his coronation, pope Clement VIII – who

⁴ The new analysis of the problem: GEORG LUTZ, *Roma e il mondo germanico nel periodo della guerra dei Trent'Anni*, La corte di Roma tra Cinque e Seicento, 425–460, 429–432. The latest concise history of the Thirty Years' War *ibid.*, 425, note 1; the short historiography and almost the whole bibliography, divided according to the national "workshops", of the Papacy's role *ibid.*, 426–429, notes 2–8. The papal and secular interests' reconcilable problems at the turn of the sixteenth and seventeenth century are thoroughly analysed by: ECKEHART STÖVE, *Häresiebekämpfung und „ragione di Stato“*. *Die Protestanten und das protestantische Lager in den Hauptinstruktionen Clemens' VIII*, Das Papsttum, die Christenheit und die Staaten Europas 1592–1605, 53–66.

⁵ A neat narration in Hungarian: VERA ZIMÁNYI, *Lepanto, 1571* (Csaták), Budapest 1983.

⁶ Cf. M. BERNARD BARBICHE, *La politique de Clément VIII à l'égard de Ferrare en novembre et décembre 1597 et l'excommunication de César d'Este*, *Mélanges d'Archéologie et d'Histoire* 74 (1962) 289–328.

⁷ RENZO U. MONTINI, *Aspetti della politica interna e della politica estera all'inizio del pontificato di Clemente VIII*, SR 7 (1959) 647–656, 653–656; MATTEUCCI, *Il papato di fronte all'assolutismo*, 677–679; on the question from a wider perspective: FREDERICK J. BAUMGARTNER, *Crisis in the French Episcopacy. The Bishops and the Succession of Henri IV*, ARG 70 (1979) 278–301.

wrote a warm-hearted letter to Philip II the day before – renewed the so-called “three benevolences”, the State use of the *subsidio*, the *excusado* and the *crusada*.⁸

Not only could Clement VIII create his superiority, the *supra partes*, among the Catholic States, but he could also establish their coherence by his active diplomacy. With the mediation of cardinal legates, Alessandro Medici, the later Leo XI, and then Pietro Aldobrandini, the best proof for this benevolent papal behaviour is the Peace of Vervins⁹ in February, 1598, which ended the Spanish intervention in France, and the Treaty of Lyon in 1601. The treaty of Vervins left some open questions behind, which caused a war between France and Savoy; however it was ceased by the agreement of Lyon.¹⁰

Not only did the pope want to unify the circle of the Catholic States but also to extend it. From the beginning of his pontificate, he was occupied with the idea of Catholicizing the Scottish James VI, who became an English king known as James I (1603–1625). However, in the end, he could not accomplish his aims, neither was he able to improve the situation of the Catholics on the British island. His other effort also ended in a fiasco. He wanted to take advantage of the coronation of Sigismund III (the king of Poland 1578–1632) the Swedish king in 1593 as a member of the Vasa dynasty, since with his help the pope wished to weaken Protestantism in the Scandinavian State. His Church policy, in the territory of the Holy Roman Empire proved to be more successful. With his effective providence, William V, then Maximilian I, Bavarian governor,¹¹ and Ferdinand the archduke of Graz achieved remarkable results in catholicizing their territories. Clement VIII made Rudolph II (1576–1612) change his Protestant advisers to Catholics via his nuncios. His effort to hinder a possible election of a Protestant emperor with the coronation of a Catholic Roman king remained vain. The question of the Habsburg monarch's succession was only solved after his death.¹²

⁸ JAITNER, *Die Hauptinstruktionen Clemens' VIII.*, I, XII–XVII; CARVALE–CARACCILO, *Lo Stato Pontificio*, 406–414; the latest evaluation of the reformed Papacy and especially Urban VIII's Western European policy: BERNARD BARBICHE, *Clément VIII et la France (1592–1605). Principes et réalités dans les instructions générales et les correspondances diplomatiques du Saint-Siège* and AGOSTINO BORROMEO, *Istruzioni generali e corrispondenza ordinaria dei nunzi: obiettivi prioritari e risultati concreti della politica spagnola di Clemente VIII*, *Das Papsttum, die Christenheit und die Staaten Europas 1592–1605*, 99–117 and 119–234; AGOSTINO BORROMEO, *Clemente VIII*, *Enciclopedia dei Papi* III, 249–269, 254–255. – On the three, originally Church taxes, see the subchapter which deals with the papal incomes and the Spanish relations.

⁹ *La paix de Vervins 1598* (Société archéologique et historique de Vervins et de la Thiérache), éd. par CLAUDE VIDAL–FRÉDÉRIQUE PILLEBOUE, h. n. 1998 (its review: AHP 37 [1999] 219–220); BORROMEO, *Clemente VIII*, 256.

¹⁰ For example: C. MANFRONI, *Nuovi Documenti intorno alla legazione del cardinal Aldobrandini in Francia (1600–1601). Tratti dall'archivio segreto Vaticano*, ASRSP 13 (1890) 101–105.

¹¹ The latest biography of the often occurring monarch: DIETER ALBRECHT, *Maximilian I von Bayern 1573–1651*, München 1998.

¹² BORROMEO, *Clemente VIII*, 258–259. The vivid curial attention, paid to the election of the emperor, was the close continuation of an earlier tradition. Cf. JOSEPH SCHMID, *Die deutsche Kaiser- und Königswahl und die römische Curie in den Jahren 1558–1620*, HJ 6 (1885) 3–41.

With the establishment of the union of the Catholic States, the pope aimed at the driving out of the Turks from the territory of Hungary, nonetheless, he wanted to achieve the liberation of Constantinople, itself. After Lepanto, the theatre of operations against the Ottomans shifted over from sea to land. Clement VIII yearned for victory so dynamically and persistently that we have not witnessed one since Pius V. In order to achieve his goals, he did not leave any chances behind. He constantly bombarded the Catholic monarchs with his requests to make them send money, aid and subsidy to the Hungarian fronts. By the help of the nuncios of Madrid, the bulk of the consignment of the American-Spanish silver fleets landed in the boxes of the imperial paymasters. The main focus of the papal foreign policy was put on the initiation of Spain, the Italian States and France into the land warfare against the Turks. The pope endeavoured to convince the Catholic States – even the remote Russia – with a broad range of diplomatic measures to form an offensive league.¹³ Three times (in 1595, 1598 and 1601), the pope himself sent troops to the fronts of Hungary.¹⁴ Only in the first mission, he sent 10,000 papal infantrymen, 650 cavalrmen and 100 officials, which cost 600,274 *scudi*.¹⁵ Apart from these, there were detailed plans about how to trigger a riot of the Christians in the Balkans and in the Ottoman occupation. For the sake of opening the central-east front, the pope led a secret correspondence with the Shah of Persia¹⁶ from 1599, and with the renegade Christian Scipione Ciacala, known as Sinan pasha in the hope of his switchover. His attempts were as ineffective as that of the military actions at the turn of the century.¹⁷

¹³ Cf. DOMENICO CACCANO, *La diplomazia della Controriforma e la corciata: dai piani del Possevino alla «lunga guerra» di Clemente VIII*, ASI 128 (1970) 255–281.

¹⁴ The detailed annals and the exact account of the participants, based on a remarkable source basis: FLORIO BÁNFI, *Gianfrancesco Aldobrandini magyarországi hadivállalatai*, *Hadtörténelmi Közlemények* 40 (1939) 1–33 and 213–228; 41 (1940) 143–156.

¹⁵ ANDREA DA MOSTO, *Ordinamenti militari delle soldatesche dello Stato romano nel secolo XVI*, QFIAB 6 (1904) 72–133, 102. According to ENDRE VERESS, the “official accounts on the expenses of the first and third papal troops maintained, and recorded an expense of 1,101,938 forints.” *Erdélyországi pápai követek jelentései VIII. Kelemen idejéből (1592–1600)* [*The Reports of the Papal Legates in Transylvania under Clement VIII (1592–1600)*], (Vatikáni Magyar Okirattár II/3), Budapest 1909, xvii. – The papal troops did not simply arrive in the Hungarian theatre of war as “Christian warriors”, but as the “soldiers of the Apostolic Church”. GIAMPIERO BRUNELLI, *Soldati del papa. Politica militare e nobiltà nello Stato della Chiesa (1560–1644)* (Università degli Studi Roma Tre. Dipartimento di Studi Storici Geografici antropologici. Studi e Ricerche 8), Roma 2003, 101–132, 104–III.

¹⁶ JAN PAUL NIEDERKORN, *Zweifrontenkrieg gegen die Osmanen. Iranisch-christliche Bündnispläne in der Zeit des „Langen Türkenkriegs“ 1593–1606*, *MIÖG* 104 (1996) 310–323; CARLOS ALONSO, *Una Embajada de Clemente VIII a Persia (1600–1609)*, *AHP* 34 (1996) 7–126.

¹⁷ Clement VIII’s anti-Ottoman policy in the course of the Long Turkish War: JAITNER, *Die Hauptinstruktionen Clemens’ VIII*, I, xvii–xxii; L.F. MATHAUS-VOLTOLINI, *Die Beteiligung des Papstes Clemens VIII. an der Bekämpfung der Türken in den Jahren 1592–1595*, *RQ* 15 (1901) 303–326 and 410–423; BURKHARDT ROBERG, *Türkenkrieg und Kirchenpolitik. Die Sendung Kardinal Madruzzo an den Kaiserhof 1593 und zum Reichstag von 1594*, *QFIAB* 65 (1985) 192–305; PETER BARTL, „*Marciare verso Costantinopoli*“. *Zur Türkenpolitik Klemens’ VIII*, *Saeculum* 20 (1969) 44–56; [IDEM], *Der Türkenkrieg: Ein zentrales Thema der Hauptinstruktionen und der Politik Clemens’ VIII*, *Das Papsttum, die Christenheit und die Staaten Europas 1592–1605*, 67–76; JAN PAUL

The liberation of Hungary only a hundred years later was not due to these negotiations' failure. Neither was it due to the disorder of the imperial forces, nor to the unprofessional high rank orders, given to the papal troops. The Ottoman Empire, in contrast to its obvious weakening, had enormous power to move its supplies. On the other hand, the real interests of the European States did not correspond with the league-founding plans of Clement VIII. France's traditional anti-Habsburg relationship with the Ottomans and Spain's engagement in the Low Countries were not favourable either. In the course of the above mentioned plans, the northern Protestant States won their freedom and independence by establishing the Netherlands. In addition, Venice did not want to bring its relationship with the Ottomans to a head, owing to their untroubled eastern trade. Besides, in Poland, people were afraid of being attacked from the rear by the Habsburgs or the Russians during the Turkish campaign. The some 1.5–2 million *scudi*, which were spent on the Turkish wars by Clement VIII, proved to be a fruitless sacrifice; moreover, it also shook the papal State budget to a certain extent.¹⁸

Although the chance of suppressing the Turkish Crescent faded more and more away, Rome's intention did not cease to exist even after the death of Clement VIII. Even Leo XI (1605), who was elected pope by the support of Henry IV owing to his legation in France, did not consider himself to be indebted to the French monarchy. The most significant event of his few-day-long pontificate is related to the anti-Ottoman wars. After having received the begging letter of Rudolph II, conveyed by cardinal Madruzzo on 2 April 1605, in spite of the bare papal treasury, without any hesitation, the Medici pope decided in favour of backing the imperial forces in Hungary.¹⁹

Paul V: the Slight Turn towards Italy

The turn of the papal policy was a straw in the wind during the pontificate of Paul V (1605–1621). After the unexpected death of Leo XI, there were five factions competing in the second conclave of 1605. There were the *zelanti*, who had only the ecclesiastical interests in sight, the indebted cardinals of Spain and France and cardinals of the two

NIEDERKORN, *Die europäische Mächte und der „Lange Türkenkrieg“ Kaiser Rudolfs II. (1593–1606)* (AÖG 135), Wien 1993, 161–182; ELISABETH SPRINGER, *Kaiser Rudolf II., Papst Clemens VIII. und die bosnischen Christen. Taten und Untaten des Cavaliere Francesco Antonio Bertucci in kaiserlichen Diensten in den Jahren 1594 bis 1602*, MÖStA 33 (1980) 77–104; BORRAMEO, *Clemente VIII*, 259–260.

¹⁸ The datum is disclosed by: JEAN DELUMEAU, *Vie économique et sociale de Rome dans la seconde moitié du XVI^e siècle I–II* (Bibliothèque de Écoles Françaises d'Athènes et de Rome 124), Paris 1957–1959, II, 762–763. However, according to the calculations of ÁRPÁD KÁROLYI, the Holy See spent two million *scudi* only on the payment of the imperial troops between 1594 and 1605. *A „Bécsi béke” és a bárom kassai országgyűlés. 1606. június–december [The “Treaty of Vienna” and the Three Diets in Kassa. June–December 1606]*, Magyar Országgyűlési Emlékek XII, Budapest 1917, 103–417, 138. Around 1605–1606, another 130 thousand *scudi* arrived in Vienna from Rome. REINHARD, *Papstfinanz und Nepotizismus*, 21–23.

¹⁹ The decision was preceded by the resolution, made on 13 April, of the *Congregazione d'Ungheria* which dealt with the Hungarian war situation. MATTEO SANFILIPPO, *Leone XI*, Enciclopedia dei Papi III, 269–277, 275.

former ruling families, the Perettis and Aldobrandinis (*amministratori di eredità*). Camillo Borghese was to be grateful to these families for his election: to the patronage of the Sfondratis and to the Peretti-Montaltis and Aldobrandinis' assistance with his position as a *chierico di Camera* and as a cardinal.

He had the support of Florence due to his origins of Siena. Moreover, he aroused the sympathy of Spain, when he visited Madrid in 1593 as an extraordinary nuncio exhorting to join the anti-Ottoman war. This sympathy did not win the opposition of France. Actually, only his young age (he was only fifty-two years old, which meant to be the youngest pope in the Early Modern Ages) and health could be against him. Namely, a long pontificate entailed a new clientele with permanent positions, which implied cultural and economical problems just like the evolution of the power relations within the conclave projected the political dominance of Italy.²⁰

Paul V obstructed the subsidies for the anti-Turkish wars only after a half a year of his election. In his decision, the former serious sacrifices²¹ and the military defeats, such as the surrender of Esztergom in the autumn of 1605, played an important role. In reality, he wanted to ensure the aid of the Habsburgs in the campaign against Venice. According to the new priorities, the diplomats of the Holy See actively supported the Hungarian Peace of Zsitvatorok in 1606²². Neither did they protest against the compromise with the Protestants signed in Vienna in the same year.

It is hardly surprising that the most significant challenge of the early pontificate of Pope Borghese was related to Venice. Traditionally, the Holy See had a cold and tense relationship with the City-State. After the Council of Trent, the Papacy put a great emphasis on regaining and preserving the immunities and rights of the Church. Venice regarded them as theocratic efforts; therefore, it did its utmost to impede them in order to save its state of being independent. It tried to have stricter control over the Church institutions, especially on their benefices. Furthermore, Venice wanted to maintain taking command of the clergy. It was almost symbolic that the more relentless Rome insisted on the doctrines of Trent during the conflict, the slower the reform movement became in the Curia. Yet, the republic of Venice turned into the intermediary of the modern State which viewed the Church as an organization under the responsibility of politics. The theoretical background was worked out by the legal advisor of the Signoria, by Paolo Sarpi, in his memoranda and pamphlets.²³

²⁰ VOLKER REINHARDT, *Paolo V*, Enciclopedia dei Papi III, 277–292, 279–280.

²¹ The Italian historiography still calls the Long War *tragiche guerre d'Ungheria*. STEFANO ANDRETTA, *Cerimoniale e diplomazia pontificia nel XVII secolo*, Cérémonial et rituel à Rome (XVI^e–XIX^e siècle) (Collection de l'École Française de Rome 231, éd. par Catherine Brice – Maria Antonietta Visceglia), Rome 1997, 202–221, 210.

²² The turn of the Turkish policy: NIEDERKORN, *Die europäische Mächte*, 301–329; MASSIMO PETROCCHI, *La politica della Santa Sede di fronte all'invasione ottomana (1444–1718)*, Napoli 1955, 86–88; KÁROLYI, A., *Bécsi béke*, 139–144; PETROCCHI, *Roma nel Seicento*, 23–25.

²³ PETROCCHI, *Roma nel Seicento*, 21–22; I disregard the representation of the immense amount of literature on Sarpi.

The differences became more acute in December 1605, when the pope (perhaps being encouraged by the successful acquisition of Ferrara in 1598) threatened the republic with the most severe sanctions if the republic did not withdraw some injurious laws and released two clerics and gave them to the ecclesiastical court. After the already cold atmosphere was made tenser – more conflicts occurred, such as some boarder and financial debates, and the complication around the papal confirmation²⁴ of the new Venetian patriarch –, in April 1606 Paul V excommunicated the senate, and he put the whole territory of Venice under canonical ban, *interdictum*. However, the Signoria did not balk. As an answer, it threatened the clergy with severe sanctions if they obliged to the orders of the pope. Besides, the Jesuits were expelled from the City-State without hesitation.

The conflict of religious – at the peak of the crises, there was a fear that Venice was likely to be converted to Protestantism – and political nature was drifting towards a clash of arms. The preparation's gravity was indicated by the fact that half a million *scudi* was spent on the arm of the papal forces and on the hastily done fortification work. The increasing tense implied an outbreak of a Europe-wide war. Not only were the surrounding Italian States agitated but due to the neighbouring Lombardy, Spain, as well, which made France be in a state of readiness. Such intensification of the conflict was not in the interests of Rome, Venice, nor of the great powers. The negotiation with Spain and France enabled their compromise without a backing, in the spring of 1607. The two sued priests were handed over to the pope's delegate; the questioned laws were not withdrawn, however, they announced that the “republic would manifest the usual humble conduct” and they accepted the papal absolution, yet, the Jesuits could not return.²⁵

Paul V was not defeated as historiography sometimes States, the conflict, however, indicated the events and conclusion of the Thirty Years' War. The great powers, who declaimed the agreement, declared that the age of the direct papal intervention in the European policy was over. The political way of thinking, independent from the religious elements, was irreversibly developing, even among the Catholic States. Paul V acknowledged the message. It is proved by his diplomatic-political behaviour – which was cautious, defensive and of a reserved nature – in the following years of his pontificate. His situation was eased for a decade by the assassination of Henry IV in 1610 which brought the *détente* of the French-Spanish rivalry until Richelieu's entry on the scene. The temporary state of peace, obviously, did not mean that Paul V – though he ex-

²⁴ GINO BENZONI, *Una controversia tra Roma e Venezia all'inizio del '600. La conferma del patriarca*, Studi Veneziani 3 (1961) 121–138.

²⁵ On the Venetian affair and its roots: PASTOR, *Geschichte der Päpste XII*, 82–154; RANKE, *A pápák története [The History of the Popes]*, 454–467; MATTEUCCI, *Il papato di fronte all'assolutismo*, 682–687. REINHARDT, *Paolo V*, 287; the annals with many sources: ENRICO CORNET, *Paolo V e la repubblica Veneta. Giornale dal 22. Ottobre – 9. Giugno 1607*, Vienna 1859; CARLO PIO DE MAGISTRIS, *Per la storia del componimento della contesa tra la Repubblica Veneta e Paolo V (1605–1607). Documenti*, Torino 1941, xvii–xlv; furthermore with ample literature: STEFANO ANDRETTA, *Clemente VIII e la Repubblica di S. Marco: costituzionalità e tatticismi*, *Das Papsttum, die Christenheit und die Staaten Europas 1592–1605*, 77–98; JAITNER, *Die Hauptinstruktionen Clemens' VIII.*, I, xxii–xxiii.

perienced the effective help of Philip III (1598–1621) in Venice – was not aware of the unstoppable decline of Spain and of France’s perspective under Louis XIII (1610–1643).²⁶

That restraint, which was shown by the Holy See in the preliminaries and first phase of the Thirty Years’ War, can be comprehended only in the light of the concluding of the Venetian conflict. The pope, in spite of the repeated requests and urges even after the establishment of the Catholic League in 1609, was reluctant to give military or financial support, which support remained to be rather symbolic even after the outbreak of the war. In 1583 a papal-Bavarian-Spanish military union hindered the archbishops of Cologne’s fall into Protestants’ hands. The main aim of Paul V’s German policy was to maintain the *status quo*, namely keeping the principle of *cuius regio eius et religio*, accepted in Augsburg in 1555. Ranke’s statement, according to which the Holy See, by its legates on the imperial diet of 1608, contributed to the intensification of the conflict, leading to the Thirty Years’ War, cannot be confirmed. Neither did Rome support Maximilian I of Bavaria’s – who had absolute power in his country and put the Catholic confessionalisation in the centre of his policy by inner conviction – effort to establish a Catholic league. Paul V could hardly identify himself with Maximilian and Ferdinand II’s – who just acceded to the imperial throne, (1619–1637) – endeavour to change the Catholic-Protestant power relations, even beyond their frontier. The Holy See, for example, simply did not answer to Ferdinand II’s question, whether in his difficult situation he could give the freedom of religion to the Lower Austrian orders. The Papacy provided evidence of its incapacity that shows its less and less vivid interest in the second half of the 1600s, concerning the events, happening in the territory of the Empire.²⁷

At the beginning of the Thirty Years’ War, despite the repeated urge and sending of legates by the zealous Catholic Ferdinand II, he could gain only monthly ten thousand *scudi* for the battles against the Protestants. Paul V refused the allocation of considerable sums and the utilization of the reserves, accumulated under Sixtus V in the Castle of Saint Angelo, by referring to the difficulties of the papal budget. His behaviour clearly voiced that turn in the Curia which was taken after the death of Clement VIII, who ordered the payment of a gigantic amount of money for the war against the Ottomans. The direct reasons were naturally of many kinds. The imperial problems might have been underestimated in Rome, or they were afraid of a possible provocation of France. The Curia, of course, did not want to strengthen Spain’s Italian presence with the aid granted to the

²⁶ REINHARDT, *Paolo V*, 287–288. On the – later often quoted – weakening of Spain in relation to foreign policy: JOHN. H. ELLIOTT, *Foreign Policy and Domestic Crisis: Spain, 1598–1659*, Krieg und Politik, 185–202.

²⁷ REGEN, *Die römische Kurie und der Westfälische Friede*, I 1, 160–161. I am unacquainted with the modern analysis of the foreign policy of Pope Borghese, might not exist there one. The relevant annals’ reconstruction of a positivist nature: PASTOR, *Geschichte der Päpste XII*, 275–314. 498–583; and the summary of the pontificate: MICHELE MONACO, *Le finanze pontificie al tempo di Paolo V (1605–1621). La fondazione del primo banco pubblico in Roma (Banco di Santo Spirito)*, Lecce 1974, 57–119; JEDIN, *Europäische Gegenreformation*, 652–657; furthermore, FRANZ BOSBACH, *Die Habsburger und die Entstehung des Dreißigjährigen Krieges. Die „Monarchia Universalis“*, Krieg und Politik, 151–168.

Habsburgs. For this very reason, the pope gave a flat refusal to get involved in the more and more serious conflict of Valtellina, to which his successor paid more attention. He put the emphasis on the questions of his State's government, society and city development.²⁸

These later mentioned angles were of high-priority only in the Barberini era. In case of Paul V, this picture was a bit more shaded – especially in the first years of his pontificate – due to those small exceptional instances when he appeared less reserved. By his nuncio in Cologne, Antonio Albergati, he took more firm measures concerning the succession of the Duchy of Cleves and Jülich to gain these important territories for Catholicism, though, the pope did not dare to intervene directly, since he did not want to “inflare those territories”.²⁹ In 1612, there was a reasoned strategy composed in the Curia for the Catholicization of the Rhineland,³⁰ and the instructions given to the nuncios were basically phrased in accordance with the *Christianitas*.³¹ Notwithstanding, in the reports of the nuncios – apart from some high-sounding plans – this was hardly reflected. The Holy See undoubtedly had a comprehensive reform-plan at this time, though it can scarcely be regarded expansive.

It belongs to the exceptions; or rather it proves the gradualness of the papal policy's turn that the papal diplomacy showed remarkable interest also in Rudolph II and Matthias of Austria's struggle for the throne. But for the cardinal legate Giovanni Garzia Mellini's intervention in 1608, the conclusion of the fratricidal struggle could not have been realized.³² The Roman zeal, in relation to the imperial succession of Rudolph and then Matthias, can be reckoned here. The aim was to hinder a Protestant emperor's succession to the throne and to avoid a longer vacancy which could have been unfavourable to the Catholics. Under all circumstances, Matthias's dependence on the Austrian, Bohemian and Hungarian Protestants – that derived from the circumstances of his coming into power – encumbered the duties of the pope. Due to the Hungarian bishops' denunciation

²⁸ A thorough analysis: INGO STADER, *Herrschaft durch Verflechtung: Perugia unter Paul V (1605–21). Studien zur frühneuzeitlichen Mikropolitik im Kirchenstaat* (Beiträge zur Kirchen- und Kulturgeschichte 5), Frankfurt a. Main–[usw.] 1997.

²⁹ When, on 14 November 1614, in Xanten, Brandenburg and Palatinate-Neuburg temporarily agreed on the status of Jülich, Kleve, Berg, Mark and Ravensberg, they actually concluded a two-decade long conflict, which could be regarded as the archetype of the conflicts of the Thirty Years' War in many respects. BURKHARDT ROBERG, *Päpstliche Politik am Rhein. Die römische Kurie und der Jülich-Klevische Erbfolgestreit*, Rheinische Vierteljahresblätter 41 (1977) 63–87.

³⁰ WOLFGANG REINHARD, *Ein römisches Gutachten vom Juli 1612 zur Strategie der Gegenreformation im Rheinland*, RQ 64 (1969) 168–190.

³¹ SILVANO GIORDANO, *Aspetti di politica ecclesiastica e riforma religiosa nelle istruzioni generali di Paolo V*, Kurie und Politik, 236–271.

³² The documents of his legation: *Johannis Garziae Millini ad cardinalem Burghesium epistulae et legatione apud imperatorem anno 1608 datae* (Epistulae et acta nuntiorum apostolicorum apud imperatorem 1592–1628 4, III 2), ed. ELENA LINHARTOVA, Pragae 1946.

and the signing of the anti-Catholic acts, the pope was not reluctant to excommunicate – temporarily and in secret – the monarch.³³

After Matthias's gradual reversal – for example on the Diet of Pozsony, in the spring of 1609 – Paul V won the Catholic imperial electorates to the succession of the Habsburg dynasty, and agreed with Philip III in the person of Matthias. He urged, later as well, the clarification of the imperial succession. In 1617, his nominee was expressly Ferdinand, whose accession to the throne in 1619 was given a tremendous reception by the pope. He was clearly aware of the fact that in certain territories (especially in the hereditary provinces, in Bohemia and in Hungary) only the dynasty could guarantee the maintenance and expansion – from whose coordination he withdrew himself – of Catholicism.³⁴ He exerted political activity only on the periphery. Especially in Eastern Europe, where – not as the last in the row of popes at all, driven by the desire of a union with the orthodoxy – he supported the succession of the False Dmitry, who was acting as the son of Ivan the Terrible (1533–1584). Yet, the attempt failed. The pretender, who was just beguiling the Holy See was assassinated. The failure cost the career of the nuncio in Poland, Claudio Rangoni.³⁵

The Last Military Reformist Pope: Gregory XV

The visible process of the voluntary or sometimes forced isolation from the immanent European, especially imperial problems under the pontificate of Paul V halted at the beginning of the 1620s. The dominant and authoritative attitude of the reformist Papacy's return was owed to one person, to Gregory XV (1621–1623). However, Alessandro Ludovisi became a cardinal rather late, in 1616.³⁶ Due to the evenness of his career and his contemplative spirituality, on the conclave in 1621 – where he occurred as a *papabile* – he faced none of the factions' veto. Spain and France both had favourable memories of him, since Clement VIII appointed Archduke Albert of Austria to the archbishop of Toledo and primate of Spain by his advice, while he played an important role in the absolution of Henry IV. The fifty-two cardinals, participating in the uniquely short conclave, which lasted only a couple of days, elected him – without an actual counter-nominee – the successor of Saint Peter.³⁷

³³ PÉTER TUSOR, *Az 1608. évi magyar törvények a római inkvizíció előtt: II. Mátyás kiközösítése [Hungarian Acts of 1608 Before the Roman Inquisition: the Excommunication of Matthias II]*, *Aetas* 15 (2000) 4, 89–105.

³⁴ It is a radical, but typical example that Ferdinand II directly imprisoned Cardinal Melchior Klesl, the former chairman of the secret council who sought for compromise with the Protestants. Truly, with his action, he gave the Curia plenty to think about. JOHANN RAINER, *Der Prozeß gegen Kardinal Klesl*, *RHM* 5 (1961/62) 35–163.

³⁵ REINHARDT, *Paolo V*, 287–288.

³⁶ ALEXANDER KOLLER, *Gregorio XV*, *Enciclopedia dei Papi* III, 292–297, 293.

³⁷ Unless we reckon with the candidate of the Borghese party: the Bolognian Pietro Campori. The new Pope called himself after his first patron, the Pope of the calendar reform. *Ibid.*

In contrast to his predecessor, he paid exceptional attention to the contemporary Europe's two critical focuses: Bohemia and Valtellina. He was the only pope since Gregory XIII, who wanted to fulfil a reasoned political program in the territory of the Empire. The main chapter of this plan was the delegation of the electoral rights of the marquis in Rhine-Pfalz, who was catastrophically defeated in the Battle of White Hill on 8 November 1620 by the Habsburg troops. After Ferdinand II had debarred Frederick from his duties on 29 January 1621, the policy of the Holy See aimed at strengthening the position of the Catholics by the fifth vote of Rhine-Pfalz in the Electoral College. Out of the two nominees, Wolfgang Wilhelm, Duke of Neuburg, and Maximilian, the duke of Bavaria, the papal diplomacy supported the later one due to his reinforcement of Catholic confessionalisation and his political and military achievements. Yet, Gregory XV had the delegation of the electoral rights, based on medieval basis, acknowledged in a vain attempt, which proved to be the first significant, however isolated, sign of the popes' losing power in the seventeenth century. After Carlo Carafa, the new nuncio in Vienna, Fabrizio Verospi, extraordinary papal legate and Giacinto da Casale had done their best to support Maximilian at Ferdinand II; Maximilian formally became a prince-electoral on 25 February 1623. As a token of his gratitude, he endowed Gregory XV with the lavish library of the University of Heidelberg, which was occupied by the troops of Tilly in September 1622.³⁸ The collection of some 9,500 volumes arrived in Rome on 5 August 1623, where it was placed in the Vatican Library, which can be still found in *Bibliotheca Palatina*.³⁹

In parallel to the diplomatic steps, the pope increased the amount of the subsidies to the Catholic League, from the incomes of the Apostolic Camera and from the tithes imposed on the German benefices and the Italian religious orders. At the end of his pontificate, in the first three years of the Thirty Years' War, the Borghese pope sent a subsidy of 300–330 thousand *scudi* to the Catholic troops.⁴⁰ Gregory XV – in spite of the agricultural crisis, occurring in Italy, in the first period of his pontificate – sent more than twice as much as Paul V did. Between 1618 and 1623, Rome gave altogether 1.05–1.08 million *scudi* to the Catholic League, from which they directly sent 700 thousand gulden, in accordance with the exchange rate, 230–280 thousand *golden scudi*,

³⁸ DIETER ALBRECHT, *Die deutsche Politik Papst Gregors XV. Die Einwirkung der päpstlichen Diplomatie auf die Häuser Habsburg und Wittelsbach 1621–1623* (Schriftenreihe zur bayerischen Landesgeschichte 53), München 1956, 1–104; [IDEM], *Der Heilige Stuhl und die Kurübertragung von 1623*, QFIAB 34 (1954) 236–249; [IDEM], *Die auswärtige Politik Maximilians von Bayern 1618–1635* (Schriftenreihe der Historischen Kommission bei der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften 6), Göttingen 1962, 62–66; KLAUS JAITNER, *Kurie und Politik – Der Pontifikat Gregors XV.*, Kurie und Politik, 1–16, 7–8; REGEN, *Die römische Kurie und der Westfälische Friede*, I 1, 161–162.

³⁹ STANISLAV PETR, *L'analisi dei manoscritti di argomento boemistico nella Biblioteca Vaticana*, Bolletino dell'Istituto Storico Ceco di Roma III (a. c. d. Zdenka Hledíková), Praga 2002, 56–70, 59–61.

⁴⁰ Half of the sum was covered by the payment of the twelve Italian monastic congregations. REINHARDT, *Paolo V*, 284.

to the German papal troops.⁴¹ A considerable sum of it was spent on Pietro Aldobrandini's recruitment in Moravia,⁴² which finally proved to be an unnecessary undertaking since his troops were not deployed, owing to the peace treaty with Gábor Bethlen, the prince of Transylvania, in Nikolsburg.

After the expansion of the Catholic League, which was greatly encouraged by the pope, the aim of the Curia was to conclude peace and to stabilize military achievements by gaining benefit from them. Extraordinary nuncios were sent to Germany, whose task was to control the retrieved bishoprics and cathedral chapters. They had to take care of the filling of the bishoprics with not only Catholic but zealous prelates, who were suitable for governing. In the territory of Bohemia, the reinforcement of the Catholic religion was directly organized by Carlo Carafa, the nuncio of Vienna. He provided for the establishment of a Catholic university in Prague, and for the issue of the catechisms and other spiritual readings in Czech. Furthermore, for the sake of the reform and recruitment of the clergy and the religious orders, with Jesuit guidance he revived the earlier established seminars and colleges.⁴³

The triumphs of Catholicism in Germany were crowned by the splendid ceremonies of four Spanish saints' – Ignatius of Loyola, Francis Xavier, Teresa of Avila and the medieval patron of Madrid – raising to altar on 12 March, 1622. These expressed the seemingly everlasting union of the Papacy and the Habsburgs.⁴⁴

The other centre of war besides Bohemia was Valtellina that was situated northeast of Como. Its territory was owned by Graubünden, which joined the Swiss cantons as an allied province in 1513. While the people in Graubünden (Grigioni in Italian) became the followers of Protestantism, the inhabitants of Valtellina regarded themselves as an inseparable part of the Italian culture and language, so they remained Catholic. From 1618, their efforts for autonomy, accompanied by confessional division, more frequently ended up

⁴¹ On the papal policy and the aids at the beginning of the Thirty Years' War: JOSEPH SCHNITZER, *Zur Politik des hl. Stuhles in der ersten Hälfte des Dreißigjährigen Krieges*, RQ 13 (1899) 151–262, 151–171; ALBRECHT, *Die auswärtige Politik Maximilians*, 31–39, 62–66, 78–80. [IDEM], *Zur Finanzierung des Dreißigjährigen Krieges. Die Subsidien der Kurie für Kaiser und Liga 1618–1635*, Zeitschrift für bayerische Landesgeschichte 19 (1956) 534–567, 535–545; LUTZ, *Roma e il mondo germanico*, 432.

⁴² A copy of the order for Pietro Aldobrandini (who should not be mistaken for the former cardinal nephew) to engage three thousand foot-soldiers: Österreichisches Staatsarchiv (ÖStA), Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv (HHStA), Handschriftensammlung, ms. W 780, fol. 302r–306v. Published: KLAUS JAITNER (Hrsg.), *Die Hauptinstruktionen Gregors XV. für die Nuntien und Gesandten an den europäischen Fürstenhöfen 1621–1623* (Instruções Pontificum Romanorum), Tübingen 1997, 737. However, the instruction of the paymaster (*pagatore*) of Matteo Pini remained to be unpublished: ÖStA HHStA Handschriftensammlung, ms. W 780, fol. 308r–310v.

⁴³ Numerous data on the Catholicization of the Kingdom of Bohemia: IGNATIUS KOLLMANN (ed.), *Acta Sacrae Congregationis de Propaganda Fide res gestas Bobemicas illustrantia I–II*, Pragae 1923–1954. A short outline as the preliminary study of the publication of the Bohemian related selected reports on the role of Nuncio Carafa: PAVEL BALCÁREK, *Le nunziature di Carlo Caraffa degli anni 1621–1628 e la loro accessibilità di edizione*, Bolletino dell'Istituto Storico Ceco di Roma III, 71–90.

⁴⁴ KOLLER, *Gregorio XV*, 293–294; PO-CHIA HSIA, *The World of Catholic Renewal*, 126–130.

in armed conflicts. On 19 July, 1620, the “saint massacre”, the *sacro macello* was the height of this conflict, where approximately four hundred Protestants were slaughtered. The crisis was more than that of a confessional and local-political nature. In the question of Valtellina's status, all significant great powers – the Habsburgs, Venice, France, which controlled a remarkable part of the Swiss cantons and Savoy – felt concerned since here reached the main roads, linking the Empire and the Spanish territories of northern Italy, the southern part of the Alps, moreover, there stood those forts which controlled the attainment of the important passes.

First the Habsburgs became conscious: the Spanish-Austrian troops occupied Valtellina in August, 1620. With their entry, they opened a strategically important corridor from Milan to the German theatre of war and directly to Tirol, which could have been reached only through the territory of Venice. After many attempts to conclude peace and many recrudescing clashes, in Paris, in February 1623, France, Venice and Savoy formed an alliance to chase the Spanish out. Their union involved the risk of the conflict's considerable expansion.

For the sake of compromise, Gregory XV, whose policy in Valtellina was, besides to preserve the Catholic interests, also to maintain Italy's peace and tranquillity, was inclined to make grave sacrifices. Not only did he undertake the mediation but also the neutralization of whole Valtellina. According to the compromise with the court of Madrid, in June, 1623 the papal troops of three thousand men, led by the brother of the pope, Orazio Ludovisi, marched into the territory, where all of the forts were taken over from the Spanish and the white-yellow flag was hoisted on their bastions. The total conclusion of the question remained the task of his successor, since Pope Gregory died in the following month.⁴⁵

The other remarkable, but less successful intervention of the papal diplomacy in European politics is related to the marriage plan of Charles, the Prince of Wales – who was later beheaded by Cromwell – and Maria, the Spanish archduchess. From the wedding, which excited the curiosity of the Continent's public opinion since 1614, the pope expected significant improvement in the situation of the Catholics in England, who were practically outlawed after the Gunpowder Plot of 1605. In 1621, he entrusted a particular congregation with the adjustment of the marriage contract. The cardinals succeeded in elaborating a draft, complying with the canon law, which was accepted both by the court of Madrid and London. In 1623, the pope could give the dispensation, needed for the marriage, to the archduchess in good conscience. However, the breach in Anglo-Spanish relation in the autumn of that year led this planning astray. Likewise, the results and characteristics of the short ruling of Gregory XV, who took the role of

⁴⁵ The conflict and consequences of Valtellina are dealt with by numerous earlier and current works, such as: GEORG LUTZ, *Kardinal Giovanni Francesco Guidi di Bagno. Politik und Religion im Zeitalter Richelieus und Urbans VIII.* (BDHIR 34), Tübingen 1971, 19–26. 46–60; ALBRECHT, *Die auswärtige Politik Maximilians*, 145–150; JAITNER, *Die Hauptinstruktionen Gregors XV.*, 13–29; SCHNITZER, *Zur Politik des hl. Stables*, 170–180; PASTOR, *Geschichte der Päpste XIII*, 266–299; RANKE, *A pápák története [The History of the Popes]*, 545–550.

the industrious and initiative *padre commune*, namely the “common father of Christianity”,⁴⁶ did not prove to be lasting.⁴⁷

The Acceleration of the Loss of Power: Urban VIII

In July, 1623, the conclave, assembled after the death of Pope Gregory promised to be difficult and long. Out of the participating fifty-five cardinals, at least fifteen were *papabili*. The three groups of the same number of cardinals did not represent political lines but papal families, the Aldobrandinis, the Borgheses and the Ludovisis. After the seventeen-day long unsuccessful voting, owing to the epidemic, spreading among the conclave members, the Borghese and Ludovisi party finally reached an agreement with the mediation of Antonio Caetani, Maurizio di Savoia and Odoardo Farnese. As a result, on the final voting of 6 August, Maffeo Barberini, who likewise his colleagues fell seriously sick, won the overwhelming majority of the votes, fifty out of fifty-four. He owed his election to the fact that he was not dependent on the Borghese family, since he won his appointment as a cardinal just at the beginning of Paul V's pontificate, the substantial part of his career fell in other periods, which made him acceptable for the Ludovisi party, as well.

It can be hardly decided whether – as a consequence of his early speeches, in which he emphasized the need of the fight against heretics and pagans – he traced back his name to Urban II (1088–1099), the pope of the Crusades, or to his affection for the *Urbs Romae*.⁴⁸ Under all circumstances, if we examine the accomplished program of his pontificate, the later can be completely proved. In the following two decades, the invasion against the Ottomans, the idea of *Crociata*, did not exist even on rhetoric level. Moreover, after having expelled the Jesuits from Constantinople (where they arrived under Gregory XV, in 1623) in 1628, and in 1634 the places of worship of the Holy Land were taken over by the followers of orthodoxy from the Franciscan order – in spite of the achievements of the missions in the Balkans – the circumstances of the Catholics changed for the worse.⁴⁹

One of the first significant events of Urban VIII's (1623–1644) pontificate was the Jubilee of 1625. He personally visited churches, confessed the people and, moreover,

⁴⁶ The general analysis of the papal neutrality's (*neutralità*) theorem and the relations, roots of the political conflicts: PRODI, *The Papal Prince*, 177–181.

⁴⁷ KOLLER, *Gregorio XV*, 293–294. On the Church and Habsburg policy of Gregory XV, see also: JAITNER, *Die Hauptinstruktionen Gregors XV*, 9–53; PASTOR, *Geschichte der Päpste XIII*, 151–224; on his reform program, his personality and the inherent characteristics of his pontificate: JAITNER, *Die Hauptinstruktionen Gregors XV*, 54–63 and 67–105.

⁴⁸ GEORG LUTZ, *Urbano VIII*, Enciclopedia dei Papi III, 298–321, here 302–303.

⁴⁹ PETROCCHI, *La politica della Santa Sede*, 88.




Paul V (1605–1621)



Pope Urban VIII visits the Il Gesù church in Rome to celebrate the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Jesuit order (1640–1641)



Innocent X (1644–1655)



Innocent XI (1676–1689)

he spent 200 thousand *scudi* on the fortification of the town walls, the Castle of Saint Angelo and the Quirinal.⁵⁰

His fears were rooted in the conflict of Valtellina, inherited from this predecessor. The papal neutralization of the territory proved to be only a temporary solution. The negotiations between France and Spain, which lasted until September 1624, were fruitless. The Spanish wanted to keep the right of free passage, to which France did not agree. Not only for the sake of its own interests, since by this means France should have faced Spanish marching all around its borders, but of its Netherlandish allies, who wanted to become independent from Spain. In December, 1624 with the leadership of Coeuvres marquis, the French army occupied Valtellina. By January, 1625, the papal soldiers were obliged to hand the two most important bulwarks – Bormio and Chiavenna – over to them.⁵¹ A deaf ear was turned to Rome's protest and menaces.

Urban VIII, the Barberini, who, also as a cardinal, was against the papal intervention in the territory of the Alps, was not willing to make an alliance with Spain, in spite of the obvious grievance. As *Padre commune*, he wanted to maintain the same distance between the two States, therefore he sought the solution through diplomacy. In February, 1625, he sent his nephew, Cardinal Francesco Barberini, to Paris as a legate. His three-month long negotiations focused on two important issues: the deliverance of the Apostolic See's reputation and the recognition of Valtellina's total political and administrative independence. The inhabitants could not imagine returning under the rule of the Protestant Grigioni. However, France remained persistently loyal to its allies in Graubünden. In the possession of the territory, they demanded the direct control of the strategic passes of the Alps. In November, 1625, the cardinal legate was obliged to embark in Toulon with the bewildering realization of their diplomatic impotence. His fiasco became the trauma of Urban VIII's political world concept. At this time, the pope started to realize that the interests of the Catholic monarchs were so irreconcilable with the Roman universalism, to which according to his original program, he pledged himself as the father of all Catholics.⁵²

His suspicion was soon established. In March, 1626, when the cardinal nephew visited Barcelona to attain his goal with the Spanish, as an unexpected turn, the Franco-Spanish peace had been already concluded in Monzon. The threat of the escalation of the problem ceased to exist. The treaty was ratified without the Apostolic See's knowledge and attendance on 3 May, which made many sacrifices for the settlement of this conflict. The compromise ordained the territory's demilitarization, the dismantling of its bulwarks and it was passed under the French allied Graubünden's rule.

⁵⁰ MARIA ANTONIETTA VISCEGLIA, *Giubilei tra pace e guerra (1625–1650)*, RMC 5 (1997) 431–474, 436–456.

⁵¹ ANDREAS KRAUS, *Die auswärtige Politik Urbans VIII. Grundzüge und Wendepunkte*, Mélanges Eugène Tisserant IV (ST 234), Città del Vaticano 1964, 407–426, 410–411; LUTZ, *Urbano VIII*, 304–305.

⁵² LUTZ, *Kardinal Giovanni Francesco Guidi di Bagno*, 19–26.

On the other hand, it assured the exclusive usage of Catholic religion, moreover, the inhabitants of Valtellina won absolute autonomy on a governmental and judicial level.⁵³

As a consequence, in spite of Rome's exclusion, the points of the treaty regarded Urban VIII's religious political aims to a certain extent. In other words, it took almost a year for the papal diplomacy to modify the religious phases of the treaty, which were acceptable to them. Although his neglect dampened his enthusiasm, the pope did not remonstrate about the compromise. Notwithstanding the Papacy did not receive indemnities for its grievances, suffered from the entry of the French, and for the price of the neutralization – according to certain estimates, the expenses of the Apostolic See met 670 thousand *scudi* –, the pope did not protest, either. Furthermore, at the beginning of 1627 Valtellina's bulwarks were handed over to his troops to accomplish the uncongenial task of their demolition.⁵⁴

The regulation of religious matters, which proved to be more pragmatic than the Roman theological-political maxims, abode the test of time and the three other occupations (imperial, Spanish, then French) under Urban VIII. The most lasting "result" of the settlement of Valtellina was the radical turn of the papal policy. The essence of the new guiding principle, based on galling experiences, was the realization that Rome had to stand aside from all of the conflicts of the Catholic States, or at least had to beware of any undistinguished standpoint in the future. The method, how the treaty of Monzon was concluded, left its mark on the Curia. The Papacy had to face the fact that it was no longer able to represent an independent political pole therefore it was forced to choose among the more and more antagonistic great powers. Pope Barberini – instead of his predecessor's commitments: Paul V's tepid and Gregory XV's Habsburg-amity – voted for France.⁵⁵

The military preparation around the Jubilee of 1625 was not only for Valtellina. It can be related as well as to the annexation of the duchy of Urbino by the Papal State. Although the last duke of Urbino, Francesco Maria della Rovere, who had no heirs, did his utmost to enable his State to revert to the Apostolic See, to its original liege lord (*devolutio*). Urban VIII was afraid that this event would cause military replies by the other Italian States, especially by Toscana. The gradual occupation, though, ran an easy course. In 1625, the old duke resigned and his place was taken by a papal governor. The territory was connected to the Papal State in 1631, after the death of the duke. The *ex novo* legation, without a legal predecessor, was led by Antonio, then by Francesco Barberini in 1633. In the territory of the duchy, the pope established a new diocese in 1636 with the union of Castel Durante, whose name was changed to Urbania, and Sant' Angelo in Vado.

⁵³ LUTZ, *Kardinal Giovanni Francesco Guidi di Bagno*, 46–60; ALBRECHT, *Die auswärtige Politik Maximilians*, 145–150; SCHNITZER, *Zur Politik des hl. Stables*, 170–180; PASTOR, *Geschichte der Päpste XIII*, 266–299; RANKE, *A pápák története [The History of the Popes]*, 545–550; LUTZ, *Urbano VIII*, 304–305.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

Along with Urbino, a prestigious title, which was formerly owned by the Della Roveres, the title of the prefect of Rome changed hands. The title, endowed to Taddeo Barberini by the pope, provided precedence over all of the foreign legates in the papal court for the young nephew. However they – for lack of imperial confirmation – were reluctant to accept. The pope endeavoured to fill this title with meaning in vain, since the foreign diplomats consistently avoided the meeting with Taddeo. Later this caused many diplomatic conflicts, for instance in 1631 with the Venetian legate,⁵⁶ then in 1638, with the extraordinary imperial legate, entering the Papal State with large armed company.⁵⁷

The easing of the tension between Spain and France after Monzon – in the course of which a plan of a common invasion against England was expressed⁵⁸ by the help of the papal diplomacy in 1625–1626 – was stranded due to the question of the succession of the Duchy of Mantua and the Earldom of Monferrato. After the reliable Habsburg-friendly, governing line of the house of Gonzaga died out, Spain wanted to hinder, by all means, the most legal inheritance of the French Duke of Nevers. The conflict of Mantua was that phase of the Thirty Years' War, where Catholics joined battle with each other in the Italian peninsula.⁵⁹ It showed the weakness of the Spanish which caused a slow turn in Ferdinand II's power. The emperor was at his zenith. In 1629, in Lübeck, he concluded a favourable treaty with the Danish, who entered the war four years earlier. Furthermore, he announced his decree, the so called *Restitutionsedikt*,⁶⁰ which legitimized the superiority of Catholicism in the territory of the empire and returned the benefices and in-

⁵⁶ VISCEGLIA, *Giubilee tra pace e guerra*, 436–456; LUTZ, *Urbano VIII*, 305. The acknowledgement of the title of a prefect became the repeated topic of the nuncios' reports. MARIA ANTONIETTA VISCEGLIA, *Il cerimoniale come linguaggio politico. Su alcuni conflitti di precedenza alla corte di Roma tra Cinquecento e Seicento*, *Cérémonial et rituel à Rome*, 117–176, 154–162 and 168–170 (= MARIA ANTONIETTA VISCEGLIA, *La città rituale. Roma e le sue cerimonie in età moderna* [La corte dei papi 8], ROMA 2002, 119–190: *Conflitti di precedenza alla corte di Roma tra Cinquecento e Seicento*); and also P10 PECCHIAI, *I Barberini* (Archivi d'Italia e Rassegna Internazionale degli Archivi 5) ROMA 1959, 166–168 and 169–174.

⁵⁷ The clash took place at the time of the younger Prince Eggenberg's so called legation of *oboedientia*, through which the new emperor expressed his obedience to the Pope. This action was not without any tense since Frederick III. In 1577, for example, however late, Rudolph II was willing to send his delegation to Rome only to express his "humility" towards the Apostolic See. He avoided the term of *oboedientia*, which Gregory XIII reluctantly accepted. FRIEDRICH NOACK, *Das Deutschtum in Rom seit dem Ausgang des Mittelalters*, Berlin–Leipzig 1927, 108; ALEXANDER KOLLER, *Der Konflikt um die Obödienz Rudolfs II. gegenüber dem Hl. Stuhl*, *Kurie und Politik*, 148–164.

⁵⁸ LUTZ, *Kardinal Giovanni Francesco Guidi di Bagno*, 117–128–132–143–155. 160–313; on the relations between the Holy See and England see: PETROCCHI, *Roma nel Seicento*, 17–19.

⁵⁹ The events: KRAUS, *Die auswärtige Politik Urbans VIII*, 412–414.

⁶⁰ A source on Rome's ambiguous attitude towards the decree, which could not be questioned legally but politically: KONRAD REGEN, *Lukas Holstenius als politischer Gutachter in Rom. Eine unbekanntene Denkschrift aus der Zeit des Restitutionsedikts*, *QFIAB* 39 (1959) 342–352.

stitutions. However, the temporary dismissal of the genius general, Wallenstein⁶¹ in the following year and the launch of the Swedish attack⁶² caused the gravest crisis to him.⁶³

Rome's interests in the war of Mantua were clear; it is enough to have a look at the map. The southern neighbour of the Papal State was the Spanish Naples, in the north, there was the Spanish Lombardy.⁶⁴ In case of Habsburg victory, the Hispanic influence would have become more oppressive. If Mantua had fallen in the hands of Nevers, the French successor, with the French's gaining ground in Italy, the Habsburg superiority could have been counteracted. Nevers's success, namely France and the Papacy's interests coincided.⁶⁵ Urban VIII's actual attitude towards the events in Mantua was determined by the dear and bitter experience gained in Valtellina. Already before the armed conflict, the Barberini Pope decided that he would use every means to impede the expansion of the Spanish influence in Italy. In his view, not only did it threaten, but also subjugated the Papal State and the Church itself. (For the sake of historical truth, we have to point out that the pope's standpoint would have been the same if he had found the French in the Italian position of the Spanish.) The daily friction of ecclesiastical and legal nature with the Spanish and mainly with the viceroy of Naples contributed to the decision of the pope.

The requirement of the role of *padre commune* precluded the expression of the undistinguished standpoint. The papal diplomacy, learning from the conflict of Valtellina, as a mediator, which undertook guarantees, was cautious about coming to the fore. Although the diplomatic measures – being least as intriguing as intensive – were not totally known, they could be pictured.

Urban VIII, for the sake of the cease-fire and the compromise among the States involved in the war of 1627 – the emperor, the Spanish and French monarch, the Duke of Savoy, Nevers and Venice –, mobilized almost all of the nunciatures. Furthermore, in favour of peace, he appointed his younger cardinal-nephew, Antonio Barberini with

⁶¹ On Wallenstein and on his assassination in 1634, based on Roman sources: GEORG LUTZ, *Wallenstein, Ferdinand II. und der Wiener Hof. Bemerkungen zu einen erneuten Beitrag zur alten Wallensteinfrage*, QFIAB 48 (1968) 207–243; moreover, Nuncio Ciriaco Rocci's relevant reports are published: PAVEL BALCÁREK, *Cbebská exekuci ve světle korespondence s římskou Kurií*, Pocta Josefu Kollomannovi. Sborník k životnímu jubileu (hrsg. v. Alena Pazderová), Prag 2002, 6–45 and 287–288 (*Die Egerer Exekution im Lichte der Korrespondenz mit der römischen Kurie*), 26–45.

⁶² On the motivation of the Swedish: SVEN LUNDKVIST, *Die schwedischen Kriegs- und Friedensziele 1632–1648*, Krieg und Politik, 219–240.

⁶³ On the conflict of Mantua and its context, see MORE: ROBERT BIRELEY, *Religion and Politics in the Age of the Counterreformation. Emperor Ferdinand II, William Lamormaini S.J., and the Formation of Imperial Policy*, Chapel Hill 1981, 94–100; LUTZ, *Kardinal Giovanni Francesco Guidi di Bagno*, 314–408 (especially 314–325); ALBRECHT, *Die auswärtige Politik Maximilians*, 204–210; SCHNITZER, *Zur Politik des hl. Stuhles*, 190–195; PASTOR, *Geschichte der Päpste XIII*, 366–407; RANKE, *A pápák története [The History of the Popes]*, 558–573.

⁶⁴ On the latter's Spanish government: GIANVITTORIO SIGNOROTTO, *Milano Spagnola. Guerra, istituzioni, uomini di governo (1635–1660)* (Saggi Sansoni), Milano 1996, 25–105 and 160–170.

⁶⁵ LUTZ, *Roma e il mondo germanico*, 434–435; The papal-Habsburg relations' survey: PETROCCHI, *Roma nel Seicento*, 19–21.

Giulio Mazarino on his side to an intermediary legate. By the extraordinary nuncio Giovanni Battista Pallotto, the pope tried to withhold Vienna from going to war with small gestures.⁶⁶ In spite of all, his actions for peace seemed busy idleness. The ceaseless activity of the papal diplomats could not shorten the war, which lasted until the end of 1631, whose bloodiest event was the siege and looting of Mantua by the imperial troops.

Rome did not only have the role of mediator,⁶⁷ behind the scenes, the nuncio in Paris expressly supported the French intervention in Mantua. Urban VIII also agreed with the second French military action in Italy, which aimed at answering the imperial military success in late 1629, moreover, he tolerated that the French provided religious concessions to their hinterland. He did not raise his voice against the compromise made with the English and the Huguenots in April and June 1629, in spite of the fact that through them the French Protestants won freedom of religion despite La Rochelle's siege and their devastating defeat. The papal reply to the anti-Spanish compromise, made with Low Countries, which also promised subsidy, was likewise omitted. These patterns lead us to believe that there was a political deal (*intesa politica*) against the Catholic Habsburgs between Rome and Paris from 1628, which was in flat contradiction to the papal theory of neutrality. Urban VIII, as the head of the biggest Italian State, was interested in France's security in the north due to the open Italian front, furthermore in the Habsburgs' engrossing occupation in the Thirty Years' War to weaken their Italian positions.⁶⁸

After the quick victory due to primarily the hardened imperial troops, in the background the papal diplomacy attempted to change the balance of power – with overshadowing the confessional aspects – disadvantageously to the Habsburgs. The Curia in 1630–1631, in spite of the public announcements, did not support the succession of the son of the emperor, Ferdinand III (1637–1657), who was already a crowned king of Hungary, but Maximilian I's, the Elector of Bavaria. Nuncio Ciriaco Rocci arm-in-arm with the papal legate, Giovanni Francesco Guidi di Bagno, of Paris, organized the secret Franco-Bavarian ally.⁶⁹ With the contract reached in Fontainebleau on 30 May 1631, they succeeded in dividing the imperial camp. Ferdinand II could not utilize the successes of Mantua and he was to withdraw. At the same time, as a consequence of the crushing

⁶⁶ *Nuntiatur des Pallotto (1628–1630) I–II* (Nuntiaturberichte aus Deutschland nebst ergänzenden Aktenstücken IV 1–2), hrsg. v. HANS KIEWING, Berlin 1895–1897, I, 123, n. 46, note 1.; I, 123. 157. II, 94–95. 98. 176. 184. 390; BIRELEY, *Religion and Politics*, 94–100.

⁶⁷ LUTZ, *Urbano VIII*, 305–306.

⁶⁸ LUTZ, *Kardinal Giovanni Francesco Guidi di Bagno*, 340–410; on the behavior of the papal diplomacy towards the earlier years' English-Spanish-French marriage and federal plans *idem.*, 113–313; ALBRECHT, *Die auswärtige Politik Maximilians*, 106–127; JAITNER, *Die Hauptinstruktionen Gregors XV.*, 30–40.

⁶⁹ On the papal role in the conclusion of the Bavarian-French secret agreement: DIETER ALBRECHT, *Die kurialen Anweisungen für den Nuntius Rocci zum Regensburger Kurfürstentag 1630*, QFIAB 35 (1955) 282–289; [IDEM], *Die auswärtige Politik Maximilians von Bayern*, 211–302; REPGEN, *Die römische Kurie und der Westfälische Friede*, I 1, 191–239; in summary: KRAUS, *Die auswärtige Politik Urbans VIII*, 415–418.

defeat suffered from the Protestant Swedish near Breitenfeld, all of the achievements of the Catholic League collapsed like a house of cards in the territory of the Empire.⁷⁰

The final outcome of the war of Mantua gave a clear proof to Richelieu and Urban VIII about the appropriateness of their policy. The Treaty of Cherasco in April 1631, which ended the Italian war, provided Mantua's imperial investiture for the Duke of Nevers, besides, the French opened the door to Italy with the occupation of Pinerolo. The war did not affect the papal territories, despite the repeated Habsburg menaces Urban VIII succeeded in avoiding the imperial troops' entry in Rome, like in 1527. It shows his fear for another *sacco di Roma* that he spent more than 3,5 million *scudi* on military expenses. In the summer of 1631 he still kept fifteen thousand people in arms, on the border of Lombardy in Castelfranco, he had a new bulwark built, called Forte Urbano, furthermore, he continued the strengthening of Ferrara and fortified the Castle of Saint Angelo with cut bastions. Besides, the costs of negotiations were 100–200 thousand. The conditions of Pope Barberini were notably improved so that, contrasted with the northern territories, his State was hardly bordering on the State of the plague, owned to the war.⁷¹

In the course of the 1620s, the pope paid attention to the Catholicization of the vast territories, occupied by the Catholic League to the north of the Alps in the theatre of the Thirty Years' War. Rome vigilantly protected the regained benefices, institutions and the rights and canonical regulations of the Church. At the same time, it accorded privileges to the newer orders, such as the Capuchins and the Jesuits as opposed to the older religious orders; on the other hand, it sent a lot of missionaries. Their main task was – the so called *disciplina ecclesiastica* – to have the ecclesiastical discipline and the norms of Trent complied with. In contrast to his predecessors, Urban VIII denied giving remarkable financial aid to the League or to the German Catholic princes. His well-announced reference basis was the inadequacy of his financial means. Only 1632 brought a turn in this policy, when the Swedish king, Gustav II Adolf (1611–1632) and his German allies smote the Catholic troops on the battlefield of Lech, near Augsburg, where Tilly, their leader died as well. After having swept to victory, the Swedish occupied almost the whole territory of the Empire. They directly threatened Bavaria and the Rhineland, and in the meantime, the Saxon troops were stationed near Prague.⁷²

The Protestant successes were examined in Rome according to the experience gained in the war of succession of Mantua. Namely, the failures in the north weakened the influence of the Habsburgs in Italy, which was favourable for the papal policy. In the extreme peril⁷³ of the Catholic League, Urban VIII confidently denied responsibility for the catastrophe; however, the papal secretary of State was aware of – not later than

⁷⁰ Rome and its nuncio followed the imperial attempts to settle the religious relations within the Empire with remarkable passivity. *Ibid.*

⁷¹ LUTZ, *Urbano VIII*, 305–306.

⁷² LUTZ, *Urbano VIII*, 305–306.

⁷³ The events of great importance: FRITZ DICKMANN, *Der Westfälische Frieden*, Münster 1959, 59–65–70–77.

the end of 1630 – the previous negotiations of the Franco-Swedish compromise, which was concluded on 23 January 1631, undertaking the obligation of a monthly-paid aid of 100 thousand *livres*.

After the defeat in Breitenfeld, by the gradual pressure of the Empire and Spain, Urban VIII, who regarded the catastrophic situation of the imperial troops as the punishment of divine providence, reluctantly changed his policy of aid. While he provided only 80 thousand *scudi* between 1624 and 1626, in the following years he did not give any, and between 1632 and 1635 he sent 550 thousand imperial thaler (650–700 thousand *scudi*) for the sake of the Catholic League. Within five years he provided as much as his predecessor during his most critical two years; though, not in a satisfying amount, at all. The expenses were covered by the tithes imposed on the Italian clergy, therefore these payments cannot be considered as direct papal grants. The first instalment already made its effects felt in the Battle of Lützen, in November 1632. In spite of this, they were still defeated, but the Swedish king died.⁷⁴

The reserved behaviour of the pope reflected the changed Roman public opinion. While Clement VIII asked and received 150 thousand *scudi* from the public of Rome in 1599 for the general supplies of the papal troops⁷⁵ in Hungary; the Roman magistracy sent a delegate of eight members to the Apostolic Palace⁷⁶ to prevent the expenditure of the treasures of the Castle of Saint Angelo by the imperial legate, Péter Pázmány.⁷⁷ The pope's joining of the old or perhaps a newer alliance was out of question.⁷⁸ The main Roman advocates of the Habsburg demands – Cardinal Gaspare Borgia, who made a scandal on the consistory on 8 March 1632 around the papal French policy, and his predecessor's nephew, Ludovico Ludovisi – were removed from Rome by referring to the obligation of residence.⁷⁹

⁷⁴ ALBRECHT, *Zur Finanzierung des Dreißigjährigen Krieges*, 545–566; LUTZ, *Roma e il mondo germanico*, 436–437. GEORG LUTZ, on the basis of the latest resources on the papal aid policy between 1632 and 1635, in his detailed survey considers the expenditure of the aids accomplished by the summer of 1634 and estimates the sum at 477,000 *scudi*. *Die päpstlichen Subsidien für Kaiser und Liga 1632–1635. Zahlen und Daten zu den finanz- und bilanztechnischen Aspekten*, Staat, Kultur, Politik. Beiträge zur Geschichte Bayerns und des Katholizismus. Festschrift zum 65. Geburtstag von Dieter Albrecht (hrsg. v. W. Becker–W. Chrobak), Kallmünz 1992, 89–105; [IDEM], *Urbano VIII*, 306.

⁷⁵ DELUMEAU, *Vie économique et sociale de Rome*, II, 829–36.

⁷⁶ The decree of 22 April 1632 is published: FERDINAND GREGOROVIVUS, *Urban VIII. im Widerspruch zu Spanien und dem Kaiser*, Stuttgart 1879, 138–139, n. 13.

⁷⁷ On the mission of the archbishop of Esztergom, see more: PÉTER TUSOR, *Pázmány állandó római követségének terve 1632–1634 [Pázmány's Plan for the Permanent Legate in Rome 1632–1634]*, Pázmány Péter és kora [*Péter Pázmány and his Age*] (Pázmány Irodalmi Műhely, Tanulmányok 2, ed. by Emil Hargittay), Piliscsaba 2001, 151–175.

⁷⁸ Those arguments are extremely characteristic, with which the entry into the League and the expenditure of a considerable aid were rejected in Rome. KONRAD REPGEN, *Finanzen, Kirchenrecht und Politik unter Urban VIII. Eine unbekanntete Denkschrift aus dem Frühjahr 1632*, RQ 56 (1961) 62–74.

⁷⁹ On the details of the papal policy in the Swedish phase of the Thirty Years' War (in which about the protest of Borgia and about the legation of Pázmány): STEPHAN EHSSES, *Papst Urban VIII. und Gustav Adolf*, HJ 16 (1895) 336–341; GREGOROVIVUS, *Urban VIII. im Widerspruch*, 1–164 (The text of Borgia's protest is pub-

Pope Barberini examined the all-Catholic interests with cool aloofness, therefore his opponents conceived the idea to summon a council. The method, how criticism was intended to parry in Rome, is very informative. In April 1632 Bichi, the nuncio of Paris, was ordered to conduct a note of the Secretariat of State, dated back to January or earlier, with Richelieu. This document would have protested against the Franco-Swedish alliance and could have prevented the accusations of the Habsburgs. Furthermore, Urban VIII referred to the *breve* of warning, which was sent to the French monarch, on the audience of Péter Pázmány on 24 April.⁸⁰ However, it did not exist, but on the very same day they sent a “duplicate” to the nuncio of Paris by summoning him to hand it over to Louis XIII with the explanation that the original had been lost. They made decision on the partial aid later.⁸¹

In the unusually tense atmosphere of the spring of 1632, extraordinary nuncios were sent to Vienna, Paris and Madrid in early May to represent the seemingly active papal diplomacy. Their task was to unite the Catholic monarchs against the “heretic” Swedish.⁸² The papal negotiation of a mainly gesture-like nature was an attempt doomed to fail, since it did not take the already concluded Franco-Protestant alliances into consideration. On the other hand, Urban VIII persistently rejected all those attempts that wanted him to join a political or military alliance, no matter if it was limited only to Italy.⁸³ He made vain efforts in 1634–1635 to summon a peace congress in Rome, or in another neutral city, while the local negotiations between the Catholics and Protestants had already started. The papal nuncios had to do their utmost to prevent the results of those negotiations, which infringed upon the Church’s rights (for instance, they led to the loss of benefices).⁸⁴

lished: 123–124); BIRLEY, *Religion and Politics*, 169–208; LUTZ, *Kardinal Giovanni Francesco Guidi di Bagno*, 484–707; ALBRECHT, *Die auswärtige Politik Maximilians*, 303–377; LUTZ, *Roma e il mondo germanico*, 435–437 and 452–453; SCHNITZER, *Zur Politik des hl. Stubles*, 212–250; PASTOR, *Geschichte der Päpste XIII*, 419–501; a clear survey: DIETER ALBRECHT, *Richelieu, Gustav Adolf und das Reich* (Janusbücher. Berichte zur Weltgeschichte 15), München–Wien 1959.

⁸⁰ *Pázmány Péter...összegyűjtött levelei [Collected letters of Cardinal Péter Pázmány] I–II*, ed. by FERENC HANUY, Budapest 1910–1911, II, n. 734, 284.

⁸¹ On these criteria of the secret papal diplomacy: GEORG LUTZ, *Glaubwürdigkeit und Gehalt von Nuntiaturberichten*, QFIAB 53 (1973) 228–275, 245–253; [IDEM], *Roma e il mondo germanico*, 435–436; in summary: KRAUS, *Die auswärtige Politik Urbans VIII*, 419.

⁸² The instructions to the legates which clearly express the Roman position, published: QUINTÍN ALDEA, *España, el Papado y el Imperio durante la Guerra de los treinta años. II: Instrucciones a los Nuncios Apostólicos en España (1624–1632)*, Miscellánea Comillas 39 (1958) 276–296; furthermore 297–318 (in connection with Pázmány’s legation, especially 318).

⁸³ Between 1633 and 1635, by Tuscan suggestion, with the leadership of the Pope a concrete draft of an Italian league was composed, which would have been exclusively of a defensive nature, moreover it did not wish a confrontation especially with the Turks and French. Understandably this was passionately rejected by the Spanish and partly by the French. ANTONIO PANELLA, *Una lega italiana durante la guerra dei Trent’Anni*, ASI 94 (1936) 3, 3–36 and 95 (1937) 1, 21–50.

⁸⁴ As an example the literature in note 86 can be mentioned.

France's direct entry into the war in May 1635 made the situation of the papal diplomacy more difficult.⁸⁵ Cardinal Marzio Ginetti, who had been waiting in vain in Cologne for the opening of a general peace congress⁸⁶ from the summer of 1636, the three other extraordinary nuncios,⁸⁷ who were sent-off in May 1639 and Fabio Chigi, who was finally accredited for the general negotiations in Münster,⁸⁸ in April 1644, had to operate according to the same instructions, therefore they could face the same difficulties. The closest interpretation of the Apostolic See's neutrality, namely the prohibition of including the pope in any compromises in the course of the plain conflict of the Catholic great powers, deprived the diplomats of the possibility of every standpoint and initiation. These regulations forced their role to a repetitive ritual, which was only symbolic and made only the achievement of marginal results possible.⁸⁹

The Roman diplomacy's notable attempts at concluding peace after 1632–1635 remained to be unsuccessful until the end of the Thirty Years' War. The parties tried to circumvent them according to their own interests. The Holy See's actions,⁹⁰ sketching its ambitious plans, lacked adequate backing. In reality, only the economical-military potential of the Papal State counted, which was by no means sufficient for maintaining the State of a great power. The opponent, rather than constructive gestures of Rome for the sake of the Catholic affair (for instance, the protest of Gaspare Mattei, the nuncio of Vienna, against the legitimization of Calvinism on the Imperial Diet of Regensburg in 1640–1641) were welcomed by unanimous refusal or disregard.⁹¹

Urban VIII's policy during the Thirty Years' War was followed by severe consequences. Vienna and Madrid realized its contradictory nature. By 1632 the Holy See could not influence the policy of the traditionally Catholic great powers, at all. Moreover, by the secret diplomacy, by the double policy, Urban VIII surrendered himself to France: in 1634 he was obliged to confess to his confidants, though it would have been necessary, but he was simply not able to enforce ecclesiastical censures against the Church's cardinal, against Richelieu – who could expect similar behaviour from the pope in the future – to avenge his Protestant allied policy. Such attitude that Rome showed when France entered the war on the pretext of Protestantism in 1635 is not surprising. An additional example was served by the behaviour of the Curia after having concluded the advantageous, though with a content of religious concessions, treaty with the Saxon Elector in Prague after

⁸⁵ Cf. DICKMANN, *Der Westfälische Frieden*, 77–87; and more, HERMANN WEBER, *Vom verdeckten zum offenen Krieg. Richelieus Kriegsgründe und Kriegsziele 1634/35*, *Krieg und Politik*, 203–218.

⁸⁶ KONRAD REGEN, *Die Hauptinstruktion Ginettis für den Kölner Kongress (1636)*, *QFIAB* 34 (1954) 250–287; AUGUSTE LEMAN, *Urbain VIII et les origines du congrès de Cologne 1636*, *RHE* 19 (1923) 370–383.

⁸⁷ Cf. note 90.

⁸⁸ Their course is introduced by: DICKMANN, *Der Westfälische Frieden*, 189–493.

⁸⁹ LUTZ, *Urbano VIII*, 306–307.

⁹⁰ See, for example, the instructions given to the three extraordinary nuncios (Scotti, Mattei, Facchinetti), who were sent to Paris, Vienna and Madrid in 1639: PIERRE BLET (ed.), *Correspondance du nonce en France Ranuccio Scotti (1639–1641)* (*Acta Nuntiaturae Gallicae* 5), Rome 1965, 58–90.

⁹¹ Cf. REGEN, *Die römische Kurie und der Westfälische Friede*, I 1, 391–534; KRAUS, *Die auswärtige Politik Urbans VIII*, 420–425.

the triumphal victory won by the Catholic League in Nördlingen in 1634. The Holy See aloofly disapproved and protested against both, however, it avoided every standpoint concerning canon law and politics of religion, with which it did not do harm, or good, nor did it win anything. There are no traces of papal aid sent to the Catholic League from Rome after 1635, and it was totally unlikely to happen after the French entry to the war.⁹² Such gestures, like the papal support of Ferdinand III's election as an emperor – and his coronation as a Roman King – did not have much weight.⁹³

The policy of the Curia led to the Papacy's loss of prestige in the countries of Habsburgs and also ambiguously in France. There developed a fight in competences between the Holy See and the institutions and clergy of France concerning canon and constitutional law. Those controversies, which were suspended in the course of the collaboration, broke out again in an unusual way after 1635. France, as soon as the Papacy shifted its ground according to the Curia's interests, launched diplomatic contradictions that were inconceivable before. By 1639 the spectre of discontinuance of the official relations threatened. By the 1640s, in the relations between the Holy See and the Catholic States, the general climate change was perceivable.⁹⁴

The political horizon of the central Church administration in the Barberini era was determined by the conditions of the preservation of the Papal State's independence and security, namely – as in the case of other secular leaders – the State interests and the maintenance of integrity. This was the background of the fundamental principles' pragmatic transgression. Although the doctrine, based on medieval tradition, and the political requirements of the struggle against the heretics maintained, the pope undertook the substantial points of the basic program of the Catholic confessionalisation, however, in practice it remained only a rhetoric topos. There occurred a huge gap between the ideal of *padre commune* and the realities.⁹⁵

It would only be proper to ask: was there an alternative? The decline of the papal power was the most visible under Urban VIII; however, it had started decades earlier. Pope Barberini undoubtedly inherited a burdensome situation. The Papal State could not keep pace with the rising monarchies in Europe in the seventeenth century. Its territorial expansion, economical productivity and military potential could not surpass the

⁹² BIRELEY, *Religion and Politics*, 209–230; about the Peace of Prague: REGEN, *Die römische Kurie und der Westfälische Friede*, I 1, 239–388.

⁹³ The main force of the gesture might have been the fear of electing a Protestant emperor. The election was accepted by the Pope in the secret consistory of 12 January 1637, where he made the decision about sending a greeting brief and ordered the holding of the traditional *oratio pro gratiarum actione* in the Sistine Chapel. However, he prohibited the planned celebration of the Roman magistracy, with the explanation that he was actually the king in Rome. AUGUSTE LEMAN, *Le Saint-Siège et l'élection impériale du 22 décembre 1636*, RHE 34 (1938) 542–555, 553.

⁹⁴ LUTZ, *Roma e il mondo germanico*, 438–439. On the papal-French relations in the 1630s, see more: JOSEPH BERGIN, *Cardinal de la Rochefoucauld. Leadership and Reform in the French Church*, New Haven–London 1987, 81–82; and a less critical survey: MATTEUCCI, *Il papato di fronte all'assolutismo*, 692–695.

⁹⁵ The politicizing of the ideal of the *padre commune* is detailed in: PRODI, *The Papal Prince*, 157–181.

moderate extent. It could have a political role only as a coalition partner in an alliance. The scope for political action, however, narrowed down from the sixteenth century. Europe was divided by two camps, Rome could obviously join only the Catholic side, and therefore, it could not count on the Protestant powers as an ally.⁹⁶

Furthermore, the ideal of *padre commune* made him take the all-Catholic interests into consideration, namely he could not enter into an alliance with any Catholic States against another Catholic State and in case of a battle between Catholic States he could not take sides. When a Catholic State launched a war, by disregarding the all-Catholic interests, Rome faced an insurmountable difficulty. The *padre commune*-maxima limited his scope for action to more insurmountable obstacles than Europe's division into Protestant and Catholic camps. As a consequence of its geographical situation, the Papal State was far from the Protestant States; its direct neighbours were the Habsburg and French great powers. Thus, it could have a factual clash only with these States. Urban VIII could only broaden his political scope by the means of secret diplomacy, though it proved to be awfully hazardous and double-edged.

Pope Barberini, as the sovereign monarch of the Papal State in the Italian relation protected the legitimate interests, namely the maintenance of the *status quo*. Before the war of Mantua the pope clearly saw that his State was threatened by the Spanish expansion efforts; in the south, the Spanish Sicily and Naples, in the north the Spanish Milan, from which only two weak duchies, Parma and Modena separated, while the Republic of Genoa was politically and economically related to Spain. In the course of the conflict of Mantua the realization of the nominal imperial rights over the northern Italian duchies would have concluded the ring around the Papal State. Besides the Adriatic and Tyrrhenian Sea, it would have bordered on the Habsburg lands. Urban VIII was not interested in anything else but to hinder – according to his opinion and the altered attitude of power – the threatening increase of the Habsburg influence in Italy.

However, the absolute victory of the House of Austria in the Thirty Years' War could have meant the triumph of Catholicism in Germany. The pope, as the head of the universal Church, was obviously aware of this. His anti-Habsburg policy was not only determined by pure political interests, but by spiritual-ecclesiastical considerations, as well. The preservation of the sovereignty of the Papal State was one of the most important factors in the history of the Papacy and Church, since this could be the only guarantee for the liberty of the magisterium and the preaching. The loss of the political autonomy would have set bounds not only to the Papacy's spiritual prestige, but also to the liberty of the Church, as such. The self-imposed resignation from the Papal State's autonomy and the establishment of a pure spiritual alternative would have been an absolute impossibility at that time, due to the ambiguity of the diplomatic standards.

Although the secret diplomacy against the Habsburgs caused detrimental consequences for the prestige of the Papacy in the long run, the short-term results verified the policy of Pope Barberini almost until the end of his pontificate. The winds of the

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

general European wars did not affect his State's territories, the influence of the Habsburgs did not increase either, moreover, the pope could keep the Duchy of Urbino for the Papal State.⁹⁷ After the occupation of Bologna in 1506 by Julius II (1503–1513) and of Ferrara in 1598 under Clement VIII, the early modern Papal State reached its largest extension.⁹⁸

Nevertheless, the genuinely successful Italian policy caused politically and morally irretrievable harm to the Papacy. The war of Castro of Renaissance nature was launched partly – nowadays it is inconceivable – due to reasons of precedence and prestige, owing to the known prefect title of Taddeo Barberini. The Duke of Parma, Odoardo Farnese, did not respect this, either, and in 1640 after the diplomats of the great powers, he also resisted the Roman etiquette. Certainly, this was only the last drop in the glass; the real reasons were much more far-reaching.

Odoardo Farnese was not only the sovereign Duke of Parma and Piacenza but also of Castro and Ronciglione, which were located in the territory of the Papal State, north-west to Viterbo. These fertile territories were indispensable for the corn supply of Rome. The Barberinis declared their wish to occupy them already in 1635. Their plan was facilitated due to the fact that Odoardo ran into debt as a result of a credit scheme, the *monte baronare Farnese*, based on the incomes of Castro. He had to pay proceeds of 50–60 thousand *scudi* to the papal creditors, the sum of which was charged for due capital-reimbursements, as well. His financial situation was worsened by his entry in war against the Spanish Milan in 1635–1636 on the side of France, Savoy and Mantua. By 1641, he was already indebted 1.5 million *scudi* to the Apostolic Camera, the trustee of his debts and the representative of the creditors.⁹⁹

In spite of his difficulties, the duke was adamant. He refused the surrender of Castro as well as the marriage plan of the Farneses and Barberinis. After a three-month long debate, he left Rome – he outraged Taddeo Barberini at this time – in stormy circumstances in February 1640, then he suspended the payment of his debts. After having

⁹⁷ Out of the numerous historiographical studies, the above mentioned, which is regarded as the most relevant analysis, is mainly based on those newer standpoints that were stated by QUINTÍN ALDEA – with the help of the correspondence of the nunciature in Paris and the Spanish State council's verbals – for reevaluating Urban VIII's policy, which was interpreted with apologia by L. VON PASTOR. *La neutralidad de Urbano VIII en los años decisivos de la Guerra de los Treinta años (1628–1632)*, Hispania Sacra 21 (1968) 155–178 (Urban VIII and the French presence in Italy: 161–164; the war of succession of Mantua: 164–174; the secret Bavarian-French agreement: 174–178). On the other hand, the excellent survey of Urban VIII's pontificate by GEORG LUTZ has been heavily drawn upon: *Rom und Europa während des Pontifikats Urbans VIII. Politik und Diplomatie. Wirtschaft und Finanzen. Kultur und Religion*, Rom in der Neuzeit, 72–167, 74–78. 85–90. – I steadily exploit the view, methodology and the statements of this brilliant study of LUTZ not only in the outline of the foreign policy of the Papacy in the seventeenth century, but also of the internal relations of the Papal State's Church policy and governmental system.

⁹⁸ JEAN DELUMEAU, *Le progrès de la centralization dans l'État pontifical au XVI^e siècle*, Revue Historique 226 (1961) 399–410, 399–400.

⁹⁹ We can become acquainted with the *montes* in connection with the papal budget.

forbidden the import of the corn of Castro and confiscating a cargo of wheat in Montalto by Cardinal Antonio Barberini as a *camerlengo* in March 1641, Farnese allowed himself an absurd step: he fortified and filled the citadel of Castro with ammunition and troops. The demand of payment, issued by the Camera on behalf of the creditors on 20 July was not effective either, which was followed by another one on 20 August. In this letter, the pope summoned him to destroy the fortress and to disband his troops on pain of excommunication and the loss of his tenure.¹⁰⁰

As Odoardo Farnese took not the slightest notice of it, the papal troops – twelve thousand foot soldiers and three thousand cavalymen – gathering around Viterbo, launched an attack. On 28 September 1641, without striking a blow, they occupied Montalto and Castro in the middle of October. The quick success enabled Parma's siege, as well. It was common knowledge around Europe that Urban VIII intended to gain this sovereign duchy for his family. In January 1642, the pope excommunicated and dispossessed Odoardo of his possessions in the territory of the Papal State. However, after the occupation of the neutral Mirandola by the papal troops marching to the siege of Parma in July, the neighbouring Italian States: Toscana, Venice and Modena – with the assistance of the French and with a monthly aid of 25 thousand *scudi* – contracted an alliance for balking the destabilizing Italian policy of the Barberinis.

Along with their support, Odoardo Farnese mounted an offensive, and as he had been a genuine strategist of the twenty-first century, he compassed Forte Urbano and Bologna, and forced his way forward to Rome. With his six thousand soldiers, he occupied Imola, Faenza and Forlì. In October he established his general headquarters already at the Lake Trasimeno, from where he directly threatened Orvieto. There was a bit of panic in Rome. The pope retreated from Quirinal to the palace of Vatican and he ordered the offer of the expiatory prayers in the churches. As the escaping papal troops burnt everything up, the duke, facing the impassable logistic barriers, sounded the retreat. Despite being in a tight corner, the pope adhered to his demands: to the apology and to the recourse to absolution, moreover to the surrender of Castro and to the payment of the debts.¹⁰¹

The war continued with varying success in 1643. Farnese's troops marched on Viterbo, Firenze's on Perugia, in the meantime, the papal troops achieved success in the northern territories, against Venice and Ferrara. The long wars drove all sides to the brink of ruin. Another crushing defeat of the papal troops in March 1644 enabled the conclusion of the negotiations by French mediation. By the treaty, signed on 31 March in Venice, the pope absolved the Duke of Parma, who undertook the demolition of the fortress of Castro in return. As a matter of fact, it was about the restoration of the former state, the *status quo ante*, yet the question of debt was not even mentioned.

¹⁰⁰ The annals of the war of Castro: PASTOR, *Geschichte der Päpste XIII*, 848–881; RANKE, *A pápák története [The History of the Popes]*, 585–601; PECCHIAI, *I Barberini*, 176–177; BRUNELLI, *Soldati del papa*, 241–272; LUTZ, *Urbano VIII*, 312–313; LAURIE NUSSDORFER, *Civic Politics in the Rome of Urban VIII*, Princeton 1992, 205–227.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*

Not only did the lasting Italian inner conflicts have catastrophic consequences for the papal budget (the expenses of warfare are estimated at 5,7–7 million, together with the havoc 12–14, or 18 million *scudi*), but they also caused vast damages in the Italian and European authority of the Holy See. The “Urban warfare” (*guerra Urbana*), which broke out for reasons of prestige and finance, was named after that pope, who desired to go down in history as the *padre commune* and the mediator of peace in the Thirty Years’ War.¹⁰²

It remains to be a question whether Urban VIII or the members of his dynasty had the real responsibility in the conflict of Castro. As a matter of fact, the pope was so seriously ill at that time that he completely retired from the actual governing. On hearing of his death in July 1644, there were riots in the Eternal City. The furious mass, after not having been able to reach the monumental statue of Bernini in the Capitoline Hill, tore his portrait to pieces in the court of the Roman College of the Jesuits.¹⁰³

Innocent X: Rome’s Elimination from the New Power System

The conclave, succeeding the death of Urban VIII, was the longest ever since the election of Gregory XIV in 1591. It lasted for thirty-seven days. According to the general trend, it was characterized by the fight of three main factions, of the Austro-Spanish party, led by cardinals Allbornoz and Harrach, of the French faction, led by Antonio Barberini and of the Barberini-liegemen’s, represented by younger cardinals. They were headed naturally by the first nephew, Francesco. Also according to the traditions, the factions based on political interests objected to each other’s candidates, the Spanish to Sacchetti, the French to Cennini. As a *modus vivendi*, finally Francesco Barberini initiated the seventy-year-old Giovanni Battista Pamphili, who acquired knowledge of decades in many congregations, such as in the Council, in the Rites and in the Holy Office. He was known to be congenial to the Spanish. To such an extent that, Mazarin, who was informed late by the Roman-French legate, imposed a veto on him on 19 September 1644 from Paris. By this time, Pamphili had already acceded to the throne of Saint Peter, as Pope Innocent X (1644–1655) for four days. He received forty-eight votes and became the oldest pope ever since Gregory XIII.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰² *Ibid.*

¹⁰³ LUTZ, *Urbano VIII*, 315–316.

¹⁰⁴ OLIVIER PONCET, *Innocenzo X*, Enciclopedia dei Papi III, 321–335, 324–325. His “neither splendid, nor fortunate” pontificate’s analyses: IGNAZIO CIAMPI, *Innocenzo X Pamphili e la sua corte*, Roma 1878, especially 1–114; HUBERT JEDIN, *Europäische Gegenreformation und konfessioneller Absolutismus (1605–1655)*, Reformation. Katholische Reform und Gegenreformation, 650–683, 659–666; PASTOR, *Geschichte der Päpste XIV*, 15–299; RANKE, *A pápák története [The History of the Popes]*, 602–607; DONATA CHIOMENTI VASSALLI, *Donna Olimpia o del nepotismo nel Seicento. La donna che per un decennio governò lo Stato pontificio*, Milano 1980, 64–255; as well as RODÉN’s below quoted book (51–57).

Mostly his relations with the haughty France – which objected to his election and summoned its permanent legate back at the very beginning of his pontificate – were regarded as critical. The first serious conflict burst out when the pope rejected the French monarch's request to appoint Mazarin's brother, Michele, to a cardinal. Moreover, the standpoints of the cardinal-election consistory on 6 March 1645 were not determined by the French's interests, either. The tension was accelerated by the Barberinis' escape from their settlement to French territories.¹⁰⁵ The conflict reached its summit in June–July and September 1646, when Mazarin sent two military expeditions to launch the siege of the Spanish bulwarks in Tuscany by directly threatening the border of the Papal State. The Pamphili Pope retreated and as a result, on 24 May 1647 the French legate returned to the Eternal City, on 7 October, Michele Mazarin was appointed cardinal and the Barberinis soon appeared.¹⁰⁶

The relations with Spain were slightly more balanced. In the long pontificate of Urban VIII, all of the initiations that – with French assistance – aimed at the dissolution of the Spanish authority in Naples were supported by Rome. The most tumultuous out of all were the vain attempts at a riot by Giovanni Orefice (*principe di Sanza*), Fabrizio Carafa and Giovanni Girolamo Acquaviva (*conte di Conversano*) in 1639–1643. By Innocent X's accession, there was a notable change in the relations of the two States. We could not, however, talk about an absolute *détente* due mainly to the conflicts concerning canon law, the support of the rebels by Rome ceased to exist. The anti-Spanish Masaniello riot in Naples on 7 July 1647, did not win support either. The pope tried in vain to mediate between the rebels and the Spanish, who were determined in finding military solution, through his legate, Emilio Altieri, the future Clement X. These negotiations were aggravated by the tension occurring between the nuncio and the Spanish viceroy, Rodrigo Ponce de León, the prince of Arcos. However, the cessation of the Spanish hegemony in South Italy would not have crossed the interests of the Papal State, Innocent X did not accept the dominion over Naples which was offered to him by the rebels. He expressed his sincere wish for peace by announcing, in public, his regret of the town's bombardment. On the other hand, the laying down of the arms in the spring of 1648 visibly eased him since the French previously had been more and more vividly interested in the riot.¹⁰⁷

The Pamphili Pope also faced the pressure of the great powers in the field of Church policy on several occasions. On the one hand, the Portuguese, who seceded from Spain by the accession of the Braganzas; on the other hand, the French, who occupied Catalonia and Artois, endeavoured to persuade the pope to appoint their own nominees as

¹⁰⁵ The details: HENRY COVILLE, *Étude sur Mazarin et ses démêlés avec le pape Innocent X (1644–1648)* (Bibliothèque de l'École pratique des Hautes Études. Sciences Historiques et Philologiques 210), Paris 1914, 2–24, 25–47, 48–73, 95–118; ECKHARDT, *The Papacy and World-Affairs*, 53–163, mostly 101–114; CHIOMENTI VASSALLI, *Donna Olimpia*, 81–93.

¹⁰⁶ COVILLE, *Étude su Mazarin*, 141–160 and 161–169; and VITTORIO TORNETTA, *La politica del Mazzarino verso il papato (1644–46)*, ASI 99 (1941) 86–116 and 100 (1942) 95–134; PONCET, *Innocenzo X*, 326–327. See more the fourth chapter, dealing with nepotism.

¹⁰⁷ PONCET, *Innocenzo X*, 329; CHIOMENTI VASSALLI, *Donna Olimpia* 117–121.

bishops of the occupied and emancipating territories. The assignment of the State right of appointing a bishop would have been equal to the acceptance, and especially, to the ratification of the change of sovereignty. On the other hand, the series of the bishops' vacancy – especially in the case of the Portugal colonies – had a compelling effect. Therefore, as an intermediate solution, the pope contributed to appoint the Portugal bishops alone in his *breve* on 20 April 1645. Although this includes the acceptance of the loss of the Spanish rule, this did not necessarily legitimate the rule of the new dynasty, the Braganzas.

However, this was too much for the Spanish. The Roman agent of the Portuguese, Niccolò Montero was attacked by the guards of the Hispanic delegate, Count of Sirvela, some members of his retinue were wounded and his major-domo was slaughtered. This event was obviously against Innocent X's indulgent behaviour towards the new Portuguese king, John IV (1640–1656). The conflict between Madrid and Rome was settled by Nuncio Giulio Rospigliosi, the future Clement IX, who could convince Philip IV (1621–1665) to order Sirvela home.

By the end of his pontificate, Pope Pamphili intended to resolve the Portuguese conflict once and for all and to meet the French's wishes. Whereas, after the pope had filled many Catalan bishoprics with the nominees of Louis XIV (1643–1715), Madrid was reluctant to accredit the new papal nuncio and did not accept his Church jurisdiction. This and the military successes of Spain in 1652–1654 (for instance the occupation of Barcelona, the capital of Catalonia), moreover the threats of the Viceroy of Naples (to suspend the corn consignment towards Rome), made the pope back down after a long hesitation.¹⁰⁸

During the ten years of his pontificate, the whole diplomacy of the Holy See was characterized by forced waiting and continual postponement, which is clearly proved by the unusual constancy of the nunciature's personnel. Out of the eleven permanent positions, there were only four, where there were more than two nuncios, while Niccolò Guidi di Bagno, who was sent to Paris by Urban VIII in 1643, remained in his position until 1656.¹⁰⁹

Innocent X endeavoured to compensate the pressure of the great powers in Northern Italy. The key to his effort was to resolve the relations with Venice. However, the republic continued to violate the ecclesiastical privileges. The pope was still inclined to make such symbolic gestures towards Venice such as the restoration of an epigraph, appearing in the Regal Room of the Apostolic Palace and having caused a severe diplomatic crisis in 1630; and the exemplary punishment of Felice Contelori, the historian-archivist of Vatican, who had earlier been announced as a scapegoat. One of the antecedents was the following: in 1632 Contelori published a book on the history of the Peace of Venice in 1177 between Alexander III (1159–1181) and Frederick I Barbarossa (1152–1190). The thorough book

¹⁰⁸ PONCET, *Innocenzo X*, 330; CHIOMENTI VASSALLI, *Donna Olimpia*, 94–98.

¹⁰⁹ PONCET, *Innocenzo X*, 331.

caused a tempest because according to its details, it occurred that the epigraph – which was ordered by Pius IV and described the events of the peace-negotiations – in the most magnificent chamber of Vatican, in *Sala Regia*, unlike reality, showed Venice to its best advantage by regarding the republic as the saviour of the Papacy. Upon the evidence of Contelori's data, Urban VIII had the insulting text to the sovereignty of the Papal State rewritten. The Signoria objected to his actions to such an extent that the new legate, appointed in July 1635, could not even take his post. The diplomatic relations were finally restored only by 1638.¹¹⁰

In 1645, the Cretan War established still closer links. The pope sent five armed galleys against the Turks, to which the panic in Rome due to the Ottoman menace might have contributed.¹¹¹ Apart from this, he undertook to provide a military aid of 100 thousand *scudi* a year in 1649 and 1653. Although this cannot be regarded as considerable, it was not a negligible aid, at all, since it was not based on the popes' traditional anti-pagan crusade-ideal. Its extent and regularity were determined by the opportunities and the best interests of the Papal State, namely, the defence of Italy.¹¹² The new guiding principles were bluntly expressed to Ferdinand III by the Pope in his reply in form of a *breve*, *Perscriptae a Maiestate tua*, of 21 June 1645. Ferdinand asked aid for the battles in Upper Hungary against George I Rákóczi, who fought with Turkish support.¹¹³

Innocent X could profit from his policy in Northern Italy in the Second War of Castro, where, in contrast to his predecessor, he met the benevolent neutrality of the surrounding States. It so happened that after the new Duke of Parma, Ranuccio II Farnese had had the earlier appointed bishop, the Barnabite Cristoforo Giarda, killed on 18 March 1649, the pope had Castro occupied and destroyed by his army of five thousand members. He removed the Episcopal see and had the bells of the cathedral moved to his later burial place, to the church of Sant' Agnese in Agone, built on Piazza Navona. Besides, by the relief of the creditors, he forced the Duke of Parma to pay his debt of 1.7 million and dispossessed him of his neighbouring land. In one fell swoop, he took the estates of the Malatestas into the hands of the Apostolic Camera. The last medieval feudal autonomies disappeared from the territory of the Papal State nearly for good.¹¹⁴

¹¹⁰ The events in the biography of Contelori: *Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani XXVIII*, a c. d. ISTITUTO DELLA ENCICLOPEDIA ITALIANA, Roma 1983, 336–341, 339 (F. PETRUCCI).

¹¹¹ *Giancinto Gigli: Diario Romano (1608–1670)*, a c. d. GIUSEPPE RICCIOTTI, Roma 1958, 268 (May 1645).

¹¹² PETROCCHI, *La politica della Santa Sede*, 88–89; EKKEHARD EICKHOFF, *Venedig, Wien und die Osmanen. Umbruch in Südosteuropa 1645–1700*, München 1970, 32–34 and *passim*; PONCET, *Innocenzo X*, 328–329; a comprehensive work: PETROCCHI, *Roma nel Seicento*, 25–28.

¹¹³ PÉTER TUSOR, *Jakusith György római követjárása 1644–45-ben (A magyar rendek kísérlete a Szentszék bevonására a török és az erdélyi protestantizmus elleni fegyveres harcra) [The Roman Legation of György Jakusith in 1644–45 (The Attempt of the Hungarian Orders to Initiate the Holy See into the Battle against the Ottomans and Transylvanian Protestantism)]*, *Hadtörténelmi Közlemények* 113 (2000) 237–268. The document is mentioned also by: WALTER FRIEDENSBURG, *Regesten zur deutschen Geschichte aus der Zeit des Pontifikats Innozenz' X. (1644–1655)*, QFIAB 4 (1902) 236–285, 5 (1903) 60–124 and 207–222, 6 (1904) 146–173, 7 (1905) 121–138, 254.

¹¹⁴ CHIOMENTI VASSALLI, *Donna Olimpia*, 144–147; PONCET, *Innocenzo X*, 328.

The Italian successes could hardly cause the weakness of the papal diplomacy to be forgotten, however, it was accelerated by the negotiations preceding the Peace of Westphalia. This was the last act of the process of loss of power, beginning under Urban VIII's pontificate. Innocent X did not have any scope for action on international level. The papal nuncio, the future pope, Fabio Chigi, who was sent to the peace negotiations in Münster, could participate only in the preparations, though he could not influence the phrasing of the treaty.¹¹⁵ After his accession to the throne, Innocent X withstood the pressure of Spain to call the diplomat, appointed by his predecessor, back home. Along with the legate of Venice, Chigi's task would have been to mediate between the opposing parties in accordance with the instruction of Urban VIII of 1643, though, he quickly realized that the decisions afoot hardly complied with the Catholic interests. In agreement with the Catholic leaders of the *Imperium*, in the autumn of 1645 he had already composed a protest document which was sent to Rome. Partly as a consequence of this and in the spirit of the more and more severe Church policy, in his new credentials, which were issued on 19 May 1646 (however, were dated back to 5 October 1644), Pope Pamphili ordered his legate to leave the meeting in order not to violate the Catholic interests in any form. However, Chigi wanted to maintain his – more and more narrow – opportunities. The *breve* was handed over only in November 1647.¹¹⁶ Yet, at this time the negotiations were at such an advanced stage that the papal legate's function was decreased to a minimum.

The main disposals of the peace treaty meant obviously the defeat of the Catholic aims. The Peace of Augsburg was extended to the Calvinists, as well; the ownerships – except for the case of the hereditary provinces – were restored according to the conditions of 1624; the orders' right of reformation and the *reservatum ecclesiasticum* – namely those, who changed denomination had to resign from their office which were not allowed to be Catholicized – were accepted. By obeying the instructions of the Secretariat of State, on 14 October 1648 the nuncio announced his first official protest against the Treaty of Osnabrück, which had been concluded between the Empire and Sweden earlier on 6 August. He protested again on 26 October against the “infamous treaty” (*infame pace*) of Münster, whose signing, in contrast to the other plenipotentiaries, he openly

¹¹⁵ Comprehensively: ECKHARDT, *The Papacy and World-Affairs*, 53–163; MATTEUCCI, *Il papato di fronte all'assolutismo*, 697–699; and REPGEN's frequently quoted classical monograph.

¹¹⁶ JEDIN, *Europäische Gegenreformation*, 664–665. The instructions' analysis of philological character: KONRAD REPGEN, *Fabio Chigis Instruktion für den Westfälischen Friedenskongreß. Ein Beitrag zum kurialen Instruktionswesen in Dreißigjährigen Krieg*, RQ 48 (1953) 79–116; the documents of Chigi' nunciature: *La nunziatura di Fabio Chigi (1640–1651)* (Miscellanea della Deputazione Romana di Storia Patria 14), a c. d. VLASTIMIL KYBAL – G. INCISA DELLA ROCHETTA, Roma 1943; his personal notes: *Diarium Chigi 1639–1651* (Acta Pacis Westphalicae ser. 3, Abt. C, I), hrsg. v. KONRAD REPGEN, Münster 1984; the dating and genesis of the plan for the protest: KONRAD REPGEN, *Wartenberg, Chigi und Knöringen im Jahre 1645. Die Entstehung des Plans zum päpstlichen Protest gegen den Westfälischen Frieden als quellenkundliches und methodisches Problem*, Dauer und Wandel der Geschichte. Aspekte europäischer Vergangenheit. Festgabe für Kurt von Raumer (hrsg. v. Rudolf Vierhaus–Manfred Botzenhart), Münster 1966, 213–268.

refused two days earlier. His third and last protest took place one day after the ratification of the negotiations on 19 February 1649.¹¹⁷

In the meantime, the “State Congregation” of cardinals, which dealt with important political affairs with the pope as its chairman, considered expediting a solemn bull on the Apostolic See’s statement. For fear of disturbances in the territory of the *Imperium* – where Chigi appeared in the meeting of Nuremberg, dealing with the details of the execution – due to the too early publication of such a document, the pope postponed it for the time being. The *breve Zelo domus Dei*, which was finally not a bull but a less solemn document, was dispatched on 20 August 1651, dating back to 26 November 1648. Its copies, duplicated in the press of the Apostolic Camera, were sent to all the nunciatures for the sake of further spreading.¹¹⁸

In terms of canon law, the papal protest can be regarded as *declaratio nullitatis*, since it annulled outright the points of the treaty. It was not conceived according to the spirit of the former reservation of a right but of a definite strong opposition.¹¹⁹ Innocent X listed at full length the most grievous points for Catholicism. For example, the loss of three archbishoprics and thirteen bishoprics, the secularization of innumerable monasteries and pious endowments; the compromises that were unacceptable to Rome, such as the alternate rule over the bishoprics of Osnabrück by Catholics and Protestants (by the words of Chigi: *scelerata alternativa*, “fatal alternation”); furthermore, the eighth electorate given to the Count of Rhineland-Palatinate, which strengthened the political positions of the Protestants within the Empire.

According to the historiography, the conduct of Pope Pamphili is regarded as having considerable importance in the history of Church. It meant nothing but the Papacy’s voluntary withdrawal from the theatre of the international politics by narrowing the Curia’s diplomatic scope for action. The “no” of 1648 was not self-evident, neither was it unavoidable nor necessary. Mainly Pope Pamphili’s personal canonical point of view was expressed by the events. His views of canon law and theology was indisputable until the Second Vatican Council (1962–1965), however not only was his policy disadvantageous but explicitly harmful.¹²⁰

¹¹⁷ More on the reception of the protest: REPGEN, *Die römische Kurie*, I, 12–29 and partly; DICKMANN, *Der Westfälische Frieden*, 456–464.

¹¹⁸ Its latest publication, based on the “original” text from the Castel Sant’Angelo and its critique in accordance with the variant reading’s neat philology: MICHAEL F. FELDKAMP, *Das breve „Zelo domus Dei” vom 26. November 1648. Edition*, AHP 31 (1993) 293–305; KONRAD REPGEN, *Drei Korollarien zum Breve „Zelo domus Dei” (26 November 1648): Editionstechnik, Nachdrucksgeschichte, Vorgeschichte*, AHP 33 (1995) 315–334; former analysis of the text: [IDEM], *Die Proteste Chigis und der päpstliche Protest gegen den Westfälischen Frieden (1648–1650). Vier Kapitel über das Breve „Zelo domus Dei”*, Staat, Kirche, Wissenschaft in einer pluralistischen Gesellschaft. Festschrift zum 65. Geburtstag von Paul Mikat (hrsg. v. Dieter Schwab et al.), Berlin 1989, 623–647.

¹¹⁹ This statement is reinforced also by the terminology of Chigi’s protest („*repugno, resisto et contradico atque... protestor...*”). HANS JÜRGEN BECKER, „*Protestatio. Protest*”, *Zeitschrift für Historische Forschung*, 1978, 385–412, 403–405.

¹²⁰ PONCET, *Immenzo X*, 329–330.

The *Zelo domus Dei* did not achieve concrete results, if not that Rome marked its place on the margins of the European politics for a long time. Ferdinand III expressly forbade the announcement of the papal *breve* in the territory of the Empire. The Papacy slid down from the state of “political neutrality” to the sphere of “political impotence”. After the Peace of Westphalia, the Holy See could not influence international politics, at all. This was distinctly determined by the Franco-Austrian and Franco-English conflicts. From the second part of the seventeenth century the theocratic papal power was not the subject but rather the object of the international politics; however, the process reached its peak in the end of the eighteenth century. The only exception to this was the organization of an international anti-Ottoman union.¹²¹

The French Hegemony and the Squadron Volante

By the mid-1650s the French hegemony had become the most oppressive in the western part of Europe ever. The Holy See also contributed to its establishment by Urban VIII. Rome misjudged the opportunities of France and the supplies of the Habsburgs in the course of the Thirty Years’ War. The former was under-, the latter was overestimated. For this miscalculation a heavy price had to be paid in the following decades. After Innocent X, the popes of the seventeenth century experienced the plain French pressure. Throughout the process of political weakening and isolation, apart from the traditional French and Habsburg orientation within the Curia, or namely within the College of Cardinals, the emerging third faction, the *squadron volante* (“independent faction”) could not bring an immediate change, either. The leaders of the movement were: Decio Azzolini (Fermo), Francesco Albizzi (Cesena) and Pietro Ottoboni (Venice); its members were: Giovanni Girolamo Lomellino, Lorenzo Imperiale (Genoa), Luigi Omodei, Gilberto Borromeo (Milan), Benedetto Odescalchi (Como), Carlo Pio (Ferrara), Ottavio Acquaviva (Naples) and Carlo Gualtieri (Orvieto); all of them were appointed by Innocent X. Cristoforo Vidman from Friuli and Giovanni Stefano Dongo from Genoa joined later. The original group of eleven cardinals aimed – apart from rescuing the Holy See from the great power’s tutoring – at the reform of the administration and finances of the Curia and at the idea of the anti-Ottoman war.

The efforts of the movement – owing to Benedetto Odescalchi, who remained in the background for a long time – reached their purpose after decades, though politically only for the time being. The curial reforms became irreversible by the election of Innocent XI, however, by this time, most of the *squadrons* had already died or become such old cardinals that they could not represent, by all means, their former ideas.¹²²

¹²¹ KONRAD REPGEN, *Der päpstliche Protest gegen den Westfälischen Frieden und die Friedenspolitik Urbans VIII*, HJ 75 (1956) 94–122; LUTZ, *Roma e il mondo germanico*, 456–460; from a wider perspective: PRODI, *The Papal Prince*, 157–181.

¹²² A newer analysis of the movement, which initiated the still existing mentality of the papal Curia: MARIE-LOUISE RODÉN, *Cardinal Decio Azzolino, Queen Christina of Sweden and Squadron Volante. Political and Administrative Developments at the Roman Curia 1644–1692*, Aun Arbor 1993, the general evaluation: 34–50;

Alexander VII: the Humiliating Struggle with France

The conclave in 1655 was absolutely irregular, since there was no cardinal-nephew, which resulted in the lack of the faction around him. This enabled the establishment of the “independent faction”, the *squadron volante*. The heads of the Spanish faction were two Medici: Carlo, the dean of the Sacred College of Cardinals and Cardinal Giovanni Carlo. Rinaldo d’Este and Antonio Barberini led the French faction. Francesco Barberini again headed the old ones, who were appointed by Urban VIII. The primary candidate was Giulio Sacchetti, who failed ignominiously in 1644. As the candidate of the Francophones, he obtained thirty-six votes out of the necessary forty-four; however, the Spanish veto hindered the other eight cardinals from joining. Fabio Chigi came to the fore by the suggestion of the *squadrons*, yet, he was objected by the French. However, after the intervention of Sacchetti and the determined demeanour of the *squadron volante* against the right of exclusion, in April, Mazarin contributed to his election and he could accede to the throne of Saint Peter as Alexander VII (1655–1667).¹²³

In spite of the unfavourable tendencies, Pope Chigi endeavoured to perform an energetic behaviour by leaning on the “*squadron*” cardinals concerning foreign affairs. His policy, besides the spheres of power, was determined by his slight sympathy with Spain. They wanted to counteract their rapid loss of power in Europe by increasing the amount and number of the pensions given – however, sometimes in secret – to certain members of the College of Cardinals by the Council of State (*Consejo de Estado*).¹²⁴ On the other hand, the pope’s bad relations with the omnipotent head of France were more determining.

Mazarin – on some basis – blamed the pope for not having supported him properly, as the nuncio of Cologne, in the course of the long crisis of the French politics between 1648 and 1653, during the *Fronde*, when he was forced to go into exile for two years.¹²⁵ Apart from this, Pope Chigi supported the *bête noire* and rival of the cardinal minister, Cardinal Retz, far too much. The Pope provided shelter to him in Rome and was

GIANVITTORIO SIGNOROTTO, *The Squadrone Volante: „Independent” Cardinals and European Politics in the Second Half of the Seventeenth Century*, Court and Politics in Papal Rome, 1492–1700 (Cambridge Studies in Italian History and Culture, ed. by Gianvittorio Signorotto–Maria Antonietta Visceglia), Cambridge 2002, 177–211, especially 181–182. (Although, there is no reference, the volume is a shortened, sometimes amplified version of the *La corte di Roma...* Out of the overlaps I used some articles, like this one, due to its easier comprehensible English language.)

¹²³ MARIO ROSA, *Alessandro VII*, Enciclopedia dei Papi III, 336–345, 338.

¹²⁴ SIGNOROTTO, *The Squadrone Volante*, 187–190 and 190–194.

¹²⁵ On Chigi’s nunciature in Cologne, besides the earlier quoted literature, see more: HENDRICK VAN BERGH, *Botschafter des Papstes. 400 Jahre Nuntius in Deutschland*, Berg 1984, 140–157; KONRAD REPGEN, *Die Finanzen des Nuntius Fabio Chigi. Ein Beitrag zur Sozialgeschichte der römischen Führungsgruppe im 17. Jahrhundert*, Geschichte. Wirtschaft. Gesellschaft. Festschrift für Clemens Bauer zum 75. Geburtstag, Berlin 1975, 229–280; MARCEL ALBERT, *Nuntius Fabio Chigi und die Anfänge des Jansenismus 1639–1651* (RQ Supplementheft 44), Rom–Freiburg–Wien 1988, 47–48. 205–237. 284–287.

willing to accept his resignation from the archbishopric of Paris only after a long hesitation. This affair, at the very beginning of his pontificate had, likewise, its effect on the relations between the Holy See and France, as well as the papal diplomacy on the thwarting of the planned union of France and Cromwell's England. For this purpose, Alexander VII forwarded a *breve* to the summoned council of the French clergy in 1655–1656. He did not support, either, the similar ambitions of the Spanish. As an answer, Mazarin supported the anti-Roman local religious movements: the Jansenists and the Gallicans. Furthermore, Mazarin hindered Alexander VII's from mediating, by pursuing his independent policy in halting the war being waged since 1640, between France and Spain on the ownership of Catalonia and the surrounding territories. It was out of question that the Eternal City would be the theatre of the peace conference; moreover, the French automatically refused the participation of the papal nuncio.¹²⁶

The Treaty of the Pyrenees, concluded on 7 November 1659 – which kept Catalonia in exchange for Artois and many fortresses in the Low Countries, yet, sealed the decline of Spain – contained explicitly detrimental terms against the interests of the Holy See which was, despite its intention, excluded from the negotiations. Namely, the territorial demands of Parma and Modena against the Papal State were included in its clause. Rome was informed about the demands for Castro and Comacchio – lying south of the estuary of the Po river, on the coast of the Adriatic Sea – which were guaranteed by the great powers, only on 1 January 1660. Alexander VII replied to the re-emerging realization of the decadence of the great powers after Westphalia with the total re-occupation of the territory of Castro on 20 December 1660, which caused numerous problems for the earlier popes, as well. However, he was to retreat soon. In the relations with the French, which were danger-fraught enough, – in spite of the various, for example, personal concessions, concerning the appointment of bishops – the gravest breach ever ensued.¹²⁷

Alexander VII had to face the most oppressive manifestation of the French hegemony ever after the Treaty of the Pyrenees, in 1662–1663. Louis XIV, who embarked on building up his absolutism after the death of Mazarin, employed a peculiar pretext for breaking the pope, with the intention of spreading his authority over the French Church as the cornerstone of his absolutist domestic policy. The indirect antecedent of the crisis was that the pope, by following the ideas of the *squadron volante*, dealt with the question of the Ottoman conquest to a greater extent than his predecessors did. Not only did he send a papal fleet to Venice in 1657 – as a return, the Signoria let the Jesuits come back

¹²⁶ ROSA, *Alessandro VII*, 341–342; RODÉN, *Cardinal Decio Azzolino and Squadron Volante*, 70–97; BURKHARDT SCHNEIDER, *Das Papsttum zur Zeit der französischen Hegemonie*, Die Kirche im Zeitalter des Absolutismus und der Aufklärung (Handbuch der Kirchengeschichte 5, hrsg. v. Wolfgang Müller–Quintin Aldea–Heribert Raab–Burkhardt Schneider *et al.*), Freiburg–Basel–Wien 1970, 120–151, 124–129; PASTOR, *Geschichte der Päpste XIV*, 303–389; RANKE, *A pápák története [The History of the Popes]*, 608–611; more on the outline of the papal-French relations in the seventeenth century: PETROCCHI, *Roma nel Seicento*, 11–14–17.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*

after nearly fifty years –, but he also engaged in organizing an international union to halt the Turks' offensive in Hungary.¹²⁸

His actions crossed the plans of Louis XIV, who did not concern himself, at all, with the Habsburgs' consolidation along on their eastern border. Therefore, his legates, d'Aubeville or Crécy, who were sent to Rome regarding the league, hindered the negotiations. They raised formal objections of various sorts, and they were occupied in extending diplomatic immunity – in an unacceptable way and degree for a sovereign head of a sovereign State – around their accommodation. The violent clash in the tense atmosphere between their strikingly large retinue and the Corsican Guard on 20 August 1662 could hardly be attributed to an accident.

In the accelerating crisis, Alexander VII, regardless of all his efforts to organize an anti-Ottoman all-European coalition, became totally isolated. Madrid was absorbed by the war against Portugal, Vienna was engrossed by the Turkish attack resulting in the surrender of Érsekújvár, Venice was filled with apprehension by the affair of Crete and the other Italian States examined Rome's tight situation with indifference mingled with malice. Parma and Modena showed unreservedly hostile behaviour. The papal enclave of Avignon and the related Comtat Venaissin were invaded by French troops, moreover the Sun King was ready to occupy the Eternal City, as well. The Gallican card also appeared: further clauses were phrased at the Sorbonne at the end of 1663.

As a consequence, there was no other way for Alexander VII but a total and humiliating retreat. In the Treaty of Pisa of 12 February 1664, Castro's earlier legal status was provisionally restored and the rights of the Duke of Modena over Comacchio were acknowledged. The Treaty of Pisa reinforced the positions and influence of the French in Northern Italy, who were not even satisfied with obtaining the right of intervention in the affairs of the Papal State. On the other hand, Louis XIV demanded formal amends from the pope. Namely, Alexander VII had to disband the Corsican Guard, proclaimed as the scapegoat, he had to set up a "shame-pyramid" in front of their barracks admitting the soldiers' guilt, moreover, by the direction of his cardinal-nephew, Flavio Chigi, the pope was obliged to send an apologetic legation to Paris.¹²⁹

His ordeals in the politics of Western Europe and Italy were slightly mitigated by the conversion of world-sensation of Queen Christina of Sweden (1632–1654, † 1689), the daughter of Gustav II Adolf, and her move to Rome.¹³⁰ As a member of the old school of diplomacy and incapable of forgetting the past papal influence over the European con-

¹²⁸ JOHANN RAINER, *Rom und der Türkenkrieg 1663–64*, *Atti e Memorie della Accademia di Scienze, Lettere e Arti Modena*, 6 (1974) 174–194; PETROCCHI, *La politica della Santa Sede*, 89–90; EICKHOFF, *Venedig, Wien und die Osmanen, passim*.

¹²⁹ ROSA, *Alessandro VII*, 341–342; MATTEUCCI, *Il papato di fronte all'assolutismo*, 703; RODÉN, *Cardinal Decio Azzolino and Squadron Volante*, 70–97; SIGNOROTTO, *The Squadrone Volante*, 198–201; SCHNEIDER, *Das Papsttum zur Zeit der französischen Hegemonie*, 120–151, 124–129; PASTOR, *Geschichte der Päpste XIV*, 303–389; RANKE, *A pápák története [The History of the Popes]*, 608–611.

¹³⁰ MATTEUCCI, *Il papato di fronte all'assolutismo*, 702–703. There are more studies on the Roman phase of the Swedish queen primarily from the perspective of art history: BÖRJE MAGNUSSON (a c. d.), *Cristina di*

minent, the pope could not find an adequate solution in the new situation, even though he did not have the chance for this after Westphalia.¹³¹

Clement IX and X: the Decade of Clementia

The period of the two Clements was determined by the quiet resignation to the vulnerability, bitterly experienced by their predecessors, however, the quest for new paths had already started.¹³² The election of Giulio Rospigliosi did not have another alternative. The soft-spoken diplomat started his career as the nuncio of Madrid in 1644 then he became the secretary of State under Alexander VII. He was supported by Spain, by the appointed ones of Urban VIII, led by Antonio Barberini, moreover by Louis XIV himself and by the *squadron volante*¹³³ – arm in arm with Christina of Sweden –, which made approaches to France. This time the Sun King endeavoured to provide his outrageously gained influence over the Papacy with a new basis by his unconditional support towards the strongest candidate, to such an extent that the French diplomacy attributed the election of Rospigliosi to Louis XIV.¹³⁴ Rospigliosi, in terms of his program for the settlement of the diverse confrontations, chose the name of Clement.

Like his predecessor concerning the Treaty of the Pyrenees, he did not have much influence on the Peace of Aachen – which ended the so-called War of Devolution (1667–1668) for the territories of the Spanish-Low Countries between France and Spain and allocated Lille for Louis XIV – especially, he could not control its sections about religion.¹³⁵ His most important diplomatic achievement was removing the “shame-pyramid”, helping to relax of relations between France and Spain after the war, moreover he succeeded in organizing a temporary coalition of some smaller Italian and German States with Emperor Leopold I (1657–1705). With the help of the temporary union under the leadership of Vincenzo Rospigliosi, he launched two expeditions in 1668 and in 1669 to back Venice in the lasting Cretan War. Due to the fateful divisions within

Svezia e Roma. Atti del Simposio tenuto all'Istituto Svedese di Studi Classici a Roma, 5–6 ottobre 1995 (Suocoromana 5), Stockholm 1999.

¹³¹ On the personality of the Pope: GIOVANNI INCISA DELLA ROCCHETTA, *Gli appunti autobiografici d'Alessandro VII nell'Archivio Chigi*, Mélanges Eugène Tisserant VI (ST 236), Città del Vaticano 1964, 439–457; ALEXANDER KRAUTHEIMER, *The Rome of Alexander VII*, Princeton, n. d., 8–14.

¹³² On their reign, see: GAETANO BEANI, *Clemente IX*, Prato 1893; and RODÉN, *Cardinal Decio Azzolino and Squadron Volante*, 124–143; SCHNEIDER, *Das Papsttum zur Zeit der französischen Hegemonie*, 129–133; PASTOR, *Geschichte der Päpste XIV*, 527–665; RANKE, *A pápák története [The History of the Popes]*, 611–613.

¹³³ SIGNOROTTO, *The Squadrone Volante*, 198–201.

¹³⁴ LUCIANO OSBAT, *Clemente IX*, Enciclopedia dei Papi III, 348–360, 348–353.

¹³⁵ GIUSEPPE DE GENNARO, *La crisi della monarchia spagnola e la diplomazia Pontificia (1665–1673)*, Torino 1994, 89–100.

the command and after the withdrawal of the French, the Venetians had to surrender on 6 September 1669 and hand Crete over to the Turks.¹³⁶

The four-month long conclave from December 1669, after the death of Pope Clement, was characterized by the same division as there was in the enterprise of the Aegean Sea. The, originally, fifty-six, then later sixty-five members of the pope-election body were absolutely distinct. The supporters of France and Spain were seven-seven; the cardinals of Alexander VII were twenty-four under the guidance of Flavio Chigi; the cardinals of Clement IX were eight with Giacomo Rospigliosi and Urban VIII's, under the direction of Francesco Barberini, were seven. The *squadrons*, hallmarked by Azzolini and Ottoboni, were at full strength, with their twelve cardinals. No matter how well and cunningly they politicized – which is commemorated the public satirical pamphlet of 1669, the *Il colloquio delle volpi* (“The dialogue of the foxes”) –, the confident personal vetoes came in quick succession in the stalemate. That is why, Elci, the former nuncio of Vienna and Cardinal Vidoni and Brancaccio never became the Vicars of Christ on earth and that is why Benedetto Odescalchi had to wait some six years more. The eighty-year old Emilio Altieri owed the tiara to the lengthy and hopeless wrangling. Neither his nunciature in Naples, causing bankruptcy and political failure, nor his later curial offices condemned him to this position. He was invested with the red hat only at the death-bed of his predecessor.¹³⁷ The political balance of his rather quiet pontificate turned in a positive direction.

This statement is also valid, even if his awkward memories of Naples did not cause serious clashes but generated a gentle tension between Spain and the Holy See. The most significant event was when, in spite of the several requests, he was reluctant to employ ecclesiastical censures against the participants of the anti-Spanish riot in Messina.¹³⁸ Even if we are aware that Pope Altieri's behaviour towards France was neither clear nor coherent, a favourable judgement is still acceptable. Clement X did not object to the declaration of the war of conquest (1672–1678) against the Dutch, since he expected from the successes the restoration of Catholicism in the Protestant territories after a period of more than a century. Nevertheless, in 1673 France and the Holy See started to drift apart, the pope had to realize that Louis XIV lacked all religious motivation, since the main aim of his Church policy was to isolate the French clergy from the Roman centre as much as he could. Given the knowledge of the conquering intentions, Clement X, in favour of the negotiation – without a result yet –, undertook the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Protestant States. This gesture, beyond all questions, was a huge advance. The alteration of Rome's isolating policy and the realization of the new European power politics required the bitter experience of the past thirty years.

¹³⁶ STEFANO ANDRETTA, *Venezia e Roma dalla guerra di Candia a Clemente XI*, La corte di Roma tra Cinque e Seicento, 393–422; OSBAT, *Clemente IX*, 355; PETROCCHI, *La politica della Santa Sede*, 90–92.

¹³⁷ LUCIANO OSBAT, *Clemente X*, Enciclopedia dei Papi III, 360–368, 364. In his election, the memory of his relative, Cardinal Giovanni Battista Altieri's absolute authority played a role.

¹³⁸ OSBAT, *Clemente X*, 364.

Whereas Chigi categorically refused to establish any relations with Protestants during the negotiations in Münster, Clement's instructions invested the extraordinary nuncios with full authorization.¹³⁹

Clement X's diplomatic exploratory talk, transgressing the confessional bounds, was followed by the cooling down of the relations between the French and the papal court. Such a detrimental crisis, as there was under Alexander VII, did not break out. The smaller diplomatic clashes – for instance, the deprivation of the foreign, especially French, duty concession by cardinal nephew Altieri, the *camerlengo* – indicates rather the new and slow development of the papal independence. Rome re-gained a central role on the stage of European politics by being preoccupied by organizing the defence against the renewed Turkish threat in Europe, by providing financial aid and by encouraging the union of the great powers. However, at first, his attempts were made possible by the indifference of the great powers, the shaping Eastern European policy of Pope Altieri increasingly elicited the sympathy of the Habsburgs, which in earnest, contributed to the gradual liberation from the French tutelage. While the popes were excluded from every important question and were compelled to the margins, their traditional attempts to mediation were simply neglected, however, their efforts in favour of halting the Ottoman expansion found remarkable response. Realizing and emphasizing the significance of the unique opportunity can be ascribed to the merits of the administration of Pope Altieri.¹⁴⁰

The main stage of the anti-Ottoman policy of Clement X was Poland. Sultan Mehmed IV (1645–1687) attacked on this front in 1672. However he was halted by the Polish troops of John Sobieski, but Michael Korybut Wiśniowiecki, the Polish king, underestimated the supplies of his country and the diplomatic aid of the Holy See, as a consequence he concluded peace with the Turks at Buczacz, by acknowledging their occupations. Yet, the Sejm discarded the treaty, and after the death of the king, they elected Sobieski, who again gained victory in Chotin on 11 November 1673. In the following year, not only did the new king (1674–1696) fulfil the expectations by the repeated blows levelled on the Turks, but he also opened new prospects for the offensive politics by reconquering Podolia. Clement X and those surrounding him were not satisfied with taking a huge part of the military expenses. They did their utmost to prevent the election of a Protestant pretender to the throne, or a nominee of a great power instead of Sobieski. Under the name of the bulwark of Christianity, the king was encouraged to wage a war by the extraordinary nuncios and by the permanent papal legates and they assured him of the steadfastness of the Apostolic See's determination. The pontificate of Innocent (Blessed) XI justified how successful it was.¹⁴¹

¹³⁹ SCHNEIDER, *Das Papsttum zur Zeit der französischen Hegemonie*, 129–133; ANDRETTA, *Cerimoniale e diplomazia pontificia*, 217–221.

¹⁴⁰ OSBAT, *Clemente X*, 364–365.

¹⁴¹ GAETANO PLATANIA, *Polonia e Santa Sede tra conflitti e compromessi (sec. XVII)* (in addition: LUCIEN BÉLY, *La diplomatie française et les compromis en Europe centrale et orientale*) (Incontri e dibattiti 1), Viterbo 2002, 31–77, 33–41; PETROCCHI, *La politica della Santa Sede*, 90–92.

The Provisional Return to the Role of Great Power: the Initiation of the Holy League

Although the Western European political sphere of Rome from Westphalia through the complete military defeat in the War of the Spanish Succession (1701–1714) to the annexation of the Papal State by the revolutionary France, proved to be narrowing,¹⁴² the one and a half decade long pontificate of Benedetto Odescalchi can be regarded as an exception to this tendency. However, his reign entailed another nadir in the relations between the Holy See and France, this time Rome was not exposed to the French efforts. In the course of the repeated debates over the extraterritoriality for delegates, the *extra-territorialitas*, in 1687, the pope dared to excommunicate the French delegate in Rome. In 1688, in the matter of the succession of the Electorate of Cologne he placed himself again in opposition to France, however, this act caused another war between the House of Austria and the Bourbons after the decade long peace from the Treaty of Nijmegen in 1679.¹⁴³

Innocent XI was the last, who could call himself *padre commune* in the line of the popes. He did not achieve this role by his neutrality or by the accomplishment of emancipation from the French rule with the assistance of the Habsburgs. The other goals of the *squadron volante*: the compliance of the unrealized reforms after Trent, the settlement of the Papal State's finances and the organization of an international alliance against the Turks – after some partial successes – yielded partly temporary, yet in many cases essential, moreover in the suppression of the Turkish Crescent lasting results under his reign.¹⁴⁴

If we recall the policy of Paul V, we see that after the conflict with Venice, the expenditure of the military aid to the anti-Ottoman wars was suspended for almost fifty years. The plan of initiating an anti-Ottoman, all-European alliance did not occur even on the level of rhetoric under Urban VIII. Innocent X, who endeavoured to square the conflict with Venice, in the course of the Cretan War, which threatened the whole Mediterranean, immediately sent assistance to the Signoria. To put it bluntly, his intervention was not considerable, since the republic did not stop violating the ecclesiastical immunity and privileges, besides they continued the public utilization of tithes. His successors, Alexander VII and Clement IX provided greater financial and military aid to Venice,¹⁴⁵ however, they could not prevent the surrender of Crete. We are aware that the efforts of Pope Chigi – namely to organize a league against the Turkish cam-

¹⁴² For example NORBERT HUBER, Österreich und der Hl. Stuhl vom Ende des spanischen Erbfolgekrieges bis zum Tode Papst Klemens' XI (1714–1721) (AÖG 126), Wien 1967, 27–35.

¹⁴³ See the related literature below, in the details.

¹⁴⁴ Besides the works on the *squadron volante* for instance: AGOSTINO LAURO, *Il cardinale Giovanni Battista de Luca. Diritto e riforma nello Stato della Chiesa (1676–1683)* (Storia e diritto. Studi 29), Napoli 1991.

¹⁴⁵ EICKHOFF, *Venedig, Wien und die Osmanen*, 32–34 and *passim*; ANDRETTA, *Venezia e Roma dalla guerra di Candia*, 393–422.

paigns in Hungary in 1663–1664 – also remained fruitless. The same can be stated concerning the efforts of Clement X in forming a coalition in favour of Poland in 1672.¹⁴⁶

Let us highlight it again: the papal diplomacy masterfully realized in the second half of the seventeenth century that it could only achieve successes on the stage of international politics only by focusing on the eastern politics. In spite of the failures of organizing a league, the Turkish question became the centre of interests of Rome more and more. This theory is proven, for example, by the expenses of more than one million *scudi* on the anti-Ottoman wars by Alexander VII. We learnt that under Clement IX and especially later under Clement X the main target of the papal foreign policy was the suppression of the Turks. Nevertheless, the initiation of the Habsburg-Polish-Venetian Holy League and the creation of its financial background were merely the merits of Innocent XI. However, paradoxically, the quick expulsion of the Turkish troops made the renaissance of the Papacy's role of a great power ephemeral. By the time of the conclusion of the Treaty of Karlowitz in 1699 and the dissolution of the League, the conditions after Westphalia were immediately restored. After the realization of the old debt of the former *Respublica Christiana*, the European States no longer needed Rome's international role as a coordinator.

The Last Padre Commune: Innocent XI

In early August 1676, on the opening election of the ninth conclave of the seventeenth century, out of the seventy-seven cardinals, there were only forty-four. The four French cardinals arrived only at the end of the summer. The Holy College still remained rather divided. Seven cardinals were still considered to be the members of the group of Urban VIII, led by – who else but – Francesco Barberini. They were followed by those, who were appointed by Innocent X, Alexander VII and the two Clement Popes. As usual, there were the French and Spanish factions and the remains of the *squadron volante*, represented by Azzolini, Ottoboni and Omodei. After having dropped several candidates, Odescalchi's name was mentioned by the nephew of the former pope, by Cardinal Altieri. He could win the support of the Spanish, who were led by the former grand inquisitor, later cardinal and *valido* of Spain, Nidhard. On the other hand, Cardinal Altieri became convinced that the French were no longer as hostile as they had been during the previous conclave. Every cardinal might have reckoned with Odescalchi, yet they did not agree with his nomination by Altieri. Some shared the view that the ex-nephew wanted rather to compromise the prelate from Como by his zeal. However, after Louis XIV had adhered to his election – with the reservation that Odescalchi should not be regarded as the candidate of the Spanish or Altieri – the white smoke rose from the chimney of the Sistine Chapel. By the protodeacon Cardinal, Benedetto Odescalchi was crowned as

¹⁴⁶ RAINER, *Rom und der Türkenkrieg 1663–64*, 174–194.

pope under the name of Innocent XI (1676–1689) by remembering Pope Pamphili who appointed him as cardinal.¹⁴⁷

The two main pillars of Innocent XI's pontificate were the opposition to the aggressive and hegemonic ambitions of Louis XIV and the war, inspired by the idea of the Crusades, against the Ottomans. Parallel to the Sun King's alliance with the Turks in favour of weakening the Habsburgs, the pope had to pacify the destabilized Europe, owing to the aspiring plans of France, and cut the root of the Ottoman extension. The usual anxiety of the Austrian Habsburgs put obstacles in the initiation of the holy league's way, which aimed at the liberation of Constantinople. The Habsburgs were afraid of the eastern war of a longer, engrossing engagement and of the Polish-Russian traditional antagonism. The fear of the Russian – who were also traditionally hostile to Rome – presence after forcing the Ottomans back, had already been shaped.¹⁴⁸

In the mid 1670s, the complexity of the international affairs was exacerbated by Louis's friendly relations with the Turks, moreover, by the fact that the Sun King also made efforts to win Sobieski. As a result of the French diplomacy's intrigue and mediation the Polish agreed to sign the peace treaty in Zhuravno, which favoured the Turks, in October 1676. Their released troops, as the summit of the French wishes, could potentially be turned against the Habsburgs and directly against Hungary. However, Louis XIV was satisfied with standing to benefit from his victories in Eastern Europe on the peace conference in Nijmegen in January 1676, in order to gain the territories of the Republic of

¹⁴⁷ ANTONIO MENNITI IPPOLITO, *Innocenzo XI*, Enciclopedia dei Papi III, 368–389, 371–372. About Innocent XI's life, pontificate and French policy PASTOR, *Geschichte der Päpste XIV*, 669–1043; focusing on his sanctity: MATTIA GIUSEPPE LIPPI, *Vita di Papa Innocenzo XI raccolta in tre libri* (a c. d. Giovacchino Berthier), Roma 1889; with also countless Hungarian aspects: FERDINANDO DE BOJANI, *Innocent XI. Sa correspondance avec ses nonces IIII*. (Première partie: Affaires politiques [I.] 21 Septembre 1676–31 Décembre 1679. [III.] 1680–1684. Seconde partie: [II.] Affaires ecclésiastiques, 21 Septembre 1676–31 Décembre 1679), Roules–Rome–Paris–Vienne 1910–1912; his far-reaching correspondence with monarchs, prelates, among whom with also Hungarians: *Innocentii PP. XI Epistolae ad Principes. I: Annis I–V (3 Oct. 1676–20 Sept. 1681). II: Annis VI–XIII (24 Sept. 1681–6 Aug. 1689)*, ed. by JOACHIM JOSEPH BERTHIER, Romae 1890–1895; moreover CHARLES GÉRIN and E. MICHAUD's French positivist works.

¹⁴⁸ MENNITI IPPOLITO, *Innocenzo XI*, 380; HUBERT JEDIN, *Papst Immoenz XI. Verteidiger des chrstlichen Abendlandes*, Kirche des Glaubens. Kirche der Geschichte, I, 287–291; WILHELM FRAKNÓI, *Papst Immoenz XI. und Ungarns Befreiung von der Türkenherrschaft*, Freiburg im Breisgau 1902 (The German translation of FRAKNÓI's work, written for the two hundredth anniversary of Buda's liberation.); *Rom und Wien im Jahre 1683. Ausgewählte Actenstücke aus römischen Archiven zur II. Säcularfeier der Befreiung Wiens*, Als Festgabe des Campo Santo zu Rom hrsg. v. AUGUSTIN SAUER (Caplan des Collegiums), Wien 1883. I neglect here the other – rich and well-known Hungarian and Austrian – literature, I only put emphasis on the studies of JAN PAUL NIEDERKORN, ADAM WANDRUSZKA, ANTON C. SCHAENDLINGER, WALTER LEITSCH, ZYGMUNT ABRAHAMOWICZ and PAOLO PRETO, written on the occasion of the tricentenary: RHM 26 (1984) 337–350. 243–252. 263–266. 267–278. 279–288. 289–302; furthermore, it should be highlighted: AGOSTINO BORROMEO, *Le direttrici della politica anti-ottomana della Santa Sede durante il pontificato di Innocenzo XI*, 303–330.

the United Netherlands after putting an end to the constant warfare, which brought him many defeats and slight temporary decline.¹⁴⁹

The legate of Innocent XI, Nuncio Bevilacqua and his chief administrator, Lorenzo Casoni arrived in the Dutch town fairly late in June 1677, due to the initial opposition of the Protestant countries. The commission of Bevilacqua was to conclude peace and to improve the situation of the Catholics in the Netherlands, by maintaining papal neutrality between France, the Spanish and Austrian Habsburgs. Although the conference, which ended in February 1679, could not resolve the contradictions of the great powers, in spite of its instability, the peace itself enabled Innocent XI to continue to fulfil his anti-Ottoman plans. The idea of an emphasized war of liberation, which created a stir throughout Europe parallel to the acceleration of the Ottoman menace, ceased the thirty-year long marginalization of the papal diplomacy, which manifested bewildering activity during the negotiations. However, the principles of the Treaty of Nijmegen coincided with the terms of Westphalia (the religious provisions elicited strenuous opposition of the pope), the Holy See was omitted from the final act merely because the pope, in his instruction given to Bevilacqua, refused to name Louis XIV in the requested form.¹⁵⁰

Even after Nijmegen, there were incredible difficulties piling up for Pope Odescalchi, who even sent legates to Persia after some century-long interval. Be it either the improving of the Russian-Polish relations, or the winning of Louis XIV, his nuncios could only produce trifling results after the long lasting negotiations about the establishment of either a defensive, or an offensive league. They managed to convince the monarch – who after having been defeated in the Netherlands was unable to launch a significant offensive in the west and who could not withdraw himself from general European public opinion in the shadow of the Ottoman threat – to give his assistance in case of an Ottoman attack against Poland or Venice.¹⁵¹ On the other hand, the initiation of an alliance between Sobieski and the Austrian Habsburgs was crowned with splendid success. At the mere news of the convention,¹⁵² which was concluded in April 1683, by the assistance of Francesco Buonvisi, the nuncio of Vienna, the sickly pope, who rarely left his bed at that time, organized an irregular, lavish festival.

The points of the (first) Holy League stated that 1. the offensive league lasted until the mutually established peace, whereas the defensive league lasted until an indefinite time (*in perpetuum*). 2. With the purpose of reinforcing the safety of the League, one has to take an oath to the pope, where the imperial majesty is represented by His Eminence, Cardinal Carlo Pio, besides, the royal majesty and the Polish State are represented by

¹⁴⁹ MENNITI IPPOLITO, *Innocenzo XI*, 380.

¹⁵⁰ The details: P.J. RIETBERGEN, *Papal Diplomacy and Mediation at the Peace of Nijmegen*, The Peace of Nijmegen 1676–1678/79. International Congress of the Tricentennial, Nijmegen 14–16 September 1978 (ed. by J.A.H. Bots), Amsterdam 1980, 29–96.

¹⁵¹ MENNITI IPPOLITO, *Innocenzo XI*, 380.

¹⁵² The diploma was signed by Leopold on 2 January 1683 in Vienna and by Sobieski on 31 March 1683 in Warsaw. This was ratified by the Polish diet on 18 April. The last issue of the related documents from Vatican sources: MARCO JAČOV, *L'Europa tra conquiste ottomane e leghe sante* (ST 403), Città del Vaticano 2001, 217–231.

His Eminence Cardinal Carlo Barberini¹⁵³...¹⁵⁴ 5. Neither party can make peace with the Turks, only by a mutual agreement. 6. The inheritors and successors of both parties are obliged to maintain the League. 7. This is limited only to the war against the Turks and it cannot be extended to another war. 8. In case of an offensive war, the emperor will mobilize an army of sixty thousand, including the subsidiary troops, and Poland an army of forty thousand people. 9. There are going to be more theatres of war, the emperor will siege the Turkish bulwarks in the territory of Hungary, while the Polish monarch will reoccupy Kamianets-Podilsky, Podolia and Ukraine. 10. With the purpose of launching the war the earliest and the most efficient as they can, in advance the emperor sends 200 thousand thaler to Poland, which will reimburse it from the tithes that the pope released. 11. For the sake of the entry into the alliance, legates will be sent to the Christian monarchs and dukes, one can be received only by the mutual agreement of the parties; in particular the Tsar will be pressed.¹⁵⁵

The pope's sheer joy was not ineffectual. After half a year, on 2 September 1683 the united Catholic army of imperial, Polish and Bavarian troops, commanded by Sobieski, defeated the forces of Kara Mustafa Pasha in Kahlenberg, by preventing the capture of Vienna and the hoisting up of the Turkish crescent to the steeple of Saint Stephan's Cathedral. After the achieved victory, or rather victories – since the League occupied Párkány on 9 October and Esztergom on 27 October –, which were the fruit of the long preparation of the papal diplomacy, there was still much that remained to be done. Not only did the pope have to prevent the Polish's withdrawal from the League but he also had to divert Leopold I from his idea of an armistice. In the meantime, Louis XIV took advantage of the Habsburgs' dire straits, however, he did not launch a general offensive, but occupied some fortresses in the western borderland. Moreover, after the acknowledgement of Casale Monferrato's obtainment in 1681 and the hegemony over Savoy, he had Genoa shelled in early 1684. With the occupation of the City-State, he made his positions in Italy the firmest ever, which meant that not only did he threaten the Habsburgs from West, but from South, as well.

Finally, the diplomats of Pope Odescalchi could not only save the Polish-Habsburg alliance, but after long negotiations – owing to the informal diplomatic activity of Pietro Ottoboni – Venice entered the (second) Holy League, which was initiated by the pope, Leopold and Sobieski. The alliance of an offensive nature aimed at the cessation of the Turkish presence in Poland and Hungary and their suppression to the eastern part of the *Mediterraneum*. The League was ratified on 24 May 1684 by an oath in the Apostolic Palace's consistorial chamber. In exchange for its help, the Signoria received

¹⁵³ The ceremony of the taking of the oath was organized on 16 August 1683 in the Quirinal Palace. Carlo Pio and Carlo Barberini represented the two monarchs as the cardinal protectors of the German empire, the kingdom of Hungary and Poland. On this role of Barberini: GAETANO PLATANIA, *La Polonia nelle carte del cardinale Carlo Barberini Protettore del regno*, Accademie e Biblioteche d'Italia 56 (n.s. 39) (1988) n. 2, 38–60.

¹⁵⁴ The 3rd and 4th point referred to the settlement of the conflicts, occurring at the Polish-Swedish war and to the recognition of Sobieski's election.

¹⁵⁵ LIPPI, *Vita di Papa Innocenzo XI*, 161–162; JAČOV, *L'Europa tra conquiste ottomane*, 227–228.

100 thousand *scudi*, and they won commandship over the papal fleet.¹⁵⁶ The efficiency of the alliance was guaranteed by the agreement signed in Regensburg, three months later, on 15 August, which provided an armistice for twenty years between France, the Empire and Spain. Another success of the papal foreign policy had a heavy price, however it was unusually not paid by Rome. In exchange for his inclination to enable the liberation of Hungary after one hundred and fifty years, the Sun King obtained Strasbourg and Luxembourg.¹⁵⁷

The newer League's initial enterprises went with varying success. The siege of Buda, which started in July 1684 was interrupted on 3 November, nevertheless, the advance of Venice into the area of the Adriatic and Ionian Sea, which not only assured their dominance over Dalmatia, but it also held out hope for the obtainment of all Morea. In the following years there were only smaller campaigns in Hungary, since Poland was engaged with the recrudescing Russian-Polish conflict. Finally, through the agreement,¹⁵⁸ signed on 2 May 1686, Russia also joined the League. The alliance, inspired and encouraged by Marco D'Aviano,¹⁵⁹ emerged victorious on 2 September 1686 by capturing Buda, which triumph was not only celebrated in Italy but throughout Europe, as well. It was followed by the liberation of Pécs, Szeged and almost the whole Slavonia during that given year. In the following years the Turkish garrisons one after another surrendered. The forces of the League, led by Charles V, Duke of Lorraine, gained a final victory over Suleiman, the Grand Vizier, in Nagyarsány on 12 August 1687. On 6 September 1688 Belgrade was liberated.¹⁶⁰

Innocent XI's actual authority in the battles of the League was to provide the financial background. The remittance to the emperor, to Poland and Venice was more than two million *scudi* during 1683–1689.¹⁶¹ The pope was mostly obsessed with the establish-

¹⁵⁶ The points of the treaty, signed on 10 March, correspond to the one's from the previous year. The credentials of the cardinal protectors (Venice was represented by Pietro Ottoboni, the later Pope Alexander VIII) were dated on 24 February, 6 February, 27 March and on Venetian side on 29 April. JAČOV, *L'Europa tra conquiste ottomane*, 232–251.

¹⁵⁷ MENNITI IPPOLITO, *Innocenzo XI*, 381; PLATANIA, *Polonia e Santa Sede*, 41–50; PETROCCHI, *La politica della Santa Sede*, 96–98; MATTEUCCI, *Il papato di fronte all'assolutismo*, 717–719.

¹⁵⁸ The text, including thirty-two points, published on 25 April: JAČOV, *L'Europa tra conquiste ottomane*, 251–254; PLATANIA, *Polonia e Santa Sede*, 50–56.

¹⁵⁹ Much data on his role can be found in the exemplary publication of his extensive correspondence: ARTURO BASSO DA CARMIGNANO DI BRENTA, *P. Marco d'Aviano. Corrispondenza epistolare I–V*, Venezia-Mestre 1986–1991, *passim*; moreover GABRIELE INGEGNERI, *Il cardinale Gregorio Barbarigo e padre Marco d'Aviano*, Gregorio Barbarigo patrizio veneto vescovo e cardinale nella tarda controriforma. Atti del convegno di studi Padova 7–10 Novembre 1996 (San Gregorio Barbarigo. Fonti e Ricerche III 1–2, a. c. d. Lilliana Billanovich–Pierantonio Gios), Padova 1999, 1129–1145, 1131–1133.

¹⁶⁰ MENNITI IPPOLITO, *Innocenzo XI*, 381; PETROCCHI, *La politica della Santa Sede*, 96–98.

¹⁶¹ The most exact and valid sums: PAOLO CHERUBINI, *Mandati della reverenda Camera Apostolica 1418–1802* (Quaderni della Rassegna degli Archivi di Stato), Roma 1988, 131 (*Registro de'mandati delle tre decime per la guerra d'Ungheria contro il Turco; Registro de polize de cambio delle decime imposte dalla S.^{sa} di N.S. Innocenzo XI per la guerra d'Ungheria contro il Turco, principate li 8 maggio 1683 a tutto li 8 maggio 1691*. [Archivio di Stato di Roma, vol. 972]). Its data are affirmed by the enclosure of a *breve* of 20 February 1690, which indicates a sum

ment and maintenance of the harmony of the alliance and the restraint of France. He was aware that the at least passive support of Louis XIV was essential to sustain all the achievements in the eastern fronts. On the other hand, there occurred a vast amount of problems. The question of Alsace and Lorraine was solved for the time being by the surrender of Strasbourg, yet, by the death of the elector of Pfalz in May 1685, another focal point arose in the west. At this time the French already laid claim to the territories by the Rhine. By the mediation of the papal diplomacy in 1687, the candidate of Leopold I could take the chair of the elector. As an answer Louis XIV had fortresses built on the right riverside of the Rhine.

The efforts, undertaking more and more direct conflicts, of Pope Odescalchi to avoid a fatal breach in the relations of France and the Habsburgs in the course of the Holy League's wars, proved to be fruitful only until September 1688. This time, only two weeks after the occupation of Belgrade, the Sun King – by breaking his engagements – launched an invasion to annex the Rhineland, Mainz and Trier. By luck, due to the zeal of Nuncio Buonvisi, the ministers, who hastened the one-sided armistice with the Turks in the critical circumstances, remained in minority in Vienna. Much to the pope's relief Leopold shouldered the two-front war. In place of Charles V, Duke of Lorraine, and Maximilian II Emanuel, Elector of Bavaria, who had to travel West, Louis William, Margrave of Baden as the chief commander of the League's army continued the advance to the heart of the Balkans. In October 1689, his troops reached Vidin then they set up their winter-quarters at the Lower Danube. However, the only blessed pope of the seventeenth century did not live to see it.¹⁶²

Pope Odescalchi, in favour of the Holy League, did his utmost to keep in contact with the most Christian monarch and participated in postponing the opening of the western front. Nevertheless, the French-Roman, similar to the French-Habsburg relations, was irresistibly drifting towards its fall. The reason was along two evolving paths: the turbulent conflict around the district of the delegates in Rome and the whirling sequence of events of the ecclesiastical prince-electors, the archbishop of Cologne's succession.

The privileges of the accommodation of the diplomats became vivid by several abuses since the failure of Alexander VII's attempt to settle their questions. The tax and duty free exchange of the most diverse types and amounts of products happened unhindered. It also came up against obstacles to obtain a sealed document for money, which verified one's status as a diplomat. The decrees of the governor, vicar and local magistrate of Rome had no effect in the territories which were free of the papal jurisdiction. From

of 108,3753,22 *scudi* (*di moneta*), paid to Leopold I in annual instalments between 1683 and 1688 (ÖStA HH-StA Allgemeine Urkunden). Although it refers to sources from the Vatican Archives (Instrumenta Miscellanea, n. 5382, fol. 97v), criticism should be addressed to the sum, defined by MENNITI (381) – 5 million forints between 1683 and 1689 – and by JAČOV (236, note 24.) – 661,310 *scudi* between 1683 and 1699. On the collection of 1683, among the cardinals and Roman noblemen, only 48,082 *scudi* were gathered. PLATANIA, *Polonia e Santa Sede*, 45. See also BORROMEO, *Le direttrici della politica anti-ottomana della Santa Sede*, 329–330.

¹⁶² MENNITI IPPOLITO, *Innocenzo XI*, 381–382.

the very beginning of his pontificate, Pope Odescalchi, by his loyal man, Giovanni Battista de Luca's advice, endeavoured to prevent the offences mingled with scandals. Not only did he not accredit those diplomats who did not show any inclination to square the unblessed matters, but he also neglected their visits in Rome.

Out of the most concerned States, Spain in 1682 and Venice in 1684, conceded the papal call. In contrast to the French, they reduced the number of their delegates and ceased the corruption there. The cardinals in Rome, Maidalchini and d'Estrées, who represented the Sun King, refused their consent. The departing, new standing delegate's task was to maintain the privileges with diplomatic immunity.¹⁶³ Lavardin arrived with such a fully armed retinue at the northern gate of the Eternal City that the contemporaries suspected a military attempt. The Pope let the delegate cross the Porta del Popolo only after some hesitation on 16 November 1687. Then, Lavardin had the already existing French residence, the Palazzo Farnese, reconstructed into a genuine fortress. In reply to the direct provocation, which profoundly violated the sovereignty of the Apostolic See, Innocent XI was by no means inclined to see him. The Sun King answered with threats of the annexation of Avignon and the Duchy of Castro. By Christmas, the crisis increased to extremes, since the pope put the Church of Saint Louis of the French under *interdictum* on 26 December. It happened, namely, that the indifferent French priests administered Holy Communion to the delegate who had been earlier automatically excommunicated after having violated the papal orders. At the peak of the crisis, Spain and England sided with Innocent XI and promised military aid to him. The French were obliged to retreat. In their inability, in the summer of 1688, they planned to kidnap the papal confidant, Lorenzo Casoni, since he was blamed for the established situation.¹⁶⁴

Apart from the smaller problems in the nature of protocol, the outburst of the extremely tense situation was due to the succession of the Church Electorate of Cologne. Louis XIV wanted to place a French loyal coadjutor next to the mortally ill archbishop, Maximilian Henry of Bavaria, in order to attain the appropriate succession and to strengthen his positions within the Imperium. He succeeded in having his candidate accepted by the Chapter of Cologne, however, the pope definitely refused its canonical confirmation. In the meantime, the archbishop died in June 1688. From that point, not the person of the coadjutor was at stake, but the new elector. The Sun King acted in the most threatening way ever; he recruited his army to a direct invasion against the Papal State. Innocent XI did not withdraw. On 18 September 1688, Joseph Clemens of Bavaria received the papal bulls concerning Cologne, which was unacceptable for the French. As an answer, firstly the freedom of the papal nuncio was restricted in Paris,

¹⁶³ SIGNOROTTO, *The Squadrone Volante*, 206–211. 126–127; SCHNEIDER, *Das Papsttum zur Zeit der französischen Hegemonie*, 133–143; RANKE, *A pápák története [The History of the Popes]*, 667–671; MENNITI IPPOLITO, *Innocenzo XI*, 383.

¹⁶⁴ SIGNOROTTO, *The Squadrone Volante*, 206–211. 126–127; SCHNEIDER, *Das Papsttum zur Zeit der französischen Hegemonie*, 133–143; RANKE, *A pápák története [The History of the Popes]*, 667–671; MENNITI IPPOLITO, *Innocenzo XI*, 383. – The problem of the *Quartierfreiheit* in the early eighteenth century reoccurred in Austrian relations: HUBER, *Österreich und der Hl. Stuhl*, 93–106.

then Ranuzzi and Lavardin, who broke off the diplomatic relations, headed back home. France – according to tradition – prepared for the annexation of Avignon and the Comtat Venaissin, which was indeed occupied later.¹⁶⁵

Louis XIV took revenge for the humiliation in Cologne by his attack by the Rhine. His aggression was mainly caused – apart from Innocent XI's fruitful martial spirit – by the successes of the Holy League in Hungary. The pope, who moved to the celestial home in August before the return of Nuncio Ranuzzi, could find his only pleasure in these victories. On his deathbed, besides the French situation, the change of the English affairs filled him with apprehension.

Under his pontificate the situation of the Catholics gradually improved, owing to James II (1685–1688), who was also Catholic himself. Yet his absolutistic ambition and his policy, lacking all foresight, projected a picture of the approaching fall. The pope, who supported him from the very beginning of his reign, was aware of this danger and tried to do his utmost to prevent a second Sun King's evolution. Not only did he refuse the appointment of James's confidant, the Jesuit Edward Petre, as a bishop then a cardinal, but he also objected to the ambitious Jesuit's political role as the secretary and secret counsellor of the king. The papal diplomacy was fully aware of – partly due to the unrestrained ambition of the Jesuit – the more and more unfavourable English public opinion. As a consequence, the landing of William III of Orange (1688–1702) in November 1688, then his marching in London on 28 December did not take Innocent XI by surprise. However, the shadow of the French threat and his financial engagement in Hungary hindered him from doing anything against it. The expelled monarch and his Catholic followers, the so-called Jacobites, finally found shelter in the Eternal City, where they hatched their unfulfilled dreams of return.¹⁶⁶

Alexander VIII and Innocent XII: Again on the Verge of Power Politics

The election of the last two popes of the seventeenth century was objected by France. In contrast to his attempts at rapprochement in the 80s, the candidature of Pietro Ottoboni was rejected due to his earlier statements against the Gallicanism. His election, as Alexander VIII (1689–1691), was enabled by his promises without any obligations, made to France, and by the disorganization of the imperial party, furthermore by the votes

¹⁶⁵ SIGNOROTTO, *The Squadrone Volante*, 206–211. 126–127; SCHNEIDER, *Das Papsttum zur Zeit der französischen Hegemonie*, 133–143; RANKE, *A pápák története [The History of the Popes]*, 667–671; MENNITI IPPOLITO, *Innocenzo XI*, 383.

¹⁶⁶ The dethroned English king died in Rome, his tomb can be found in Saint Peter's Basilica. MENNITI IPPOLITO, *Innocenzo XI*, 383–384. On the Jacobites with other international literature (46, notes 38–39. and 47, note 41.): GABRIELLA ERDÉLYI, „Szent Margittal Magyarországról jöttünk”. *A skót Drummond család eredetbajománya a 17. században [“We Came from Hungary with Saint Margaret”. The Origin of the Scottish Drummond Family in the Seventeenth Century]*, Sic itur ad Astra, 1994, 1–2, 38–56.

of every cardinal at the conclave.¹⁶⁷ The origin of the Spanish subject, the archbishop of Naples, Antonio Pignatelli, was also questioned by Louis XIV in 1691. In contrast to Leopold I, who set a veto on Gregorio Barbarigo, who was accused of French-amity, Louis did not operate with such severe sanctions. The reason for this might be the fact that the former nuncio of Vienna was not originally regarded as the candidate of the Austrian-Spanish faction, but of the independent *zelanti*.¹⁶⁸ Neither Pope Ottoboni, nor Pope Pignatelli, crowned as Innocent XII (1691–1700), confirmed the initial French fears. However, their pontificates radically differed from each other: Alexander VIII's was the traditional curialism, Innocent XII's the triumph of the decade-lasting inner reforms, on the other hand, the centre of both popes' policies was the arrangement of the French relations.

The Papacy of Alexander VIII started with favourable omens. The Sun King gave up the privileges of the delegates' immunity, which caused many tempests in Rome, moreover, he settled the diplomatic relations and retreated from Avignon and Venaissin. The pope returned the gestures of the monarch by giving the red hat to the bishop of Beauvais, to Forbin-Janson, who was rejected for so long. (Innocent XI was reluctant to appoint the French bishop, since he operated against the papal diplomacy on his legation in Poland in 1670s.) Naturally, the question of Gallicanism and royal supremacy over the French Catholicism was not solved immediately which irritated Louis XIV. The monarch accused the pope of being biased toward the emperor, who supported the Protestant England against France, though, his accusation was not grounded. Alexander VIII's relations to the Habsburg court were anything but not good. After the amount of aids against the Turks, which were promised by his predecessor, was radically reduced to minimum, he favoured his birth place, Venice to the Habsburgs.¹⁶⁹ On the pretext of the appointment of two French-amity cardinals around 1690, Leopold summoned his delegate from Rome home.¹⁷⁰

¹⁶⁷ AMANDO PETRUCCI, *Alessandro VIII*, Enciclopedia dei Papi III, 389–393, 391. On Pope Ottoboni's career, family and pontificate, besides the positivist works of RANKE and PASTOR (and more French authors) see also: SIGISMUND BISCHOFFSHAUSEN, *Papst Alexander VIII. und der Wiener Hof (1689–1691)*, Stuttgart–Wien 1900; the latest: ANTONIO MENNITI IPPOLITO, *Politica e carriere ecclesiastiche nel secolo XVII. I vescovi veneti fra Roma e Venezia*, Bologna 1993, in some places; here the remarkable writings of the later bishop of Szatmár should be mentioned: JÁNOS SCHEFFLER, *VIII. Sándor pápa és a bécsi udvar 1689–1691. A vatikáni levéltár okmányai alapján [Pope Alexander VIII and the Court of Vienna 1689–1691. On the Basis of the Documents in the Vatican Secret Archives]*, Ungvár 1914.

¹⁶⁸ RENATA AGO, *Innocenzo XII*, Enciclopedia dei Papi III, 395–404, 396. Detailed annals from the perspective of a contemporary: *Pontificato di Innocenzo XII. Diario del Conte Gio. Battista Campello*, a c. d. Paolo Campello della Spina, Roma 1887; and recently (apart from the editions of L. M. DE PALMA, B. PELLEGRINO): FRANCESCO ANTONIO GISONDI, *Innocenzo XII Antonio Pignatelli (Spinazzola 1615–Roma 1700)*. «I miei nepoti sono i poveri», Roma 1994.

¹⁶⁹ PLATANIA, *Polonia e Santa Sede*, 56–59; MATTEUCCI, *Il papato di fronte all'assolutismo*, 719–720.

¹⁷⁰ In detail: ELISABETH GARMS-CORNIDES, *Scene e attori della rappresentazione imperiale a Roma nell'ultimo Seicento*, La corte di Roma tra Cinque e Seicento, 509–535.

The quickly isolated pope was compelled to make concessions to the French. However, the long-term establishment of the *modus vivendi* in the question of the Church and Church policy was accomplished only under his successor.¹⁷¹ In contrast to his predecessors, Innocent XII inclined to the compromise with the Sun King for two reasons. On the one hand, he clearly saw the infirm of Spain through his own experience; on the other hand, Innocent XI's theory of the Crusade had no effect on him. Particularly, since by the dawn of his pontificate the Holy League had already achieved its feasible goals. The results were stabilized by the victory of Prince Eugene of Savoy in the Battle of Zenta in 1697 and were confirmed by the Treaty of Karlowitz. The treaty, signed between the Empire, Venice, Poland, Russia and the Turks meant to Rome only auspicious conditions for the Catholics in the Ottoman territory and it settled the status of the shrines in the Holy Land.¹⁷²

Innocent XII, in the shadow of Pope Odescalchi's international authority, could reach a compromise with France from a favourable situation. He did not shrink from such gestures towards the Sun King, as the assignment of the right of filling the archiepiscopal see of Cambrai, which he gained during the Dutch war. This enabled the legitimization of the territorial conquests during 1688–1697. In parallel to these, the relations with the Habsburgs were burdened by diplomatic scandals. In 1692, Anton von Liechtenstein and in 1699, Georg Adam von Martinitz both had passionate rows with the pope. The fact that Innocent XII supported the French candidate in the question of the Spanish succession had more severe consequences than the crisis of a pure precedence and prestigious reason. However, he could not live to see the war and its catastrophic consequences on his State.¹⁷³ He passed away shortly before the dying out of the Spanish Habsburg line.

At the time of his death, the Papal State had already returned to the course of the decades after Westphalia. The declining curve of this orbit basically did not change until a century later realized temporary cessation of the popes' State. The policy of Innocent XII, similarly to Urban VIII's, brought its own punishment. Pope Pignatelli did not face the facts that the long warfare had exhausted France, in whose back there reared up a new world power: England. Neither did he reckon that with the liberation of Hungary, Austria would gain strength to such an extent that it would be able to seize, though, not the Spanish, but the Italian inheritance. Moreover, they would not shrink back from the direct military actions against the Papal State...

¹⁷¹ PETRUCCI, *Alessandro VIII*, 391–392. See Chapter VI.

¹⁷² GISONDI, *Innocenzo XII*, III–III8 and 151–159; PETROCCHI, *La politica della Santa Sede*, 98–99; PLATANIA, *Polonia e Santa Sede*, 59–77. – Here it must be mentioned: VILMOS FRANKÓI, *Várad felszabadítása 1692-ben és XII. Ince pápa [The Liberation of Várad in 1692 and Pope Innocent XII]*, Róma 1892.

¹⁷³ AGO, *Innocenzo XII*, 403; MATTEUCCI, *Il papato di fronte all'assolutismo*, 720–722.

III

The Society, Economy and Finances of the Papal State

The evolution of Rome's policy – later its Church administration, then its relations to the single nations and national Churches – can only be comprehensible in the context of the Papal State's inner relations, which delimited the papal decision making. This phenomenon is evident in the knowledge of Rome's role on the European stage in the seventeenth century. The analysis and survey of the central Italian region's social, economical and financial problems are a rather complex task. We should examine the structure and processes of the society, as well as the criteria of the change and stability; the situation, population, production and financial needs of Rome, moreover, the relations of the surrounding area of the city, of the Roman Campagna and the other provinces of the Papal State; the economical measures of the curial offices, especially the tax and financial policy of the central fiscal body, the Apostolic Chamber. The incomes (taxes and revenues) of the Holy See from the territory of the Papal State and the incomes from the universal Church, neither their allotments, must not be neglected. An overall answer covering the whole century's questions is almost impossible for the time being due to the uneven circumstances of the resources and literature. Nevertheless, a rather exact and trustworthy picture can be drawn.¹

General Economical and Social Tendencies

“Central and North Italy was the most developing region of Western Europe with a rather high standard of living in the seventeenth century. However, around 1680 it was characterized by backwardness and depression. Its industrial equipment was insufficient, the population was significantly greater than the available resources; the most important branch was the agriculture.” The traditional explanations of this thesis are the following: 1. The main trade routes were relocated from the Mediterranean Sea to the region of the Atlantic Ocean. This change mainly affected Venice and Genoa, since

¹ A comprehensive, not too detailed analysis of the question: PETROCCHI, *Roma nel Seicento*, 29–91; a perfect summary: DELUMEAU, *Political and Administrative Centralization*, 296–302.

only these two city States' economies and wealth were based exclusively on trade. 2. The other reason is financial: on the one hand, the devaluation of money and the dumping of precious metal from the New World caused depreciation, on the other hand, the so-called price-revolution was not only an inflation shock but a slow, continuous rise of prices; it was annually 2% and in Italy between 1552–1560 it was more than 5%. This phenomenon hindered the profit of money lending; moreover, it was a hard hit for the blooming Italian banking sector.

The reason for the economic crisis of the seventeenth century can be found in the producing sector. The agricultural production meant the production from the early Modern Period to the Industrial Revolution. In the middle of the sixteenth century the blooming agriculturalism reached its peak, the population of Italy rose from 10.5 million to 13.3, though, in the seventeenth century it started to stagnate. Due to the price revolution, the price of agricultural products, especially of the corn, rose fast; in fact, it left the products of manufacture far behind. The result of which became the *ritorno alla terra*, the phenomenon of the “return back to the fields”. The capital assets naturally flew towards the agrarian sector, leading to the halt of the process – starting in the Renaissance – of the widening achievement of middle-class status and the parallel economic growth. The purchasing of manors was accompanied by the obtainment of titles of nobility by considerably inflating them.²

The re-feudalisation entailed rather negative consequences, since the recession of the technical activity in the manufactures reduced the solvent demand resulting in the state of being completely at the mercy of the cycles, which were characterized by the agricultural production and attributed to the changes of the weather. For instance, at the beginning of the seventeenth century in Milan, there were sixty-seventy cotton mills, in which 450 km of wool was produced; in 1640 there were only fifteen and in 1682 there were only five. The others were obliged to close and lay off their workers. By 1619–1622, re-feudalisation caused a general economic crisis in Italy, while those countries (England, the Netherlands and partly France) which relied on the expansion of trade, were not affected. The trade relations with the German States, which were broken due to the Thirty Years' War, had a bad influence. Italy was characterized by ruralisation instead of industrialization in the seventeenth century.³

The general regression in Italy hardly concerned the Papal State, since Rome and its surroundings due to their agriculture were of greater importance than in the North.

² CARLO M. CIPOLLA, *Il declino economico dell'Italia*, Storia dell'economia italiana. Saggi di storia economica. I: Secoli settimo-diciassettesimo (Biblioteca di Cultura Economica 24, a c. d. Carlo M. Cipolla), Milano 1959, 605–623; ALDO DE MADDALENA, *Il mondo rurale italiano nel Cinque e nel Seicento (Rassegna di studi recenti)*, Rivista Storica Italiana 76 (1964) 341–425; PASQUALE VILLANI, *Il capitalismo agrario in Italia (sec. XVII–XIX)*, Studi Storici 7 (1966) 471–513; the latest, RUGGIERO ROMANO (a c. d.), *Storia dell'economia italiana. II: Letà moderna: verso la crisi*, Torino 1991.

³ RUGGIERO ROMANO, *Tra XVI e XVII secolo. Una crisi economica: 1619–1621*, Rivista Storica Italiana 74 (1962) 508–513; [IDEM], *L'Italia nella Crisi del secolo XVII*, Studi Storici 9 (1968) 723–741; in summary and with further literature on all, LUTZ, *Rom und Europa*, 94–101.

The handicraft satisfied mainly the local needs. The export was insignificant; therefore, the economy hardly became exposed to the external circumstances, so there was only a general, long-lasting stagnation rather than regression, which is proved by the balance of the papal incomes.

The agricultural crisis, due to the long-lasting cold weather and the reduction of the general demand, generated structural changes in Rome also. In 1590 a papal bull had to arrange the tension in the money market by ordering the auction of the indebted aristocrats' lands. This decision resulted in the fact that the properties fell into the hands of new families who invested their money in real estate. Despite the development of the "new nobility", the most powerful group of the owners remained to be – the restructuring – aristocracy. Its members, unlike in most of the other regions of Italy, were followed by the religious bodies (cloisters, colleges, hospitals) which increased their property share from 28% to 37% during the seventeenth century.

The process led to the establishment of new and extensive lands. The spreading of the latifundiums damaged the population's social and economic situation on a large scale. The independent peasants were replaced by hired workers in the surrounding fields, in *Agro Romano*. As a result of the agricultural crisis, from the end of the sixteenth century Campagna could not supply Rome with enough corn and they had to compensate from other provinces (mainly from Romagna) of the Papal State. The purchasing and transport demand brought about the evolution of a narrow wholesale merchant class (*mercanti di Campagna*), whose activity was controlled by the papal office, which was responsible for the corn supply, the *Annona*.⁴

Similarly to the other regions of Italy, the small economic elite was represented by a narrow wholesale merchant class. The number of those Roman patrician families, who mainly bought estates, titles, and were the wealthiest, was about 215 in the middle of the seventeenth century.⁵ There was always a sharp difference between the title and the economical potentiality of those historical families who were at the head of the social hierarchy. It is true that one of the most mellow families, the Caetanis' annual income of only 27 thousand from their disadvantageously located lands raised astonishment and became an exception, compared to the Colonnas' and Orsinis' income of some 100 thousand. The genuine aristocracy, apart from the above mentioned, the Contis, Savellis, Cesarinis, Cesis and Altemps, all in all sixty-one 300, thirty-two 200 and sixteen

⁴ On the social and economical conditions of the Papal State in the early modern period, the already quoted fundamental work of DELUMEAU (*Vie économique et sociale de Rome*); and GIAMPIERO CAROCCI, *Lo Stato della Chiesa nella seconda metà del secolo XVI. Note e contributi*, Milano 1961; besides, a more detailed monograph: GIORGIO ROSSI, *L'Agro di Roma tra '500 e '800. Condizioni di vita e lavoro* (Biblioteca di Storia Sociale 19), Roma 1985, especially 83–174, 175–208, 209–252; on the merchants: ENZO PISCITELLI, *Un ceto scomparso nello Stato della Chiesa: i mercanti di Campagna*, SR 16 (1968) 446–457; with a more comprehensive bibliography, LUTZ, *Rom und Europa*, 116–118.

⁵ The data are estimated by Teodoro Ameyden (*Relazione della Corte di Roma*). They are quoted by MARIA ANTONIETTA VISCEGLIA, *La Giusta Statera de' porporati. Sulla composizione e rappresentazione del Sacro Collegio nella prima metà del Seicento*, RMC 4 (1996) 167–212, 175–176.

100-year-old noble families⁶ were heavily in debt and suffered its interest burdens. (As an example, the debt of the Caetanis was 400 thousand *scudi*.) Neither could the new papal families – the Boncompagnis, Perettis, Aldobrandinis, Borgheses – who accumulated an enormous capital, withdraw themselves from indebtedness, which obviously became severe after the death of the “paterfamilias”, the pope. However, it is not true for the Barberinis who could gain and accumulate such an amount of money – under Urban VIII – with which they could avoid this process.⁷

Only those who began a career in the Church could achieve substantial accumulation as well as gain political and social influences from the old-new nobility and the developing municipal middle class. The maintenance of their vocation’s opportunities was the essentials of life. This fact, in all segments, fundamentally determined the structure and mechanism of the high society in the contemporary capital of the world, the *Caput mundi*. It stands especially for the body, which created the main core of the elite and included most of the opportunities, for the College of Cardinals.⁸

The Sacred College, the Papal Court and the Roman Society

By the beginning of the early modern period, the structure of the Sacred College had already developed.⁹ The *Senatus Divinus* had its own revenues and apparatus for centuries.¹⁰

The head of the College, similarly to every curial college, was the dean; its administration was controlled by the annually different cardinal chamberlain (the *camerarius Sacri*

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ On the economical conditions of the Italian aristocracy: FRANCESCO CARACCILO, *Il regno di Napoli nei secoli XVI e XVII. I: Economia e società* (Università degli Studi di Messina. Facoltà di Magistero. Pubblicazioni dell'Istituto di Storia Vittorio De Caprariis 1), Roma 1966, especially 303–317; ANGELANTONIO SPAGNOLETTI, *Stato, aristocrazie e ordine di Malta nell'Italia moderna* (Collection de l'École Française de Rome III), Roma 1988, 1–29 and 171–200; MARIA ANTONIETTA VISCEGLIA (a. c. d.), *Signori, Patrizi, Cavalieri in Italia centro-meridionale nell'Età moderna* (Biblioteca di Cultura Moderna 1022), Roma–Bari 1992 (there are more studies on the all-Italian relation); MARIA ANTONIETTA VISCEGLIA, *Identità sociali. La nobiltà napoletana nella prima età moderna* (Studi di Storia Europea Protomoderna 9), Milano 1998, 1–58 and 59–88. See the other volumes of this series and the below quoted social-historical literature.

⁸ Cf. for example, CARVALE–CARACCILO, *Lo Stato Pontificio*, 398–405; and VISCEGLIA, *La Giusta Statera de' porporati*, 177.

⁹ On the College of Cardinals with a more comprehensive bibliography: CHRISTOPH WEBER, *Senatus Divinus. Verborgene Strukturen im Kardinalskollegium der frühen Neuzeit 1500–1800* (Beiträge zur Kirchen- und Kulturgeschichte 2), Frankfurt a. Main–Berlin–[usw.] 1996, 27–35 and 539–478; the latest outline in Hungarian: ERDŐ, *Egybázisjog, [Canon Law]*, 221–224 (282–287).

¹⁰ In more detail with international literature: PÉTER TUSOR, *A magyar koronabíborosi és bíboros protektori „intézmény” kialakulása és elbálása a 15–16. században* [*The Establishment and Decline of the “Institution” of the Crown-cardinal and Cardinal Protector in the Fifteenth-Sixteenth Centuries*], *Analecta Mediaevalia* 2 (ed. by Tibor Neumann), Piliscsaba 2004, 303–322; [IDEM], *Purpura Pannonica. Az esztergomi „bíborosi szék” kialakulásának előzményei a 17. században* [*Purpura Pannonica. The “Cardinalitial See” of Strigonium and its Antecedents in the 17th Century*] (Collectanea Vaticana Hungariae I/3), Budapest–Róma 2005, *passim*.

Collegii, who should not be confused with the chamberlain of the Holy Roman Church, the *camerlengo*. Its officials were from the clergy (*clerici Sacri Collegii*), and from the “depositories” (*depositarii et computistae Sacri Collegii*). The secretary of the College was always Italian, however, among the clerics there was annually a *dericus ultramontanus* who was in turn a German, a Spanish and a French. Besides them, there was the traditional and prestigious body of the consistorial lawyers with its hundred members. At the beginning, their duty was exclusively to prepare the formal-legal acts of the consistories, such as the execution of the donation procedure of the badge of the metropolitan’s jurisdiction, the pallium, and to issue the necessary requests. In the discussed period they had already participated in the work of various curial offices (for instance the Sacred Congregation of Rites) and took part in the operation of the Roman university.¹¹

In the second half of the sixteenth century, the only substantial change was realized by the increase and stabilization of the number of the corporation’s members and by the establishment of the congregations of the Holy See. As we could already see, in 1586 Sixtus V maximized the number, which became seventy (six cardinal bishops, fifty cardinal priests and fourteen cardinal deacons). As a consequence the “assembly” of the cardinals and certain cardinals lost their previous importance; however, the corporation’s own estates and offices naturally remained.¹²

In the contemporary administrative system the development of the unique cardinal committees, or rather the congregations, which were responsible for certain partial spheres and regarded as the archetype of the later ministries, almost resulted in a modern senior role in the central Church administration and in the governing of the Papal State.¹³ Consequently, certain cardinals’ influence and ability to yield an income depended on: of how many congregations they were a member and whether they had a leading position there, or whether they belonged to the party of the pope or to his opposition.

The prestige of the title of the cardinal, in spite of their inferior role – by replacing the renaissance cardinal-oligarchy – as an official, was enhanced by the baroque period. This is proved by the title of the *eminentissimus*, used from 1630, which not only put the cardinals above the dukes but it drew an equals sign between the members of the college, no matter their origin.¹⁴ Furthermore, this phenomenon – the increase in prestige – is es-

¹¹ OTTAVIO PIO CONTI, *Elenco dei Defensores e degli Avvocati concistoriali dall'anno 598 al 1905 con discorso preliminare*, Roma 1905, 1–35; MARIA ROSA DI SIMONE, *La «Sapienza» Romana nel Settecento. Organizzazione Universitaria e Insegnamento del Diritto* (Studi e Fonti per la storia dell’Università di Roma 1), Roma 1980, 36–37.

¹² HC IV–V, 58–61; the archontology of the officials of the College, the vice-chancellors, *camerlengos* and chamberlain cardinals is at the same place; the deans: CHRISTOPH WEBER, *Die ältesten päpstlichen Staats-handbücher. Elenchus Congregationum, Tribunalium et Collegiorum Urbis (1629–1714)* (RQ Supplementheft 45), Rom–Freiburg–Wien 1991, 168–169; see also the *Appendix*.

¹³ On the basis of the already quoted and later quoted literature.

¹⁴ The order was welcomed by the protest of the cardinals of ducal origin. The royal delegates also objected that they had to call also the “last” cardinal by this name. VISCEGLIA, *Il cerimoniale come linguaggio politico*, 145–152. According to the resolution of Urban VIII on 10 June 1630, the three German electors and the grand master of the Knights of Malta could also use the title of *eminentissimus*. MARIO BOSI, *Quando ai Cardinali fu dato il titolo di eminenza*, *Strenna dei Romanisti* 41 (1980) 107–114, 112.

established by the profusion of the contemporary works, dealing with the members, history, rights and privileges of Sacred College.¹⁵ No wonder, since the influential cardinals' households of fifty, hundred and sometimes hundred and fifty members – with masters of ceremonies, chaplains, chamberlains, with auditor (*uditore*), who headed a private office to accomplish the official duties, with the secretaries, officials of economy, with pages and servants – were the centre of the baroque representation and patronage.¹⁶ They usually left their palaces only in the company of their large retinue; their precedence of protocol and their privileges were to be respected by everybody.¹⁷ In the presence of the pope, they were the only ones who were allowed to sit with their hats on (apart from them, the delegates of the great powers were the only ones who were not obliged to keep standing), and on the papal audiences they were the only ones who did not have to kneel down and, according to the tradition, kiss the feet of the pope.¹⁸

At the beginning of the seventeenth century, the income of the cardinals, in the case of the relatives of the pope, may have reached 100–150 thousand *scudi* from many sources (benefices, pensions, official duties, the mutual revenues of the college, etc.); the leading officials earned 10–15 thousand, an ordinary curial cardinal received only 5–8 thousand *scudi*. Those cardinals, whose annual income did not reach 5,500 *scudi* (165 kg pure silver), were regarded as poor and the deficiency was supplied by the papal treasury. The incomes were spent on private expenditure, mainly in order to support their distinguished household. Under the pontificate of Urban VIII, there were 3,100 cardinal

¹⁵ Cf. WEBER, *Senatus Divinus*, 29–30 (their detailed bibliography in the notes 43–48.); their still useful synthesis: Lorenzo Cardella: *Memorie storiche de' Cardinali della santa Romana Chiesa I–IX*, Roma 1792–1797. Giovanni Battista de Luca's works with documentary value, which are about the mechanism of entering the College, about the tasks of the cardinal and about the function of many congregations: *Il cardinale della S. R. Chiesa pratico*, Roma 1680; and *Relatio Romanae Curiae Forensis, eiusque Tribunalium et Congregationum*, Romae 1673; the recent analyses of the latter one: GIUSEPPE ERMINI, *Potestà del papa nel'600, secondo G.B. de Luca*, Nuova Rivista Storica 63 (1979) 434–443; [IDEM], *La curia romana forense del secolo XVII nella relazione di G.B. de Luca*, ASI 138 (1980) 41–57. – Especially out of the volumes of the seventeenth century, the works of De Luca are by far the best concerning the system of the Roman Curia; the practical aims of their preparation will be detailed in relation with the reforms of Innocent XI.

¹⁶ MARCUS VÖLKEL, *Römische Kardinalsbaushalte des 17. Jahrhunderts. Borgese–Barberini–Chigi* (BDHIR 74), Tübingen 1993, 55 and 62–64. – While the printed and recently republished *elenchi* give information about the officials of the curial offices (see the later often quoted work of WEBER: *Die ältesten päpstlichen Staatsbandbücher*), the servants and workers of the papal and cardinal household are depicted in the manuscripts, the so-called *Ruoli di famiglia*. From the sixteenth century, there remained 432 pieces from them in the library of the Vatican. (Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana: *Ruoli 1–432. Inventario* a c. d. GIOVANNI MORELLO 1973 [Indice n. 448].) Some of them were partly or entirely published: THEODOR SICKEL, *Ein Ruolo di famiglia des Papstes Pius IV*, MIOG 14 (1893) 537–588; ANDREAS KRAUS, *Zur Datierung des Ruolo di famiglia Nr. 9 der Vatikanischen Bibliothek*, RQ 51 (1956) 236–237.

¹⁷ In more detail: TUSOR, *Purpura Pannonica*, *op. cit.*; besides, H. C. HYNES, *The Privileges of Cardinals* (Catholic University Studies in Canon Law 217), Washington 1945; S. GOYENECHE, *De iure praecedendi patrum cardinalium proprio*, Apollinaris 32 (1959) 129–141.

¹⁸ VISCEGLIA, *Il cerimoniale come linguaggio politico*, 137; on the unique tradition of the *bacio del piede* and the debates around it: MARINA CAFFIERO, *La maestà del papa. Trasformazioni dei rituali del potere a Roma tra XVIII e XIX secolo*, Cérémonial et rituel à Rome, 282–316, 296–298.

clients (servants, secretaries) in Rome who represented the 3% of the total population. The growth of the college, compared to the renaissance, caused a severe differentiation among the members. From the seventeenth century – despite the increasing prestige – there were only a few who had expansive representation by means of the reform measures to retrench the incomes, the inflation and the strengthening papal power within the Papal State.¹⁹

In the control of the division of nationalities in the College, neither did the Catholic renewal entail substantial change compared to the Italianization, starting in the fifteenth century. The regulations of the Council of Trent and Sixtus V emphasized that the members of the body “should come from all Catholic nations” (*sess. XXIV, decr. de reform., c. I*).²⁰ In reality it meant that four-fifths of the cardinals were Italian in the early modern period, and the rest were from other nations. According to the figures, out of the 544 cardinals created between 1550 and 1690, there were only 101 who were not Italian.²¹ The reasons are remarkably complex.

The most important, no matter how strange it might be, was the dynastic policy. The administration of the new pope was to be strengthened, his family had to be raised which was only possible by satisfying the old elite of the Papal State. There were 793 out of the 1154 cardinals, appointed between 1500 and 1800, who were related to the family of a pope – be it a dead or a live – or of a cardinal (eighty-nine of them were directly descendant of one of the medieval or renaissance popes and ninety were of collateral descent).²² In the course of the discussed period, there were thirteen cardinal appointments which can be specifically regarded as a wedding present, consequently the new pope acknowledged the reception of one of his family members in an older family. The collateral descents of the direct predecessors entered the College on twenty-two occasions and the family members of the previous pope, who made the new pope the member of the College of Cardinals or supported his family, could expect special advantages.²³ The family relations also determined the role in the congregations. Among the members of the Roman Inquisition during 1629–1714, the proportion of such cardinals was always above 50% and sometimes exceeded 80%.²⁴

¹⁹ REINHARD, *Kardinalseinkünfte und Kirchenreform*, 157–194.

²⁰ *Conciliorum Oecumenicorum Decreta*, 760–761.

²¹ WEBER, *Senatus Divinus*, 236.

²² WEBER, *Senatus Divinus*, 12. 367–528. 363–366. 248–250. 118–121.

²³ WEBER, *Senatus Divinus*, 93–99 and 109–121. A descriptive contribution: Benedict XV (1914–1922) was the 18. generations nephew of Innocent IV (1243–1254), which shows the incredible stability of the Italian, papal elite from the Middle Ages till the twentieth century and represents the fundamental reason for the maintenance of a such stable system in the world history. WOLFGANG REINHARD, *Le carrière papali e cardinalizie. Contributo alla storia sociale del papato*, Roma, la città del papa, 263–290, 263.

²⁴ WEBER, *Senatus Divinus*, 140–141. This unique client system was manifested also in the heraldry. WOLFGANG REINHARD, *Sozialgeschichte der Kurie in Wappenbrauch und Siegelbild. Ein Versuch über Devotionswappen frühneuzeitlicher Kardinäle*, Römische Kurie Kirchliche Finanzen. Vatikanisches Archiv II, 741–772. Apart from the political divisions of the factions within the Sacred College – mainly according to French and Habsburg orientation – the importance of the family patron-client system is put in the focus by MARIA

The other way to enter the Sacred College was the curial career. Certain positions – such as the nuncios or the judges of the Sacred Roman Rota, who were called the auditors – were clearly regarded to be a stage towards the title of a cardinal. Out of them there were five in the fifteenth century (25% of the whole creation), twenty-three in the sixteenth century (24%), twenty-seven in the seventeenth century (33%), thirty-six in the eighteenth century (40%), and twenty-seven in the nineteenth century (44%) who gained access to the College of Cardinals. Furthermore, there were six of them who became pope: Clement VIII, Gregory XV, Innocent X, Alexander VIII and Clement XIII. The loyal service to the popes had to be undoubtedly recompensed. This was demanded not only by the interests of the Papal State and the Roman court but by the central Church administration, as well.²⁵

The appointment of those curial officials (mainly the positions of the Apostolic Camera) was reasonable for the sake of tangible benefits, which could be bought for money. Between 1550 and 1690 every fourth cardinal obtained his title this way, out of which there were seven who acceded to the throne of Saint Peter.²⁶ It should be noted that in the course of the process, which was the custom until the seventeenth century, the red hat could never be bought. The income was from the action that the newly appointed cardinal resigned from his former positions without compensation, which enabled these positions to be sold again. The case of Benedetto Odescalchi is suggestive and simultaneously the most famous: at his appointment in 1645, there was a position of the Camera's chairman which was worth 42 thousand *golden scudi*, two secretarial positions of 18 thousand *scudi* and a position of a protonotary apostolic of 7 thousand, which became free. The choice of Innocent X is undeniable since thirty-two years later in the person of Odescalchi one of the most prominent and outstanding popes in history succeeded to the throne of Prince of the Apostles.²⁷ Apart from these, the influence of certain religious orders (mainly the Dominicans³) and the theological or reformer renown cannot be neglected. In the course of the Catholic renewal the appointment of Morone and Bellarmino can be reckoned here.²⁸

The peculiar tendencies left plenty of opportunities for adverse selection and several oddities. As a matter of fact, from 1500 up to 1763, there were forty-five cardinals of

ANTONIETTA VISCEGLIA, *Fazioni e lotta politica nel Sacro Collegio nella prima metà del Seicento*, La corte di Roma tra Cinque e Seicento, 37–91.

²⁵ WEBER, *Senatus Divinus*, 102–108; ALESSANDRO GNAVI, *Carriere e Curia Romana: L'uditorato di Rota (1472–1870)*, Mélanges de l'École Française de Rome. Italie et Méditerranée 106 (1994) 161–202, 179–180. – While during 1417–1527 the 39% of the cardinals had already filled a certain office, this rate rose to 59% during 1593–1667 (under Urban VIII it was 70%) and even in the nineteenth century it was 66%. The some 34,00 cardinals' various statistics: WOLFGANG REINHARD, *Le carriere papali e cardinalizie*, mainly 264–271 and 271–288.

²⁶ In the indicated period, there were all in all 112, for example Paul V and Urban VIII. WEBER, *Senatus Divinus*, 326–327 and 210–211.

²⁷ WEBER, *Senatus Divinus*, 199. According to an account from 1659, the position of the cameraleistic treasurer was worth 56 thousand, the cameraleistic auditor's the same and the cleric's 42 thousand. The prices rose in the second half of the century (on all, in detail, *idem.*, 182–202).

²⁸ WEBER, *Senatus Divinus*, 123–124 and 134.

different nationalities who had illegitimate child(ren), though in decreasing number. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries there were only eight such cases. During the discussed period there were twelve cardinals who resigned and got married. Concerning canon law, this was made possible by the fact that the dignity of a cardinal deacon could be obtained through tonsure, where celibacy was not an obligation, or at smaller orders' possession; besides, it could be preserved by certain exemptions.²⁹

The system, in spite of resulting in a gerontocratic method, was functioning. Certain cardinals, who were related to the pope, participated in Church administration for more than fifty years, through which they gained valuable and considerable experience. Among them we can find such outstanding characters, like Federico Borromeo or Innocent XI's secretary of State, Alderano Cybo. Besides traditions, the College of Cardinals became the prototype for the Western European leading corporations (municipal senates, royal cabinet-councils) due to its credible operation.³⁰

The abundance of the above mentioned data definitely attests that, despite the series of curial reforms of the sixteenth century, the local and Italian respects – even if sometimes to a variable extent – were in an advantageous situation in framing the College of Cardinals' membership. The claims and demands of the aristocracy, which had more restricted opportunities than those living in a secular State, had to be satisfied: they could only make a substantial fortune if there was a cardinal in their family. According to the inner logic of the patron-client system the mobility of the official hierarchy within the wider curial elite of the Church was to be provided, not to mention the financial respects and the interests of the newer and newer papal families, and those layers who came from the civil society and streamed into the nobility – however, the former withdrew weakened in the second half of the seventeenth century by the slow end of the mobility. At the cardinal appointments, one had to meet the inner requirements then the external factors could play a part. The remaining places could be filled by cardinals who were created by certain States' nominations, requests or by reason of foreign policy.³¹

The unique inner mechanisms – modelled on the Sacred College – of Rome, or using the contemporary terminology, *Gran Teatro del Mondo*, the “great theatre of the world”, also operated on lower levels of the Roman court and society. These levels were limited either to a couple of people, who were naturally the representatives of the important offices, families or countries, or to the members of a less dignified curial college than the primary body of the cardinals. The units of the court structure followed each other in a strict and unchanging order in the seventeenth century. Namely, after the cardinals,

²⁹ WEBER, *Senatus Divinus*, 36–43, 74–75, 80–82. There were thirty who won the cardinalship as widows. *Ibid.*, 82–86.

³⁰ WEBER, *Senatus Divinus*, 116–126 and 280–302.

³¹ Later, in chapter VI, there will be more details on the complex problems of the non Italians' entry to the College of Cardinals.

the governor of Rome³² came (theoretically he was preceded by the prefect of Rome), then in the third place was the imperial delegate, then the senator of Rome, the leader of the magistracy (4), the delegates of the monarchs (5), the auditor of the Apostolic Camera (6), the treasurer (7), Constantinople, Alexandria, Antioch, Jerusalem's titular, and Venice's regular patriarch (8). The ninth level was taken by the archbishops and bishops, living in or casually visiting the Curia, among whom the secretaries – endowed with the above mentioned titles – of the congregations could be found.

If we disregard the delegates of the foreign monarchies and the senator and prefect of Rome, the laity appeared on the 10th place, namely the heads of the two most melowered families, the “dukes of the throne”, the Colonnas and Orsinis (the *principe di Paliano* and the *duca di Bracciano*).³³ Below them were the real apostolic protonotaries (11), the members of Rome's first four noble families (apart from them were the Savellis and Contis), moreover the descendants of the families who had a papal ancestor and the closer secular relatives of the ruling pope who were the owners of the most important military positions (12); the judges of the Rota, the clerics of the Camera (13), then the dukes, counts, barons, the *conservatores* of Rome, namely the members of the magistracy (14). The 15th place is again the foreigners', the residents and the chargé d'affaires of the ruling dukes, and furthermore Malta, Bologna and Ferrara's representatives at the Holy See. The 16th was taken by the generals of the religious orders, the 17th by the referendaries of the Apostolic Signature and by the titular protonotaries. The long list was closed by the papal major-domo (18).³⁴

He was always from the confidants of the papal family and usually finished his career as a cardinal. No matter where he stood in the hierarchy, his position could not be evaded in the organization of the court life. With the help of the four masters of ceremony he controlled the order of the popes' burial and election, the consecration of the bishops, churches and altars, the ceremony of the cardinals, the Holy See's general, the prefect of Rome's, taking of the oath; furthermore, he supervised the seating of the princes, delegates and prelates in the Sistine Chapel during every ceremony. On the other hand, he was the one who organized the series of such spectacles which covered the whole city and represented power and legitimacy: like the coronation of the popes, the entry of the Lateran in a ceremonial march (*cavalcata per la prese di possesso*

³² I did not find data where the *datarius* – who, on behalf of the Pope, mainly had beneficiary, sacramental and disciplinary (*beneficiaria, sacramentaria, disciplinarian*) authority, stood in the curial hierarchy if he, exceptionally, was not a cardinal. Cf. STORTI's below quoted work, 138–174 (*La preminenza del Datario nella Curia Romana*).

³³ The precedence among them was determined by the papal regulation according to the age of the persons.

³⁴ *Magister Domus Sanctissimi*, and *Praefectus Domus et Palatii Sanctissimi*. VISCEGLIA, *Il cerimoniale come linguaggio politico*, 138–139; RENATA AGO, *Hegemony over the Social Scene and Zealous Popes (1676–1700)*, Court and Politics in Papal Rome, 229–246, 236; archontology: WEBER, *Die ältesten päpstlichen Staatsbandbücher*, 171.

papale), the entrance of the foreign monarchs and their delegates, the visitation of the seven basilicas and the various processions.³⁵

The greatest spectacle was the *possesso*, the pope's "mythical marriage with his episcopal cathedral". In practice, under Julius II this had already separated from the coronation, but it became official under Gregory XIV.³⁶ Its route was the so called *via papale*, which started at the Vatican, by passing the Castel Sant' Angelo, the Piazza Navona and the San Marco until it reached the Forum, then led through the Arch of Constantine, turned at the Coelius and by passing the Basilica of Saint Clement marched along the Lateran. It was last organized at the beginning of Pius VI's (1775–1799) pontificate. The constraint of the unique ceremony's observance is demonstrated by the death of Leo XI who caught cold during the *possesso* in the windy April of 1605 and died within ten days.³⁷

The major-domo alone directed and represented the papal household (*Famiglia Pontificia*) and the papal Chapel's (*Capella Pontificia*) members of special influence; namely those clerics and laymen, who had a determined function in the papal residency. The members, prelates of the Apostolic Palace (*Palazzo Apostolico*) entered the pope's service day by day. The magister of the papal palace (*magister Sacri Palatii*)³⁸ – who was traditionally a Dominican –, the Capuchin or Jesuit court preacher,³⁹ the personal theologian and confessor of the pope,⁴⁰ his auditor, sacristan⁴¹ and the real secret chamberlains, with the leadership of the chief chamberlain (*maestro di Camera*), lived in the Vatican and the Quirinal Palace.

Not only did they deal with protocol, but they also had an actual governmental role. They participated in the work of diverse congregations, especially of the Inquisi-

³⁵ MARTINE BOITEUX, *Parcours rituels Romains à l'époque moderne*, Cérémonial et rituel à Rome, 27–87, 31–36. 45–50. 50–52. 52–65. 69–86; VISCEGLIA, *Il cerimoniale come linguaggio politico*, 127–138; the description of the services in the life of the Curia *ibid.*, 162–168 and 170–174; furthermore RENATA AGO, *Sovrano pontefice e società di corte. Competizioni cerimoniali e politica nella seconda metà del XVII secolo*, Cérémonial et rituel à Rome, 222–238.

³⁶ The glowing spectacle of the "old Rome" was obliterated by his successor, Pius VII (1800–1823). IRENE FOSI, *Court and City in the Ceremony of the Possesso in the Sixteenth Century*, Court and Politics in Papal Rome, 31–52; VISCEGLIA, *Il cerimoniale come linguaggio politico*, 175–176; BOITEUX, *Parcours rituels Romains*, 36–45; CAFFIERO, *La maestà del papa*, 302–316; and again MARIA ANTONIETTA VISCEGLIA, *Cerimoniali romani: il ritorno e la trasfigurazione dei trionfi antichi*, Roma, la città del papa, 113–170, 114–154 (= VISCEGLIA, *La città rituale*, 53–118: *Il ritorno e la trasfigurazione dei trionfi antichi*) (on the also spectacular papal funerals); moreover, on the other smaller festivals, ceremonies: SILVIA CARANDINI, *Effimero spirituale. Feste e manifestazione religiose nella Roma dei papi in età moderna*, Roma, la città del papa, 521–554.

³⁷ SANFILIPPO, *Leone XI*, 276.

³⁸ Their archontology: WEBER, *Die ältesten päpstlichen Staatsbandbücher*, 170–171.

³⁹ MAURO DA LEONESSA, *Il Predicatore Apostolico. Note storiche*, Isola del Liri 1929, 44–45 and with prosopography 61–121.

⁴⁰ Cf. more F. ANTONIO M. VICENTINI, *Il confessore del S. Palazzo Apostolico e l'ordine dei servi di Maria. Memorie storiche pubblicate nell'anno giubilare 1925*, Vicenza 1925, 3–4. (From the beginning of the seventeenth century, the spiritual life of the members of the papal household was always led by a Servite monk, their biographies: 20–34.)

⁴¹ Their Latin equivalents: *theologus*, *auditor*, *sacrista Sanctissimi Domini Nostri*.

tion, in the organization of the consistories, or they functioned as various papal secretaries. Their clout was excellent since they met the pope daily, or they could engage in longer conversations with those who were waiting for an audience in the often quoted antechamber (*anticamera*). On the other hand, the papal chief almoner, the cup-bearer, the guard of the papal cloakroom, the director of the papal pilgrim house (only this latter could be a layman in the seventeenth century),⁴² etc.⁴³ played an important role in the everyday life of the court. From among the lower orders, the old Roman families (by wearing a coat and a sword) were represented by the chief quartermaster of the Apostolic Palaces, the Master of the Horse, the chief postmaster, the carrier of the Golden Roses, the commander of the Swiss Guard and the officers of the papal Noble Guard, out of whom there were many related to the pope.⁴⁴

The highest level of the court elite and the papal household were co-opted by the rest of the curial offices' some fifty prominent officials – without any order of rank –, by the provincial governors, vice-legates and major beneficiaries.⁴⁵ They were followed by a long-long row of the smaller officials who often formed a separate body: secretaries, abbreviators, glossators, correctors, computists, bullators, etc. Their function was mostly titular, mainly the clerics held the positions of real activity.⁴⁶ The effectual Curia was enclosed by the members of the cardinals and aristocrats' households, the permanent or temporary representatives of the Papal State and Italy's towns, and of the foreign prelates and noblemen.⁴⁷

⁴² See more on him: N. [?], *Del Maestro del S. Ospizio Apostolico*, Vignanello 1923, 8–10. His rights as a chamberlain were confirmed by Alexander VII.

⁴³ The group of the papal secret chamberlains was way more populous than the officials who accomplished effectual tasks (*camerieri segreti partecipanti*). FILIPPO FREZZA, *Dei Camerari segreti e d'Onore del Summo Pontefice memorie storiche*, Roma 1884 (on their other tasks and their unique dress: 23–25).

⁴⁴ JUDITH A. HOOK, *Urban VIII. Die Paradoxie der geistlichen Monarchie*, Europas Fürstenthöfe 1400–1800 (hrsg. v. A.G. Dickens), Graz–Wien–Köln 1978, 213–231, 213–214; a recent outline: HENRY DIETRICH FERNÁNDEZ, *The Patrimony of St Peter. The Papal Court at Rome, c. 1450–1700*, The Princely Courts of Europe. Ritual, Politics and Culture under the Ancien Régime 1500–1750 (ed. by John Adamson), London 1999, 141–163 and 326–328; on the life, every days of the papal court and their sources, for instance: *Giancinto Gigli: Diario Romano*, *op. cit.*; ALESSANDRO BASTIAANSE, *Le Memorie dell'Ameyden sui Papi e cardinali del Seicento basate sulle sue esperienze personali*, AHP 4 (1966) 155–195; and a thorough analysis from 1621–1623: JAITNER, *Die Hauptinstruktionen Gregors XV*, 335–497. – However, the direct surroundings of the Popes, which did not do official work, did not become the subject of newer analyses. Their numerous data, based on contemporary and mainly eighteenth century descriptions, can be found: GAETANO MORONI, *Dizionario di erudizione storico-ecclesiastica. Da S. Pietro sino ai nostri giorni I–CIII*, Venezia 1840–1861, *passim* [Indici I–VI, Venezia 1878–1879].

⁴⁵ It must be noted that the critique of the *Famiglia Pontificia* is rather survey-like. An accurate account on Gregory XV's "family": JAITNER, *Die Hauptinstruktionen Gregors XV*, 463–480. The primary scene of the papal household, the actual papal palace's main building, won its present shape under Sixtus V. The public and secret consistories' rooms, the *Sala del Concistoro Pubblico (Aula Tertia)* and the *Sala del Concistoro Segreto (dello Spogliatoio)* are here, moreover, the mainly representative *Sala Regia* and the *Scala Regia*, which leads to it, furthermore, the *Sala Clementina* established by Clement VIII. DEOCLECIO R. DE CAMPOS, *I Palazzi Vaticani (Roma Cristiana 17)*, Roma 1967, 184–193 and *ad indicem*. On the smaller alterations by certain Popes: 195–228.

⁴⁶ See the literature quoted in the previous notes.

⁴⁷ On the delegates of the towns and then only on their agents: STADER, *Herrschaft durch Verflechtung*, 62–81.

In spite of its close order, the whole system was characterized by occasional jockeying for position and some flexibility, which was due to the reorganization and establishment of the offices.⁴⁸ In order to maintain the system's receptivity and social acceptance, the establishment of newer bodies and the extension of the older offices were still frequent in the seventeenth century. However, this was accompanied by dysfunctional proliferation, which threatened efficiency. The closing from below, the restriction then cessation of reception caused the impossibility of the lower orders' rise and also the reduction then blocking of their social mobility. The functional capacity could have been supported only in this way, since by the end of the century there was no financial basis for the Curia, namely the Church and State administration's earlier extensive measures.⁴⁹

Apart from having been regulated, the system was blended with various personal overlaps and was operated and kept together by complicated concerns. The clients of the cardinals could often obtain favourable curial positions. The papal officials could distinguish themselves by possession of the title of referendary or chamberlain. The office of the referendary in the Signature was often held by – with the exception of the cardinals and diocesan bishops – the congregational secretaries and other curial officials who had important assignments from the governors of provincial towns and by the members of the nunciatures. The proportion of the referendaries, coming from Rome, or rather from the Papal State was 30–50%, they were followed by Tuscan, Genoese, Milanese, Venetian and Paduan officials. In their constitution concerning birth place, the College of Cardinals' factions' and the pope's place of origin was determining. In 1665, there were not any Venetians, however, from 1693 their number rose considerably due, not to the short pontificate of Alexander VIII, but to the vice-chancellorship of his nephew, Pietro Ottoboni. Similarly, the ratio of the Neapolitans considerably grew at the same time. (Before his election, Innocent XII of South Italian origin was the archbishop of Naples.⁵⁰)

Apart from prestige, the obtainment of many titles, offices, and benefices also improved one's financial circumstances. The maintenance of the representation, which was appropriate to the rank, was not cheap. The required level: the model of the careers, which meant financial accumulation and growth in influence via obtaining titles, positions and benefices – in spite of the complexity of the system –, was graphically easy in

⁴⁸ VISCEGLIA, *Il cerimoniale come linguaggio politico*, 139–143.

⁴⁹ Comprehensively: RENATA AGO, *Carriere e clientele nella Roma barocca*, Roma–Bari 1990, 13–19; and the related works of REINHARD, which were quoted in the *Introduction*.

⁵⁰ AGO, *Carriere e clientele*, 16–18 and 23–25 (the data in chart format are from 1665–1733). The function of the patron-client system is summarised by: MARCO PELLEGRINI, *Corte di Roma e aristocrazie italiane in età moderna. Per una lettura storico-sociale della Curia Romana*, Rivista di Storia e Letteratura Religiosa 30 (1994) 543–602; the most important works are introduced in review-form and collated by: MARIA ANTONIETTA VISCEGLIA, *Burocrazia, mobilità sociale e patronage alla Corte di Roma tra Cinque e Seicento. Alcuni aspetti del recente dibattito storiografico e prospettive di ricerca*, RMC 3 (1995) 11–55; mainly with the analysis of the example of the Ottobonis: MENNITI IPPOLITO, *Politica e carriere ecclesiastiche*, sporadically.

its main types.⁵¹ For success, an investment of capital was needed in order to buy certain offices or a prestigious, related patron even on lower levels.

A successful advancement not only depended on one's family relations and financial elements. The inner motivation, the criteria of the offices' selection and their involved risks, the small details of the career's advancement: its sophisticated "culture", moreover, the cross-dependence, proved to be determining. The long-awaited moment that the prelate could do something to his family did not immediately arrive. A foreign mission proved to be a unique opportunity to internationalize one's relations; furthermore, acquiring references from monarchs usually meant the obtainment of higher positions for those who returned to Rome.⁵²

Apart from numerous nunciatures, the commission – usually for three years – of the Apostolic Camera; the two congregations which played an important role in Church administration: the Consulta and the *Buon Governo*; the two courts: the Rota and the Signature; the approximately fifty provincial governorships and legations, and respectively the prelate and secretary positions of the other congregations were in question of a real career.⁵³ In the system, it should be emphasised that the all-Italian character occurred on every level. Between 1665 and 1733 the proportion of the Romans in the *Buon Governo* was 42%, in the Signature 39%, in the Camera 30%, while in the Consulta it was only 15%. The remaining places were filled only by Italians – though there was no regulation for this –, the Consulta was unanimously ruled by Tuscans.⁵⁴ In this period, only in the Rota did the cosmopolitan character dominate.⁵⁵

Out of the – known⁵⁶ or unknown – cases of the personal career types where significant growth occurred by maintaining the gained positions through generations, one should be examined, which has already been discussed, concerning the peace negotiations in Westphalia: Fabio Chigi's.

The future pope, the descendant of an ordinary Sienese family, after having graduated from the university, arrived in the capital of the Papal State in December 1626.

⁵¹ REINHARD, *Freunde und Kreaturen*, 22–31 and 71.

⁵² Certain phases' micro-historical analysis, through the cases of Fabrizio Spada and Camillo Cybo: AGO, *Carriere e clientele*, 32–42. 42–43. 44–51. 51–60. 73–113. 115–137. 139–161 and 163–180.

⁵³ AGO, *Carriere e clientele*, 19–21.

⁵⁴ Statistics with detailed charts: AGO, *Carriere e clientele*, 26–31.

⁵⁵ RICHARD BLAAS, *Das kaiserliche Auditoriat bei der Sacra Rota Romana*, MÖStA II (1958) 37–152, 48–57; AGO, *Carriere e clientele*, 22. – The above mentioned institutions are going to be presented in more detail later.

⁵⁶ Apart from the next quoted and REINHARD's works (*Papal Power and Family Strategy*, 329–356; *Freunde und Kreaturen*, 63–67; Domenico Cecchini; 67–69; Francesco Albizzi; 69–71; Mazarin; *Amterlaufbahn und Familienstatus*, 328–427) the career – studied in detail and in monographic form – of the Barberinis' devoted supporter, who loyally served three Popes, Giulio Sacchetti, the candidate for the papal throne of 1644, should be mentioned: IRENE FOSI, *All'ombra dei Barberini. Fedeltà e servizio nella Roma barocca* (Biblioteca del Cinquecento 73), Roma 1997; a more roughly outlined career picture of the French and Flemish nuncio, Guido Bentivoglio: RAFFAELE BELVEDERE, *La vita della Curia Romana ai primi del '600*, SR 6 (1958) 534–546; on the typical relations of a slightly distant pope-relative cardinal: RENATO LEFEVRE, *Un cardinale del '600: G.B. Deti*, ASRSP 94 (3.s. 25) (1971) 183–208.

In the first two years of his stay, he established and stabilized his circle of acquaintances and patrons – plainly, his connections –, which preconditioned him for integration into the Curia. In the company of his beloved brother, Agostino, he often visited the various offices, he became acquainted with their operations and he extended his knowledge in law. His primary patron was Clemente Merlini, one of the prestigious judges of the Rota. Within two years, he was indebted to him for applying for the title of the referendary of the Apostolic Signature from Urban VIII, which almost immediately involved positions of effective duties. He received his nomination in January 1629, and in the same year he moved to Ferrara where he functioned as vice-legate until 1634. He was ordered back to Rome to be sent to Malta as a general inquisitor and Apostolic delegate. In the next year he obtained the bishoprics of Nardò, located by Lecce. Despite the fact that his vice-legation was accompanied by diverse incomes, until this moment his expenses – which were doubled with his position of referendary – were covered by his family in Siena, namely by his uncle, Agostino Chigi's annual allowance of thousand *scudi*.

What proved to be a matter of the utmost importance in his rising career was that after his service in Malta, in 1639 he did not receive the leadership of a dignified Italian diocese but he was entrusted with the nunciature of Cologne. Hereupon, he became the primary expert of the German affairs, and later the extraordinary nuncio of the peace congress of Münster in December 1643. After twenty-two years of absence by fits and starts, he returned to the Eternal City in 1651, where he was not obliged to wait for the substantial turn of his career. Innocent X entrusted the administration of the Secretariat of State to him, as to the key figure of the papal diplomacy, then in the following year he was made a cardinal.

His career and the initial support of his family has been a peculiar example of the strategy of an aristocratic family which aimed for the growth of fortune and influence. The investment risked by his relatives would have been abundantly recovered, if Fabio had become the archbishop of Siena after his service in Malta or his nunciatures. His appointment as a cardinal guaranteed his younger relatives' curial advance by being far beyond their local opportunities. The papal throne, won in 1656, meant a dazzling career for all of them.⁵⁷

The ecclesiastical order and the nobility, with rather limited openings, – in the social and not necessarily financial rank of orders – were followed by the civil middle and upper class: wholesalers, bankers, notaries, lawyers, doctors, chemists, etc. The greatest class of Roman society was naturally formed by the craftsmen, retailers and workers. In the 1620s there were 5,615–5,635 enterprises with 6,609 owners and 17,584 employees.⁵⁸ The whole curial system, as long as it promised a possibility to rise and to make ends meet, seemed

⁵⁷ MARCO TEODORI, *I parenti del papa. Nepotismo pontificio e formazione del patrimonio Chigi nella Roma barocca*, Padova 2001, 46–55; KRAUTHEIMER, *The Rome of Alexander VII*, 8–14.

⁵⁸ RENATA AGO, *Economia barocca. Mercato e istituzioni nella Roma del Seicento* (Saggi Donzelli, Storia e scienze sociali), Roma 1998, 30–60, 6.

more than acceptable, it was almost ideal. The universal papal monarchy, which mainly rested on spiritual basis, was a wider opening field for them, comparing to other European countries. Although in the seventeenth century they could not succeed to the papal throne, yet there were many of these classes, who could enter the Sacred College, not to mention social mobility from the lower ecclesiastical court and official levels.

The proportion of the clerics along with the nuns, in Rome, almost exceeded the 5%. At the end of the sixteenth century, according to reliable sources, there were 68 bishops, 1,221 priests, 1,489 monks and 1,641 nuns living in the Eternal City. After a century – presumably in close relation to the repeated regulation of the obligation of residence – there were, however only 40 bishops, but already 2,309 priests, 3,559 monks and 1,814 nuns.⁵⁹ This was a tremendously high proportion and number concerning the overall-European average – especially with the amplification of the prelate and cardinal clients – if the affiliation to the social elite is taken into consideration. Anticlericalism was not a matter of question in the Papal State until the beginning and middle of the eighteenth century. The phenomenon, occurring as a result of the end of the social mobilization, would have been a rather decent self-contradiction. This statement – concerning the deep and traditional piety of the rural population – is adequate even if we are aware of the fact that the chance of rise in farmers and winegrowers, comparing to the townspeople, was far more moderate and unrealizable by evading the way for the achievement of middle-class status.⁶⁰

Due to the centralized, rather clerical system the local governments in other towns, as well as in Rome, had limited authority and autonomy.⁶¹ Apart from the curial power centres, the magistracy of the capital – comparing to its earlier influence – was characterized by a continuous and unstoppable weakening from the beginning of the sixteenth century. It could be regarded metaphoric that around the end of the sixteenth century, the position of Rome's *conservatori* near the throne in the Sistine Chapel was taken up by the representatives of the princes, headed by the imperial delegate. The magistracy of the Eternal City cannot be completely disregarded.⁶² The town hall(s), the Palazzo del Senatore and the Palazzo dei Conservatori had a central role in the ritual of the Roman public life, mainly in the course of *sede vacante*. None of the papal dynasties neglected

⁵⁹ The data are from 1592 and 1702. PIETRO STELLA, *Strategie familiari e celibato sacro in Italia fra '600 e '700*, Salesianum 41 (1979) 73–109, notes 26 and 79. The proportion of the clergy, concerning the total population, rose from 1.2% to 1.6%, while the monks' from 1.5% to 2.5%. There are data about the nuns from 1640 and 1650, according to which the result of their growth within one decade was from 1.6% to 2.21%, which meant that there were 2796 (!) nuns to 126,192 inhabitants. (*Ibid.*)

⁶⁰ Above all the quoted literature: LUTZ, *Rom und Europa*, 106–III.

⁶¹ At the bottom of the Roman society, there were the Jews and the prostitutes, the number of the latter, despite the strict regulations of Clement VIII, was still around 1150. However, after having ousted them around 1660, their number was around a hundred by 1740. *Ibid.* and ROBERTO ZAPPERI, *Der Neid und die Macht. Die Farnese und Aldobrandini im barocken Rom*, München 1994, 52–59; ANNA FOA-KENNETH STOW, *Gli ebrei di Roma. Potere, rituale e società in età moderna*, Roma, la città del papa, 557–582.

⁶² It is symbolic that – in parallel to the decline of the international role – Innocent X gave back the position of the representative of the *conservatores* in 1647. VISCEGLIA, *Il cerimoniale come linguaggio politico*, 130–133.

to insert their names and badges into the symbols of the *Senatus Populusque Romanus*. Besides, the scenes of court life did not separate from but intertwined with the various parts of the city. Not only should the Vatican-Quirinal-Lateran triangle be taken into consideration, but for instance the Piazza Navona, which became a sort of private territory of Innocent X's family in the middle of the century.⁶³

In figures, the typical characters of the patron-client system – though, they served as a field of success throughout Italy – formed the life of the population of 1.6–1.8 million people of 41,823 kilometres within the Papal State. The two margin numbers show a slight increase in the seventeenth century, as opposed to Spain, where there is a decrease from 7.5 to 5.7 million.

The change and the number of inhabitants of certain provinces are shown in the following chart:⁶⁴

Provinces	Population	
	1656	1701
Campagna Marittima, Sabina	170,762	241,115
Patrimonio and the Duchy of Castro	114,045	136,726
Umbria and Camerino	343,239	360,493
Marca	282,260	333,362
Duchy of Urbino	113,201	120,172
Romagna	252,027	295,612
Duchy of Ferrara	86,342	117,076
Bologna	203,462	237,381
<i>Total:</i>	<i>1,565,338</i>	<i>1,841,937</i>

The number of the inhabitants of 120 thousand people of the most affected Eternal City (24–28 thousand households) is only steady until the 1650s.⁶⁵ This number was

⁶³ AGO, *Hegemony over the Social Scene*, 230–234 and 234–238; VISCEGLIA, *Cerimoniali romani*, 154–170; PARTNER, *Il mondo della curia*, 224–229; AGO, *Sovrano pontefice e società di corte*, 222–238; in more detail: NUSSDORFER, *Civic Politic in the Rome*, 21–58; [IDEM], *Il «popolo romano» e i papi: la vita politica della capitale religiosa*, Roma, la città del papa, 241–262; The criteria of becoming a citizen and his rank is analysed by: ELISABETTA MORI, «Tot reges in Urbe Roma quot cives». *Cittadinanza e nobiltà a Roma tra Cinque e Seicento*, RMC 4 (1996) 379–401.

⁶⁴ G. BELOCH, *La popolazione d'Italia nei secoli sedicesimo, diciassettesimo e diciottesimo*, Storia dell'economia italiana, 449–500, 468 and 470. A general decline is noticeable only after this, the result of the register of 1736 showed 1,656,585 inhabitants.

⁶⁵ Only as a subject for comparison, the population of other Italian towns around the 1630s: Naples 300,000; Messina and Venice 120,000; Palermo 100,000. The data are on the basis of *Raum und Bevölkerung in der Weltgeschichte. III: Vom Mittelalter zur Neuzeit*, hrsg. v. ERNST WOLFGANG BUCHHOLZ, Würzburg 1966 from LUTZ: *Rom und Europa*, 109–112.

already reached by the city under Paul V in the proliferation at the beginning of the century. As a consequence of the re-feudalization at the turn of the century, from the latifundiums, a powerful immigration started, however, into perishable rather than developing conditions. Between 1655 and 1657, the number of inhabitants reduced from 123–126 thousand to 100 thousand people due to the plague; then, in the following decade it grew to 110 thousand. In 1680 the Roman population contained the same amount of people and households as fifty years earlier.⁶⁶ Thus, there was not a bigger increase in the second half of the century, except the last decade, when the number of the total population approximated 140 thousand persons.⁶⁷

Apart from Rome, the number of the provincial capitals and bigger towns in the Papal State were the following:⁶⁸

Towns	Population	
	1656	1701
Bologna	53,494	63,346
Ferrara	23,368	29,129
Perugia	17,385	16,045
Ravenna	12,969	14,361
Viterbo	11,124	11,500
Faenza	10,445	11,380
Forlì	10,276	11,985
Cesena	10,094	10,124
Ancona	9,556	8,644
Iesi	8,305	5,062
Velletri	5,266	10,120

The long and reliable row of figures can mainly be referred to the pure-blooded population. However, the “audience” of the *Gran Teatro del Mondo* cannot be forgotten. The proportion of foreign people, staying on and off – mostly Spanish⁶⁹ – in the city was always considerable. Annually, it was 30 thousand people: merchants, diplomats, artists and peregrinating young noblemen. Above all, there were the pilgrims, espe-

⁶⁶ MONACO, *Le finanze pontificie al tempo di Paolo V*, 89; KRAUTHEIMER, *The Rome of Alexander VII*, 13.

⁶⁷ There were exactly 138 568 inhabitants in 1702. STELLA, *Strategie familiari e celibato sacro*, 79. BELOCH's data (*La popolazione d'Italia*, 469) differ from the above, his data are: 1600: 109,729, 1650: 126,192, 1656: 120,596, 1701: 141,784.

⁶⁸ BELOCH, *La popolazione d'Italia*, 470.

⁶⁹ Cf. THOMAS DANDELET, *Spanish Conquest and Colonization at the Center of the Old World: The Spanish Nation in Rome 1555–1625*, *The Journal of Modern History* 69 (1997) 479–511.

cially around Easter and in the Jubilees, which were organized every twenty-five years.⁷⁰ During the ceremony of Jubilee of 1650, an enormous mass of 700 thousand believers visited the Eternal City.⁷¹ In the course of the more and more popular European round trips, from the middle of the century in Rome, there were more and more foreigners, so called “tourists”, of mainly Protestant origin. These noblemen meant a considerable risk by arousing the Inquisition’s interest.⁷²

Similarly to the proportion of the foreign population, the distribution of genders also differed from the early modern European average, which was characterized by female dominance. In Rome – like in some harbours and university towns – there were a hundred women for one hundred-fifty men. This fact, like the continuously increasing number of the clerics, is barely explained by the existence of the Curia. In the papal court itself – except certain extreme manifestations of nepotism – women played no role at all.⁷³

The picture of Roman society cannot be holistic without dealing with the incomes of the wider strata, compared to the ecclesiastical elite and secular elite’s, mainly the cardinals’ incomes – or later with the revenues in the papal budget –, or along with their expenses, to the price conditions which determined the general standard of living. The sundry data shows society’s division concerning the quality of life:

The daily wage of the winegrowers, living within Rome and forming the 20% of the workers, was between 14–25 *baiocco* (*b*), which meant an annual income of 42–72 *scudi* if we count with twenty-five working days a month. During 1627–1647, the day-labourers of the Roman Campagna got daily 15 *b*. A painter in 1624 got daily 35 *b*, between 1632–1634 31–40 *b*, which meant annually 90–120 *scudi*. A wage of 45–60 *b* is known from 1648, which was in case of an assistant 20–30 *b*, annually 135–180, or 60–90 *scudi*. In 1610 a carpenter earned 80 *b*, a tinker 40 *b*, which were annually 240 and 120 *scudi*. In 1658 a stonemason got 45 *b*, his assistant 25 *b*, so they earned annually 135 and 75 *scudi*. By analysing the incomes of the intellectuals, one can see that in 1610 a doctor earned 136 *scudi* in accordance with various benefits. An auditor (*computista*) at the Banco de Santo Spirito

⁷⁰ On the Roman “catering trade”, developed by the demand, with numerous hotel statistical accounts: MARIO ROMANI, *Pellegrini e viaggiatori nell'economia di Roma dal XIV al XVII secolo*, Milano 1948, 1–55, 56–141, 142–197, 198–234, 235–262.

⁷¹ Out of which 400 000 were counted by May. UTA PIERETH, *Bericht aus Rom. Ein Diario zum Heiligen Jahr 1650*, RHM 42 (2000) 324–350, 350; VISCEGLIA, *Giubilei tra pace e guerre*, 546–472. The number of visitors significantly reduced by 1675, yet it was still considerable. MARINA CAFFIERO, *L'anno Santo come risorsa politica. Il giubileo del 1675 tra polemica antiprotestante e apologia del papato*, RMC 5 (1997) 475–500; the description of the still glamorous festivals: ROBERT A. BEDDARD, *Pope Clement X's Inauguration of the Holy Year of 1675*, AHP 38 (2000) 97–117. On the ceremonies of the Jubilees and on their spectacles in the context of one and a half centuries, more: VISCEGLIA, *La città rituale*, 239–286: «*Haec est Porta Domini. Iusti intrabunt in eam*». *I rituali del giubileo* (= *La storia dei Giubilei. III: 1600–1775*, a c. d. A. ZUCCARI, Firenze 1999, 84–129).

⁷² IRENE FOSI, *Roma e gli «ultramontani». Conversioni, viaggi, identità*, QFIAB 81 (2001) 351–396, 384–396; PETER SCHMIDT, *L'Inquisizione e gli stranieri*, *L'Inquisizione e gli storici: un cantiere aperto. Tavola rotonda nell'ambito della conferenza annuale della ricerca* (Roma, 24–25 giugno 1999) (Atti dei Convegni Lincei 162), Roma 2000, 365–372.

⁷³ LUTZ, *Rom und Europa*, 106–III; and the latest, STEFANO ANDRETTA, *Il governo dell'osservanza: poteri e monache dal Sacco alla fine del Seicento*, Roma, la città del papa, 397–428.

earned 200 in 1619, 400 *scudi* in 1658, however he did not receive any other allocations. A deputy-cashier got 80 *scudi* in 1619, 120 *scudi* in 1658, plus benefits of the same amount of money. The incomes in kind of the *Santo Spirito* hospital's commandant were – mainly food – 150 *scudi* a year. The price conditions, which consumed the incomes, were the following. The rise in the prices culminated during 1600–1609, then there was a sudden fall, then after 1620 a slow decrease can be seen. During 1623–1644 a kilogram of beef was 8–11 *b*, a kilogram of cheese 14–18 *b*, a hen 25–35 *b*, a loaf of bread was 3,5–4,5 *b*; which means, for a *scudo* one could buy 9–12 kilograms of beef, 5,5–7 kilograms of cheese, 3–4 hens, 22–28 loaves of bread. While, a carriage cost 500 *scudi*, the Madruzzo Villa, nearby the Vatican, was sold for 13,000 *scudi* in 1608, for 14,500 *scudi* in 1668. The rent of the villa was rather cheap in 1630, at a life-long date it was 400 *scudi* a year.⁷⁴

The mighty logistics of the city were characterized by more shocking data. Rome's annual need for corn was 25 thousand tons, which cost 700 thousand to 1 million *scudi*. In 1622, the stock of horses was 3,400, with an additional 5,000 horses and mules which were in the possession of the papal household, cardinals, and the diplomatic representatives. At the end of the sixteenth century, there were 28 thousand cattle, 96 thousand lambs and 20 thousand swine needed. The same figures stayed until the middle of the seventeenth century.⁷⁵ These numbers are remarkable by themselves. Their pure importance is the fact that they clearly demonstrate the enormous challenge the papal administration had to face in operating the Eternal City.⁷⁶ Not to mention the utterly complicated financial system.

The Papal Budget

If the medieval Papacy was the reformer of the administration, then the early modern Papacy can be regarded as the forerunner of the modern State due, not only to its activity in State administration and diplomacy, but also in the handling of economy and finance. It was the first body which imposed a permanent, direct tax (*sussidio triennale*) in order to maintain its permanent army in 1543; the development of the economy was supported by mercantilist means: construction and regular maintenance of roads, bridges, ports and the expansion of industry and trade (the extension and modernization of the port of Civitavecchia; the planned utilization of the mines in Tolfa).⁷⁷ Its enduring ca-

⁷⁴ LUTZ, *Rom und Europa*, 113–115. On the Roman population and the various sources of income, especially on the opportunities offered by the Curia: NUSSDORFER, *Civic Politics in the Rome*, 60–116 and 168–204.

⁷⁵ LUTZ, *Rom und Europa*, 100–106.

⁷⁶ On the corn supply, on the Roman logistics, and on its organization in startling detail: VOLKER REINHARDT, *Überleben in der frühneuzeitlichen Stadt. Annona und Getreideversorgung in Rom 1563–1797* (BDHIR 72), Tübingen 1991, 1–34 and 37; on the officials of more importance: [IDEM], *Die Präfecten der römischen Annona im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert. Karrieremuster als Behördengeschichte*, RQ 85 (1990) 98–115.

⁷⁷ In more detail: G. BARBIERI, *Industria e politica mineraria nello Stato Pontificio dal 400 al 600*, Roma 1940.

capacity is proved by a subsidy of 19,632,143 *scudi* that Rome gave to the Catholic nations during 1542–1716.⁷⁸

The economy of the Papacy was controlled by many offices, which had accurate policy, separate accounting and competency. However, in the seventeenth century, the incomes of the papal budget were determined by the above mentioned economical, social environment. The more and more complicated administration could hardly cope with the more and more unfavourable tendencies. In the second half of the century, the balance, turning to negative, was temporarily altered only by the curial reform and the strict cuts under Innocent XI, who acted by the impetus of the *squadron volante*.

The papal finances – which terminology primarily, but not exclusively meant the finances of the Papal State –, the situation of the incomes and expenses besides the social processes explain the seemingly controversial behaviour of Rome in the European policy as well as in its relations with certain States and particular Churches. In contrast to the Middle Ages, in the seventeenth century the proportion of the incomes from the universal Church and to State incomes was 20:80. It also meant that three-quarters of the papal revenues came from same sort of sources as other monarchs' incomes.⁷⁹

The State Incomes of the Papacy: “Steady and Precarious Revenues”

According to a survey from 1652, the State incomes, the taxes, profits, duties and dues were unevenly distributed among the provinces of the Papal State. Marca received a share of 33% from the public burden, Umbria 12–14%, the “Patrimony of Saint Peter”, namely the *Patrimonium Petri*: Northern Lazio and Sabina, furthermore Romagna (except Bologna, which had an independent economy) 12–14% alike, Campagna and Marittima 4% and Urbino 2% due to its special privileges. The situation of Rome was rather favourable due to many local bodies' and communities' numerous privileges

⁷⁸ The data can be found at ARMANDO LODOLINI, *L'Archivio di Stato di Roma*, Roma 1960, 82; the comprehensive evaluation of the aid policy: MONACO, *Le finanze pontificie al tempo di Paolo V*, 35–37.

⁷⁹ Cf. PO-CHIA HSIA, *The World of Catholic Renewal*, 99–102; BIRELEY, *The Refashioning of Catholicism*, 71–73; THOMSON, *Popes and Princes*, 78–95 and 95–114. – The first comprehensive attempt to the historical analysis of the papal budget: CLEMENS BAUER, *Die Epochen der Papstfinanz*, HZ 138 (1928) 457–503; the historiography of the researches and the changes of the institutional structure: PETER PARTNER, *Papal Financial Policy in the Renaissance and Counter-Reformation*, Past and Present 88 (1980) 17–62, 20–22; and ANDREA GARDI, *La fiscalità pontificia tra medioevo ed età moderna*, Società e Storia 9 (1986) 509–557, mainly 509–520–538 and 544–557; MONACO, *Le finanze pontificie al tempo di Paolo V*, 19–56; WOLFGANG REINHARD, *Finanza pontificia, sistema beneficiale e finanza statale nell'età confessionale*, Fisco, religione, Stato nell'età confessionale (Annali dell'Istituto Storico Italo-germanico 26, a c. d. Hermann Kellenbenz–Paolo Prodi), Bologna 1989, 459–504; and especially ENRICO STUMPO, *Il capitale finanziario a Roma fra Cinque e Seicento. Contributo alla storia della fiscalità pontificia in età moderna (1570–1660)* (Pubblicazioni della Facoltà di Giurisprudenza dell'Università di Sassari, Serie Storica 4), Milano 1985.

and exemptions. It paid only 33% in the central Treasury, which was controlled by the *Camera Apostolica*.⁸⁰

The main units of the office controlled by the *camerlengo* (*cardinalis camerarius S.R.E.*) consisted of eight *presidenza*, or *prefettura*, which were led by clerics of the Camera (*chierici di Camera*) of the same amount. Their college of twelve members, since Sixtus V, constituted the prominent body with the right of decision making. On behalf of the Apostolic Camera, they signed with its seal and issued the documents of various cases, like the *prefetturas*, as well, which controlled diverse cases related to economy and finance. They dealt with the corn supply (*prefettura dell'Annona*), with the national food supply (*prefettura della Grascia*), with duties (*delle Dogane*), with the roads (*delle Strade*), with the army (*delle Armi*), with the ports and their profits (*delle Ripe*), with prisons (*delle Carceri*), with the archives (*degli Archivi*) and with minting (*della Zecca*). Apart from the eight, four other clerics of the Camera each governed a town, directly controlled by the office. Apart from the college of the clerics, the other body of the Camera was formed by the so-called *Assistentes* with its eight members. In contrast to their name, their duty was not of a subsidiary nature. The governor of Rome, who was simultaneously a *vicecamerlengo*, also belonged to them. The two positions, performed at the same time, meant the highest non cardinal's rank in the Curia. The proper leaders of the Camera in duumvirate were the *presidente* and the *commissarius generalis*. They were obliged to control the interests of the State economy and report on the important cases of the Camera, personally to the pope. There were also in the line of the *assistentes* the treasurer (*thesaurarius generalis/tesoriere generale*) and the auditor of the Camera (*uditore generale*) who headed the court of the office that dealt with the economic cases. He also had jurisdiction over the curial officials and their clients, too. The attorney of the Camera (*procurator fiscalis generalis*) and his two leading lawyers (*camerae et fisci advocatus* and *advocatus pauperum*) brought up the rear.⁸¹ Their work was obviously helped by a crowd of officials. While it had not yet existed in 1629, by 1644 the so-called *Camerialis Congregatio* appeared to enhance the decision making. Its prefect was the cardinal-nephew, out of its members there were three who were from the Camera (the treasurer, the lawyer and the general-commissioner), furthermore the prefect of the Apostolic Palace and the secretary of the Consulta. Later the cardinal-nephew vanished, the sessions were led by the treasurer and an auditor from the Camera always participated.⁸²

There were several characteristics of the tax collection procedures. While the absolutist monarchs of contemporary Europe initiated a vigorous centralization and ration-

⁸⁰ LUTZ, *Rom und Europa*, 120.

⁸¹ Apart from the quoted literature in the *Introduction*, more: FELICI, *La reverenda Camera Apostolica*, 1–11, 113–115 and *passim*; PASTURA RUGGIERO *La reverenda Camera Apostolica*, 53–63 and 63–167; AGO, *Carriere e clientele*, 19–20. – Out of the Latin-Italian terminology, which exist in parallel, I gave preference to those which are used more often. – The latest, precise archontology of the *thesaurarius*, the *commissaries generalis* and the auditors of the Camera from 1627–1629: WEBER, *Die ältesten päpstlichen Staatsbandbücher*, 166–167 and 174; on the duty of the *camerlengo*, *vicecamerlengo*, *commissarius* and *auditor generalis*: PASTURA RUGGIERO *La reverenda Camera Apostolica*, 63–75, 203, 206, 211–219.

⁸² CHRISTOPH WEBER, *Die ältesten päpstlichen Staatsbandbücher*, 191, 221 and *passim*.

alization also in this respect, by entrusting the duty completely to the State apparatus, in the Papal State – exceptionally unlike them – concerning taxes, duties, benefits, the role of the private collectors, who rented this position for a short or longer period of time, remained significant. This is the so-called *appalto*-system, led to the division of the tax revenues and gave wide-ranging possibilities to certain craftiness.⁸³ The Camera entrusted the administration of the central State treasury (*tesoreria generale*) to a Roman banker for a long time, under Paul V they were the Ruspoli. However, the more and more unambiguous need of the private banks pointed to the establishment of a public bank which managed more general tasks.⁸⁴ The title of the banker (*depositario generale*), who dealt with the central treasury, was a confidential position. The person who held this position was different in every pontificate and should not have been mistaken for his direct superior, the *tesoriere generale*, who was meant to be the main official of the Camera, despite the fact that his office could have been purchasable.⁸⁵

The taxes, monopolies, duties, and the *droit de regale* (*risposte delle tesorerie ed appalti camerali ed altro*) constituted the main part of the ordinary State revenues (*entrate certe*). Some examples: the monopoly of salt-mining (there is no accurate datum), the extraordinary tax (*sussidio triennale*) which was collected from 1543 and was at first 300 thousand *scudi* and was replenished by the so-called *quarto aggiunto* in 1628; the salt-tax was 32 thousand *scudi* a year under the Barberini-era; the tax for the maintenance of the papal navy was around 100 thousand *scudi* at the end of the seventeenth century. Besides, the taxes imposed on the sum of the military and defensive actions were annually 17 thousand *scudi*; moreover the meat-tax from 1553, the wine-tax from 1586 and the duty on tobacco from the beginning of the seventeenth century, etc.

Urban VIII endeavoured to raise the taxes and replenish them with new ones, by which he became worthy of having the nickname the “tax pope” (*papa gabelle*).⁸⁶ The rise of the taxes, especially on tobacco, continued also under Alexander VII.⁸⁷ However, the

⁸³ A local example from earlier times: CLAUDIO ROTELLI, *La finanza locale pontificia nel Cinquecento. Il caso di Imola*, Studi Storici 9 (1968) 107–144.

⁸⁴ On the transaction and techniques of the real circulation of money: REINHARD, *Papstfinanz und Nepotismus*, 3–5; MONACO, *Le finanze pontificie al tempo di Paolo V*, 121–149; and more by ERMANNO PONTI: *Il Banco di Santo Spirito fondato da S.S. Paolo V con breve del 13 dicembre 1605*, Roma 1941, 5–83; another, rather superficial, outline of the contemporary characteristics of the Roman circulation of money: RENATA AGO, *Politica economica e credito nella Roma del Seicento*, La corte di Roma tra Cinque e Seicento, 243–261 (this is a summary of the author’s major work: *Economia barocca. Mercato e Istituzioni nella Roma del Seicento*, Roma 1998).

⁸⁵ PASTURA RUGGIERO *La reverenda Camera Apostolica*, 167. 179. 192. See the diagram of the total papal financial system at the end of the chapter (REINHARD, *Reformpapsttum zwischen Renaissance und Barock*, 785; [IDEM], *Finanza Pontificia*, 490). The chart of PARTNER, *Papal Financial Policy* shows an earlier state (19), NUSSDORFER, *Civic Politics in the Rome*, however, the structure of the Apostolic Camera around 1650 is depicted rather simplified (47).

⁸⁶ For example, the *gabella del macinato*, a newer special meat tax yielded an income of 100–150 thousand *scudi* around 1630, in 1643 some 350 thousand *scudi*. LUTZ, *Rom und Europa*, 122–124. The latest analysis of the Pope’s economic policy from Clement VIII to Urban VIII: AGO, *Economia barocca*, 111–130.

⁸⁷ ROSA, *Alessandro VII*, 343.

possibility for the decrease of the sums was being analysed, due to the rise of prices and unemployment under Alexander VII's successor, the financial condition of the Roman inhabitants deteriorated.⁸⁸ However, the improvement of the essential conditions under the pontificate of Clement X was in the centre of politics, the substantial tax reduction was achieved only under Alexander VIII – in parallel with the minimization of the anti-Turkish aid.

Various customs revenues aggregated 420 thousand *scudi* around 1640. In addition to all these, there was the item of thousands, or even ten thousands, from the tenure of lands (*censi e feudi*), the export licences (*tratte*) and the fines imposed by the courts (*malefizi*). The ordinary State revenues formed 2–2.3 million *scudi* in the second half of the seventeenth century, which may have been the same in the first half of the century. It is true that as a result of the uncertainties by the *appalto* system, there were a large number of years when the revenues were fewer with hundreds of thousands.⁸⁹

Apart from the ordinary and fixed State revenues, which were hardly enough to finance the budget and to cover the interests of the public debt, the so-called *entrate incerte*, the extraordinary revenues played a significant role. Their unique system comprised a transition between the State and direct Church revenues. (The already mentioned *malefizi* can be reckoned among them, as long as the fines, imposed not only by the governor of Rome, the auditor of the Camera, but also by the court of the cardinal vicar, were included here.) The two main types of the extraordinary revenues – which in a long run increased the extent of indebtedness and enhanced the fragmentation of the non-refundable public funds – were the issue of the bonds, the *monti*, and the venality of the curial offices.

The *monti*, the rudimentary bonds, served as long-term credits; according to the prices of the *luoghi* (which can be called today shares), they were worth between 50–100 *scudi*. The first *monte* was issued under Clement VII (1523–1534) at the end of 1526. In order to cover the aid to Hungary against the Turks he provided shares of 200 thousand *scudi* – namely two thousand pieces – to the burden of the Roman port's customs on annually 10% guaranteed proceeds.⁹⁰ The further issue of bonds in the middle of the sixteenth century ensured only 7.5% and later 5% at the turn of the century. These shares were inher-

⁸⁸ OSBAT, *Clemente IX*, 356.

⁸⁹ There are exact cameralistic accounts only from the second half of the century. Their analysis: GEORG LUTZ, *Zur Papstfinanz von Klemens IX bis Alexander VIII. (1667–1691)*, RQ 74 (1979) 32–90. On the State revenues: *ibid.*, 49–51; and GRISAR, *Päpstliche Finanzen*, 230–232. – In contrast to the Barberini era, the resources of the Borghese pontificate are quite rich, however, REINHARD estimates the ordinary revenues to 182 thousand *scudi* and the total annual revenues to 386 thousand *scudi*. The huge difference is based on the fact that REINHARD could not numerically explore the total revenues, which is proved by the expenses of the monumental buildings of Paul V which were much higher annually than the noted revenues. On the other hand, it seems that REINHARD dealt only with the net revenues, after allowing for the redemption of debts. Cf. *Papstfinanz und Nepotismus*, 6 and 23. More detailed data on Scipione Borghese can be found in the work of VOLKER REINHARDT, which is quoted in the next chapter. (IV, note 30.)

⁹⁰ On the *monte della Fede*: GARDI, *La fiscalità pontificia*, 511–512; MONACO, *Le finanze pontificie al tempo di Paolo V*, 38–39.

itable (*monti non vacabili*). The *monti vacabili*, which fell into the hands of the Apostolic Camera in case of the death of their owners, occurred only in the seventeenth century and due to the greater risk – comparing to their inheritable version – they brought higher proceeds of 3–4%.⁹¹

Monte was imposed on almost every papal tax, customs, and duty; however, it was possible only via a papal bull from Urban VIII. This was accompanied by a reduction of the proceeds during the century. In 1635, the profit of the inheritable bonds fell to 4.5%, in the second half of the century, due to the stagnation of the economy it was 4% then in the course of 1684–1685 it became 3% and the non-inheritable bonds fell back to 7–8 and 6%. The number of the *monti* under Urban VIII was thirty-three (out of which twenty-three were *non vacabili*), whereas according to other data, there were thirty-eight, moreover Pope Barberini issued new bonds, as well. The annual income of the *monti* is not mentioned by resources. The real value of the *monti* was altered as a function of the issue of the bonds and the demand and supply. In general, they yielded only a one-time major income to the papal treasury; as an example, Urban VIII founded “treasury bills” of 3 million *scudi* for covering the expenses during the Wars of Castro. Nevertheless, during 1542 and 1716 the Curia accumulated a public debt of 20 million *golden scudi* with a “dividend” only from the issue of the *monti*. The sum – considering the austerity measures of the successors – was already complete under the Barberinis.⁹²

In the discussed period, the competence of the Apostolic Camera was confined to the administration of the ordinary State revenues and the issue of the *monti*, which was not a negligible task. In their books of accounts, notwithstanding, the total income (and expenditure) of the Holy See was registered, thus the important allocation of the other main type of the “precarious revenues”, as well.

The extent of the process of the venality of offices of a Roman origin, which was the other determining component of the *entrate incerte* besides the *monti*, and was of smaller but socially more important effect and also known by other European monarchies, was the greatest here.⁹³ The practice started to spread around 1400 and grew to considerable dimensions in the second half of the fifteenth century. Under Sixtus IV (1471–1484) the number of the curial offices, which were mostly of a secular character, grew from

⁹¹ On the *monti* in more detail: ARMANDO LODOLINI, *I «Monti Camerali» nel sistema della finanza pontificia*, Archivi Storici delle Aziende di Credito II, Roma 1956, 263–278; [IDEM], *Le finanze pontificie e i «Monti»*, Rassegna Storica del Risorgimento 46 (1957), 421–428; and PARTNER, *Papal Financial Policy*, 23–31.

⁹² *Ibid.* – Apart from the two unique borrowing practices: the issue of the *monti* and the later detailed venality of offices, there is no information about taking out a loan from the European market. However, the credits with an interest of 75%, borrowed from Genoa for the expenses of the War of Venice under Paul V, prove this system’s impracticability. Although, under the Barberinis there was a plan to take 2 million *scudi* from the banks of Genoa with only an interest of 2%, yet this unrealistic idea was never fulfilled. REINHARD, *Papstfinanz und Nepotismus*, 13–14; LUTZ, *Rom und Europa*, 134.

⁹³ On the general European practice: *Ämterhandel im Spätmittelalter und im 16. Jahrhundert. Referate eines internationalen Colloquiums in Berlin vom 1. bis 3. Mai 1980*, hrsg. v. ILJA MIECK, Berlin 1984; an Italian example: ENRICO STUMPO, *La vendita degli uffici nel Piemonte del Seicento*, Estratto del volume XXV–XXVI (1973–1974) dell’Annuario dell’Istituto Storico Italiano per l’Età Moderna e Contemporanea, Roma 1976.

300 to 650, under Julius II it was 996 and under Leo X (1513–1521) it was about 2,230. In 1551 there were 2,590, one decade later there were 3,640 offices sold for 3.5 million *golden scudi*. Obviously, these actions were not encouraged by administrative needs but fiscal consideration, a great part of the offices was fictive. In 1561, out of 3,460 there might have been only 800 real ones, the owner of 2,840 positions did not function effectively. For instance, at the Apostolic Chancery 104 *collettori del piombo*, who sealed the bulls with lead, and 612 *portionari della ripa*, who supervised the ports of the Papal State, were absolutely needless. Certain positions were already in their names only titular, such as the 2,000 members of the five papal orders of knighthood. The 535 members of the Pian Order, founded in 1560, paid 500, then later 530–560 *scudi* to be entitled to bear the title of the Pian Order.⁹⁴ The sale of the offices meant to be a short and middle-term debt contract, which demanded the expenditure of a high sum from the creditor. Even the smallest office cost more than 500 *scudi*, consequently, the offices of actual roles and authority were above 50 thousand *scudi*.⁹⁵

The venal offices can be categorised into three classes: 1. the first category includes some fifty offices, whose owners were obliged to be of a certain origin with the necessary relations. The holders of these offices belonged to the leading prelates of the Curia. They had actual jurisdiction and administrative authority, moreover, the most prominent ones (the treasurer from the Camera and the auditor or the *reggente della Cancelleria*) could certainly expect the red hat. 2. Besides these “top officials”, there was the second class, which was represented by those officials who still had actual authority. They were required to have appropriate qualification, for instance a doctorate. 3. There was the mass of the fictive officials.⁹⁶

The venal offices were *uffizi vacabili*, after the death of their owners they reverted to the Holy See and could be sold again. These officials, who established corporations – colleges in the third as well as in the second category – had a share in the papal institution’s income in proportion to their paid-up capital. As, due to the vast growth of the venal offices, the tax and duty revenues could not cover the allowances of the officials the deficiency had to be supported by other incomes (tax, customs, etc.) by shortening the ordinary papal revenues.

⁹⁴ By the 1650s this number rose to 671 and the price to 750. The granting of two places out of them belonged to the *Colleggio di Gesù*. MENNITI IPPOLITO, *Il tramonto della Curia nepotista*, 153 – this work is mentioned below at the beginning of the following chapter. (IV, note 12.)

⁹⁵ The development of the practice of venality and the mentioned data with numerous following details: STORTI, *La storia e il diritto della Dataria Apostolica*, 327–373; LITVA, *L'attività finanziaria della Dataria* 131–156; FRENZ, *Die Kanzlei der Päpste*, 193–198 (the price of certain places in the colleges of officials, not only the positions in the Chancery: 201–233) – all three of the works are quoted below in note 104; and more by: F. PIOLA CASELLI, *Aspetti del debito pubblico nello Stato pontificio: gli uffici vacabili*, *Annali della Facoltà di Scienze politiche dell'Università di Perugia* 1 (1973) 98–170 (the introduction to its substantial message: VISCEGLIA, *Burocrazia, mobilità sociale e patronage*, 20–21).

⁹⁶ The terms of the categorization of the offices according to Giovanni Baptista de Luca: 1. *Officia maiora seu praelatitia* 2. *Officia media* 3. *Officia minora* (*Tractatus de officiis venalibus vacabilibus Romanae Curiae*, Roma 1682).

The *uffizi vacabili* meant a great risk to the investors, since in case of their death the capital was lost. The prime motive for the purchasing was the title and rank, moreover the obtainment of some influences besides the quasi annuity. After a while the so-called *uffizi non vacabili* were established, as well. Namely, the fictive positions could be bought by legal entities, ecclesiastical bodies and in case of certain offices (for the 10% of the purchasing sum) – as they were allowed to be held until the age of sixty-two –, the living owners were permitted to transmit them. Consequently, in some cases an office could be kept within a family even through generations.⁹⁷

For the papal budget, the venality of offices was only remunerative if the duration of a position was not longer than fifteen years, otherwise the expenditure, spent on the disbursement of the annual allowances of 10–12%, would not have been balanced with the incomes from selling the office (and with the profit from its investments gained in the meantime). The risk of the long-term loss, which involved the collapse of the system, was averted in three ways: firstly, by incredibly increasing the number of the fictive offices and purchasable titles. Namely, the money gathered from this method – a bit like a “pyramid scheme” – could also cover the running expenses. However, this opportunity was limited and technically exhausted during the sixteenth century, therefore the number of positions could not be raised since the demand was finite. Due to the understandable opposition of the safeguarding colleges, the other solution, which was carried through only in the second half of the seventeenth century as a part of a financial reform, was the reduction of the payable annual incomes, namely to one half their previous amount. The third way, which took a remarkable turn under Urban VIII, namely the price of the offices in the first and second category, the ones with real influence, was vastly increased by maintaining the amount of their incomes; besides, the price of the third category, the fictive offices, was reduced for maintaining and partly increasing the demand for them.⁹⁸ Sixtus V’s regulation meant a certain relief, according to which, after having been created cardinal or bishop, the officials had to resign from their other positions which were again offered for sale. From 1629 on – in spite of the obvious fiscal interests – the bishops could keep their offices and their incomes.⁹⁹

Some examples for the trend of the offices’ prices, besides the ones mentioned at the appointments of the cardinals. Cleric of the Camera: around 1500, 10 thousand, around 1550, 20 thousand and from the end of the sixteenth century to the 1620s, 36 thousand *golden scudi* (some 45–50 thousand silvers, depending on the rate); under Urban VIII it was already 42 thousand *golden scudi*. The auditor of the Camera paid 4 thousand around 1500, by the middle of the century 25 thousand; by 1585, 80 thousand then after cutting his incomes to their one half, the price of the office became 54 thousand. Then by 1629,

⁹⁷ Cf. LITVA, *Lattività finanziaria della Dataria*, loc. cit.

⁹⁸ Cf. WOLFGANG REINHARD, *Staatsmacht als Kreditproblem. Zur Struktur und Funktion des frühneuzeitlichen Amterhandels*, *Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte* 61 (1974) 289–319 (Ausgewählte Abhandlungen, 151–178).

⁹⁹ The data: LUTZ, *Rom und Europa*, 128.

it rose again to 60 thousand *golden scudi* (which were about 78 thousand silver *scudi*). (The essence of the previously mentioned process was that the price did not halve.) Fictive positions: the *secretarii apostolici* in the second half of the fifteenth century cost 2,000, at the beginning of the sixteenth century 2,600; around 1514, 4,300 *golden scudi*, in 1595 7,000, in the middle of the seventeenth century 15 thousand, then 22 thousand *silver scudi*. The *abbreviatori di Parco maggiore*, the twelve minutants of the papal bulls: in 1514 they paid 4,500; in 1551, 5,500, in 1586, 6,200 and in 1629, 11 thousand *golden scudi*. However, the price of the *scrittori apostolici*'s offices gradually reduced, in the sixteenth century it was 2,700, whereas later it was only 1,200 *golden scudi* and in 1646 it rose only to 1,800.

Under Sixtus V the 3,900 venal and titular offices represented a capital value of more than five million *golden scudi* (concerning the public debt), in the 1640s it reached 7.4 million golden. Above all, there were some hundred positions which belonged to the Chancery, the Penitentiary and to smaller offices and officials,¹⁰⁰ which, furthermore, accumulated a capital value of half a million *golden scudi* (which also required instalments). In contrast to the public debt of 7.9 million – according to the estimations – under Urban VIII there were annually only 161 thousand *golden scudi*, namely 200–300 thousand *silver scudi*, from the sale of offices.¹⁰¹

To sum up the question of the venality of offices: the primary motivation of the papal budget was to gain a substantial sum of money in one go, which, in the case of *uffizi vacabili*, was not obliged to be repaid entirely but in instalments under the pretext of salary. That is why, at the most ten-fifteen year-long tenure of office was the ideal since there was not any deficit. In case of a longer tenure of office, the gain of the purchaser was, apart from the given title and influence, a remarkable profit. His risk was his early death, however, the Curia's was the too long tenure of office. Consequently, the limited, rather short-term tenure of office meant profit for the papal budget – though, it could hardly be controlled –; apart from death, the cardinals' appointments meant a greater accumulation, since the capital of the released offices remained without instalments, moreover they could be sold again. However, the drawback of the system was the unbearable amount of the annual, regular allowances, which were to be paid after the capital of the partly inherited or transmitted offices, the payments of non-expired duration and the more and more sold offices' proceeds. Yet, these "interest charges" could not be covered by the re-sold offices; moreover, newer offices could not be established by the beginning of the seventeenth century. Therefore, other expenses and allowances had to be cut. By the discussed period, the system was far beyond profitable; it created a gradually reproduced public debt. Nonetheless, it provided an opportunity for certain abuses and bribes,

¹⁰⁰ For instance to the *camerlengo*, to the Camera itself, to the treasurer, to the *Conservatori del popolo Romano*, to the vicar of Rome and to some confraternities. Their balances were hardly public. MENNITI IPPOLITO, *Il tramonto della Curia nepotista*, 153. On the still popular confraternities in Rome and on their contemporary economy: ARMANDO SERRA, *Problemi dei beni ecclesiastici nella società preindustriale. Le confraternità di Roma moderna*, Roma 1983, 139–187; LUIGI FIORANI, «Charità e pietate». *Confraternite... nella città rinascimentale e barocca*, Roma, la città del papa, 431–476.

¹⁰¹ Comprehensively: LUTZ, *Rom und Europa*, 125–130.

which spread to such an extent by the middle of the century that Alexander VII, immediately after acceding to the throne, introduced strict orders against them.¹⁰²

The Church Revenues of the Papacy

The third type of the papal revenues was constituted – apart from the *entrate certe*, based on the State *droit de regale*, and the *entrate incerte*, which was established to maintain the functioning system – by the revenues from the universal Church and the various duties, paid for the services of the central Church administration. With some exceptions, by the beginning of the seventeenth century the *Dataria Apostolica*, which moved to the palace on the Quirinal, controlled them.

The Apostolic Dataria was established as an independent institution in the fifteenth century. The Dataria was entrusted with granting papal graces, indulgences which were related to the “external forum” (*forum externum*). It consisted of two chief officials, the *datarius*, who was usually a cardinal, and the *sub-* or *prodatarius* (*sottodatario-prodatario*), besides there were even more subordinate officials than in the Camera. The name of the institution can be traced back to the act of dating (*datam ponens, qui datam ponit*) the petitions (*supplicationes*). During the discussed period, the *datarius* is the “eye of the pope” (*oculus papae* or *organum mentis et vocis papae*), in the course of his ordinary, weekly audience at the pope, he reported only on the cases of great importance, moreover, he made the positive (*concessum ut petitur*), or negative decisions concerning the petitions. His subordinate officials controlled certain tasks of the Dataria. The *prefetto dell'uffizio per obitum* dealt with the vacant, non-consistorial benefices; the *prefetto del concessum* prepared the matrimonial dispensations, the *prefetto* or *amministratore delle componende* dealt with the sale of the offices and with the so-called “compositions” (see later); the *prefetto delle date* handled the dating of petitions. (This *parva data* should not be confused with the so-called *grande data*, which signed the document’s arrival to the *datarius*.) They were followed by the revisers who prepared the decisions: the *revisore delle matrimoniali* who checked the petitions concerning the matrimonial dispensations, the *primo* and *secondo revisore delle suppliche* who examined the supplications concerning the benefices and pensions in formal and content respect in the first place (the latter ones marked the petitions with letter C = *Componenda* and with the first letter of their names). The *ufficiale del missis* (*tassatore*) provided the registration of the petitions which were arranged according to the payable duties, determined by him. He was followed in the official hierarchy by the substitutes (*sostituti*) of the *sottodatario* and the *prefetto del obitum*, the *revisore dei conti* who controlled the scale of charges, then the *ufficiale dei brevi* and the *spedizionieri apostolici* who prepared the draft of the dispatched documents (*breves*, bulls) and (furthermore, the *scrittore delle bolle in via segreta*, however this position might have not existed in the seventeenth century) the *custode delle suppliche* who guarded the supplications. They were obviously only the officials of great importance.¹⁰³

¹⁰² *Regulae, ordinationes et constitutiones Cancellariae Apostolicae*, 1655. ROSA, *Alessandro VII*, 342–343.

¹⁰³ On the origin and development of the Dataria with additional old-recent literature: NICOLA STORTI, *La storia e il diritto della Dataria Apostolica dalla origini ai nostri giorni* (Contributi alla Storia del Diritto Ca-

The competence of the Dataria changed in the course of time; it embraced more and more tasks of the Camera and the Chancery. The incomes were transmitted to the so-called “secret treasury”, the *tesoreria segreta*, or in other words to the *borsa particolare*, whose controller was the *tesoriere segreto*,¹⁰⁴ however, its trustee was also the *depositario generale*. They were exclusively responsible for the administration of the incomes. The salaries, paid from the secret treasury, were remitted solely by the direct order of the pope.¹⁰⁵

The sum of the Church revenues, similar to the “precarious” State revenues, was fluctuating year by year, together with a considerable decline, comparing to the Middle Ages. In 1562, the reorganization of the Rota, the Penitentiary and other papal courts resulted in a deficit of 200 thousand *scudi*, moreover during 1537 and 1570 the sum of the Church revenues narrowed to 400 thousand *scudi*. The annates from the universal Church’s benefices were still the most important revenues until the middle of the seventeenth century. The concept itself embodies a quite ambiguous terminology and also in the early modern period the *servitium commune* was meant by that. This was paid after those benefices (bishoprics and certain monasteries), the grant or ecclesiastical confirmation of which required the mutual action of the pope and the cardinal consistory, for which they were called consistorial benefices. The *servitium commune* was half the College of Cardinals and half the pope’s. In the second half of the sixteenth century, it already caused a big problem that they were collected in accordance with the medieval registers; however, the *servitium* was nowhere equal to the annual income of the benefice, but to its one-third. (In the middle of the seventeenth century, in the German States it was equal to its one fifth.) In 1643, the net income from the *servitium*, entitled only the pope, was way more than it had been at the beginning of the century (however insignificant considering the Middle Ages); it comprised a total of approximately 110 thousand *scudi*, though, in the second half of the century it was only 25–30 thousand. (Together with the part due the cardinals, the total was twice the sum.¹⁰⁶)

The *servitium* was followed by the closer annates, which were called with a special liking as Boniface’s annates. These were such duties – in compliance with a half year

nonico. Nuova Serie di Studi Storico-giuridici 2), Napoli 1968, 39–69, 70–109, 110–137; on its official structure: 175–226; on its expanding competence: 227–279. On the institution’s role in the papal finances with numerous partial figures: FELICE LITVA, *Lattività finanziaria della Dataria durante il periodo Tridentino*, AHP 5 (1967) 79–174; THOMAS FRENZ, *Die Kanzlei der Päpste der Hochrenaissance (1471–1527)* (BDHIR 63), Tübingen 1986, 97–100; ERNST PRITZ, *Supplikensignatur und Briefexpedition an der römischen Kurie im Pontifikat Papst Calixtus III.* (BDHIR 42), Tübingen 1972, 33–94; RE, *La Curia Romana*, 443–454. The archontology of the *dataries* from 1627: WEBER, *Die ältesten päpstlichen Staatsbandbücher*, 168; see also the *Appendix*. – The official structure and administrative role of the Dataria will be dealt with several times later.

¹⁰⁴ In the Borghese era (and perhaps later, too) his person corresponded to the *prefetto delle componende*.

¹⁰⁵ Cf. STORTI, *La storia e il diritto della Dataria Apostolica*, 175–226 and 139–141.

¹⁰⁶ GRISAR, *Päpstliche Finanzen*, 213–215; MARIO ROSA, *La «scarsella di Nostro Signore»: aspetti della fiscalità spirituale pontificia nell’età moderna*, Società e Storia 10 (1987) 817–845, 832–833. On the question of the papal taxing of the consistorial benefices more: THOMSON, *Popes and Princes*, 78–95, 145–167, 167–181, 181–201; GEOFFREY BARRACLOUGH, *Papal Provisions. Aspects of Church History, Constitutional, Legal and Administrative in the Late Middle Ages*, Oxford 1935. (Its review: ZSSRG Kan. Abt. 56 [1936] 530–534.)

income – which were to be paid after the entry of those smaller benefices (namely, after also those that were not granted by Rome), whose annual income reached the twenty-four gulden. Their abrogation was discussed in the councils of the fifteenth century and even in Trent. Their repeal was already promised by Martin V, the concordats with the States limited their enforcement. Their rate gradually declined; in the seventeenth century the rich Spanish and German monasteries did not pay it after their real incomes, or after the old estimated value, but only after the minimal twenty-four gulden. Their total abrogation was not complied due to the understandable opposition of the Curia, but there was no other way of the particular Churches to contribute to the maintenance of the centre of Catholicism.¹⁰⁷

The so-called *quindenniums* belonged to the annates to a certain extent. From the fifteenth century, to retrieve the lost annates they were collected after those benefices, which were to pay annata, however, they were incorporated into bigger benefices. In the case of such incorporated benefices, the unique duty did not have to be paid when their owner changed, but, as its name indicates, every fifteen years. In the Middle Ages, apart from the above mentioned, there were other curial incomes. Some of them provably remained, others disappeared or there is no data concerning their collection. 1. *Procuraciones* (the duty, paid to the pope, his legates, and to certain bishops who represented Rome), there remained no definite traces of them, though, their abrogation was asked already in Konstanz. 2. *Visitaciones* (certain prelates, who travelled to Rome, paid these on the occasion of the *ad limina*), there is no data from the discussed period. 3. *Subsidia caritativa*, this was imposed on certain States, dioceses or religious orders by the popes in the case of urgent circumstances of the Holy See and the Church. It was similar to the tithes, yet it was not in proportion to the incomes but it was a fix sum, which fell mainly into the possession of the State at the beginning of the sixteenth century. It seems that it existed in the seventeenth century. It refers to its change in use that Pázmány thought that he could have collected it from the clerics in order to cover the expenses of his Roman visit, though – with all rights reserved – he renounced it.¹⁰⁸ 4. “*Schutzzinsen*”, the “protection money”, as the literature calls it. Certain bishoprics, monasteries paid it in return for their unique relations to the Holy See. It occurred also in the seventeenth century; however, it was already negligible. 5. Peter’s pence was paid by the northern States: England, the Baltics and Poland as a token of their esteem towards the successors of Saint Peter. This tradition ceased to exist with the Reformation in the seventeenth century. Pius IX (1846–1878) introduced a totally different system under this name.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁷ GRISAR, *Päpstliche Finanzen*, 215–217 and 235–236; A. CLERGEAC, *La Curie et les bénéfices consistoriaux. Étude sur les communs et menus services 1300–1600*, Paris 1911, 1–42. 44–78. 80–109; with medieval documentary accounts: HERMANNUS HOBERG, *Taxae pro communibus servitiis. Ex libris obligationum ab anno 1295 usque ad annum 1455 confectis* (ST 144), Città del Vaticano 1949. – On the debates over the annatas of Trent: KLAUS GANZER, *Das Konzil von Trient und die Annaten*, Römische Kurie. Kirchliche Finanzen. Vatikanisches Archiv I, 215–247, the explanation of the maintenance of the annatas in the early modern period came from him.

¹⁰⁸ Pázmány Péter... összegyűjtött levelei, II 28–249, n. 715. [Pázmány Péter... Collected letters of Cardinal Péter Pázmány I–II], ed. by FERENC HANUY, Budapest 1910–1911.

¹⁰⁹ GRISAR, *Päpstliche Finanzen*, 215–217 and 235–236.

The other source of the Church revenues, apart from the annates, was the *spoliums*, namely those partial amounts which were reserved for Rome from the estates and the chattels of the deceased clerics, owners of the benefices, or from longer unfilled benefices (unless the beneficiary had free testamentary disposition). In the course of the fourteenth century, they represented the most important papal revenue, however, by the discussed period they also withdrew. In the seventeenth century only in Italy, Spain and Portugal were few papal *collectorias*, integrated into the nunciatures. The *fructus non exacti* (the revenues of those Church benefices, which could not have been collected due to the death of the beneficiary) and the intercalary revenues (the incomes of the unfilled benefices) differed from the *spolia* in a way.¹¹⁰ Their trustee was exceptionally not the Dataria but – perhaps due to the traditions – the Camera.

The *collectorias* were not established for the collection of the *spoliums*, but for the so-called papal tithes, which evolved from the tax, paid by the clergy in the course of the crusades in the Middle Ages. At this period of time, Rome could make profit from this type of revenue only from the territory of the Papal State where it itself collected. By papal approval, in the other countries, where it existed, the *collectorias* increased the State revenues on the stipulation that its sum had to be spent on the anti-Turkish war and defence.¹¹¹ In the case of a severe emergency, the attempt to a direct papal collection – successful at times – caused strenuous opposition among the local clergy, in Naples as well as in Spain.

In 1642, the Holy See's revenues from the *collectorias* were approximately net 90–100 thousand *scudi*, one third of which came from Italy. This figure shows a rise comparing to the Borghese pontificate, when the net revenue was 45 thousand. The *spoliums* constituted a considerable part of the collected sum – that is why they were called unofficially *collettori de' spogli* –, the tithes were not registered as separate items in the accounts of the Camera. The office of the “chief collector” (*collettore generale*) was directly subordinated to the papal treasurer, to the *tesoriere generale*. Similarly to the *spolia*, the extraordinary tax, which was annually imposed by the twelve Italian monastic congregations and collected by the Apostolic Camera by three titles, was about 80 thousand *scudi*.¹¹²

In the seventeenth century, the Church revenues of the Holy See – apart from the specific taxes paid after the incomes of the universal Church – were constituted by the duties, collected by the central Church administration. A considerable part of them was

¹¹⁰ GRISAR, *Päpstliche Finanzen*, 217–220; ROSA, *La «scarsella di Nostro Signore»*, 834–837.

¹¹¹ ROSA, *La «scarsella di Nostro Signore»*, 833–834; STUMPO, *Il capitale finanziario a Roma*, 184. The presentation of certain States' income-withdrawing role: REINHARD, *Finanza Pontificia*, 470–472. For instance the appropriation of the *subsidio*, *excusado* and *cruzada*, which occurred already in Spain, was part of this. (*Ibid.*) The process in Italy, mainly in Tuscany and Venice, in Austria, in the German States, especially in Bavaria is analysed by the papers of the noted volume of essays, the *Fisco, religione, Stato nell'età confessionale*: 355–386. 387–426. 147–190. 87–118. 191–225. The latest monographic analysis of the papal collectors' work with additional literature: CHRISTIANE SCHUCHARD, *Die päpstlichen Kollektoren im späten Mittelalter* (BDHIR 91), Tübingen 2000, 1–194, certain institutions: 195–320.

¹¹² REINHARD, *Papstfinanz und Nepotizismus*, 7–8; LUTZ, *Zur Papstfinanz von Klemens IX*, 52–53.

constituted by the so-called *compositiones*, the sums from the accomplishment of the basic duties of the Dataria. According to a definite rate, the compositions were paid for certain privileges, graces, indulgences, absolutions (irregularity, hinders of consecration, pluralism) and for certain permissions (matrimonial dispensations, free testamentary disposition, obtaining a coadjutor, to burden the benefices with pensions).¹¹³ As a consequence, these were to be settled, if somebody wanted to obtain justification for a given canonical regulation.¹¹⁴ Comparing to the medieval conditions, there was a tendency to decrease also in the sum of the revenues coming from the compositions. While, in the sixteenth century their total sum was around 200–300 thousand *scudi*, yet, due to the enforced reforms the number of the absolutions declined, therefore the sum, paid after them, also halved. Around 1640, the total sum was already 80–140 thousand which might have remained throughout the century, namely the Barberini-era did not initiate growth, either, moreover, this figure did not change under the latter popes.¹¹⁵

The compositions were followed by the duties, which were paid for the issue of certain papal documents. In the course of the seventeenth century they yielded little income for the popes, however, their number and rate always increased. The issue of the ecclesiastical as well as secular papal documents, especially of the papal bulls, was a rather complex and complicated bureaucratic process; after each completed phase (issue, drafting, verification, registration) a certain amount of sum had to be paid.¹¹⁶

There were duties imposed on the examination of the documents of the archive, though, from the sixteenth century not the Dataria but the Apostolic Camera received annually 11 thousand *scudi*. Why the Camera? It can be explained by many reasons. On the one hand, its task was to control the papal archives; on the other hand, the centre accounts were kept here, thirdly due to its former competence, a vast amount of original data was here to be researched. In the seventeenth century, not only were such researches carried on for settling debates of inheritance and possessory, but also for resolving disputes about Church administration and legal questions.

By filling the consistorial benefices, the officials received the 3,5% of the annual income (*servitium minuta*). Besides the *sollicitators*, who complied with the process, the agents, moreover the Cardinal Protectors, who took part in the consistory (*propina*), received an

¹¹³ It is important to highlight that the absolutions given by the Dataria were never of spiritual character. The Apostolic Penitentiary was competent in the matters of conscience. The data of the duties paid for matrimonial dispensations: QUINTÍN ALDEA, *Iglesia y estado en la España del siglo XVII (Ideario político-ecclesiástico)*, Santander 1961, 127–138.

¹¹⁴ See STORTI, *La storia e il diritto della Dataria Apostolica*, 280–326.

¹¹⁵ LITVA, *L'attività finanziaria della Dataria*, 121–130; GRISAR, *Päpstliche Finanzen*, 220–222; REINHARD, *Papstfinanz und Nepotismus*, 6–10; ROSA, *La «scarsella di Nostro Signore»*, 838–842.

¹¹⁶ LUTZ, *Rom und Europa*, 125; CLERGEAC, *La Curie et les bénéfices*, 157–186. III–132. 134–150. 188–206 and 207 (chart). Certain items numerically: 260–261, n. 10 and 278, n. 24. In the case of a diocese with an annual revenue of 1,000 golden forint, the obtainment of the bulls cost 1,672 golden *scudi* (in which the sum of the *servitium* was also included). More additional data: ALDEA, *Iglesia y estado*, 151.

extra fee. Under Sixtus IV, the duties of the bulls and the registers were annually 30 thousand *scudi*, however under Sixtus V, they were only 10 thousand. In the first years of Innocent X's pontificate, they constituted an insignificant net income.¹¹⁷

This datum, together with the net Church revenues, might be deceptive. Namely, many data were not registered in the accounts of the Dataria or the Apostolic Camera, since they were directly spent on the salary of the officials, as well as, on the covering of the titular, or effectual, venal offices' value. It is noticeable mainly concerning the incomes from the annatas and duties; the officials, who received their salary from this, usually formed so-called annalistic colleges to assure their allowances. In the first half of the seventeenth century, partly this phenomenon stands in the background of the debates about the annatas and duties with the local Churches and of the implacable behaviour of the Curia and its officials. On the other hand, due to the limit of the increase of the already rather high State taxes, in the Borghese and Barberini era, the Church revenues – which declined comparing to the medieval times – seemed to support the adverse budget. Therefore, the incomes (as the extant accounts conclude them by mentioning the fees of the leaden bulls: *spogli, fruttato della Dataria: composizioni, le vacanze e spedizioni e frutto del piombo*), appearing in the accounts, were raised to 0.5–0.6 million *scudi*. One of the most important changes in the second half of the century was to abolish the locking up and strict collection of such forms of the incomes, which resulted in only a yearly average of 300 thousand *scudi*. This time, appropriating the duties by the officials was also lessened.¹¹⁸

According to the above mentioned data, the total revenues of the Papacy in the seventeenth century (altogether the State, Church revenues and the incomes from the venality of offices) constituted 2.3–2.8, or 3 million *scudi*, consequently they hardly changed throughout the decades. Without economical development, a significant accumulation was beyond question.¹¹⁹ The thorough examination of the papal expenditures is required to answer the question, how Innocent XI could afford the anti-Turkish aid of such a tremendous sum of money. However, the possibility of the rationalization of the expenses was comprehensively appraised also under Clement X,¹²⁰ the fiscal brilliance of the Odescalchi Pope, coming from a banker family, was necessary for amassing the surpluses.

¹¹⁷ CLERGEAC, *La Curie et les bénéfices*, 157–186; GRISAR, *Päpstliche Finanzen*, 236–237.

¹¹⁸ LUTZ, *Rom und Europa*, 122–125; [IDEM], *Zur Papstfinanz von Klemens IX*, 53–57; JOSEPH GRISAR, *Franccesco Ingoli über die Aufgaben des kommenden Papstes nach dem Tode Urbans VIII. (1644)*, AHP 5 (1967) 289–324, 313, n. 50. (GRISAR denotes – as the contemporaries sometimes did – the total revenues of the Dataria with the compositions; in 1648, the estimation of the Venetian delegate was 400 thousand.); and SERRA, *Problemi dei beni ecclesiastici*, 69–87.

¹¹⁹ The chart of the exact, non-rounded data, see: LUTZ, *Zur Papstfinanz von Klemens IX*, 57.

¹²⁰ OSBAT, *Clemente X*, 366.

The Expenditures of the Papal Budget

The expenditures of the Holy See are even more chaotic than its revenues; in many respects they give a hardly numerical account. The theory, which was kept until the middle of the century, that the pope could freely handle all of the revenues of the Holy See was the root of the problem since the State and the papal expenditures were consecutively confused. According to the demands, sums were spent from the cameralistic *tesoreria generale* on the assistance of certain distant papal relatives, as well as on financing diplomatic delegations from the secret treasury of the *Dataria*. In the second half of the century, the formula simplified, since the State and non-State expenditures were clearly separable. As an example, the State expenses (*spese del Palazzo*) of the Apostolic Palace were covered by the *Camera*. This was remitted by a particular official, the *depositario del Palazzo*, to the papal chief major-domo. The other personal, supplementary costs, for instance the charities, were provided from the private treasury. Moreover, its surplus – unless the pope had not spent it on other purposes – was redirected to the ordinary treasury. In 1672, 135 thousand *scudi* were transferred to the *tesoreria generale*.¹²¹

There were three main categories of the expenditures. 1. The closer State expenditures. 2. The papal “private expenses” which can be regarded as State expenditures. 3. The public debt’s payments by instalments.

The expenses of the army, navy, the administration of finance and government – not only civil, but Church –, furthermore, the diplomatic representations belonged, like in other European countries, to the State revenues. The precise accounts are from the seventeenth century, according to which in 1669 110 thousand *scudi* were spent on the navy, whereas in 1678 only 50 thousand. In 1669, the cost of the forts (Castel Sant’ Angelo, Forte Urbano, Avignon) and guards in Rome was some 200 thousand, while in 1678 it was 125 thousand. The cost of the general supply of the papal troops – which was deployed in the Cretan War – reduced from 80 thousand to 69 thousand at the beginning of Innocent XI’s pontificate, whilst it was only 55 thousand *scudi* in 1689. The engagement of the troops in residential garrisons cost constantly about 60 thousand, however it was not covered by the central treasury but by the provinces’ hardly known treasuries. The expenditures, together with the navy, constituted a total of 400–470 in 1650–1660, by 1670–1680 280–300 thousand *scudi*.¹²²

Significantly smaller items formed the final cost of the State machinery’s sustenance. The supply of the (vice)legates of the provinces, the governors and officials of the towns (judges, accountants, clerks, secretaries) and their Swiss guards reached 75–87 thousand

¹²¹ The process is introduced by REINHARD, *Papstfinanz und Nepotismus*, 2–6; LUTZ, *Zur Papstfinanz von Klemens IX*, 58–60.

¹²² LUTZ, *Zur Papstfinanz von Klemens IX*, 60–64. On the contemporary history of the papal army and navy: P. ALBERTO GUGLIEMOTTI, *Storia della Marina Pontificia. VII: 1573–1644. VIII: 1644–1669*, Roma 1892 (especially the collection of various sources); BRUNELLI, *Soldati del papa*, *op. cit.*

scudi.¹²³ They spent on the official and material expenses of the curial and Roman officials, courts, congregations, official-bodies (out of which, the first place was taken by the judges of the Rota with 6,600 *scudi*), the cameralistic officials, the architects in permanent employment, the secretaries of the congregations, the clerks of the library of Vatican, the staff of the Roman mint, the salary of the Frankfurter papal proofreader, etc. average 21–24 thousand. This was still a ridiculously low sum, even if we know that it does not include the allowances of those, who bought real offices.¹²⁴

The budget of the auditor of the Camera and the Roman governor's office appeared in a separate chapter, which reached 1,400–2,400 and 20–24 thousand *scudi*. An average of 19–20 thousand *scudi* was spent on the sustenance of the diplomatic representations. However, this does not include the occasional and greater travel expenses of the extraordinary nuncios and legates. The Roman magistrates and officials had a share of 4,200–4,400 from the budget, while the Roman residence and court of the vicar had approximately 1,500. In the name of *spese incerte* (building, maintenance works, gun-founding, minting, etc.) 25–35 thousand *scudi* were confined. There were subsidies given, which were annually 7,000 *scudi*. 26–28 thousand *scudi* were expended on the occasional State expenditures with diverse purpose and appropriation, called the *regaglie camerali*.¹²⁵

In the second half of the seventeenth century these sums stagnated, despite the attempts to cut them; as a consequence, however there are no sources, a similar rate can be expected from the earlier periods. This statement is supported by some data. On the diplomatic representations there were spent 23 thousand under Paul V and 21 thousand *scudi* under Urban VIII, the allowances of the auditors of the Rota came also to 6,600 *scudi* in 1605.¹²⁶ The reverse conclusions might be correct. There are data on the sustenance of the northern Jesuit papal colleges from 1605 which was 17 thousand *scudi*, which might have remained in later times. It is striking how a small part of the papal budget was constituted by the actual Church administration, the diplomatic representations and the typically new institutions of the Catholic reform.

Exceptionally, the growth of the expenditures is noticeable. The increase of the civil forces (*sbirri, bargelli*), units' expenses was motivated rather by the growing need for order than the worsening public safety. (In 1585 exactly 10,573 *scudi* were spent on them, in the middle of the seventeenth century they came to 15–20 thousand, however, the sum reached about 14 thousand already in 1605.)

Apart from the expenses of the navy and the army, the reduction of the ordinary State expenditures generated a genuine decline in only one other case. Similarly to the earlier years, at the beginning of the 1670s the allowances of the curial cardinals were

¹²³ On the treasuries of the provinces: PASTURA RUGGIERO, *La reveranda Camera Apostolica*, 25–43.

¹²⁴ See the concrete sum of the incomes of certain important officials in Church administration in Chapter V.

¹²⁵ LUTZ, *Zur Papstfinanz von Klemens IX*, 64–71.

¹²⁶ REINHARD, *Papstfinanz und Nepotizismus*, 2–6.

around 62 thousand, then by 1689 fell to 22 thousand, albeit, Christina, the Queen of Sweden's allowance of 12 thousand *scudi* did not have to be paid.¹²⁷

All in all, the State expenditure of the Holy See was 735,000 *scudi* in 1669, under Innocent XI it was around only 545–583,000. Consequently, the saving, due to the reforms, was some 200 thousand *scudi*.¹²⁸

Due to the smaller budget, the savings at the official papal private expenditure was smaller, as well. The heavy expenditure of the papal court, which maintained still under Clement VIII, was cut by Paul V from 131 thousand to 89 thousand *scudi* by the beginning of the 1610s. Mainly due to the baroque court's needs, under Urban VIII, these expenses rose up to 150 thousand again. At the end of the 1660s the rate was the same, and they were reduced to 120 thousand *scudi* only by the pontificate of Innocent XI. The expenses of the regular papal court were constant, they were always between 80–90 thousand. The austerity measures only succeeded in the case of extraordinary expenses, namely the *spese diverse* (spent on services, smaller festivals, feasts, the presents of the guests, on painters, sculptures, musicians, etc.), sometimes they fell from 60 thousand to 30–31 thousand. However, the sum of the papal charities increased from 100 (it was under the Borgheses and Barberinis) thousand to some 120 thousand.¹²⁹

Some concrete examples on the ordinary and extraordinary expenditures of the papal household from 1672: the papal laundries received 300, the cleaners of the papal suite (*scopatori segreti*) 120, the jeweller 72, the floral gardener 32, the servants 12 *scudi* a year. The annual salary of the *tesoriere segreto* was 750 *scudi*, however about 1700 was spent on the gardens of Vatican and Quirinal; the present for the Spanish delegate cost 3,750, the auditors of the Rota received 1,800 *scudi* on their last annual session and 4,825 *scudi* was spent on court musicians, singers, papal guards and clients on the occasions of Easter, Christmas, the festival of Saint Peter and the jubilee of the pope's coronation. The musicians of the papal chapel earned around 6,000, the sum of 1605, one of the countless positions, the inspector of the Apostolic Palace's clocks earned 48 *scudi*.

Together with the charities, the official private papal expenditures decreased from 270,000 only to 240,000. The gained 30 thousand *scudi* is a negligible sum.¹³⁰

The biggest part of the papal budget's official expenditures was constituted by the public debt's repayments of interest, which accumulated from the *monti* and the sale of offices. The size of the public debt – even if it did not reach the 20 million (silver) *scudi* that Paul V announced to the imperial delegates who came to ask for help – could be estimated to a considerable sum of 18 and half million. In 1605, the ten million in *monti*

¹²⁷ LUTZ, *Zur Papstfinanz von Klemens IX*, loc. cit.

¹²⁸ The exact data *ibid.*, 72.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*

¹³⁰ All the above mentioned data: LUTZ, *Zur Papstfinanz von Klemens IX*, loc. cit.; REINHARD, *Papstfinanz und Nepotismus*, loc. cit.

and the four and a half in offices increased in total with three million, which might be acceptable within the scope of such time.¹³¹ The rise of the earlier not heavy public debt (it should be highlighted how big reserves Sixtus V could accumulate in the Castel Sant' Angelo, though, it did not mean the annulment of the public debt, only its balancing)¹³² started already under Clement VIII especially as a result of the aids given to the anti-Turkish wars. This tendency continued at a rather accelerated pace during the Borghese era. The interest charges (the proceeds of the *monti*, the salary of the officials with bought offices and the life salary of the owners of the venal offices) were 830 thousand *scudi* in 1619. The size of the public debt increased under Urban VIII. The instalments of the *monti* (according to the proceeds of 4.5% and in the case of *monti vacabili* 7–8%) were annually *one million*, based on the sum of the *monti*'s twenty million *golden scudi* and the venal offices' 7.9 million *golden scudi* forming a total of 36 million *silver scudi*. The annual expenditures of the offices were similar to this sum.

All in all, it meant that the total sum of the accumulated debt-annuity was approximately a fifth as much as the 200–220 thousand *scudi* from the venality of offices; as a consequence, the total instalments of two million consumed more than two thirds of the Holy See's total revenues of 2.8–3 million by the end of the Barberini era.¹³³ Out of the items, which occur in the budget, the settling years were mainly tied up for the interest charges; as an example, the *collectoria* of Naples' revenues of 25 thousand (however, the papal galley was directly supported by a part of this sum) and the *spolium* revenues of 15 thousand from other parts of Italy or the 80 thousand *scudi*, which was paid by the twelve monastic congregations, and the so-called revenues of "free use" were spent on this – naturally not only during the Barberini era.

In addition to all, many revenues from duties did not occur in the accounts but passed directly into the hands of the owners of the venal offices as instalments (which included an even bigger income and expenditure than in the numerical data), as a result, the contemporaries' estimation on public debt of *40 million* does not sound exaggerated.¹³⁴ The payments of interest constituted a considerable sum in the second half of the cen-

¹³¹ REINHARDT, *Paolo V*, 283.

¹³² The annulment could not have been realised, even if the financial circumstances would have enabled, the creditors, the buyers of the *monti* and offices would have lost their ordinary revenues from the instalments. They would have received their invested capitals in vain, if the absence of profit had caused social tension.

¹³³ REINHARDT, *Papstfinanz und Nepotismus*, 6–7.

¹³⁴ Without any separate references of source, at PONCET (*Innocenzo X*, 328), then at ROSA (*Alessandro VII*, 343) the amount of the public debt in the 1650s was 48 million. It can be hardly believable, they might have been based on contemporary estimations, with which, apart from some exceptions, one should deal gingerly. These estimations, for example, reckoned the sum given to the nephews from Clement VIII to Clement X at only 30 million *scudi*, moreover the rate of the venal offices, sold by the Dataria, at only 6 million. (Cf. MENNITI IPPOLITO, *Il tramonto della Curia nepotista*, 127–128 and 153.) Concerning the sum of the public debt, the figure – which was given by Georg Lutz who intensively dealt with this question – of 36 million, by rounding 40 million, can be accepted also after the 1640s. (Cf. more by GRISAR, *Francesco Ingoli über die Aufgaben des kommenden Papstes*, 312–313, n. 49.) Even if certain authors do not mention the cessation of the debt increase, but only its pace's decrease in the second half of the century. OSBAT, *Clemente X*, 366.

ture, though, due to the gradual decrease of the proceeds of the venal offices and *monti* (the process started already under Innocent X and accelerated by Alexander VII)¹³⁵ they were only between 1.35–1.47 million *scudi*. By the middle of Innocent XI's pontificate they lessened with a sum of 200–300 thousand which meant the same amount of net profit.¹³⁶

The Total Balance of the Papal Budget

The numerical expenditures were a total of 2.1–2.7, or between 2–3 million *scudi* in the seventeenth century. Comparing with the revenues of 2.1–2.8, at least 3 million, the deficit and surplus of the budget show a different picture in every pontificate (even annually).¹³⁷ The above mentioned values are the extreme values of the minimum and maximum revenues of the century. Within these bounds, the annual relative difference was always divergent. Theoretically, if the most successful year, for instance 1667, had met the year with the least expenditures, there could have accumulated a surplus of 800 thousand – one million *scudi*, however this never happened. The expected higher income encouraged an increased expenditure already during the year. If we draw the balance of the annual revenues and expenditures of the Papacy, it is clearly seen that the surplus of the budget under Paul V was rather solid (100–120 thousands *scudi*). The merit of Pope Borghese is that he succeeded in consolidating the annual papal revenues permanently above two million. His profit was proven by the fact that he could increase the income of the *tesoro di Castel Sant' Angelo*¹³⁸ with 216 thousand *scudi*. His rational economy was only surpassed by Innocent XI in the course of the century.¹³⁹ During the short Ludovisi and the long Barberini era, there was basically no profit, Urban VIII could provide the balance only with the increase of the Church revenues. The incredible growth of the public debt can be explained by the phenomenon of covering the lack with credits. In the last years of Urban VIII's pontificate, the threatening total financial collapse – due to the Wars of Castro – could only be avoided by the 800 thousand *scudi* from the Castel Sant' Angelo.¹⁴⁰

In the second half of the century, the years of a lower, 150–200 thousand *scudi*, profit (for instance 1652, 1657, 1660, 1664, 1667) and the years of a similarly not heavy loss of 100–190 thousand *scudi* (1668–1667), alternated with each other. The causes for the fluctuation were the years of poor crop and the expenses of the Cretan War. The permanent profit of 0.5–0.6 million *scudi* was reached by the 1680s, however, not due

¹³⁵ ROSA, *Alessandro VII*, 343.

¹³⁶ On the above mentioned JAITNER, *Die Hauptinstruktionen Clemens' VIII*, I, LX–LXIX; REINHARD, *Papstfinanz und Nepotismus*, 21–23; LUTZ, *Rom und Europa*, 130–134; GRISAR, *Päpstliche Finanzen*, 205–210 and 237–239; LUTZ, *Zur Papstfinanz von Klemens IX*, 76–79.

¹³⁷ Concrete data: LUTZ, *Zur Papstfinanz von Klemens IX*, 80.

¹³⁸ MONACO, *Le finanze pontificie al tempo di Paolo V*, 44–45.

¹³⁹ REINHARDT, *Paolo V*, 283–284.

¹⁴⁰ TUCCIMEI, *Il tesoro dei pontifici*, 25–27.

to the significant growth (the revenues were between 2.5–2.6 million) but to the steadfast and strict austerity measures of Innocent XI. This was the financial background of the Papacy's such immense anti-Turkish aid-programme that had not been experienced since the late sixteenth century. Consequently, the more than two million *scudi* sent to the Habsburgs and to the Polish king in the 1680s was the sacrifice of the papal budget's four years' net profit for the universal aims of Catholicism.¹⁴¹

The tendency of the papal budget, namely the financial problems of the previous decades explain the earlier political and Church administrative behaviour of the Papacy, especially of the Barberini era. Rome's loss of importance in international politics, the deterioration of its relations with the local Churches and the breaking of the Catholic reform's impetus were of a financial background. One of the most striking lessons of the revenues and expenditures of the papal budget was the fact of how few the Holy See spent on the maintenance of the effectual central Church administration and the reform institutions (for instance on the northern papal colleges). These sums do not reach the level of the Church revenues, especially not under their temporary growth under Urban VIII. Due to the redemption of debts, the other expenses had the forced preference. Therefore, it is understandable why the financial basis of the Sacred Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith, which was founded in 1622 as the highest authority of missions, could be only created by the duties paid after the cardinal rings. This can hardly be regarded as a usual, stable, or lavish financial system, notwithstanding that the baroque Papacy's pastoral program gave special attention to the mission organization.¹⁴²

Buildings: City-planning and Development

In spite of the data, which seem ample – though, they were chosen only as a sample –, an important question has not been answered yet. Namely, how the catastrophic financial circumstances of the 1640s could be stabilized by the second half of the century. Moreover, how could they accumulate a surplus, despite the fact that the economy did not grow and the Church revenues (mainly the annatas, compositions and duties paid to the

¹⁴¹ On all of these, see the literature quoted in the earlier notes and the summary of LUTZ: *Zur Papstfinanz von Klemens IX*, 81–91; a more detailed analysis of the papal budget's balance, by covering also the sixteenth century: PARTNER, *Papal Financial Policy*, 32–57; and a comprehensive chart: REINHARD, *Finanza Pontificia*, 491 (*Stima teorica per un'analisi del circuito finanziario legato alla S. Sede fra 1570 e 1600. In milioni di scudi di moneta*) = STUMPO, *Il capitale finanziario a Roma*, 308.

¹⁴² PARTNER, *Papal Financial Policy*, 58–62; and JOSEF METZLER, *Foundation of the Congregation „De Propaganda Fide” by Gregory XV*, *Sacrae Congregationis de Propaganda Fide memoria Rerum*, I 1, 79–111. After having fought our way through the depth of the papal finances, we must have a picture about the state of the *Papstfinanz* in the early modern period. If one happens to be interested in the more detailed and more exact data, which were cross-checked with the earlier research, examine the impressive monograph of ENRICO STUMPO (*Il capitale finanziario a Roma*). The secular revenues: 65–160; the Church revenues: 161–217; the shaping of the debt: 219–306; their summary 307–320.

Dataria) considerably regressed? No matter how significant they were, the sheer austerity measures – the breaking of the officials' safeguarding colleges by limiting the direct flow of the incomes to them; the reduction of the salaries and interests, the sums spent on the army; the shortening of the cardinal provisions – did not result in the halt of the public debt's accumulation under Urban VIII and the free use of the profitable years' benefits. It can even be asked on what the accumulated public debt of 40 million, namely the "State credits" mainly drawn in *monti* – which were not represented numerically among the revenues – and the revenues of the earlier profitable years (for instance the two million, gained under Paul V) had been spent.

Among the extraordinary expenditures, the aid given to the Catholic League during the Thirty Years' War should be noted; however, its total sum was not countless. From Alexander VII on, the sum of the aid continuously provided to the Habsburgs, Venice and Poland against the Turks exceeded by far the earlier sums. The peacekeeping actions of Gregory XV in the conflict of Valtellina, then the expenses of the Wars of Castro and Clement IX's entry to the Cretan War meant a great burden.

Although, there are no extant data and exact registers, the building must have cost a fortune to form the baroque Rome's still fascinating face. The city-planning, even if in many cases it was part of the papal patronage, can be considered to be a State investment, which obviously required a high cost.

Paul V – from whom the public investments enjoyed an enormous advantage – sent, as an example, 165 thousand *scudi* to the fortification of Ferrara and spent 1.7 million *scudi* on the Eternal City which almost reached one year's total sum of State revenues. There is no exact data about the cost of the extension of Civitavecchia, about the road constructions towards Marca, about the modernization of the water-system, nor about the building of the Aqua Paola in Trastevere. The building of the Saint Peter's Basilica's portico, designed by Carlo Maderno – whose plans were objected by many cardinals since he changed Michelangelo's original plans –, and the two "bell-towers" counted as representative investments. 300 thousand was allotted to the Basilica. Paul V also had the Quirinal rebuilt into a monumental papal residence, whose chapel, the *Capella Paolina* formed on the analogy of the Sistine Chapel, was ready by 1617.¹⁴³

The investments of 1620–1640 are also non-negligible, however, Urban VIII's long pontificate and his turn towards Italy can be considered as rather moderate. The most spectacular memorabilia of his reign is the liturgical space which was consecrated on 18 November 1626. The primary material for Bernini's baldachin's characteristically twisted bronze columns of fourteen tons, standing beneath the dome and above the tomb of the Apostle, was from the *porticus* of the Pantheon, from which also the eighty cannons of the Castel Sant' Angelo were cast. Apart from the baldachin – which was consecrated on 29 June 1633 and cost 200 thousand *scudi* –, the central space of the basilica

¹⁴³ More literature: REINHARDT, *Paolo V*, 284–286; his illustrated art historical description: JACK WASERMAN, *The Quirinal Palace in Rome*, *Art Bulletin* 45 (1963) 205–244; on the later alterations: DOROTHY METZGER HABEL, *The Urban Development of Rome in the Age of Alexander VII*, Cambridge 2002, 11–62.

was decorated by monumental statues, altars, etc. around 1629–1641. Bernini raised such a tomb to the imperishable memory of the Barberinis, adorned with the monumental bronze statue of the pope, like Maderna's façade, built to the Borgheses. Whilst, there were only some minor alterations (there were two private chapels established) and decorating works (the ornamentation of the corridor above the Cortile de San Damaso) in progress in the Apostolic Palace.

Apart from the extension of some squares and the establishment of the via Urbana, there were not other significant city-planning programs accomplished. In parallel to the construction of the Santa Maria della Concezione in the Piazza Barberini, there were many churches restored. The San Salvatore ai Monti and the San Lorenzo in Fonte were restored in 1630, the SS. Cosma e Damiano nel Foro in 1632, the Sant' Anastasia al Circo Massimo in 1636. Also many marvellous fountains were built (Fontana della Baccaccia, Fontana del Tritone, Fontana delle Api); the palace of the Sapienza was extended (1628–1632) and the university church's (Sant' Ivo) building was started. The moderate developments might have been compensated by the coat of arms of the papal family. The contemporaries counted some ten thousand engraved, cast in bronze and painted bees.

The real construction fever spread in the city only during 1642–1644. Thousands of workers built the three-kilometre long city wall with twelve bastions by the Gianicolo, which finally solved the defence of the Eternal City from the sea, as well. With the fortification of the ports of Civitavecchia and Ancona on the other side, Pope Barberini – in contrast to the beginning of his pontificate – did not prepare for the prevention of a distant devastating war's spread. Namely, after long decades, the Papal State was already at war with the duke of another Italian State, with Odoardo Farnese, the Duke of Parma and Piacenza.¹⁴⁴

In the Barberini era, one cannot come across such investments which were comparable to the amount of the indebtedness. Furthermore, the number of buildings did not reduce; as an example, we can think of the most imperishable memory of Innocent X's Papacy, of the Piazza Navona with its church, palaces and fountains, or of the fact that the city-planning and development played a central role under Alexander VII. It might have been in close connection with the fact that Pope Chigi could never recover from the effects of the "trauma of Münster". The truth was that the affairs of the world were not decided in Rome but primarily in Paris, Vienna and Madrid and partly in London, Amsterdam and Istanbul, which made the pope send reality into his subconscious and endeavour to build up a new Rome, by rivalling with the antique glamour, to counteract his loss.¹⁴⁵

The mottos of the Chigi era were the "magnificence and beauty" (*magnificenza e bellezza*), hallmarked by Bernini and Borromini.¹⁴⁶ The most known memorabilia of

¹⁴⁴ FRANCIS HASKELL, *Patrons and Painters. A Study in the Relations between Italian Art and Society in the Age of Baroque*, London 1963, 3–166, 24–62; and with related bibliography: LUTZ, *Urbano VIII*, 311–312.

¹⁴⁵ KRAUTHEIMER, *The Rome of Alexander VII*, 131–147.

¹⁴⁶ As also earlier. Cf. FREDERICK HAMMOND, *Musik and Spectacle in Baroque Rome: Barberini Patronage under Urban VIII*, New Haven 1994, 3–60.

Alexander's Rome, the *Roma Alessandrina*, was the colonnade of the Saint Peter's square. Above all, at that time the Piazza del Popolo developed, the grandiose plans of the Spanish Steps were elaborated, the Pantheon and the Pyramid of Cestius were restored and the church of the Sapienza was completed by an architecturally peculiar accomplishment.¹⁴⁷ The degree of the opening of new roads affecting the system of the city and the building and restoring of churches was insomuch that it would be difficult to list.¹⁴⁸ The reconstructions, the quality of the roads and their maintenance were controlled by a separate authority, the *Congregazione delle Strade*, which was re-established by the pope himself.¹⁴⁹ The recording and propagation of the obtained results were provided by the outstanding, illustrated publication of Giovanni Battista Falda, which occurred in the book stores in 1666–1667.¹⁵⁰ The establishment of the library of the Sapienza (*Biblioteca Alessandrina*) and the conveyance of the codices of Urbino (*Codici Urbinati*) to the Vatican in 1657 not only strengthened the memory of arts but science, as well.¹⁵¹

By 1670–1680, the pace of the public investments undoubtedly slowed down. From Clement X, the tomb raised to his predecessor in the Santa Maria Maggiore, the bridge of the Castel Sant' Angelo and the decoration, mainly with statues, of the Saint Peter Basilica's portico and colonnades remained for posterity,¹⁵² yet, from the era of Innocent XI not so much was preserved. The phenomenon – in spite of exact data –, which explains the saving, does not explain the halt of the accumulation of debts. Moreover, the buildings regained strength under Innocent XII, this time the social institutions and services were extended, such as hospitals.¹⁵³

The answer for our question is to be sought somewhere else.

¹⁴⁷ KRAUTHEIMER, *The Rome of Alexander VII*, 90–93, 114–125, 102–109; METZGER HABEL, *The Urban Development of Rome*, 63–95, 140–256, 257–285.

¹⁴⁸ Their detailed representation: KRAUTHEIMER, *The Rome of Alexander VII*, 15–130.

¹⁴⁹ KRAUTHEIMER, *The Rome of Alexander VII*, 17; cf. the section about the congregations in Chapter V.

¹⁵⁰ *Il Nuovo Teatro delle fabbriche et edificij in prospettiva di Roma moderna sotto il felice pontificato di N. S. Papa Alessandro VII*.

¹⁵¹ ROSA, *Alessandro VII*, 343. Another comprehensive analysis of the developments under Pope Chigi: METZGER HABEL, *The Urban Development of Rome*, 286–325.

¹⁵² OSBAT, *Clemente X*, 366; on the decline of the patronage of Roman art after Alexander VII: HASKELL, *Patrons and Painters*, 146–166.

¹⁵³ AGO, *Innocenzo XII*, 397–399; and more by GISONDI, *Innocenzo XII*, 119–130.

IV

The Papal Nepotism

The knowledge of the economical malfunction, of the constraint of the papal court's inner mechanisms' operation and of the rather controlled state of the revenues and expenditures helps us to understand the change of the centre in the Catholic confessionalisation during the early modern period. However, to get an overall picture one should examine the spiritualised form of the patron-client system of the early modern period, namely, the papal nepotism. In the unique historical phenomenon these factors functionally amalgamated. This complex formation was at the same time the determinant trend of the social structure and the operation of the Church administration of the Papal State.

Although, with the understanding of these manifestations the abstract of the Papacy's inner world is not yet complete; the question of nepotism can also be examined from the aspect of the papal expenditures. As a consequence, the culmination then breaking and regression of the system of nepotism can be regarded as the most important cause of the papal budget's stunning deficit then its rehabilitation. According to the Jesuit Joseph Grisar, in terms of finance, this occurrence meant considerable squandering of the State and Church's goods.

In the early modern period, a new type of the papal nepotism was performed. The maintenance of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Papal State precluded the nephews from establishing separate duchies, like under the Borgias, or from organizing independent principalities, like that of the reign of the Farneses in Parma. A significant attribute of the nepotism in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was the assignment of the State and Church revenues' considerable part to the papal relatives: in the form of money, *monti*, pensions, curial offices, benefices and sometimes of the incomes from taxes and duties. Naturally, the relatives of the prevailing pope were always beneficiaries of the papal authority, from earlier times to the twentieth century. Moreover, in the course of the early modern period, the papal nepotism embodied a unique factor, namely the primary relative, the cardinal nephew, had outstanding rights in the Church and State administration as the leader of the papal diplomacy. He was the "correspondent" of the nuncios, therefore, the reports were addressed to him and the instructions were written in his name. The system, as such, existed from 1538 to the middle of the seventeenth century, however it was abolished only at the end of the century.¹

¹ A satisfactory outline with thorough bibliography on nepotism: TEODORI, *I parenti del papa*, IX–XVIII. GRISAR's analysis of the papal finances can be found in his often quoted work.

Mainly the nature of nepotism should be examined, whether it was organically embedded in the society or if it was a matter of corruption; furthermore, what kind of functions did it have in the State mechanism and what was the proportion of the functional and dysfunctional factors.²

Functions and Dysfunctions

1538 was the year of the commission, with which Paul III charged his almost eighty-year old uncle, to control the diplomatic correspondence. From this moment, the primary cardinal relative, usually the cardinal nephew, can be regarded as a sort of vice-pope concerning the secular wielding power. He possessed far-reaching licenses which were circumscribed by the *breve*. Besides the pope, he is the one who negotiates with the foreign delegates; he obtained the title of *soprintendente dello Stato Ecclesiastico* (the “superintendent of the Papal States”). It meant that he corresponded with the legates, the provinces, and the vice-legates, moreover, he led the important congregations: the *Sacra Consulta* and the *Buon Governo*. However, in the questions closely related to the Church he hardly had a leading role.

The existence of the cardinal nephew can be compared to two contemporary European offices. On the one hand to the intendants, which controlled the operation of the central State offices, and the chief intendants; on the other hand to the favourites, who monitored the State offices, such as, Mazarin, Richelieu, Buckingham and the Spanish Lerma. Around the seventeenth century, as the latter were replaced by the prime minister (*primus minister*);³ the cardinal nephew was replaced by the secretary of State. If we examine the formally received licences, theoretically the nephew had real total power.⁴

In the European context, apart from the similarities, there is a difference of substance. Concerning the court representation, the Papacy, as a complex ruling system, characterised its own monarch and administration in a unique way. That is to say,

² REINHARD, *Nepotismus*, 145–147; on the historiographical debate about the question of nepotism: MADELEINE LAURAIN-PORTEMER, *Ministériat, finances et papauté au temps de la réforme catholique*, Bibliothèque de l'École des Chartes 134 (1976) 396–403 (an answer to the criticism of REINHARD on PORTEMER'S later quoted work).

³ On the difference between the favourites and the *primus ministers* in the general – which was prevailed last in Vienna – European administrative development: JEAN BÉRENGER, *Pour une enquête européenne: Le problème du ministériat au XVII^e siècle*, *Annales* 29 (1974) 166–192, on Vienna 177–183.

⁴ The exact official name of the cardinal nephew: *generalis et specialis superintendens*. The first remained *breve* of appointment was Francesco Barberini's, though, its existence might be traced back to earlier times. The *breve* of 1623 – in reality *motu proprio* – is issued: MADELEINE LAURAIN-PORTEMER, *Absolutisme et népotisme. La surintendance de l'État ecclésiastique*, Bibliothèque de l'École des Chartes 131 (1973) 487–568, 552–561. The contemporary list of the cardinal nephews' rights and duties in nine points: ANDREAS KRAUS, *Amt und Stellung des Kardinalnepoten zur Zeit Urbans VIII. (1623)*, *RQ* 53 (1958) 238–243. The latest outline on the comparison of the cardinal nephew and the ministers of favourites, moreover on the emphasis of the Roman peculiarities and the offices of the nephew: BRIGITH EMICH, *Bürokratie und Nepotismus unter Paul V. (1605–1621)*. *Studien zur frühneuzeitlichen Mikropolitik in Rom* (Päpste und Papsttum 30), Stuttgart 2001, 13–34–41–49 and 201–261.

in contrast to other European courts it lacked the dynastic-hereditary legitimation. From time to time, each pontificate was followed by a new “reigning family”. The pope, as a sovereign monarch, had to establish the representation of his secular dominion – which was always threatened by the uncertainty, derived from the lack of continuity – with the absence of this legitimizing factor. The emphasis of the spiritual base of the Papacy and the strengthening of the spiritual legitimacy could not retrieve this lack, moreover it rather narrowed down the opportunities of representation. The reform of the Curia after Trent was basically “against the court”. The tournaments, competitions (which were organised even under Pius IV), lavish festivals, hunting, banquettes were vivid parts of the court life of the Roman Renaissance and the Baroque’s secular life at court, however they totally disappeared from the papal court by the second half of the sixteenth century. The spiritual legitimation of the reform Papacy, which served as a basis for the development of the papal absolutism, hindered the popes from taking the opportunity of the Baroque forms of the absolute power. Due to this tendency, the expenditures, spent on the papal court, reduced in the second half of the sixteenth century, the nadir was under Sixtus V. However, under Clement VIII and Urban VIII they considerably grew but never reached the degree of the Renaissance.⁵

A solution to the representation of the papal secular power, which differed from the European trends and did not hurt the spiritual legitimacy, had to be found. It was realised in two ways; on the one hand, in the field of an outstanding and intensive, sometimes monopolized architecture and art.⁶ The richness of the compelling architecture and art of the Baroque Rome was due to the lack of opportunities of power manifestation. On the other hand, the other solution was embodied by the delegation of the necessary secular power representation. The necessity of the delegation of this secular function practice explains the phenomenon of the papal nepotism of the early modern period, which becomes an organic and active part of the papal reigning system by the symbolic delegation of power representation. Thus, the vast amount of money, spent on the building processes and given to the cardinal nephew, cannot be regarded as unnecessary and vain expenditures of the Papal State, or as a tool of corruption. As a consequence, one cannot handle such statements like Leo XI “did not stain himself with nepotism, as the previous Medici Popes, Leo X and Clement VII had done”⁷ From this approach, nepotism in the early modern period was a unique formation of the function and self-revelation of the Baroque papal monarchical administration, which had a real role in the legitimacy of dominion.⁸

Due to the traditionally restricted administrative alternatives (which are well illustrated by the *breves*, bulls’ set phrases and locutions), the pope could participate in the daily

⁵ VOLKER REINHARDT, *Der päpstliche Hof um 1600*, Europäische Hofkultur im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert I–III (Wolfenbütteler Arbeiten zur Barockforschung 8–10, hrsg. v. August Buck *et al.*), Hamburg 1981, III, 7–13.

⁶ HASKELL, *Patrons and Painters*, 3–23.

⁷ MONDIN, *Pápak enciklopédiája [The Encyclopaedia of the Popes]*, 480.

⁸ REINHARDT, *Der päpstliche Hof*, *loc. cit.*

affairs only through the nominal initiation of the nephew, the prime official of the Curia, into the exercise of power by means of issuing documents. This way, he could keep the formal aloofness. As an example, a letter of the nephew – in fact of the Secretariat –, which was often drafted and corrected by the pope, was enclosed to the *breves*. The role of the “cardinal nephew” enabled the preservation of the role of the papal *padre commune* also within the Curia. Formally, the papal clientele did not belong to the pope but to the nephew – in Rome as well as in the country⁹ –, therefore he was called “cardinal patron” (*cardinale padrone*) – often even in the diplomatic correspondence.¹⁰

Not only was the reception of the delegates and monarchs the task of the nephew on the side of the pope, but also, as an alter-ego, the arrangement of the visitor’s catering and banquets – in and out of Rome. He had to behave like the prince of the State (*Principe di Stato*). He took over the role of the patron of culture, founded an art collection and library.¹¹ However, he never discharged his duties in his own name. His authority derived from the pope’s, consequently this granted power automatically ceased to exist with the death of the pope; however, in most cases, he wielded influence over the process of the conclaves. His activity had three phases: the life of the pope, the vacancy, then the period under the new pope. In the course of the latter, a couple of titles for life and the loyalty of the earlier clients, moreover the diversified personal strategies helped to maintain the fragments of his influence over the Curia,¹² such as in the case of Francesco Barberini – as opposed to Scipione Borghese and Ludovico Ludovisi.

The tested and functioning system remained unchanged until the middle of the seventeenth century. One of the reasons for its banning was the loss of the papal role as a great power and the secular power representation’s loss of importance. The functions of the cardinal nephew were performed by the cardinal secretary of State without a particular financial support. In 1676, Alderano Cybo obtained all the licences of the cardinal nephew from Innocent XI and later practiced them without receiving any surplus endowments. The practical activity of the cardinal secretaries – despite the occasional functional mishaps – henceforward supported the reputation of the prevailing pope. In so far as we can talk about the sacralisation of the papal role in the eighteenth century.¹³ However, earlier the reigning system, based on nepotism, had no real alternative.¹⁴

⁹ On how important it was in everyday life, and how it generated the production of correspondence, see: STADER, *Herrschaft durch Verflechtung*, 169–284.

¹⁰ On keeping connection with mainly those clients who were in governmental function: EMICH, *Bürokratie und Nepotismus*, 115–152.

¹¹ Cf. for example HAMMOND, *Musik and Spectacle in Baroque Rome*, 117–252; and especially on the ceremonial calendar of events of Urban VIII’s pontificate: 255–282.

¹² ANTONIO MENNITI IPPOLITO, *Il tramonto della Curia nepotista. Papi, nipoti e burocrazia curiale tra XVI e XVII secolo* (La corte dei papi 5), Roma 1999, 29–70, 30–39 (its praising review from the Jesuit GIACOMO MARTINA: AHP 37 (1999) 220–223).

¹³ CAFFIERO, *La maestà del papa*, 286–294.

¹⁴ REINHARDT, *Der päpstliche Hof*, loc. cit.

In the political-social reality, from the point of view of the optimal exercise of power, many predominant dysfunctional characteristics associated with the undoubted functionality of nepotism, which was based on the administrative-power and social organising demand for legitimacy. In the early modern period, the cardinal nephews, in spite of their prominent rank, their extensive influence and several titles, did not have real, independent decision making jurisdiction yet, like the western European favourites. This is proved by the range of the juvenile cardinal nephews. In the case of Alessandro Farnese – who was the second relative in this role – Paul III managed the affairs with the help of his loyal secretaries. Practically, the same happened under Paul V with Scipione Borghese. However, there were some exceptions, such as Francesco Barberini, who again and again attempted to seize the cases; or the nephews, who filled the power vacuum under the weak and sickly popes, like Sfondrati under Gregory XIV or Ludovico Ludovisi under Gregory XV. The formula could change even during a given pontificate.¹⁵

From this approach, the real and permanent role of the cardinal nephew was to enable provision for the papal family, he had the right to transfer the diverse Church revenues then with the help of free will, he could perpetuate them into the family's wealth. Behind the titles and allowances, given to other relatives, there was not a power legitimizing background. The contemporary social values and norms allowed the pope to provide for his relatives, moreover, it was his moral obligation. (Even in the middle of the eighteenth century, the main hindrance of Innocent XI's raising to the altar was the accusation that he had not loved his family enough.)

Not only did the popes avail themselves of nepotism to legitimize their reign but also to strengthen their inner power basis and to provide for their family's social rise. The phenomenon of the development of the self-made papal dynasties became significant already from the fifteenth century, within the scope of that general tendency, according to which the wealthy citizens endeavoured to enrich the aristocracy. (That is quite another matter that the Italian aristocratic families repeatedly gave popes to the Church.) From Eugene IV (1431–1447) to Alexander VIII every pope's family became part of the aristocracy, even if in the second half of the seventeenth century, the accumulated incomes could not be compared to the earlier amounts. The stake was still high, though. Notably, in the 1630s, Giacinto Centini hatched a hazardous plot for the assassination of Urban VIII, who, according to the contemporary opinion, was reigning for a rather long time. He meant to keep the hope of his elderly uncle's creation as pope and his creation as a cardinal nephew.¹⁶

In the creation of a new dynasty the critical point was the death of the pope. Consequently, at that time it appeared whether the obtained social positions were made lasting enough. The last nephew, who was elected a pope, was Clement VII.¹⁷ A new pope's

¹⁵ REINHARD, *Nepotismus*, 171–175; [IDEM], *Papal Power and Family Strategy*, 341–344.

¹⁶ M. ROSI, *La congiura di Giacinto Centini contro Urbano VIII 1633–35*, ASRSP 22 (1899) 348–370.

¹⁷ REINHARD, *Nepotismus*, 147–167 (the earlier historical examples) and 168–171; *Papal Power and Family Strategy*, 341–344.

accession to the throne meant a great shock also to the clients; such careers which spanned several pontificates – like the Ludovisi-client, Domenico Cecchini's¹⁸ or Rospigliosi's, who was supported by the Barberinis and remained the head of the nunciature of Madrid until 1652¹⁹ –, were regarded as exceptions owing to their clever personal strategies.

All in all, nepotism of the early modern period – apart from the unique legitimizing role – can be characterised by many dysfunctions, whose main practical purpose was to support the rise of the papal family and to establish their social providence. It could exist only because it met the contemporary norms, the obligatory command of the *pietas*, the expectations of the *magnificentia* and *liberalitas*, and the social movements.

Its banning is traced back to three reasons: 1. to the loss of the role of being a great power which made the representation of the nephew useless. 2. Secondly, to its overgrowth in the Barberini era which hurt the public good, the *bonum commune*, and was no longer supported by the demand of the *pietas*. 3. Thirdly, to the change in social structure of the second half of the seventeenth century. The growth of the economic crisis, the cessation of mobility basically altered the common norms. Therefore, nepotism, which represented the most spectacular form of the social rise, became unacceptable, for good. The criticism, expressed against it in the seventeenth century, did not differ from the earlier ones, however created entirely different stir amidst the altered circumstances.²⁰

The Golden Age

After the above mentioned, let us examine what the mechanism for the creation of the papal dynasty was like. The practical role of the cardinal nephews in the State and Church administration will be detailed in the next chapter.

The Borgheses and Ludovisis

Camillo Borghese – who was elected pope in 1605 and whose, as well as his family's, uniformly rising curial career is one of the best known and most typical –²¹ adopted a relative from the female line – for lack of other possibility –, his sister's son, Scipione Caffarelli and created him a cardinal. Caffarelli-Borghese won in quick succession the

¹⁸ REINHARD, *Freunde und Kreaturen*, 63–67. His manifold course of life is more vividly described in his biography. L. FUMI, *Il cardinale Cecchini romano secondo la sua autobiografia*, ASRSP 10 (1887) 287–322.

¹⁹ It was, for instance, welcomed in the Curia that the nuncio procured archdeaconry for Camillo Pamphili in the chapter of Toledo. PONCET, *Innocenzo X*, 351.

²⁰ REINHARD, *Nepotismus*, 175–185; *Papal Power and Family Strategy*, 341–344. The analysis of the term of *pietas* and its practice in the early modern period: WOLFGANG REINHARD, *Papa Pius. Prolegomena zu einer Sozialgeschichte des Papsttums*, Von Konstanz nach Trient, 261–299, the general establishments concerning the epoch: 261–262. 276–278. 283–285. 289. 297–299 (Ausgewählte Abhandlungen, 13–36).

²¹ As it was already quoted in the *Introduction*. REINHARD, *Ämterlaufbahn und Familienstatus*, 328–381.

various smaller-bigger privileges and offices of a protocolled and real nature. He could have a private chapel; he could celebrate masses on the papal altar of Saint Peter's Basilica and the Santa Maria Maggiore; his confessor was provided for in all the existing faculties, consequently in the matter of conscience, he did not depend on anybody else but on his subordinate priest. Furthermore, he became the governor of Fermo, then from 1610–1611 the cardinal-protector of Flanders and the Empire. The latter two positions, although they did not yield little income, were mainly to strengthen the international political relations of the family, especially in the Habsburgs' direction. Naturally, he immediately received the *facultas testandi*, the right for bequeathing his increasing capitals freely; moreover he obtained a profusion of economic and tax allowances, such as the right to manufacture gunpowder. A separate household was arranged for him, besides; he had a right of jurisdiction over his clientele, except for heresy and high treason. On his estates, he also won full authority in civil and criminal suits. For practicing his jurisdiction he also received the necessary Church faculties (*facultas immiscendi se in criminalibus, facultas absolvendi banditos*).²²

The annual revenues of the cardinal were 80–90 thousand *scudi* in 1609, 140 thousand in 1612, in 1614 – concluding from the rate of the purchasing of properties – they yielded 280 thousand. These do not contain the bills and money, constantly given by the pope (a not too serious amount, some 140 thousand *scudi* during the whole pontificate), and the numerous works of art: paintings, sculptures, jewelleries, which laid the biggest foundation of a collection ever. Only one part of the annual revenue came from the revenues of his offices. Its considerable part did not charge directly the papal budget, but it was constituted by the numerous ecclesiastical benefices and pensions given to him.²³

Excursus

After Trent the accumulation of benefices, unlike in the Renaissance, became naturally impossible. Nobody could be the owner of many bishoprics and Church benefices (as a coadjutor, administrator), which required pastoral work, at the same time, not even with papal dispensation. Paul V was incidentally a consistent canonist who strictly supervised the control of the nominees for the chair of a bishop. However, due to curial opposition, the Council of Trent did not ban the granting of the monastic benefices to clerics, it only recommended this process's abandonment to the pope. Instead of discontinuing it, the possession of various abbeys and provostships became the primary ways of the nephews and the Church elite to make their fortune in the early modern period. The curial officials had a very good chance in the case of vacant non-consistorial benefices, namely those which belonged to the *Dataria* (canonries, altar directories, etc.). However, the papal clients had the most opportunities. Their scope for action was increased by the fact that according to the rules of the Chancery, the popes reserved the granting of the

²² REINHARD, *Papstfinanz und Nepotizismus*, 24–30; Ämterlaufbahn und Familienstatus, 392–396; REINHARD, *Papal Power and Family Strategy*, 334–339; WODKA, *Zur Geschichte der nationalen Protektorate*, 53 – quoted in the chapter dealing with the Church administration. (VI, note 77)

²³ The detailed list of the art treasures: REINHARD, *Papstfinanz und Nepotizismus*, 59–70.

benefices of the passed away cardinals, curial officials, and papal clients and in many cases of those prelates who died in Rome, which were later granted exclusively to their own people. The often debated institution of the papal *reservatio* lived on, yet in a smaller sphere.²⁴ The other method was the burden on the revenues of the dioceses by the often quoted pensions.²⁵ According to the regulations of Trent, the residing bishop obtained only a thousand *scudi*, the rest of it was spent on other purposes solely by the pope. Other alternatives were provided by the *resignatio in favorem*, the institution of the resignations from benefices, which was popular also in the particular Churches.²⁶ The dispensation from the obligation of residence was rarely given, even to the cardinals. As a consequence, a process spread, according to which they resigned from the obtained bishoprics for the benefit of a concrete person, however, in advance they asked – in secret – a share from the income of over a thousand *scudi* from the new bishop in the form of pension. Formally, simony was not a matter of question since the new bishop did not pay for his office, though, the practices bore a very near resemblance. The vast of the cardinals lived up to this opportunity. (For instance, the later Urban VIII Maffeo Barberini resigned from his bishopric in Spoleto in this way, though, not for pension but for certain abbeys. Later, he received a papal permission, which enabled him to gain pensions from his earlier owned bishoprics and allocated them to his relatives.) Apart from the papal family, the testamentary bequeathing and the delegation of benefices to a young cleric of the family (*facultas transferendi*) enabled the social evolution of several families.²⁷ The cumulative system perfectly worked in the territory of the Papal State. However, in France, Spain, Portugal, Naples, Milan and Savoy, due to the restrictive statute laws and the former papal concessions the scope of the Curia was rather moderate. In Genoa, Venice and Tuscany, where concrete papal privilege and concordat of any sort did not control the question, the will of the local politics always had to be taken into account. The revenues

²⁴ REINHARD, *Papstfinanz und Nepotismus*, 72–80.

²⁵ The historical preliminaries of the *pensions*' employment, the contemporary criticisms and several practical examples, see MARIO ROSA, *Curia Romana e pensioni ecclesiastiche. Secoli XVI–XVII*, Quaderni Storici 14 (1979) 1015–1055; on the canonical background SYLVESTER FRANCIS GASS, *Ecclesiastical Pensions. A Historical Synopsis and Commentary* (Canon Law Studies 157), Washington 1942, 40. Apart from the endless venality of offices, the scientific analysis and evaluation of the also unusual pensions were already accomplished in the epoch by DE LUCA, *De pensionibus ecclesiasticis*, Romae 1684. In the debate, whether only the pope or also certain bishops could carve a pension out of their revenues, as opposed to Fagnanti, De Luca supported the latter. GASS, *Ecclesiastical Pensions*, 40–41.

²⁶ On the canonical background and details of the resignations, regulated by Gregory XIII, see: F. GILLMANN, *Die Resignation der Benefizien*, AKK 80 (1900) 50–79. 346–378. 523–569. 665–788. 81 (1901) 223–242. 433–460, (on their forms 552–664; results: 665–687; in favour of a third person: 687–708; on the pensions: 433); and recently: P.G. CARON, *La rinunzia all'ufficio ecclesiastico nella storia del diritto canonico dall'età apostolica alla Riforma cattolica*, Milano 1946, on the epoch 355–410.

²⁷ The various family techniques of obtaining benefices, licences, numerous details of the patron-client system – apart from the ones quoted in the *Introduction* and Chapter III – in all-Italian relation (Milan and North Italy, Tuscany, the Papal State and Naples): CHRISTOPH WEBER, *Familienkanonikate und Patronatsbistümer. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte von Adel und Klerus im neuzeitlichen Italien* (Historische Forschungen 38), Berlin 1988, on the Papal State 148–266, on the “family prelatures” of the papal court 169–404; MARIO ROSA, *Per grazia del papa. Pensioni e commende nell'Italia del Seicento*, Roma, la città del papa, 293–326 (especially concerning Tuscany, Venice and Naples); moreover REINHARD, *Papal Power and Family Strategy*, 329–356; and [IDEM], *Freunde und Kreaturen*, loc. cit.

from the benefices, freely granted by the popes and almost exclusively provided for the papal limited-wider clientele (consequently, not the direct papal incomes), were significant from Naples and southern Italy. Their sum, from 109 bishoprics, was 200 thousand ducats, which was equivalent to the same amount of *golden scudi*.²⁸ Not only Sarpi from Venice, who had explicitly hostile feelings towards Rome, addressed criticism (*Trattato delle materie beneficiare*) to the system, but also Robert Bellarmino. His so-called *Considerationes quatuor ex concilio Tridentino* memorandum of 1612 condemned especially the accumulation of benefices. In his reflection, Paul V, who had an excellent vein of a jurist, put the emphasis on the impossibility of the execution of the council's certain decrees, and on the superiority of the Apostolic See as against the reproaches. The complexity of the situation is proved by the fact that the quoted Bellarmino enjoyed more benefit than necessary due to a tidy pension of Toledo.²⁹

Scipione Borghese had an annual income of 38 thousand *scudi* from reservations and pensions from the *Mediterraneum*. He had a profit of 114 thousand *scudi* from forty-eight (!) abbeys in the Papal State, Naples, Sicily, Milan, Piedmont and Venice, though, these data remained from 1619, from the end of his uncle's pontificate. The cardinal nephew earned 3.34 million *scudi* between 1605 and 1621, out of which 850 thousand came from his positions, 1.19 million from presents and other allowances, 1.3 million from Church benefices.³⁰ However, his expenditures on his household and various investments (in 1610, for example 190 thousand) were all in all 3.3 million. As a consequence, he was obliged to survive the change of the papal throne with a rather solid profit, although, this did not mean that Paul V's pontificate was not significantly more fruitful for the Borgheses. By 1621, in Rome the family had already obtained twenty-nine properties, through purchase and building, and fifty-one estates, parcels of total 2.32 million *scudi* in the surroundings of the Eternal City. These were not exclusively the acquisitions of the cardinal nephew – in the case of whom we should not forget the revenues which were not registered in the accounting –, but also the pope's two brothers, Francesco and Giovanni Battista Borghese's properties.³¹

The two secular brothers were excluded from the Church benefices and allowances as opposed to their nephew. Therefore the degree of the direct papal *monte-*, bill- and cash endowment, titled to them, was significantly (some 760 thousand *scudi*) higher. The sum might have been higher since, according to the above mentioned system, numerous settlements had been done before the income could have been passed into the books of the secret treasury. Moreover, the secular nephews won the vast amount of

²⁸ REINHARD, *Papstfinanz und Nepotismus*, loc. cit.

²⁹ ANTONIO MENNITI IPPOLITO, *Il tramonto della Curia nepotista*, 72–75.

³⁰ VOLKER REINHARDT, *Kardinal Scipione Borghese (1605–1633). Vermögen, Finanzen und sozialer Aufstieg eines Papstnepoten* (BDHIR 58), Tübingen 1984, 40–71. – By analysing only the years from 1607–1621, REINHARDT shows an income of only 3,207,000 scudi and a moderate loss. *Papstfinanz und Nepotismus*, 39–59. 81–141. 144–145.

³¹ REINHARD, *Papstfinanz und Nepotismus*, 81–141; with a profusion of complete, covering up to 1633, details and an outstanding summary: REINHARDT, *Kardinal Scipione Borghese*, 14–39. 40–116. 117–181. 182–192. 193–236. 237–258. 259–264. 341–547 and 548–560.

the positions for the secular aristocracy of the Papal State. The title of the general of the Church with its monthly provision of a thousand *scudi*, the commandship of the papal guards, governorship of Borgo (this district between the Vatican and the Castle of Sant' Angelo was not under the public administration of Rome),³² the position of the Castle of Sant' Angelo's commander, who earned 600 *scudi*, furthermore, the commandship of Ancona, Ascoli, Perugia's papal fortresses and the duchy of Spoleto and Benevento (this latter was a papal *exclave* in the territory of Naples). The income of only Giovanni Battista was 20 thousand *scudi* in the year of his death, in 1609.³³ Generally speaking, by the end of the first five years their income was around 100 thousand, by the end of the tenth year, it was already net 180 thousand *per capita*, which was rather glaring compared to the earlier times.³⁴

The positions of Giovanni Battista were inherited by his son, Marcantonio, who inherited also the task of establishing a dynasty. Notably, his uncle was childless, and for this he was regarded as a functionless nephew. The little more than eighteen-year-old young man was married to a member of a mellowed Roman family, the Orsini that had already given many popes.³⁵ In 1619, when he married Camilla Orsini, the wealth of the Borgheses was in total four million *scudi*, out of which two million was from provincial lands and 700 thousand from Roman estates. The palace, which was built around 1605 then augmented near the Piazza di Spagna, and the lavish villa on the Pincio, as well as the beautiful villas in Frascati, which were ornamented by Pietro Bernini's sculptures and Ludovico Cigoli's pictures, were parts of the family's property. The Capella Borghese, built in the Santa Maria Maggiore, cannot be included here, however, it represented dynastic purposes: this became the vault of the family.³⁶ Such temptation, the ransoming of the *mésalliances*, could not have been resisted even by an old aristocratic kinsman.³⁷ The poor family of Siena rose amongst the most prosperous Roman families by this marriage. The process, based on Church wealth and the papal revenues, of the establishment of the dynasty was accomplished. Only the death of the pope had to be survived.³⁸

³² NICCOLÒ DEL RE, *Il governatore del Borgo*, SR II (1963) 13–29, 13–23. The archontology of the nephew-governors from the Aldobrandinis to the Altieris 26–29.

³³ REINHARDT, *Papstfinanz und Nepotismus*, 31–59; *Ämterlaufbahn und Familienstatus*, 388–392, 397–406. The positions in the papal army that the nephews could hold were the following: *capitano generale di Santa Chiesa*, *capitano generale del mare*, *luogotenente generale delle galere pontificie*, *soprintendente generale - prefetto generale*, *luogotenente generale delle guardie pontificie*.

³⁴ REINHARDT, *Paolo V*, 280–281.

³⁵ As Margherita Aldobrandini had been so to the Farnese family by his predecessor. ZAPPERI, *Der Neid und die Macht*, 30–39.

³⁶ REINHARDT, *Paolo V*, 284–286. On the establishment of dynasty and entail, see the recently: ALBERTO CORTEGGIANI, *Ad instar regum. Note sulla fondazione del giuspatronato fedecommissario Borghese*, SR 48 (2000) 60–82; the survey of the *Villa Borghese* and its bewilderingly rich art collection: *Guide to the Borghese Gallery*, ed. by KRISTINA HERRMANN FIORE, Roma 2001.

³⁷ REINHARDT, *Paolo V*, 280–281.

³⁸ REINHARDT, *Ämterlaufbahn und Familienstatus*, 406–427.

The nuclear family was followed by the extended family and the circle of clients. The thorough analysis of the curial *cursus honorum* is a rather complex task and the necessary basic research is insufficient. The most useful sources are the appointments of the cardinals. According to them, between 1605 and 1616 there were sixty cardinals created on seven consistories. In the last five years there were no more appointments. By analysing the genealogy of the new members, it is shown that a circumscribed group of them involved the members of old aristocratic and Roman patrician families (Lante, Millino, Torres, Maffei, Verallo, Leni, Lancellotti, Muti), who got closer to the Borgheses through marriages. Another group of them belonged to the clientele of the Borgheses, especially of Scipione (Bichi and Cennini of Siena, furthermore, Tonti, Campori, Gherardi, Pignatelli). Although, these new appointments did not contrast with the inner reform of the curial life due to the moderate way of life of the cardinals and their pious behaviour, the fact that their proportion reached a quarter of the creations (fourteen out of sixty), the tendency pointed to the improvement of the *status familiae*, namely to the dynastic and not reform politics.³⁹

Gregory XV, who was ill and old when he was elected, had little time to strengthen his family's future which made him spend the papal wealth more intensively. Already on 15 February 1621 he created Ludovico Ludovisi cardinal, then two days later he was appointed as the prefect of the Secretariat of Briefs and on 21 February the chief-intendant of the Papal State. Prior to this, the twenty-five-year old nephew was only a referendary and a prelate member of the Consulta. Under the pontificate of his uncle, the sum of the properties granted to him was significantly increased by the death of two former cardinal nephews, Pietro Aldobrandini and Alessandro Peretti, the relative of Sixtus V. Apart from numerous abbeys, commendas, etc., he inherited the lifetime office of the *camerlengo* in 1621 and the vice-chancellor in 1623. Besides the vast prestige, the position of the chamberlain of the Church and the vice-chancellor (in reality the chancellor) was strategically important not only since these two ancient offices controlled the Camera and the Chancery, but due to their lifetime character, they provided a great influence even after the demise of the pope. (Their significance is proven by the fact that they could not have been held by the same person, therefore the position of the *camerlengo* fell back to the allied Aldobrandinis.⁴⁰) Ludovico received *monti* of 800 thousand *scudi* and Church benefices of 1.2 million *scudi*. The *monti* and the benefices, even after his uncle's death, yielded annually 230 thousand *scudi*.

The usual secular offices were taken over from the Borgheses by Orazio, who is familiar from Valtellina, and his eleven-year old son – Ludovico's brother –, Niccolò. The financial means of the Ludovisis is shown by the duchy of Zagarolo's purchasing for 850 thousand *scudi* in 1622 from the Colonnas, moreover, besides this, they started the dear

³⁹ REINHARDT, *Paolo V*, 291.

⁴⁰ HC IV, 58.

building of their Roman palace.⁴¹ Above all, the pope also bought the duchy of Fiano for 220 thousand *scudi* for his brother in 1621. Solely in 1622, he gave sixty-two venal offices to his nephews with a value of 83,755 *scudi*. The integration of the new dynasty into the old one was deepened by the marriage of his niece, Ippolita Ludovisi and Giovanni Aldobrandini (whose family helped the pope's election) and the matrimony of Niccolò and Isabella Gesualdo. Niccolò Ludovisi married Constanza Pamphili in 1644 which led to the three papal families' – the Aldobrandini, Ludovisi and Pamphili – union.⁴² A wider circle of clients could not have been established for lack of time. In the course of four consistories, Gregory XV appointed only twelve cardinals, among whom there was Richelieu.⁴³

The amount of the allowances, granted to the nephews, show a significant rise in the first quarter of the seventeenth century. Under Clement VIII, the two cardinal nephews earned annually only 40 and 20 thousand *scudi* from the Church benefices, however, the secular relatives, for instance Giovanni Francesco, who died in Varasd as the commander of the papal troops in Hungary, obtained one million *scudi* within twelve years.⁴⁴ Despite the growth of the expenses spent on the relatives, Montaigne's remark on the Boncompagnis, made in the *Travel Journal* in 1580, is also valid in the case of the Borgheses and Ludovisis to a certain extent. Namely, Gregory XV could assist his relatives without hurting the Church's interests. Comparing to the Spanish crown-cardinal, Gaspare Borgia, who received a farewell present of 1.2 million *scudi* at the end of his viceroyalty of Naples, or as well as to Richelieu, who had a private annual income of 850 thousand écu in 1640, Scipione Borghese and Ludovico Ludovisi were only "impecunious".⁴⁵

The Barberinis and Pamphilis

Montaigne's words can hardly be correlated with the Barberinis. The long pontificate and the favourable constitution of the family offered more remarkable opportunities to

⁴¹ GRISAR, *Päpstliche Finanzen*, 241–242; On the privileges, offices and allowances of Ludovico, Niccolò and Orazio Ludovisi, see more: JAITNER, *Die Hauptinstruktionen Gregors XV.*, I, 113–154, 157–178, 178–184; KOLLER, *Gregorio XV*, 296–297; JAITNER, *Kurie und Politik*, 9–16. On Ludovico, more by MARIO ROSA, *Per «Tenere alla futura mutazione volto il pensiero». Corte di Roma e cultura politica nella prima metà del Seicento*, La corte di Roma tra Cinque e Seicento, 1–36, 28–36.

⁴² On the connection between the dynastic marriages and the outcome of the conclaves: MARIA ANTONIETTA VISCEGLIA, *Marriage and Politics at the Papal Court in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries*, Marriage in Italy 1300–1650 (ed. by Trevor Dean–K.J.P. Lowe), Cambridge 1998, 197–224.

⁴³ KOLLER, *Gregorio XV*, 294–295.

⁴⁴ Yet, for example in 1598, all three obtained 60–60 thousand *scudi*, apart from which between 1600 and 1601 they received 190 thousand from the revenues of the Apostolic Camera. In the case of the two cardinals, the payments for various Church positions are well-known, which did not come to a large sum. JAITNER, *Die Hauptinstruktionen Clemens' VIII.*, I, xcvi–cxliv; REINHARD, *Papstfinanz und Nepotismus*, 31–32, note 3; KLAUS JAITNER, *Il nepotismo di Clemente VIII (1592–1605): il dramma del cardinale Cinzio Aldobrandini*, ASI 146 (1988) 57–93; BORROMEO, *Clemente VIII*, 253.

⁴⁵ REINHARD, *Papstfinanz und Nepotismus*, 156–160.

them than to their predecessors. Notably, Urban VIII could make three of his relatives cardinals; one of them was his elder brother, the Capuchin monk Antonio, the other two were his other brother – who naturally became the general of the Church –, Carlo's two sons, the primary and secondary cardinal nephews, Francesco and Antonio. The duty of establishing the dynasty fell on their younger brother, Taddeo.⁴⁶

The annual income of the two cardinal nephews, Francesco and Antonio's, similarly to the Borgheses for each was more than 100 thousand *scudi*. However, in 1632 after the death of Ludovico Ludovisi, two-thirds of the former nephew's wealth, which did not concern the right of free will, was divided among them and the Capuchin Antonio. This meant an income of 58,500 *scudi* annually. The vacancy of the vice-chancellor's position weighed more. It was won by Francesco, out of whose titles this became the one of primary importance until his death in 1679. At the end of 1633, three members of the Barberini family also obtained a great part of the Church revenues of the deceased Scipione Borghese.

The positions of Francesco, the proper *cardinale padrone*, considering their nature and proportion, did not differ from his predecessors'.⁴⁷ In the case of the younger Antonio – who was made cardinal in 1628 and the *arciprete* of Santa Maria Maggiore in 1629 and received the major orders only in 1633 – one can learn that the basic sum of his revenues was 22 thousand to which at least a Church pension of 8,500 *scudi* was added. The number of his abbeys rose up to eighteen by 1643. Besides, he came into possession of six *preceptorias*, three priorities and provostships. If his venal offices and other positions (from 1628 he was the prefect of the Apostolic Signature, from 1638 – after the death of Hippolito Aldobrandini – to 1671 *camerlengo*, he was the member of at least eight congregations and the prefect of the Propaganda, moreover the protector of France⁴⁸ and various religious orders, colleges and confraternities) are added to the above mentioned, there are no doubts that his revenues considerably surpassed the annual 100 thousand *scudi* by the middle of the 1630s.⁴⁹ His uncle, Cardinal Antonio had rather similar allowances.

The destiny of Taddeo, who was acquitted of the process due to the murder of a papal *sbirro*, a gendarme, in 1626, was more favourable. In 1625, the Castel Roviano was bought for him from the Colonnas, which was worth 57 thousand *scudi*, then, in 1627 Anticoli Corrado was bought for 36 thousand *scudi*. In 1631, his annual income was some

⁴⁶ Their longer-shorter biographies – with their offices, wealth, patronage – can be found in the slightly out-of-date monograph of the family's history: PECCHIAI, *I Barberini*, Carlo: 130–133. Antonio Snr: 151–152. Francesco: 154–159. Taddeo: 159–189. Antonio Jn: 189–213; see more MARIA GRAZIA IODICE, *Il cardinal Francesco Barberini*, Roma 1965, 5–31; with many biographical details OLIVIER PONCET, *Antonio Barberini (1608–1671) et la papauté. Réflexions sur un destin individuel en cour de Rome au XVII^e siècle*, Mélanges de l'École Française de Rome. Italie et Méditerranée, 108 (1996) 407–442.

⁴⁷ These are listed by KRAUS, *Das päpstliche Staatssekretariat*, 10–14 – quoted in the following chapter. (V, note 112.)

⁴⁸ The office went with a French pension of 18 thousand *livres*. OLIVIER PONCET, *Les cardinaux protecteurs des couronnes en cour de Rome dans la première moitié du XVII^e siècle: l'exemple de la France*, La corte di Roma tra Cinque e Seicento, 461–480, 469–471.

⁴⁹ LUTZ, *Rom und Europa*, 135–140; LUTZ, *Urbano VIII*, 309–310.

143 thousand *scudi*; out of which 83 thousand *scudi* came from the estates, 34 thousand his offices of representative nature and duties, 26 thousand came from the *monti* and the venality of offices, assigned to him. At the end of Urban VIII's pontificate, when he was threatened by the loss of the well-paid offices, with *motu proprio*, various commercial and economic monopolies were bestowed upon him by his uncle.⁵⁰

The annual revenue of 143 thousand *scudi* was equivalent to the profit of a capital value of approximately three million. However, the vast amount of the incomes could not cover the expenses of the duke, the deficit was 31,500 *scudi*. In 1632 he could have been given a good sum of "money infusion" by his uncle. At that time, his total assets were four million *scudi*, his annual revenues later reached 200 thousand *scudi*. In 1640, for example, he could purchase an Orsini estate (the so-called Stato di Montelibretti) for 1.5 million *scudi*.⁵¹

In parallel to the aiding of relatives, the prestigious investment of an enormous sum was launched in 1628, namely the building of the Palazzo Barberini (next to the Quattro Fontane).⁵² At the same time they created the legal framework of the dynasty's establishment. The pope circumscribed the order of inheritance, by ensuring its legitimacy in any cases (*etiam ex presbyteris et coniugatis*) by three *breves*. In 1627, Taddeo was married to Anna Colonna, whose dowry was 180 thousand *scudi*, though, only about its one third was paid. In 1630 Palestrina was obtained again from the indebted Colonnas for 550 thousand *scudi*. Owing to this, Taddeo rose to princely rank. His real social position was guaranteed by his duchy and not by the military ranks, governorships, castellanies inherited from his meanwhile dead father. However, the title of the prefect of Rome led to severe complications.

The extended family, namely Lorenzo Magalotti, Gregorio Nari, Francesco Maria Macchiavelli obtained special opportunities by being created cardinals among the seventy-four cardinals who were appointed in the course of the eight consistories of 1624, 1629 and 1641. (Four *in pectore* appointed cardinals died prematurely.) Taddeo's marriage made Girolamo Colonna (1627–1628), Alessandro Cesarini (1627), Antonio Santacroce and Giovanni Francesco Guidi di Bagno (1629) related to the Barberini family. Except of the last two creations in 1641 and 1643, the bestowing of the family was always in the focus of importance. However, at that time the economic crisis determined the reasons of support. Out of twenty-nine appointments, there were eight cameralistic officials, which earned half a million *scudi* for the benefit of the Papal Treasury. Moreover, four

⁵⁰ Cf. PECCHIAI, *I Barberini*, 168–169.

⁵¹ The proof of the Barberinis' gigantic art collection is their enormous library. The history of its organization is made known by CINZIA FORTUZZI, *Bibliotheca Barberina. La libreria di Urbano VIII e Francesco Barberini*, Roma 1994. I do not touch upon the positive relation of their patronage, like the employment of the famous composer, Girolamo Frescobaldi, the architect Maderna, Bernini, Borromini, the humanist Lucas Holstenius and the Hungarian Melchior Inchoffer, etc. See on all JUDITH A. HOOK's already quoted outline: *Urban VIII. Die Paradoxie der geistlichen Monarchie*, 213–231.

⁵² The "theatre" and iconography, appearing in the inner ornamentation of the palace, of nepotism, especially concerning Taddeo Barberini: JOHN BELDON SCOTT, *Images of Nepotism. The Painted Ceilings of Palazzo Barberini*, Princeton, 1991, 33–124 and 160–179.

of them were from Genoa, indicating that partly the banks of Genoa prevented the economic bankruptcy of the Holy See.⁵³

The personal policy, though, was ambiguous. Out of the fifty-six cardinals in the conclave of 1644, fifty owed their hat to Urban VIII, however, the nominee of the Barberini faction, Giulio Sacchetti received only 5, namely five votes. The failure of the smooth transfer of power cannot only be led back to the political, military and economical bankruptcy of the Barberini pontificate. There was grave opposition to the pope within the Sacred College, since the cardinals were deprived of their usual Church allowances due to his unlimited nepotism. It speaks volumes that the term of nepotism – naturally, not the institution – evolved in those years.⁵⁴ During the twenty-one years, the Barberinis obtained some 30 million *scudi* in cash and other revenues, out of which 1.7 million was explicitly *escamerazione*, namely the direct expenditure of the Apostolic Camera.

The ten-twelfold of this outrageous number could be regarded as the total revenue of a fruitful year and in such extent, a completely unproductive prestige investment. Apart from Taddeo, the ample allowance of the three cardinal relatives (and other relatives) and the less numerical sum of other expenditures, for example spent on the building of palaces, shook the papal budget to the fundamentals by 1640 and caused the catastrophic accumulation of the public debt. The financial faltering of the Holy See not only questions the pope's personal and moral responsibility but also proves it. Urban VIII, himself, was aware of this problem; he asked the statement of theologians around 1642–1643, though, his worsening illness might have played a role in this, not his scruple. However, he might have desired to strengthen the total papal authority on the level of economy in this way, or he might have wanted to defend himself against the more and more severe discontent.

The committee, which was rather a partial congregation (*congregatio particularis*) gathered for a given task, included Giovanni Battista Altieri and Juan de Lugo cardinals, Marco Aurelio Maraldi, the secretary of the Briefs and the Capuchin Valeriano Magno. The first conclusion of their inquiry was that the pope could freely handle the revenues of the Holy See. Later, they reconsidered their statement and less uniformly expressed their opinion, namely the pope could alone decide only on the one-fourth of the Church revenues – including the revenues from the venality of offices and other titles. Unrealistically, they estimated a sum of only 100 thousand *scudi*. The more and more rigorous statements did not serve such directive that would bring a change in the pope's behaviour, true, they did not support the legitimization of the nephews, either.⁵⁵ On the contrary, they furnished a basis for such manifestation that after the death of Urban VIII, the statutory settlement of the relatives was launched.⁵⁶

⁵³ An almost full analysis: VISCEGLIA, *La Giusta Statera de' porporati*, 177–203 and 203–210.

⁵⁴ FOSI, *Allombra dei Barberini*, 141–142.

⁵⁵ LUTZ, *Urbano VIII*, 310.

⁵⁶ On the function of the committee, moreover committees due to its varying members, whose results are vital sources of the Barberini era's finances: GRISAR, *Päpstliche Finanzen*, 252–297; MENNITI IPPOLITO, *Il tramonto della Curia nepotista*, 75–80.

Innocent X deemed it advisable to listen to the grievances in the spring-summer of 1645. After having spent some time on the throne of Saint Peter, he expressed his opposition against the fact that the papal treasury was emptied and launched a row of vindictory sanctions. It happened that the Barberinis almost trembled for their lives. They hoisted the French flag on their palaces in vain since Mazarin, in his indignation at their earlier compliance in the conclave, withheld the French patronage on 25 October 1644. Antonio Barberini secretly escaped from the more and more acute crisis on 28 September 1645. His itinerary's target was France. The answer of the pope was not delayed; he summoned an extraordinary congregation on 20 November, which was determined on having the family of Urban VIII account for the expenses of the War of Castro.⁵⁷ The family members who stayed in Rome, Francesco and Taddeo also set off to Paris on 17 January 1646. In the French capital, Mazarin solemnly welcomed them and became the patron of his former benefactors for the time being.⁵⁸ On 3 February, the Pamphili Pope sequestered all of their properties, then sixteen days later he issued his well-known – sometimes called bull – *breve*. The document obliged the members of the Sacred College to appear in the Curia within six months if they did not have a benefice of obligation of residence or a papal authorization for their absence.

The Barberinis, owing to the French armed menaces, could enter the Eternal City and obtained their offices and properties in 1648. The reconciliation was followed by the allying of the two families, which was sealed in 1653 with the red hat of Carlo and the marriage of the younger Taddeo and Olimpia Giustiniani, the second niece of the Pamphili Pope.⁵⁹ However, this matrimony is related to the history of a more problematic dynasty-establishment, which had to cope with a confusion of legitimacy. Notably, at Innocent X, for the lack of suitable relatives, the nepotism's unique type appeared.

As a reminder, Niccolò Ludovisi (*principe di Piombo*), married his niece, Constanza Pamphili in November 1644 and his nephew, Camillo Pamphili married into another papal family, the Aldobrandini in February 1647. There was no problem with the first matrimony; however, the second did not correspond to the aims of Innocent X, since from 14 November 1644 Camillo was the cardinal nephew. As a result, this position remained vacant, for the first time since the sixteenth century. As a replacement, on 7 October 1647, the pope made the seventeen-year old nephew, Francesco, of his brother's widow, Olimpia Maidalchini, cardinal, yet, who was unsuitable for the position due to his age. He owed his appointment to the papal sister-in-law's far-reaching influence.

The unique rule of women in the early modern period generated strenuous criticism among the contemporaries and rather exaggerated reactions in the College of Cardinals. A couple of cardinals, like the former nuncio in Vienna, Giovanni Battista Pallotto, some-

⁵⁷ The description of the events: PECCHIAI, *I Barberini*, 182–189.

⁵⁸ REINHARD, *Freunde und Kreaturen*, 69–71.

⁵⁹ PONCET, *Innocenzo X*, 326–327.

times abused Donna Olimpia in an unaffected style.⁶⁰ The unlimited rule of women was broken around 1649–1650, though, only for the time being. At this time, the papal sister-in-law could not even enter the Apostolic Palace. From the autumn of 1650, the duty of the nephew was accomplished by a remote relative, by Camillo Astalli, who was adopted by the Pamphili family. He was created cardinal on 19 September and some two weeks later chief intendant. However, this stopgap arrangement did not prove to be successful. Donna Olimpia retrieved her former unlimited influence in March 1653, therefore, at the beginning of the following year, Astalli was sent into exile, by parting with the name of Pamphili. Niccolò Ludovisi also fell out of favour.⁶¹

Such torso of nepotism is made intelligible by Ranke wrote exceedingly subtly: “The sculptures of the pope and his sister-in-law are in the same room in the Villa Pamphili. If we compare the two faces, the woman’s face, radiant with determination and wisdom, and the pope’s meek and expressionless feature, we understand how it was possible, moreover unavoidable that the woman directed the pope...”⁶²

Apart from his family, Innocent X had no luck with his clients, either, which is illustrated by the unprecedented scandal, the case of Mascambruno. At the end of 1651, the *sottodatarario* – who was the personal auditor of the pope and owed his career to him – was accused of the forgery of dispensations. In a short while, the court of the governor of Rome discovered a corruption network within the *Dataria Apostolica*. The pope, being shaken by the revealed evidences, ordered a criminal procedure, at the end of which the corrupted curial official was beheaded in public on 15 April 1652.

The damaged reputation was not amended even by the exemplary verdict⁶³ and the increasing control over the College of Cardinals could also only partly counteract. On the basis of the resolution of the Consistorial Congregation in 1650, the verbals of the canonical examinations of the bishop-candidates were controlled by the personal auditor of the pope, which process led to the cessation of the leaders of the College’s (*Capi dei Ordini*) similar jurisdiction. The consistorial sessions were rarely summoned between 1648 and 1649, there were only eleven. The pope strengthened the resolution of the Ceremonial Congregation in his apostolic regulation of *Militantis Ecclesiae*, issued on 19 December 1644; in which he expressed that the cardinals were not allowed to use secular symbols – for instance the crown – in their coat of arms. This regulation concerned mainly the cardinals from princely families (Savoya, Este, Medici), whose addresses (*Altezza*) were banned by the Pamphili Pope. From 1654, the congregations – ex-

⁶⁰ „...era una vergogna, che il governo di Roma stesse in mano di una Puttana.” The quotation can be found: *Giacinto Gigli: Diario Romano*, 327.

⁶¹ PONCET, *Innocenzo X*, 325–326.

⁶² RANKE, *A pápák története [The History of the Popes]*, 606–607; the positivist analysis of the Pamphili-nepotism: CIAMPI, *Innocenzo X Pamfili*, 115–208; recently CHIOMENTI VASSALLI, *Donna Olimpia*, 99–143, 148–174 and 194–234; the survey of the crisis series of the family, more: LINA MONTALTO, *Un mecenate in Roma barocca. Il cardinale Benedetto Pamphilj (1653–1730)*, Firenze 1955, 3–42.

⁶³ CHIOMENTI VASSALLI, *Donna Olimpia*, 175–186; PONCET, *Innocenzo X*, 326.

cept of the Propaganda and Inquisition – had to summon in one of the papal palaces and not in one of the cardinals. Innocent X significantly reformed the Sacred College with his appointments which meant a certain compensation to him. Out of the sixty-six cardinals, who elected Alexander VII, thirty-two were created by him, among whom there were his later successors: Chigi, Odescalchi and Ottoboni.⁶⁴

The overall understanding of the Pamphili Pope's nepotism is not only a complicated task but almost impossible for the lack of researches related to the expenditures. According to the calculations fifty years later in 1691, his nepotism cost 1.4 million to the State, comparing to the 900 thousand of the Barberinis. Not only is this numerically mistaken but also in its proportions, namely it rather produces evidence to the negative judgement of the contemporary "nepotism torso". The adverse budget could hardly afford such lavish spending. The least favourable situation was exacerbated by the corn crisis, which erupted in the provinces of Marca and Lazio, furthermore, in Todi, Perugia and Viterbo due to the weak production of 1647. In Fermo, even the vice-governor fell victim to the riotous crowd. Innocent X was obliged to command troops in the town to restore order.⁶⁵

The Decline

The Chigis, Rospigliosis and Altieris

The only favourable circumstance of the striking dysfunctional nepotism of the Pamphili Pope was the breaking of the system, the irreversible beginning of its decline. The invitation of Alexander VII's relatives from Siena to Rome happened only after some delay. At the same time, another committee of theologians – which was led by the Jesuit Sforza Pallavicini – endeavoured to estimate the nephews' annual allowances in roughly 12 thousand *scudi*. However, such radical change could not have been accomplished, since for instance, only the collection and transport of Flavio Chigi's properties cost 41,264 *scudi*. Nevertheless, the pope, ten days before the order of the family's move to Rome,⁶⁶ in his bull of 2 May 1656, the *Inter gravissimas* banned everybody – including also the relatives of the pope – from accepting any compensation in return for the transfer of curial offices and Church benefices. In brief, he terminated the institution of *resignatio in favorem*. Since Paul V's bull, which declared the ban of the Church benefices' alienation, this was the first regulation which affected the patron-client system, including the nepotism.⁶⁷ However, the granting of the offices of the nephew started

⁶⁴ PONCET, *Immocenzo X*, 327.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 328; on the patronage, more: CIAMPI, *Immocenzo X Pamfili*, 209–334; and ALESSANDRO ZUCCARI-STEFANIA MACIOCE (a c. d.), *Immocenzo X. Pamfili. Arte e potere a Roma nell'età barocca*, Roma 1992.

⁶⁶ MENNITI IPPOLITO, *Il tramonto della Curia nepotista*, 80–89.

⁶⁷ Its issue: *Bullarium Diplomatum et Privilegiorum... Romanorum Pontificum XVI*, Augustae Taurinorum 1869, 156–161; its survey: TEODORI, *I parenti del papa*, 56–62.

on 27 May 1656. His brother, Mario Chigi became the general of the Roman Church, the captain-general of the papal fleet and the governor of Borgo which was followed by the governorship of Civitavecchia, though it was originally intended for the younger Agostino. Agostino was the son of the pope's earlier deceased brother, who had the same name. In compensation, on the very day, he entered into the possession of the headquarters of the two papal guards and the castellany of Castle of Sant' Angelo, Perugia, Ancona, Ascoli and Benvento.

On the other hand, Flavio, Mario Chigi's son, had to content himself with the governorship of Fermo that he obtained on his ordination, on 3 June 1656. Until his creation as a cardinal, 9 April 1657, he was introduced to the State affairs as a referendary. Hereupon, in quick succession, he became the *soprintendente* of the Papal State, the librarian of the Church, the prefect of the Sanità and the Buon Governo Congregation and the legate of Avignon. In the course of the following years, his titles were multiplied by the governorships of Tivoli and Capranica, furthermore by the leadership of Segnatura di Grazia, the Confini (between July 1663 and February 1664 the Council), the Acque and the Sgravi Congregation. Namely, he could act the part of the "minister" of health, interior, border, council, water and the fiscal affairs in one person. The latter position was rather rewarding since this office dealt with the moderation of taxes.

However, in contrast to the practice of earlier pontificates, the granting of the offices of the nephew – which should be highlighted – did not mean such governmental influence, neither on the level of opportunities. As opposed to the congregations subordinate to Flavio, he had nothing to do with the Secretariat of State. His situation is clearly depicted by the report of the delegate of Venice, according to which every evening, in the presence of him Alexander VII saw Rospigliosi, the secretary of State, who gave account of the current affairs, though the nephew could not say a word.⁶⁸ The same can be told about Mario or Agostino's participation in the military affairs. The symbol of the formal authority was that in 1657, the only eight-year old Sigismondo Chigi could become the *luogotenente generale* of the two papal guards.⁶⁹

Apart from the representation of power, the chief purpose of the offices was the assuring of the revenues, which did not reach the earlier measure either. The further debate on nepotism in 1658 also contributed to the unavoidable decline. Concerning Agostino's marriage with the Borgheses, Alexander VII found it necessary to ask the opinion of the College of Cardinals with regard to the degree of the wedding present. The majority of the cardinals agreed with the presents, though without having calculated their value. As Cardinal Spada conceived, they trusted the self-restraint of the pope. Their hesitation rooted in the old dilemma that hardly anyone could contradict and question

⁶⁸ OSBAT, *Clemente IX*, 353.

⁶⁹ TEODORI, *I parenti del papa*, 67–71. Barely eight months after the death of Alexander VII, he will provide the *restituzione capello*, the assurance of the family's constant membership in the *Senatus Divinus*. *Ibid.*, 136.

the successor of Saint Peter, being embodied with absolute power and ancient tradition; even if the given cardinal was responsible for the prevention of corrupt practices.⁷⁰

Alexander VII, however, who was seeking legitimizing support, needed concrete figures. Cardinal Savelli was the most sedulous; he regarded one million *scudi* as a reasonable price, which would have led to State bankruptcy. According to Cardinal Sacchetti, the nephew could not obtain less than 200 thousand, which would have been complemented by various grants, like land and offices. The proposal of Paolucci estimated 150 in one sum, then annual allowances of 50 thousand. The noted canonist-cardinal – who was the cardinal presbyter of Santa Balbina, located next to the Baths of Caracalla – as a theologian, Juan de Lugo assumed a strict point of view, he would have found 50 thousand *scudi* amply sufficient. Benedetto Odescalchi went further. He held that the pope could use only his own benefices, namely his personal revenues; moreover he believed that it should be spent on more charitable purposes. Notably, being aware of the miserable state of the papal budget, Alexander VII could responsibly spend his private wealth on his “poor relatives” only if the opinion of a committee of theologians considered it justified.

The opinion of the committee, which was summoned after a short hesitation, was close to that of Odescalchi's. Francesco Rosso (Franciscus De Rubeis), who generated several debates on the Hungarian-related cases, claimed on the basis of the Council of Nicaea and Trent that the providence of the relatives was admissible only in case of true poverty and according to the norms of Saint Thomas. Sforza Pallavicini had no doubts, either, about that the interests of the Church, the standard of living of the clergy and the obligation of the poor people's providence drew limitation to the pope's authority concerning the Church revenues. On the other hand, the pope could take other aspects into account, such as the needs of a relative. For the well-known Jesuit historiographer, it meant a wedding present of 15 thousand *scudi* and an annual allowance of 50 thousand, which reached a total of 600 thousand *scudi*.

In the discussion of Juan de Lugo it appeared that this sum covered the maintenance of a middle sized baronial family: the everyday expenses, the inheritance of the first and second-born and the dowry of the daughters. The Spanish cardinal shared Pallavicini's standpoint, by going beyond his earlier opinion of 1642, when he regarded the annual 100 thousand *scudi* per nephew as acceptable. His literary vein got an inkling of the core problem of dealing with figures, which rooted in the lack of circumscription of the papal income. He estimated the income of the Dataria from Church revenues to 200 thousand (which was rather around 300 thousand), however, he found impossible to give chapter and verse about the sums from the venality of offices and the *monti*.

The indefinable character of his personal income and the convincing opinion of the most influential member of the College, Decio Azzolini – namely, if the cardinals were permitted to use the allowances from the consistorial revenues freely, why was the pope

⁷⁰ MENNITI IPPOLITO, *Il tramonto della Curia nepotista*, 166.

forbidden to do so –, made the creation of the dynasty possible for Alexander VII. Finally, Sigismondo obtained 620 thousand *scudi* as a wedding present.⁷¹

Nevertheless, the direction of the process was the point. Although there is a perfect analogy between the Chigis and Borgheses concerning the three groups of the allowances (offices, Church revenues and gifts) and the accumulation of offices, the change of the rate is striking.⁷² While Scipione, alone, could acquire an income of 3.34 million *scudi* under his uncle, his later successor, Flavio obtained only 852 thousand around 1656–1667, moreover, his whole family got a little more than two million: 990 thousand from offices, 663 thousand from grants, and 349 thousand from benefices.⁷³ The differences, which can be estimated to 1.338 million, between the Chigis and Scipione Borghese's allowances are striking even if we take into consideration that the Borghese pontificate lasted five years longer.

Except of the three outstanding years (1657: 163 thousand, 1658: 268 thousand, 1666: 211 thousand), the annual benefits of the nephews, especially Flavio, Agostino, Mario and other Chigis, like Sigismondo, were altogether between 107–142 thousand. Even if we calculate with the highest values, the additional 900 thousand *scudi*, which are rendered for five years, are half million less than the incomes of the Borghese nephew. If we had concrete sums, the difference, comparing to the whole Borghese family, would be even more striking, not to mention the Barberinis. Urban VIII's pontificate was approximately twice as long as Alexander VII's, namely 30 million faced 4 million pro rata. This number is a more telling data than the similar figure that is shown by the amount of the obtained estates and properties.⁷⁴

The nepotism of the new pope, Clement IX, was even more moderate than his predecessor's. His relatives from Pistoia could only move to Rome for the period of his pontificate. Although the *tesoriere generale* as well as the *tesoriere segreto* provided their payments, these were not enough for the creation of a noble family not only due to the shortness of the pontificate. It was of more importance that the pope renounced his inheritance in favour of his brother, Camillo, moreover that Camillo's son, Giovanni Battista could marry Camilla Pallavicini, the heiress of the Colonna-wealth in Lazio. The heirless head of the Pallavicini family, Cardinal Lazzaro, with the authorization of the use of the Pallavicini name, he created *primogenitura* from the new family, an entail based on primogenitary right. Apart from his, the Rospigliosi nephews obtained the usual offices. Camillo became the general of the papal troops, his sons: Giovanni

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 90–93.

⁷² TEODORI, *I parenti del papa*, 65–66. The revenues from the offices: 66–97, chart: 95. papal donations: 97–106, chart: 105. Church benefices, pensions: 106–120, chart: 118 (other economical benefits: 120–124). their summary: 125–136, chart: 130, estate and financial investments: 137–208, chart: 178 and 186.

⁷³ MENNITI's estimation of 4 million is false. *Il tramonto della Curia nepotista*, 90–93.

⁷⁴ TEODORI, *I parenti del papa*, 127–128 and 209–225; comprehensively MARIE-LOUISE RODÉN, *Cardinal Decio Azzolino and the Problem of Papal Nepotism*, AHP 34 (1996) 127–157, 134–140; more FRANCESCO PETRUCCI, *Alcuni arredi Seicenteschi del palazzo Chigi di Ariccia nei documenti d'archivio*, SR 46 (1998) 320–336.

Battista became the general of the Church, Tommaso the commander of the Castle of Sant' Angelo, Vincenzo the commander of the papal fleet and the former internuncio of Brussels, Giacomo was created cardinal. However, he had to go without the rights and allowances of the cardinal nephew.⁷⁵

In contradiction to the Rospigliosi era, there was an absolutely counter process under Clement X. According to a survey from 1690, the Altieris obtained an income of only 1.2 million *scudi* from the Camera. The data is markedly doubtful again, however, it is undeniable that the withdrawal of nepotism temporarily halted for five years. The adopted relative of the pope, Paluzzo Albertoni-Altieri centralized considerable power in his hand. He was in one person the cardinal nephew with all his privileges, the *camerlengo*, the vicar of Rome, the prefect of the Secretariat of Briefs and the Propaganda, the legate of Avignon and Urbino, the governor of Tivoli, the archbishop of Ravenna and the protector of Loreto, several countries and orders. It was rumoured in Rome that there was a special division of labour developed in the Palace: the ruling became the task of the nephew, while the pope gave only blessings. The larger estates – Oriolo, Veiano, Monterano and Bassano – were gained by the close relatives of Albertoni. A less fortunate relative, however a cardinal, Giulio Gabrieli obtained only the legation of Romagna and the governorship of Fermo, Benevento and Capranica. From the extended family, Vincenzo Maria Orsini then Federico Baldeschi-Colonna became the prefect of the Sacred Congregation of the Council, the close friend of the pope, Gaspare Carpegna became the head of the Dataria.⁷⁶ The recruitment of the Sacred College from, basically, relatives and clients, despite the moderate form of nepotism, proved to be determining also under the two predecessors of the Altieri Pope. In case of Clement IX, there was only one prelate – out of the cardinals, who were dubiously appointed by the pope on his deathbed – who did not belong to this circle.⁷⁷

The Odescalchis and Ottobonis

The swing of the pendulum of nepotism under the Altieries, in parallel to the acceleration of the contemporary criticism,⁷⁸ was followed by a natural decline. The occurrence's turning into a cyclic movement could not be halted at the standstill, however, Innocent XI, before the acceptance of his election, had the cardinals sign the election capitulations. The points declared – by interpreting the problems of nepotism in a broader context – that the new pope should eliminate all those corrupt practices which caused a scandal among the foreigners, furthermore, he was to maintain the prestige of the College of Cardinals and follow the advice of the cardinals and the dean of the Sacred College in relation to

⁷⁵ OSBAT, *Clemente IX*, 354.

⁷⁶ OSBAT, *Clemente X*, 366–367.

⁷⁷ OSBAT, *Clemente IX*, 356.

⁷⁸ Cf. MARIE-LOUISE RODÉN, *The Problem of Papal Nepotism*, 140–144.

the questions of the Church, the Papal State and the Apostolic Camera. He was obliged to spend the money from the venality of offices exclusively on the reorganisation of the public debt and he could not allocate anything to his relatives from the incomes of the Camera. There were many clauses, which dealt with the reconstruction of the Holy Office and the Propaganda, with the aspects of the more cautious appointment of the bishops and priests and with the legal and administrative reforms, especially with regard to the taxes and various economical monopolies.⁷⁹

Odescalchi Pope endeavoured to meet the programme, stated in the capitulations, with personal exemplification. The aspects of the family and clients did not play a role in the publicized appointments of the two consistories (1681 and 1686). On the first occasion he rewarded his close colleagues with the red hat. Only those had the chance to be appointed who had already had a cardinal in their families, however, with the exception of Benedetto Pamphili, most of them had already an important curial office.⁸⁰ Five years later, explicitly the international character was the determining.

The pope stayed in the most modest suite in the Quirinal and he never used the gardens of the papal palaces,⁸¹ moreover he never visited Castel Gandolfo. He was “satisfied” with the spiritual legitimation, the other forms of power representation were regarded unnecessary. True, in 1683, his regulations against the French fashion, games and carnivals did not meet with great success.⁸² His nephew, Livio Odescalchi did not get any offices and revenues, however he inherited the pope’s total share from the family wealth. Typically, in the Curia, this deal was considered as the disfavour of Livio. Innocent XI did not fill the positions and offices of the cardinal nephew, neither of the other positions of the nephews – the first time in the seventeenth century –, which not only meant the first step towards the change of the administration, but it also contributed to the success of the financial reform program by its annual savings of some 100 thousand *scudi*. Notably, the profit of annually more than half million *scudi*, which was (also) spent on the liberation of Hungary, became complete only with this sum.

According to a detailed account, the following sums were released per position of the nephew: the legate of Avignon: 6,072; the chief intendant of the Papal State: 4,140 (these two offices were not dissolved but merged into the office of Cybo secretary of State without any allowances); the general of the Church: 13,725 *scudi*; the general of the fleet: 7,490; commander of the Castle of Sant’ Angelo: 1811; the *luogotenente* of the fleet: 2,481; the captain-general of the guards: 3,600; the *luogotenente* of the guards: 2,160; the governor of Benevento: 4,200; the Feldzeugmeister of the troops (*maestro di campo generale delle soldatesche*): 4,100; the castellan of Ascoli: 300. In addition, there were 9,000 *scudi* saved up by the reform of the cavalry, 19,532 *scudi* from the papal relatives’ allowances in kind (bread, wine, wax, etc.) and 3,000 *scudi* from their medicines. 5,000 were not supposed

⁷⁹ MENNITI IPPOLITO, *Il tramonto*, 94–110; [IDEM], *Innocenzo XI*, 373.

⁸⁰ With the list of certain names: MENNITI IPPOLITO, *Innocenzo XI*, 384.

⁸¹ Their description with beautiful illustrations: DAVID R. COFFIN, *Gardens and Gardening in Papal Rome*, Princeton 1991.

⁸² AGO, *Hegemony over the Social Scene*, 237–241.

to be paid for the receptions organized by the cardinal nephew. The lack of the nephew in the army of Marca and Romagna yielded all in all 3,000, in the fleet 10,000. Later, Innocent filled some offices; the general of the Church earned as a professional soldier only 750 *scudi* comparing to Mario Chigi's 1,125 *scudi*.⁸³

After three years of reign, in 1679 with a bull, Innocent XI wanted to legally and definitely abolish the system based on relational privileges and he desired to lean on the whole College, or rather on the consistory, instead. His effort was supported by De Luca in his pamphlet of *Discorso apologetico per riparo dell' Antica Autorità e Decoro del Sacro Collegio de' Cardinali*. Moreover, he was supported by his secretary of State, more *zelanti* cardinals and the general of the Jesuits.⁸⁴

However, the official issue of the regulation could not have been accomplished yet. Some members of the Sacred College, with the leadership of Decio Azzolini, opposed the idea of the pope and stood up for the absolute papal authority.⁸⁵ The more and more conservative members of the *squadron volante* feared the functioning of the Curia from the radicalism of the Odescalchi Pope and his closer surroundings; moreover, they were unable to become estranged from the centuries-old cultural heritage of nepotism and its administrative foundation. In the centre of their argumentation they stated that the nephews' serious duties were rightly coupled with various privileges. However, in spite of the newer and newer doubts, the *zelanti* group, which was organized under the pontificate of Innocent XI and significantly strengthened by the appointments of 1681, desired to continue the pope's initial efforts.⁸⁶

The endeavours of Innocent XI, concerning the final arrangement of the question of nepotism, were doomed to failure. One of the keys of the reforms – which could have eliminated the one-sidedness of the absolutist decision making – could have fallen into the hand of the College of Cardinals in vain since the former *squadrons* preferred the decade-old, tried opportunities. With the leadership of Ottoboni and Albizzi cardinals, the Holy Office initiated an inquiry against the closest colleagues of the pope, against Petrucci, who was created cardinal in 1681, and De Luca, with the accusation of the actual heresy, the quietism.⁸⁷ Their third fellow, the later canonized Gregorio Barbarigo – one of the chief favourites of the conclave of 1691 – urgently returned to Venice.⁸⁸

The smaller nepotisms still wanted to find legitimacy under the shade of the papal nepotism.⁸⁹ However, Innocent XI's endeavours were by no means fruitless. Innocent XII's

⁸³ In wider context: MENNITI IPPOLITO, *Il tramonto della Curia nepotista*, 126–163.

⁸⁴ GIOVANNI BATTISTA SCAPINELLI, *Il memoriale del p. Oliva S. J. al card. Cybo sul nepotismo (1676)*, Rivista di Storia della Chiesa in Italia 2 (1948) 262–273.

⁸⁵ Azzolini's opinion is conveyed by RODÉN, *The Problem of Papal Nepotism* 144–149 and 150–157.

⁸⁶ SIGNOROTTO, *The Squadron Volante*, 187 and 204–206.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 203–211. On De Luca's role in the fight against nepotism: LAURO, *Il cardinale Giovanni Battista de Luca*, 457–519.

⁸⁸ MENNITI IPPOLITO, *Il tramonto della Curia nepotista*, 96–110.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 20–21 and 130–139.

regulation of 1692, which abolished the institutional form of nepotism for good, was based on the draft of his bull.⁹⁰

Innocent XII: Romanum decet Pontificem

The accomplishments of the second successor of the Odescalchi Pope required the last swing of the pendulum of nepotism. Notably, on the conclave of 1689, the conservative faction won. Pietro Ottoboni, crowned as Alexander VIII, restored the earlier neglected curial offices and the allowances of the nephews. He aimed at a strong Church, which not only was based on a theological but also on an invulnerable legal basis, whose most important provider was the increasing activity of the Inquisition. Alexander VIII could not accept his predecessor's social and structural reforms since in his view, they would have affected the central and leading role of the Curia.⁹¹

His nephew, Antonio – his father, Agostino Ottoboni was the brother of the pope – became the general of the Church and the commander of the papal troops, his son, Pietro Ottoboni became the cardinal nephew, the vice-chancellor, the legate of Avignon, etc. Moreover, the position of the secretary of State was filled by a relative, namely by the son of the pope's sister, Giovanni Battista Rubini. In parallel to the restoration of nepotism – as opposed to his predecessor – he reduced the taxes, liberalized the corn trade, abolished the meat and flour tax, in order to avoid epidemics, he issued a regulation on the cleanliness of the streets. He might have been the last art collector pope. He preferred the manuscripts and unique books, therefore he obtained the library of Queen Christina and the well-known Altemps; moreover he was deeply concerned about the newly founded Arcadia.⁹²

However, Alexander VIII's anachronistic policy was already out of date. As far as the total abolishment of nepotism was unfounded around the 1670s, after two decades, its total rehabilitation proved to be unrealizable. As the Papal State – after the final turns of the liberating wars against the Turks – could not play a significant role in the European politics, the State could not afford, either, the enrichment of newer and newer papal dynasties. The nepotism of the Ottobonis – which lasted only for two years between 1689 and 1691 and cost 700 thousand *scudi*, which was one third of the Apostolic Camera's income – contributed to the final settlement of this question.

The breakthrough was the dominancy of the cardinals, appointed by Innocent XI, on the conclave of 1691. The name choice of the fifty-six-year old crowned Antonio Pignatelli expressly indicated the policy of the new pontificate. Innocent XII, as one of his first actions, sent the draft of his predecessor's bull, consisted of older and modified points, to the members of the College of Cardinals. The lines of the cover letter explicitly referred

⁹⁰ The draft is thoroughly analysed: MENNITI, *Innocenzo XI*, 375–379.

⁹¹ See the earlier quoted literature on the Ottobonis.

⁹² PETRUCCI, *Alessandro VIII*, 392–393; about the Ottoboni-collection, kept in the Vatican: J. BIGAMI ODIER, *Premières recherches sur le fonds Ottoboni*, Città del Vaticano 1966.

to the prestige of the blessed memory.⁹³ At this time, there was nobody in the College who dared to oppose the pope. With the breakthrough of the *zelanti* in the conclave, the old curial world, whose roots derived from the triumphal ideal of the *Curia trionfante* in the first half of the century, was doomed to vanish. Their remained representatives, though, tried to raise some objections without any success; their action fell through due to the resistance of the chief reformers, datarius Panciatichi and his deputy, Sagripanti. Cardinal Giovanni Francesco Albani, the later Clement XI, had a particular role in the preparation of the papal regulation. As the “guard of Innocent XI’s drafts”, he contributed to the success with making available the earlier text.⁹⁴

The bull *Romanum decet Pontificem* was issued after a one-year long preparation, on 23 June 1692. In his introduction, the pope not only referred to the regulations of the councils, but also to the canonical norms which regulated the benefices of the prelates and to the fundamental principles of justice and wisdom which were to be taken into consideration while governing the Roman Church. The first chapter of the bull minutely names the target persons, namely the pope, his successors, their siblings, nephews, relatives, either blood-relation, or adopted ones. Moreover it declares that they cannot acquire an income by any rights “from properties, money, heritable or inheritable *monti*, from venal offices and any of their wealth, benefits or rights which belonged to the Apostolic See and Chancery... furthermore, from any shares and revenues, allowances and benefices of the Apostolic Dataria, Chancery and the Secretariat of Briefs, the Church *spoliums* and the Apostolic Palace...”. The second point entrusts the pope with the providence of his poor relatives according to his conscience. The third point banned the offices of the *nepotes*: the legation of Avignon, the chief-intendancy of the Papal State, the generality of the Church, the governorships of the two guards and the fleet, the castellanies of the Castle of Sant’ Angelo, Ancona, Perugia and Ascoli, the governorship of Benevento, etc., etc. In addition, it specifies that in case of emergency if any of the military positions should be reinstated, it can only be given to a professional person.⁹⁵ If a papal relative chose Church career, he could not be bestowed more income than those who had similar ranks. Only that relative who was created cardinal by the pope for the sake of his personal merits was an exception to the rule. The fourth point determined his

⁹³ “Our Holy Father resolved to execute the plan of the pious Innocent XI to publish a bull on nepotism...”

⁹⁴ MENNITI IPPOLITO, *Il tramonto della Curia nepotista*, 94–110 and 110–116; GISONDI, *Innocenzo XII*, 67–84.

⁹⁵ The abolition of the nephews’ military offices resulted in an annual saving of 80 thousand scudi. The command of the papal army was taken over by those cameralistic officials who controlled the military expenses from the beginning of the century. Their names were from this time *commissario delle armi* and *commissario del mare*. The structure of the papal army was the same at the end of the eighteenth century as it had been in 1667. GEORG LUTZ, *Das päpstliche Heer im Jahre 1667. Apostolische Kammer und Nepotismus, römisches Militärbudget in der frühen Neuzeit*, AHP 14 (1976) 169–217. In Italian: *L’esercito pontificio nel 1667. Camera Apostolica, bilancio militare dello Stato della Chiesa e nepotismo nel primo evo moderno*, Miscellanea in onore di Monsignor Martino Giusti 2 (CAV 6), Città del Vaticano 1978, 39–95.

annual income in 12 thousand *scudi*. The last three clauses embraced the regulation on the obligation of oath concerning the execution and observance of the bull.⁹⁶

This regulation was soon followed by another one, on 23 October 1692, which continued the abolition of unnecessary offices, like the auditor of the Apostolic Camera, the body and chair of the clergy and the treasurer.⁹⁷

The polemic on nepotism yielded fruit. Even if it was not completely eliminated from the life of the Curia, its official form ceased to exist. At the beginning of the century, its institutional traces were preserved only by the papal dynasties' feudal estates.⁹⁸

⁹⁶ With the note of the bull's publications MENNITI IPPOLITO, *Il tramonto della Curia nepotista*, *loc. cit.*; GISONDI, *Innocenzo XII*, *loc. cit.*

⁹⁷ *Ibid.* On the vanishing of nepotism more: PRODI, *The Papal Prince*, 91–101.

⁹⁸ According to a survey, composed under Clement XI, the Borgheses had 28, the Barberinis 15, the Pamphilis 14 *feudo minore*, not to mention the authority and fiscal immunity which belonged to them. MENNITI IPPOLITO, *Il tramonto della Curia nepotista*, 71–72.

V

The Decision Making of the Holy See and its Main Institutions

The two main characteristics of the decision making of the Holy See in the early modern period – the absolute papal power that maintained all the decisions of great importance and the “departmental ministries”, namely the establishment of the congregations, which took precedence over the general European development – were already mentioned several times.¹ While, out of the reformed ancient institutions, we were already introduced to the *Camera Apostolica*, which dealt with the revenues of the Papal State, and the *Dataria Apostolica*, which was responsible for the granting of Church benefices and the related various financial matters and concessions; we have not inspected the function and structure of the congregations, and other dicasteries. However, for the evaluation of the chapter on the history of Church administration and politics, the knowledge of these institutions is as indispensable as the acknowledgement of the chief economical, social and financial processes. In the background of certain popes’ personal decisions, the judgement of their pontificate and the reaction of the Papacy or the *Curia Romana*, there was and is always a rather complicated and complex organism which influences, moreover embodies the decision making to a large extent.²

Offices and the Tribunals

In the first place, out of the central institutions of medieval origin, the *Cancellaria Apostolica*, which dealt only with the issue of the apostolic letters, the bulls with golden and leaden seal should be mentioned.

¹ Obviously, in this chapter I could not embark on analysing the papal Curia in every detail. The task would require a distinct monograph. In spite of the fact that there is an abundance of international secondary literature and the research concerning the offices was boosted, to outline a real picture, one should face the crowd of statements contradicting themselves. Below, I will not mention the related and very useful entries of the lexicons of great importance separately. For instance: *Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche I–VI*, hrsg. v. JOSEF HÖFER–KARL RAHNER, Freiburg 1957–1961²; *Dictionnaire Historique de la Papauté* éd. par PHILIPPE LEVILLAIN, Paris 1994; *Dizionario degli Istituti di Perfezione*, a c. d. G. PELLICIA–G. ROCCA, particularly vol. VIII (Roma 1988), 182–258.

² On the important directions of the development: DELUMEAU, *Political and Administrative Centralization*, 287–296; PARTNER, *Il mondo della curia*, 222–224; and PRODI’s two basic works that were cited in the *Introduction*.

From the thirteenth century, the chief official was the so-called *vicecancellarius*, though, in reality it was a cardinal who was considered a real chancellor. From 1532, his titular church was the San Lorenzo in Damaso that was incorporated in the splendid palace of the Chancery, which could also serve as a diaconal and presbyterial title depending on the rank of the vice-chancellor. The actual head and director of the office was the *reggente della Cancelleria* (*regens-locumtenens Cancellariae*); the committee of twelve members of the apostolic protonotaries, which enjoyed privileges from 1585–1586, oversaw the preparation and completion of the papal documents. (The papal notaries, who were not only in curial service, are to be differentiated from the limited college.) The drafts were sketched out by the *abbreviators*, the ornamented versions, written on parchment, were composed by the *grossators*. From the fifteenth century, the seventy two members of the college of the abbreviators constituted three classes: the twelve *abbreviatori di Parco maggiore* made the drafts, the twenty-two *abbreviatori di Parco minore*'s duty was to settle the fees of the documents' issue and to prepare the first fair copy. The thirty-eight *abbreviatori de prima visione* compared the drafts with the original.³ The large crowd of the *grossators* did not have an exact number of people. The works were directed by the *rescribendarius*, appointed by the vice-chancellor, with the assistance of the *distributor notarum grossandarum* and the *computator*. The latter one controlled the imposed fees and the official copies, registered by the *registratori*. (The registers survived in three distinct series, kept in the Vatican Archives; the *Registri Vaticani* consists of 2,020 volumes, the *Registri Avignonensi* 349 and the *Registri Lateranensi* 2,487.) Before the bull was supplied with a leaden seal by the *bullatores* or the *sigillatores* in the *Uffizi del Piombo*,⁴ it had had a final legal and formal control by the *corrector litterarum apostolicarum* or the *Audentia litterarum contradictarum*, led by the *uditore delle contradette*.⁵

³ The granting of the offices, six from the first class, fifteen from the second and third class belonged to the vice-chancellor. The holders of these venal offices, as we have already highlighted, did not perform effective work. MENNITI IPPOLITO, *Il tramonto della Curia nepotista*, 153; PELLEGRINI, *Corte di Roma*, 553.

⁴ The granting of 101 out of the 104 (which cost 2,050 *scudi* per person) *collettori del piombo* belonged to the Datary, one to the confraternity of the Blessed Virgin Mary, one to the Saint Jacob hospital, and one to the converted nuns. MENNITI IPPOLITO, *Il tramonto della Curia nepotista*, 153.

⁵ The archontology of the cardinal vice-chancellors, apart from the *Hierarchia Catholica* see more, PAUL MARIA BAUMGARTNER, *Von der Apostolischen Kanzlei*, Köln 1908, 99–141 and the *Appendix*; on the important officials and processes: FRENZ, *Die Kanzlei der Päpste*, 181–233 and 57–180; moreover PAULIUS RABIKASKAS, *Die römische Kuriale in der päpstlichen Kanzlei*, Roma 1958; on the series of the registers: PRITZ, *Supplikensignatur und Briefexpedition an der römischen Kurie*, 95–149 and 157–206; MARTINO GIUSTI, *Studi sui registri di bolle papali* (CAV 1), Città del Vaticano 1968, 1–96 and 97–122; and LAJOS PÁSZTOR, *La Curia Romana e i registri di bolle papali*, SR 17 (1969) 319–323; on the regulations, changes and the occasional canonical significance of the inner process: EMIL GÖLLER, *Die Kommentatoren der päpstlichen Kanzleiregeln vom Ende des 15. bis zum Beginn des 17. Jahrhunderts*, AKK 84 (1905) 441–460 and 85 (1906) 20–34 and 259–265; on the withdrawal of the Chancery in the modern period: PETER HERDE, *Audentia litterarum contradictarum. Untersuchungen über die päpstlichen Justizbreve und die päpstliche Delegationsgerichtsbarkeit vom 13. bis zum Beginn des 16. Jahrhunderts I* (BDHIR 31), Tübingen 1970, 174–180; comprehensively and with further abundant literature related to the Middle Ages: RE, *La Curia Romana*, 277–291 and 598–601. – See more in the notes at the Secretariat of Briefs.

Beside the Chancery, the character of the *Sacra Poenitentiaria Apostolica*, which was responsible for the questions of conscience, was rather judicial, jurisdictional than administrative.⁶

The Apostolic Penitentiary, directed by the *cardinal penitenziere* or the *penitenziere maggiore*, was led in practice by the so-called *reggente* official. The staff was formed by the *datario*, some *correttore*, *teologo*, *canonista* and two-two *procuratore* and *scrittore* (the number of the latter ones was twenty-four and twenty-seven before Trent), moreover by a *sigillatore*. The various confessors of the *penitenzieri minori* were under the control of the major penitentiary, like the confessor colleges of the Franciscans in the Lateran, of the Dominicans in the Santa Maria Maggiore and of the Jesuits – that were restored on 22 February 1659 by Alexander VII (*In apostolicae dignitatis...*) – in Saint Peter's Basilica. As it was not definite that out of the various – marital sins, the irregularities and the secret committed sins: *casi occulti*, etc. – papal absolutions, which were of conscience or which bore a relation to the canon law, Church discipline and theology, consequently, in the seventeenth-eighteenth century, the Penitentiary had a conflict of competence against the Dataria and the Roman Inquisition. Its attempt to extend and regain its authority led to further and further restrictive papal regulations. These did not affect its rights related to the papal indulgences, though, the degree of their employment was withdrawing comparing to the Middle Ages. The dignity of the cardinal penitentiary was regarded as an entail of the nephew until the middle of the seventeenth century.

The *Sacra Romana Rota*, which received cases mainly from the territory of the Papal State by the sixteenth century and with whose influential judges we met earlier, can be reckoned among the tribunals.

The Sacred Roman Rota, the oldest papal court, which originally dealt with the judicial trials conducted in the Church, also handled the secular cases from the fifteenth century. Its tasks were sometimes taken over by local courts due to the secular ban on the appeals forwarded to Rome and the privileges given to the States by the Holy See. With the strengthening of the papal centralism after Trent, its functions practiced throughout the universal Church were replaced to the courts of the nunciatures.⁷ The efficiency of the Rota was increased by the reform of Pius V which simplified its process, though, its significance was further reduced by the fact that the congregations often had judicial in addition to their administrative and executive functions, therefore, several trials – for

⁶ LUDWIG SCHMUGGE–PATRICK HERSPERGER–BÉATRICE WIGGENHAUSER, *Die Supplikenregister der päpstlichen Pönitentiarie aus der Zeit Pius' II (1458–1464)* (BDHIR 84), Tübingen 1996, 4–21 (history and competence). 22–56 (process); KARL AUGUST FINK, *Das Archiv der Sacra Poenitentiaria Apostolica*, *Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte* 83 (1973) 88–92 and TAMBURINI, *La riforma della Penitenziaria*, 110–129; on the “inner” and the “external” forum's problems: ANTONIO MOSTAZA, *Forum internum - forum externum (en torno a la naturaleza jurídica del fuero interno)*, *Revista Española de Derecho Canónico* 23 (1967) 253–331; more literature: SCHMUGGE ET AL., *Die Supplikenregister der päpstlichen Pönitentiarie*, 243–252; RE, *La Curia Romana*, 261–273 and 596–597. The archontology of the chief *poenitentiarius* can be found in the monograph of EMIL GÖLLER on the history of the office: *Die päpstliche Pönitentiarie von ihrem Ursprung bis zu ihrer Umgestaltung unter Pius V I–II*, Roma 1907–1911, II, 1–12 and in the *Appendix*.

⁷ See below the subchapter dealing with the nunciatures.

example the controversies among the churchmen – were conducted there. The twelve auditors, who led the work of the Rota, were obliged to be qualified in law and to take a public exam. From Martin V and from the sixteenth century, the Spanish king could delegate two members, whereas the French king and the emperor could delegate only one member to the body. The practice remained in the seventeenth century, as well, though, the non-Italian judges hardly had to deal with trials from their own country. However, in the field of diplomacy and curial clout, they could achieve priceless deeds for certain States and local Churches. (Bologna, Milan, Venice, Ferrara and Ravenna won similar rights in the sixteenth century, Perugia in the seventeenth century. There were two places held for Rome.⁸)

The *Signatura Iustitiae* operated as the general forum of appeal primarily of the Rota, sometimes of smaller ecclesiastical courts, moreover, it decided on the possibility of appeal beforehand.⁹

As a result of the Supreme Tribunal of the Apostolic Signature's institutional development, from the fifteenth century, the "Signature of Justice" – being separated from the *Signatura Gratiae*, which will be detailed later – independently accepted cases also in the first instance. The unique name can be traced back to the papal *signatura*, which was written on the petitions handed in for the sake of the unusual, supreme judgement (mercy). In spite of the separation, the officials of the two offices – who parted from the Apostolic Chancery, the often quoted referendaries – were the same (*referendarii utriusque Signaturae [Apostolicae]*). From Sixtus V, there were a hundred of them. Out of them, there were few who had real, voting function (*referendarii votantes*), though, as we already know, the prestige of the title was worth more. At the head of the *Signatura Iustitiae* there was the cardinal-prefect, whose deputy was the auditor who led the office.

⁸ On the Rota, the most fundamental: EMANUELE CERCHIARI, *Capellani Papae et Apostolicae Sedis Auditores causarum sacri palatii apostolici seu Sacra Romana Rota ab origine ad diem usque 21 septembris 1870 I–IV*, Roma 1919–1921; on the process: HERMANN HOBERG, *Inventario dell'archivio della Sacra Romana Rota (sec. XIV–XIX)* (CAV 34), a c. d. JOSEF METZLER, Città del Vaticano 1996, 15–50; and CHRISTINA BUKOWSKA-GORGONI's work which should be followed in its methodology and choice of subject: *Causae Polonae coram Sacra Romana Rota XV–XVII saec. Explanatio processuum et regesta documentorum*, Roma 1998; furthermore GNAVI, *Carriere e Curia Romana: L'uditorato di Rota*, 161–202; and HERMANN HOBERG, *Die Antrittsdaten der Rotarichter von 1566 bis 1675*, RQ 48 (1953) 211–224; BLAAS, *Das kaiserliche Auditoriat*, 48–57; AGO, *Carriere e clientele*, 22; the archontology of the Rota's deans from 1612: WEBER, *Die ältesten päpstlichen Staatsbandbücher*, 169; in conclusion and with more literature RE, *La Curia Romana*, 243–259 and 592–596. In more detail in Hungarian PÉTER TUSOR, *Pázmány bíboros olasz rejtjelkulcsa. C.H. Motmann „Residente d'Ungheria”*. (A római magyar agenzia történetéhez), [*The Italian Cipher Key of Cardinal Pázmány*], Hadtörténelmi Közlemények 116 (2003) 535–581, 539–542.

⁹ BRUNO KATTEBACH, *Referendarii utriusque Signaturae a Martino V ad Clementem IX et praelati Signaturae supplicationum a Martino V ad Leonem XIII*, Città del Vaticano 1931, VII–XXXVIII; AGO, *Carriere e clientele*, 21; RE, *La Curia Romana*, 227–231 and 591–592; on the practice of handling the requests: FRENZ, *Die Kanzlei der Päpste*, 93–97.

Apart from the significant courts, the abundance of smaller courts played a role in the life of the Eternal City and the Papal State. For instance, the Roman governor,¹⁰ the *camerlengo*, the cardinal vicar,¹¹ the Roman magistracy, the governor of Borgo, the senator of Rome, the cardinal nephew as chief-intendant, the rector of the Sapienza, the general of the Papal State, the auditor of the Chamber, etc. run tribunals. Not only does the conclusion of the courts' procedure in criminal and civil cases cause a problem for the succeeding generations, but also the contemporaries were hardly familiar with it.¹² Paul V attempted to refine the efficiency of their function with his bull of 1612.¹³ After a half century long break, in 1676 for the same reason, Innocent XI established a committee (*Congregazione per la Riforma dei Tribunali*) with the leadership of De Luca, which achieved results primarily in the reorganization of the camerallistic auditor's court. Innocent XII invited the best experts to the congregation. The bull *Romanus Pontifex* (17 September 1692) was born as the fruit of their labour. The smaller courts were united in a central court (*Gran Curia Innocenziana*) in the Palazzo di Montecitorio by the regulation. The process became simpler, faster and cheaper; several lawyers, agents and solicitors' expensive work was rendered unnecessary, moreover many privileges ceased to exist.¹⁴

The judicial reform did not affect the judicial character of the congregations, mainly of the Inquisition.

¹⁰ On his role: NICCOLÒ DEL RE, *Monsignor Governatore di Roma*, Roma 1972; the most accurate archontology from 1628: WEBER, *Die ältesten päpstlichen Staatsbandbücher*, 169.

¹¹ The cardinal vicars performed the duties of the Pope as the bishop of Rome, they were usually of the most immediate papal confidants. Their archontology: ANNIBALE ILARI, *I Cardinali Vicari. Cronologia bibliografica*, Roma 1962; about the functioning of their office: CHRISTOPH WEBER, *Der Vicegerente des Vikariates von Rom im 17. Jahrhundert und seine „größte Plage“*. Ein Beitrag zur Verfassungsgeschichte der Kurie, ZSSRG Kan. Abt. 80 (1994) 301–354; NICCOLÒ DEL RE, *Il Vicegerente del Vicariato di Roma*, Roma 1976, 9–35, a newer archontology on the period 51–63; DOMENICO ROCCIOLO, *Il tribunale del cardinal Vicario e la città. Brevi note tratte dall'opera di Nicolò Antonio Cuggiò*, RMC 5 (1997) 175–184; their latest range of titles: WEBER, *Die ältesten päpstlichen Staatsbandbücher*, 175; on their role in the organization of the religious and spiritual life: DOMENICO ROCCIOLO, *La costruzione della città religiosa: strutture ecclesiastiche a Roma tra la metà del Cinquecento e l'Ottocento*, Roma, la città del papa, 267–394.

¹² IRENE FOSI, *Sudditi, tribunali e giudici nella Roma barocca*, RMC 5 (1997) 19–40; ALESSANDRA CAMERANO, *Senatore e governatore. Due tribunali a confronto nella Roma del XVI secolo*, RMC 5 (1997) 41–66; PETER BLASTENBREI, *I Romani tra violenza e giustizia nel tardo Cinquecento*, RMC 5 (1997) 67–79; ALFREDO CIRINEL, *Bandi e giustizia criminale a Roma nel Cinque e Seicento*, RMC 5 (1997) 81–95; GIAMPIERO BRUNELLI, *Nobili soldati e giustizia nello Stato della Chiesa (1560–1605)*, RMC 5 (1997) 97–115.

¹³ SIMONA FECCI, *Riformare in antico regime. La costituzione di Paolo V e lavori preparatori (1608–1612)*, RMC 5 (1997) 117–140; BEATRICE CIRULLI, *L'Affresco della riforma dei tribunali nelle sale Paoline della Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana: una proposta di lettura*, RMC 5 (1997) 141–153.

¹⁴ STEPHANO TABBACHI, *Le riforme giudiziarie nella Roma di fine Seicento*, RMC 5 (1997) 155–174; AGO, *Innocenzo XII*, 397–399.

The System of the Congregations

The fifteen organized and reorganized congregations which were announced in Sixtus V's bull *Immensa aeterni Dei* on 22 January 1588 were by no means the final number. The realised basic structure of the Curia and the nature of the "departmental ministries" remained almost unchanged until (Saint) Pius X's reform of 1908. According to the regulations of Sixtus, the congregations had to consist of at least three cardinals – with some exceptions –, in many cases, which were completed with other prelates of the papal court. With, for example, the higher officials of the Dataria and the Apostolic Palace, and the members of various colleges: the auditors of the Rota, with protonotaries, consistorial lawyers and other officials, who took only part in the preparation of the decisions.

The sources from the period do not always call the cardinal, who headed the congregation, prefect. In such cases, when the pope did not act as chairman, they mention the senior cardinal (*cardinalis antiquior*). The official work was coordinated by the secretary – who usually belonged to the prelates –; only the important congregations of independent infrastructure had lower, subordinate employees (clerks, drafters). The cardinals could call in their personal secretaries; even in the sessions, which were organized in the palace of the senior cardinal or the cardinal prefect until the middle of the seventeenth century, until Innocent X's related regulation; in the case of certain congregations they were held regularly in fixed times, in other cases according to the event.

The cases for trial reached the congregation in three ways. Either the pope or his colleagues ordered the debate of a question or another office, a congregation could refer the case, or the case went directly to the congregation. For this, the petitioner had to be aware of the Curia's new, inner plan of work. According to its significance and the occasional-permanent authorization received from the pope, the congregations could publish their resolution of the discussed case individually, or in most cases after a papal approval in the form of a *decretum*, or of an attested certificate in the case of *licentiae*. It often happened that the resolution, which was compulsorily put down in the reticent registers (*acta, decreta*), was announced only in the form of a letter, moreover, to which an enclosed letter was attached, which was signed by the prefect and the secretary, rarely only by the latter. If a separate papal document was issued after the congregation's statement, the name of the office, which took part in the preparation, had to be indicated.¹⁵

¹⁵ On the basis partly of the related chapter of Sixtus V's bull (*Declaratio facultatum praedictarum congregationum*), partly of my experience in researching in the Vatican Secret Archives and of the below cited data.

Supreme Sacred Congregation of the Roman and Universal Inquisition (Sanctum Officium)

In 1588, out of the nine to ten congregations¹⁶ that provided the effective governing of the universal Church the most prominent and oldest (*Suprema Congregazione*) was the Sacred Congregation of the Roman and Universal Inquisition (*Sacra Congregazione della Romana ed Universale Inquisizione*), established on 21 July 1542 with the bull *Licet ab initio* by Paul III.¹⁷ With its establishment the Papacy published its first – before the Council of Trent – institutional answer for the challenges of the changed political, social and religious relations after the Middle Ages. It was created by the strict and consistent mentality which was one of the fundamental characteristics of the Catholic revival and was also embodied in the unique discipline of the Jesuits. The new office neither continued the work of the defunct (Dominican) inquisition, nor can a parallel be drawn between it and the State-subordinated Portuguese and Spanish inquisition, which mainly provided the religious homogeneity of the society.¹⁸ The institution, which is addressed as the “bulwark of Christianity”, owned the most far-reaching rights, basically it was the confidant of the popes’ spiritual and Church-teaching function. Its authority was being broadened in the course of time.

It had a doctrinal, judicial and Church administrative authority over the whole Catholic world and over everybody, be it a clergyman or layman of any origin or rank. Its competences were: 1. to investigate, cite, prosecute and judge, moreover to create definitions concerning faith and morals, like heresy, schism, apostasy (*apostasia*), theological mistakes; occultisms (magic arts, black art, astrology, predictions, prophecies, witchcraft, etc.); various abuses, like unfounded saint and miracle cults, the celebration of mass without ordination, the abuse of sacraments, poly- and bigamy, homosexuality, etc. 2. to serve exemptions, absolution from the irregularities (“heretic” origin, lack of the canonical age) that hindered the embracing of orders, the breach of the religious vows and oaths, and the automatic excommunication due to breaking of the prohibitions written in the bull

¹⁶ The main elements of the Sistine reform were outlined already under Gregory XIII. However, from the conception of the only twelve planned cardinal congregations, the ones for the control of the Dataria and the papal foreign policy were not established. The text of the plan is published: LUDWIG VON PASTOR, *Geschichte der Päpste im Zeitalter der katholischen Reformation und Restauration. IX: Gregor XIII (1572–1585)*, Freiburg im Breisgau 1925, 902–903.

¹⁷ In Latin: *Sacra Congregatio Romanae et Universalis Inquisitionis*; the office had many other name variants, the most official, yet hardly spread term (from 1588): *Sacra Congregatio Sanctae Inquisitionis haereticae pravitatis*; however, there occurred many other name variations in the period: *Sacra Congregatio Sancti Officii*, *Sacra Romana ed universale Inquisizione*, *Suprema Sacra Congregazione del Sant’Offizio*, or just simply *Sanctum Officium*, *Sant’Offizio*, *Sant’Uffizio*. – In contrast to the dicasteries of medieval origin, I prefer the Italian version concerning the institutions from the early modern period, by emphasising the contrast between these two fundamentally different periods of the history of Papacy – despite all continuities.

¹⁸ The monographic elaboration of the latter’s function: H. KAMEN, *The Spanish Inquisition*, London 1965; and additional data: PAULINE CROFT, *Englishmen and the Spanish Inquisition 1558–1625*, *The English Historical Review* 87 (1972) 249–268.

In Coena Domini, which was read to the communities on Holy Thursdays and two other times a year;¹⁹ moreover it relegated the faculties of all. 3. finally, to censor books, to prohibit or authorise their reading.²⁰

In the conduct of the latter's scope of duties, the congregation's work was helped by the Sacred Congregation of the Index (*Sacra Congregazione dell'Indice*), which was created in 1571 and dealt specifically with compiling the list of the prohibited books in a way of post- (*repressiva*) and sometimes previous (*praevia*) censorship.²¹

¹⁹ The bull reflecting the universal needs of the reform Papacy, which played an important role many times during the discussed period and went through many corrections due to the amendments of Sixtus V and Gregory XIII, consisted of twenty-one points. These were (1.) the heretics and their supporters; (2.) the appellants to the ecumenical council; (3–4.) the pirates and maritime freebooters; (5.) the ones who imposed unfair taxes; (6.) the forgers of the apostolic documents; (7.) the ones who gave war aids to infidels and heretics; (8–10.) the ones who hindered and taxed the travel and pilgrimage to Rome; (11.) the ones who insulted or charged somebody with the commission to insult the cardinals and prelates; (12.) the ones who hindered the appeals to Rome; (13.) the ones who turned to secular authorities from the Church tribunals (namely the *ab usu* appellants) and the ones who practiced the *placetum regium*; (14.) the ones who dared to hinder and revise the judgements of the Apostolic See and the enforcement of the privileges given by it; (15.) the ones who called the clergymen to a secular court; (16.) the ones who hurt the episcopal authority; (17.) the ones who usurped and arbitrarily seized the Church rights and benefices; (18.) the ones who charged the clergymen and benefices without papal permission; (19.) the ones who dared to prosecute the clergymen's criminal cases; (20.) the ones who attacked the Papal State; and finally (21.) against the robbers of the Apostolic Palace. KARL PFAFF, *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Abendmablsbulle vom 16–18. Jh.*, RQ 38 (1930) 23–76.

²⁰ HERMANN H. SCHWEDT, *Die römischen Kongregation der Inquisition und des Index und die Kirche im Reich (16. und 17. Jahrhundert)*, RQ 90 (1995) 43–73, especially 49; about the scientific expectations after opening the archives of the Office in February 1998: *L'apertura degli archivi del Sant'Uffizio romano*, a cura d'ACCADEMIA NAZIONALE DEI LINCEI, Roma 1998; and with numerous statistics based on the research already in the archives of the Inquisition: V. FRAJESE, *Le licenze di lettura e la politica del Sant'Uffizio dopo l'Indice Clementino*, L'Inquisizione e gli storici, 179–220; M.P. FANTINI, *Censura romana e orazioni: modi, tempi, formule (1571–1620)*, L'Inquisizione e gli storici, 221–244; PETER SCHMIDT, *De sancto Officio Urbis. Aspekte der Verflechtung des Heiligen Offiziums mit der Stadt Rom im 16 und 17. Jahrhundert*, QFIAB 82 (2002) 404–489; RE, *La Curia Romana*, 89–94 and 578–579; the even earlier monographical analysis of the Office's history: R.A. MILLER, *The Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith* (Canon Law Studies 184), Washington 1975; JOHN TEDESCHI, *Il giudice e l'eretico. Studi sull'inquisizione romana* (Vita e Pensiero, Cultura e Storia 13), Milano 1997, especially 93–124. 125–152. 153–198; on the historical research, role and especially the judgement of the Roman Inquisition, latest: ANDREA DEL COL, *Osservazioni preliminari sulla storiografia dell'Inquisizione romana*, Identità italiana e cattolicesimo. Una prospettiva storica (Studi Storici Carozzi 37; a c. d. Cesare Mozzarelli), Roma 2003, 75–137, especially 109–122, and more [IDEM], *L'Inquisizione romana: metodologia delle fonti e storia istituzionale*, Trieste–Monte Valcellina 2000. – In parallel and temporarily the congregation also performed Church administrative duties, like the partial control of the missions until 1622, among which also those that were sent to the Ottoman Hungary.

²¹ Both offices dealt with censorship which undoubtedly supplied the extensive control, yet, this sort of overlapping caused problems in function until Benedict XIV regulated the order of procedure in detail. HERMANN H. SCHWEDT, *Der römische Index der verbotenen Bücher*, HJ 107 (1987) 296–314; RE, *La Curia Romana*, 325–329; on the function of the Index in practice more: GLIGLIOLA FRAQUITO, *L'applicazione dell'indice dei libri proibiti di Clemente VII*, ASI 159 (2001) 1, 107–149.

The Sacred Congregation of the Index – which met occasionally twice a month, though, in 1629 only once, in 1644 only once a year – consisted of sixteen–thirteen cardinals, six–twenty-four other members: consultors and officials. By 1644, the Dominican dominancy ceased to exist in the excessively increased number of the officials. In the second half of the century, the number of the cardinals became stable around twenty, however, the number of other members reduced to only two.²²

Concerning the effect of the Inquisition and the Index on the Roman and Italian scholarly, cultural life, we can conclude that it left a rather wide scope for action in many fields. The activities of these offices did not concern the literary and poetical life (the establishment of the first Roman permanent theatre in 1670 was not hindered);²³ they only had an impact on the questions that threatened the canonical, dogmatic building of the Church, the secular and spiritual rights and interests of the clergy. In such cases, not only did they preclude the publicity but the further debates were also adjourned.²⁴ Comparing to other contemporary judicial proceedings, at the Inquisition the rights of the accused were taken into more consideration than at other courts. The anonymous impeachments were not handled. At least two witnesses were required to support the charge, yet the accused were not allowed to know their names for the sake of witness protection. The interests of the accused were protected by an appointed counsel (*advocatus reorum*), which was typical in England only from 1836. Torture was moderately employed, exclusively in such cases when they were sure that the accused lied. The confessions, given during the interrogation, were only valid if the accused corroborated them later. The arrest could have been ordered only after a thorough inquiry. Between 1542 and 1761 there were all in all one hundred executions in Rome, by the order of the Inquisition, the most famous was of Giordano Bruno. Above all, it should be highlighted that the verdicts of the Inquisition could not be interpreted word for word. The “eternal custody” meant only three years in many cases.²⁵

The structure of the Holy Office differed from the other congregations’ usual hierarchy of the cardinal prefect, cardinal and prelate members, secretary and the scribes. It did not have a prefect since usually the pope acted as chairman. The senior cardinal (*unus ex inquisitoribus*) was the administrative leader, from the eighteenth century as a cardinal secretary. In direct subordination, a Dominican commissar²⁶ led the proceedings, whose role was being taken over by the “assessor” who controlled the administra-

²² WEBER, *Die ältesten päpstlichen Staatshandbücher*, 197. 241 and *passim*.

²³ Cf. ANDREA PENNA, *Il primo teatro pubblico di Roma. Le vicende del Teatro Tordinona nel XVII secolo*, SR 46 (1998) 337–368.

²⁴ GEORG LUTZ, *Rom im 17. Jahrhundert. Bemerkungen zu einer Neuerscheinung (Massimo Petrocchi, Roma nel Seicento [Sotria di Roma 14], Bologna 1970)*, QFIAB 54 (1974) 539–555, 551–552 (the article criticises PETROCCHI’S work – which was cited by us many times due to its data and comprehensive character – and complements it with numerous important aspects); U. BALDINI, *Le congregazioni romane dell’inquisizione e dell’Indice e le Scienze, dal 1542 al 1615*, L’Inquisizione e gli storici, 365–372.

²⁵ Cf. BIRELEY, *The Refashioning of Catholicism*, 96–99.

²⁶ Their archontology from 1621: WEBER, *Die ältesten päpstlichen Staatshandbücher*, 167–168.

tion, which office became *posto cardinalizio* – namely it involved the red hat – from the beginning of the eighteenth century. The work of the cardinal inquisitors was assisted by the body of the consultors. Its members were Roman theologians and canonists; their suggestions (*votum*) served as a basis for the resolutions concerning theology and censorship. The congregation could occasionally employ the so-called qualificators, experts to decide whether the debated question was false, mistaken, scandalous or belonged to the “heretic” teachings (*proposizioni false, erronee, scandalose, ereticali...*).²⁷

According to the data of the *elenchus* of 1629 and 1644, the sessions of the Holy Office were held three times a week: on Monday in its own palace without the cardinals, on Wednesday in the convent of the Dominican Santa Maria Sopra Minerva with the cardinals and on Thursday in the Sacred Palace with or sometimes without the pope. All in all, there were nine-twelve cardinals, eighteen-thirteen prelates (the general of the Dominicans belonged to them, the magister of the Sacred Palace and the *assessor*) and the consultor and official (*socius commissarius, summista, fiscalis*, from 1644 the *subofficialis, notarius* and the *procurator reorum* who was appointed for the accused), led by the commissary. The structure was the same in the second half of the seventeenth century, however, the *elenchi* had already separated the prelate members from the consultors, moreover – in the 1660s and 1670s – the number of the members reached the twenty-five – twenty-five members in the case of cardinals or other members.²⁸

In spite of the fact that the authority of the congregation was universal and its jurisdiction was practiced in many fields in all the catholic world, real inquisitional activity was pursued only in Malta and Italy, especially as the forum of appeal of the local inquisitions and as the effective tool of the papal centralization after Trent.²⁹ Its existence in Spain and Portugal was partly unnecessary; partly it met insurmountable barriers until the end of the seventeenth century. France and other States did not allow its operation, though, the original plans consisted of this possibility. Its inquisitional activities were limited by the Italian States, as well, for example Venice delegated its own officials to the tribunals.³⁰ The official view to distant areas was provided only by the “apostolic

²⁷ SCHWEDT, *Die römischen Kongregationen*, 48. The analytic processing of the congregation’s meetings (related to the trial of Galilei) with the archontology of the cardinal members and with their participation in the work of the Office from the period between 1611 and 1642: PIERRE-NOËL MAYAUD, *Les „fuit congregatio Sancti Officii in... Coram...” de 1611 à 1642. 32 Ans de Vie de la Congrégation du Saint Office*, AHP 30 (1992) 231–289; see more P. SIMONCELLI, *Clemente VIII e alcuni provvedimenti del Sant’Uffizio: «De Italis habitantibus in partibus haereticorum»*, *Critica Storica* 13 (1976) 129–172; and the *Appendix*.

²⁸ WEBER, *Die ältesten päpstlichen Staatsbandbücher*, 198. 241–242 and *passim*.

²⁹ A case-study about the period before Trent: A. SANTOSUOSSO, *The moderate Inquisitor: Giovanni della Casa’s Venetian nunciature 1544–1549*, *Studi Veneziani* n.s. 2 (1978) 119–210; On Malta: A.P. VELLA, *The Tribunal of the Inquisition in Malta* (Royal University of Malta Historical Studies 1), La Valetta 1964.

³⁰ On the local inquisition subordinated to the Holy Office as the most effective tool of the papal centralisation in Italy: *Linquizione romana in Italia nell’età moderna. Archivi, problemi di metodo e nuove ricerche. Atti del seminario internazionale Trieste, 18–20 maggio 1988* (Pubblicazioni degli Archivi di Stato, Saggi 19), Roma 1991; ADRIANO PROSPERI, *Tribunali della coscienza (Inquisitori, confessori, missionari)*, Torino 1996, 135–210; and M. FRIPPO, *Tribunali della coscienza in età tridentina*, *Studi Storici* 38 (1997) 355–382. The rural inquisitions’

book-commissary” (*commissariatus apostolicus librorum*) in Frankfurt, which was in the subordination of the nunciature of Cologne.³¹ The direction of the Holy Office’s operation is illustrated by the figures, published and remained in the Casanate collection, according to which, only 1.4% of the resolutions – of around 1680 and from one and a half centuries back –, namely twenty-five from 1742, was related to the empire. The idea of the establishment of inquisitional representations in Vienna, Graz, Prague, for those Italians who stayed in the Empire, remained only on paper.³²

The Congregation of Rites, of the Council, the Consistorial and other Sistine Congregations

In the line of the congregations of Church function the second was the *Segnatura di Grazia* (*Sacra Congregazione della Segnatura di Grazia*), which was established from the ancient office which had already passed its competences to the *Dataria*.³³

The granting of the smaller-bigger “ordinary” graces, as we saw, was the task of the *Dataria*. The Signature of Grace, which was also competent on the “external forum”, could not be regarded as a tribunal in its original form, either, since the cases were judged exclusively by the *ex bono et aequo*. In its congregational form, on the model of the Roman Inquisition, it was directly subordinated to the pope (*Signatura Sanctissimi*, its cardinal-prefect held only the title). It dealt with the non-appealable religious and secular verdicts and judged them by supreme royal and papal grace (*via gratiae*), namely, in contrast to the *Dataria*, it granted extraordinary graces (*grazie straordinarie*). In the second half of the seventeenth century, it had sessions only once-twice a year, its members were the cardinal penitentiary, the cardinal prefects of the *Signatura Iustitiae* and the Secretariat of Briefs, the datary (if he was a cardinal), apart from them, the auditor of the Camera, an auditor of the Rota and a cleric of the Camera. Only that prelate who had already been practicing this function for three years at the sister office, operating in tribunal form could get in the twelve *referendari votanti*.

The third Sistine “ministry” was the Consistorial Congregation (*Sacra Congregazione per l’Erezione delle Chiese e per i Provvedimenti Consistoriali*). As its name indicates, it prepared the decisions that traditionally remained for the cardinals’ consistory. According

documents are the basis of the works of the Italian *microstoria* (Carlo Ginzbrug, Giovanni Levi) with priceless documentary value, on which, see more: TEDESCHI, *Il giudice e l’eretico*, 35–46 and 47–68.

³¹ HERIBERT RAAB, *Apostolische Bücherkommissare in Frankfurt am Main*, HJ 87 (1967) 326–354; ROTRAUT BECKER, *Die Berichte des kaiserlichen und apostolischen Bücherkommissars Johann Ludwig von Hagen an die Römische Kurie (1623–1649)*, QFIAB 51 (1971) 422–465.

³² SCHWEDT, *Die römischen Kongregationen*, 51 and 57.

³³ RE, *La Curia Romana*, 231–234; on the officials of both Signatures: KATTERBACH, *Referendarii utriusque Signaturae*, 234–331; on the basis of the *breves* of appointment more precisely: GIUSEPPE BELTRAMI, *Notizie su Prefetti e Referendari della Segnatura Apostolica desunte dai Brevi di Nomina*, Città del Vaticano 1972, 29–119; the archontology of the prefects: *ibid.*, 1–3.

to its double function, on the one hand, it consulted about the establishment, dismemberment and justification and manner of the union of the dioceses; it debated whether the employment of a coadjutor or an auxiliary bishop, the consistorial benefice's burden with pension, was necessary. On the other hand, originally its task should have been the last examination of the suitability of the bishop-nominees before the consistory's final decision on their consecration. In practice, it happened only if a special problem occurred, mostly around the election of the chapters or the appointment of bishops by the monarchs. Its meetings were held relatively rarely and randomly in spite of its Church administrative and curial rank. However, its decisions proved to be determining, they had serious consequences for the local Churches at times.³⁴

The root fallacy of the older secondary literature is to put an equal sign between the function of the congregation and the cardinal consistory, although, despite the order of Sixtus, the congregation did not automatically examine all the appointments of the bishops, the donation of the pallium, neither did the canonical verbals go directly to it. At the beginning of the century, the congregation that occasionally gathered (*iuxta contingentiam*) had eight-ten cardinal and five prelate members; from the 1650s there were fifteen-twenty cardinals, the number of the prelates was steady; however, in the 1680s the number of the cardinals as well as the prelates was about fifteen. From 1644 its secretary was identical with the secretary of the College of Cardinals, notably with Giuseppe Fanfaneli, then with Agostino Favoriti in the 1650s and 1660s.³⁵

The fourth, the Sacred Congregation of Rites and Ceremonies (*Sacra Congregazione dei Riti e delle Ceremonie*) was erected to align the external forms of the divine services and worships with tradition and the laws of Church. The preservation of the "old sacred rites" (*veteres ritus sacri*) in the divine services, prayers, administration of the sacraments and in other liturgical activities; the revival of the services disappeared from practice, or the restoration of the still existing ones; moreover, the renewal and correction of the liturgical books fell within the competence of the congregation, which was regarded as the embodiment of the papal liturgical centralization and uniformity after Trent. The other main scope of the congregation was the process of canonization of saints, beatifications and the supervision of the observation of their feasts' celebration. Furthermore, the organization and supervision of the papal ceremonies, the planning of the proper reception of the monarchs, prelates and their delegates visiting Rome, the settlement of the precedence debates over processions and other events came within the activity of the new office.

³⁴ Its Latin name: *Congregatio pro erectione ecclesiarum et provisionibus consistorialibus; Congregatio rebus consistorialibus praeposita*. LOUIS JADIN, *Les actes de la Congregation Concistoriale concernant les Pays Bass, la principauté de Liège et la Franche-Comté 1593–1797*, Rome 1935; TÍHAMÉR VANYÓ, *Das Archiv der Konsistorialkongregation in Rom und die kirchliche Zustände Ungarns in der zweiten Hälfte des 18. Jahrhunderts*, Festschrift zur Feier des zweihundertjährigen Bestandes des Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv I, Wien 1949, 151–179 (I thank ELRÉD BORIÁN for its copy); and RE, *La Curia Romana*, 113–125 and 580–581.

³⁵ WEBER, *Die ältesten päpstlichen Staatshandbücher*, 193, 223 and *passim*.

As regards its licences, the Congregation of Rites should be considered among the most significant institutions of the period. It had influence over the fostering of the liturgy and the cult of saints and the whole Catholic revival, based on the regulations of the Council of Trent, furthermore over the supervision of the diverse rites on different continents. The control over the papal services provided influence on the life of the Curia, however, this competence was shortly withdrawn and entrusted to a distinct congregation (*Sacra Congregazione del Ceremoniale*)³⁶ for the sake of eliminating the various battles for positions and confusions occurring at the end of the sixteenth century.

After the establishment of the Sacred Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith in 1622, it had authority only on the Latin liturgy. Several cases, which belonged originally to its competence (like the liturgical faculties), ran through the more prestigious congregations related closer to the local Churches,³⁷ and directly through the Secretariat of Briefs. Its duties were increased by the *breve Coelestis Hierusalem* of Urban VIII in 1634, which declared that public ecclesiastical honour could not be bestowed on anybody without the previous approval of the Holy See. The liturgical and canonizing duties supplied, not as frequently as expected, a Church-administrational role – that outgrew the borders of Italy – to the dicastery, which had regular sessions and was small at first (five cardinals, one secretary and some consultors) but later became more and more expanding apparatus due to those officials and lawyers who participated in the arrangement of the canonizations influenced by various political and inner Church interests, which were becoming more complicated and expensive.³⁸

³⁶ VISCEGLIA, *Il cerimoniale come linguaggio politico*, 130–133.

³⁷ Especially through the Propaganda and the Inquisition. Cf. for example M. GOTOR, *La riforma dei processi di canonizzazione dalle carte del Sant'Uffizio*, L'Inquisizione e gli storici, 279–288; A. MALENA, *Inquisizione, «finte sante», «nuovi mistici». Ricerche sul Seicento*, L'Inquisizione e gli storici, 289–306.

³⁸ The analysis of the history and function of the congregation, known as the *Congregatio pro sacris ritibus et caeremoniis*, and later just *Sacra Rituum Congregatio* or *Congregazione dei Riti*: FREDERIC RICHARD McMANUS, *The Congregation of sacred Rites* (Canon Law Studies 352) Washington 1954, 23–38. 45–66. 67–71. 91–116; on the official procedure *ibid.*, 117–130; furthermore WIKTOR GRAMATOWSKI, *Il fondo liturgico più antico dell'archivio della S. Congregazione dei Riti (1588–1700)*, AHP 13 (1975) 401–424; the evaluation of the canonisations: LUTZ, *Rom im 17. Jahrhundert*, 548; conclusions with further literature: RE, *La Curia Romana*, Roma 1970, 135–148 and 435–442; LAJOS PÁSZTOR, *Guida delle fonti per la storia dell'America Latina negli archivi della Santa Sede e negli archivi ecclesiastici d'Italia* (CAV 2), Città del Vaticano 1970, 339–340. Many sub-studies dealing with the history and function of the congregation: *Congregazione per le Cause dei Santi. Miscellanea in occasione del IV centenario della Congregazione per le Cause dei Santi (1588–1988)*, Città del Vaticano 1988, especially: GIOVANNI PAPA, *La Sacra Congregazione dei Riti nel primo periodo di attività*, 13–52; CHARLES LEFEBVRE, *Relationes inter Sacram Rituum Congregationem et Sacram Romanam Rotam*, 53–59; JAROSLAV NEMEC, *L'archivio della Congregazione per le Cause dei Santi (ex-Congregazione dei Riti)*, 339–352. On its role in the life of a local Church: PÉTER TUSOR, *A magyar Egyház és a Sacra Rituum Congregatio a katolikus megújulás korában (A kongregáció megalapításától 1689-ig) [The Hungarian Catholic Church and the Sacra Rituum Congregatio During the Catholic Revival (From the Establishment of the Congregation to 1689)]*, Magyar Egyháztörténeti Vázlatok-Regnum II (1999) 1–2, 33–64; [IDEM], *Magyar szentek liturgikus tisztelete és a római Sacra Rituum Congregatio a korai újkorban [The Liturgical Worship of the Hungarian Saints and the Roman Sacra Rituum Congregatio in the Early Modern Period]*, Szentjeink és nagyjaink Európa kereszténységéért (Miscellanea Ecclesiae Strigoniensis 1, ed. by Margit Beke), Budapest 2001, 107–115.

The congregation was constituted by twenty-three – twenty-five cardinals in the seventeenth century; at first its sessions were held on every second Saturday in the senior cardinal prefect's palace. The other members of five-eight, sometimes thirteen – among whom there was permanently the “devil's advocate” (*promotor fidei*) and the papal *sacrista* – are divided into two groups by the *elenchi*: the *praelati* and the *magistri caeremoniarum* of four members. According to the data of 1644, in January, May, and September, the regular general sessions could have been held in front of the pope. On these sessions, the engrossed decision making was assisted by an auxiliary group of varying number, there were usually religious experts, as well as the magister of the Sacred Palace, the *assessor* of the Holy Office, three Rota-auditors, a protonotary and sometimes the personal theologian of the pope.³⁹

In the line of the Church congregations the Index was followed by the Sacred Congregation of the Council (*Sacra Congregazione del Concilio di Trento*). It was formed into an independent dicastery in 1564 (with the *motu proprio*, starting with *Alias Nos nonnullas*) from the immediately created cardinal committee after Trent. Its first prefect was the later canonized Charles Borromeo. Its tasks, which were still valid in the seventeenth century, were circumscribed by Sixtus V. As the pope was responsible for interpretation of the dogmatic decisions of the Council, its authority was confined to the general and concrete interpretation of the Church disciplinary and reform regulations and to the control of their observance. Its answers (*positiones*) given to the requests throughout centuries constitute some thousands of volumes. (On the basis of their content, the execution of the Council submitted exclusively to the control of Rome and the arisen problems could be perfectly recognizable.) The cardinals of the congregation supervised the local councils' observance, their regulations, furthermore originally they oversaw the compliance with the obligation of residence, though, in 1636 this was entrusted to a smaller authority (*Sacra Congregazione della Residenza dei Vescovi*) within the congregation by Urban VIII.⁴⁰ The regulations of the Sacred Congregation of the Council directly in the name of the pope (*nomine Pontificis*), made merely in these territories, prove an extensive administrative, legislative and judicial authority.⁴¹

³⁹ WEBER, *Die ältesten päpstlichen Staatshandbücher*, 203. 252. 275. 295–296. 346. 490–491.

⁴⁰ On the foundation and function of the Congregation of Residence, which will occur later concerning Church policy: AGOSTINO LAURO, *La curia Romana e la residenza dei vescovi*, La società religiosa nell'età moderna. Atti del convegno studi di storia sociale e religiosa Capaccio-Paestum, 18–21 maggio 1972, Napoli 1973, 869–883.

⁴¹ On the authority and the plan of work of the *Sacra Congregatio pro executione et interpretatione concilii Tridentini*: G. VARSÁNYI, *De competentia et procedura Sacrae Congregationis Concilii*, La Sacra Congregazione del Concilio. Quarto Centenario dalla Fondazione (1564–1964). Studi e ricerche, Città del Vaticano 1964, 51–161; SEBASTIANUS TROMP, *De cardinalibus interpretibus S. Concilii Tridentini annis 1564–1600*, Apollinaris 27 (1974) 95–106; RE, *La Curia Romana*, 149–162. 582–583; on its documents: *La Sacra Congregazione del Concilio*, 395–476. Another outstanding outline, which emphasises the congregation's decisions' force of canonical case-law and touches upon the problems of competence related to the Sacred Congregation for the Propagation of Faith after 1622: RICHARD PUZA, *Die Konzilskongregation. Ein Einblick in ihr Archiv, ihre Verfabrensweise und die Bedeutung ihrer Entscheidungen von ihrer Errichtung bis zur Kurienreform Pius X (1563–1908)*, RQ 90 (1995) 23–42; on the archontology of the prefects and secretaries NICCOLÒ DEL RE, *I cardinali prefetti della*

The analysis and commenting of the reports – which summarized the results of the dioceses' visits, and covered the local religious and Church relations (*relationes status dioecesis*) – presented on the occasion of the diocesan bishop or his (usually sent from home) representative's *ad limina* visit meant the most effective and regularly practiced administrative licence. The method and frequency of the reporting was regulated by Sixtus V on 20 December 1585. The bishops from Italy, Dalmatia and the Greek islands complied with their obligation, sworn by their oath before their consecration, in every three years, the ones from Spain, France and the Empire (and Hungary) in every four years, the ones from other countries in every five and the ones from overseas every ten years. Through the interpretation of the relations – composed by definite formal criteria, yet, diverse in their content and extent – and the suggestions, orders given by the answers for them, the cardinals of the congregation could exercise direct influence on the function of the dioceses.⁴²

Similarly to the Rites, it was summoned every second Saturday in the senior cardinal's palace; the peculiarity of its structure was that it lacked a prelate member, apart from its nineteen – twenty (in the first half of the century), then twenty-three – twenty-five cardinals, it had only one secretary.⁴³

The Congregation for Bishops and Regulars (*Congregazione dei Vescovi e Regolari*) was originally two institutions in the system of Sixtus, but they were merged from 1602. Out of these two institutions, only the monastic was newly established, since the episcopal had already been functioning from 1576. Its task was to control the newer, as well as the reformed male- and female orders' activity, the keeping of the pastoral duties of the bishop, moreover to settle the frequent controversies judicially. Consequently, its competences – except of the authentic interpretation of the regulations of Trent – overlapped the Sacred Congregation of the Council's, which might have been made necessary by the abundance of the Italian cases. Until the middle of the seventeenth century, the Italian peninsula was the main theatre of the congregation's activity.⁴⁴ Beside the twenty-six – thirty-two

Sacra Congregazione del Concilio dalle origini ad oggi (1564–1964), Apollinaris 27 (1974) 107–149; the same can be found *La Sacra Congregazione del Concilio*, 265–307, on the age 270–280; PIETRO PALAZZINI, *Prospero Fagnani, Segretario della S.C. del Concilio e suoi editi ed inediti*, *La Sacra Congregazione del Concilio*, 361–382, 377–380 (*Appendice I: Elenco dei Segretari della S. Congregazione del Concilio*). See the *Appendix*.

⁴² On the technical details of the *visitatio liminum* and further literature, see VICENTE CÁRCEL ORTÍ, *Estudio histórico-jurídico sobre la visita ad limina Apostolorum*, 21–212; an also exemplary publication on the religious relations of the direct environment of the Eternal City: *Le diocesi suburbicarie nelle «visitae ad limina» dell'Archivio Segreto Vaticano* (CAV 22), a c. d. MARIA CHIABÒ–CONCETTA RANIERI–LUCIANA ROBERTI, Roma 1988; and in the Hungarian connection for instance: PÉTER TUSOR, *Lippay György egri püspök (1637–1642) jelentése Felső-Magyarország vallási helyzetéről (Archivio Santacroce) [The Report of György Lippay, the Bishop of Eger (1637–1642) on the Religious Situation of Upper Hungary]*, *Levéltári Közlemények* 73 (2002) 199–241, especially 199–201.

⁴³ WEBER, *Die ältesten päpstlichen Staatsbandbücher*, 192. 223. 271. 284. 332. 481.

⁴⁴ Its name variants: *Sacra Congregatio pro consultationibus Regularium*; *Sacra Congregatio pro consultationibus episcoporum et aliorum praelatorum*; and unified: *Sacra Congregatio negotiis et consultationibus Episcoporum et Regularium praeposita*. RE, *La Curia Romana*, 330–334.

cardinals, there was only one secretary, and similarly to the Sacred Congregation of the Council it did not have prelate members.⁴⁵

The *Sacra Congregazione della Stamperia Vaticana* was the last in the line of the Church congregations, which was established in 1588 and directed the press of Vatican, which primarily published the Bible (not only the Vulgate, but the original Hebrew and Greek texts, as well), the regulations of the ecumenical councils, the writings of the Church Fathers and the liturgical books (the Roman missal and the breviary), etc. with a very wide circulation.⁴⁶ Its functioning must have been short-lived since the *Typographia Vaticana* was merged with the press of the Camera in 1610.⁴⁷

The *Sacra Congregazione dell'Università di Roma* was on the borderline of the Church and secular congregations, though, it is usually arranged among the latter ones. Apart from the older papal university, the *Studium Urbis*, namely the Sapienza, it controlled the Greek, Maronite College and the College of the Neophytes (*Neophytorum*) in Rome and originally the universities of Paris, Bologna and Salamanca. According to the optimist vision of the deed of foundation, Oxford would have belonged to it.⁴⁸

The dicasteries, which were competent exclusively in the administration of the Papal State, assisted the work of the departments of the Apostolic Camera with similar duties. Separate congregations dealt with the: 1. corn supply of the Eternal City (*Congregazione dell'Abbondanza dello Stato Ecclesiastico*);⁴⁹ 2. papal navy (*Congregazione dell'Armata Navale*); 3. inquiry of the complaints about the over-taxing of the papal dependants (*Congregazione per Sollevare dagli Aggravi lo Stato Ecclesiastico*); 4. building of roads, bridges, aqueducts, and their permanent repair (*Congregazione delle Strade, dei Ponti e delle Acque*);⁵⁰ 5. examination of the civil and criminal procedures conducted in the territory of the Papal State (in manorial and governmental courts), with the controversies of the secular offices and officials, moreover, with the chief questions of the Papal State's administration (*Congregazione della Consulta di Stato*). The fundamental structure of the known authority was determined by seven-eight departments (*ponenza*), which worked according to

⁴⁵ WEBER, *Die ältesten päpstlichen Staatshandbücher*, 195. 237. 272. 288. 337. 483.

⁴⁶ *Sacra Congregatio pro Typographia Vaticana*. RE, *La Curia Romana*, 344–345.

⁴⁷ FRANCESCO BARBERI, *Libri e stampatori nella Roma dei Papi*, SR 13 (1965) 433–456, 445.

⁴⁸ *Sacra Congregatio pro Universitate Studii Romani*. It seems that its establishment did not succeed, since there is no track of it from the seventeenth century. Its role was mainly taken over by the Sacred Congregation for the Propagation of Faith. It is also uncertain whether it affected the life of the Jesuit *Collegium Romanum* that represented a newer university generation. Nevertheless, the latest secondary literature does not mention this. MARIO FOIS, *Il Collegio Romano: Listituzione, la struttura, il primo secolo di vita*, RMC 3 (1995) 571–599.

⁴⁹ *Congregatio pro Ubertate Annonae Status Ecclesiastici*. REINHARDT, *Überleben in der frühneuzeitlichen Stadt*, op. cit.; [IDEM], *Die Präfekten der römischen Annona*, 98–115.

⁵⁰ *Congregatio pro Classe Paranda et Servanda ad Status Ecclesiastici Defensionem*; *Congregatio pro Status Ecclesiastici Gravaminibus Sublevandis* (or more *Congregazione dei Sgravi*); *Congregatio pro Viis, Pontibus et Aquis Curandis*; RE, *La Curia Romana*, 338–339. 340. 341–343; PRODI, *Lo sviluppo dell'assolutismo nello Stato Pontificio*, 108–111. The activity of the Camera's similar department was way more determining than its latter role. DANIEL SINISI, *La presidenza delle Strade ed il suo Archivio nel XVIII secolo*, RMC 2 (1994) 491–502, 491–495, 491–492, n. 1. and 2.

territorial division. Their work was aligned by a secretary who reported on the cases of prime importance to the cardinals. His colleagues of younger prelates oversaw the administration of justice, the keeping of order and, partly, the public health.⁵¹

The “Newer” Congregations The Sacra Congregazione de Propaganda Fide

There were already some examples for the reorganization and fusion of the institutions after their establishment according to the system of Sixtus, which prove the system's capacity of living and functioning and its organic development. Only Urban VIII, until 1642, established six congregations of permanent character, furthermore he reorganized many others' fields of activity. In the spirit of the Jubilee's preparation, in 1624, he founded the *Congregazione della Visita Apostolica*, the jurisdiction of which affected only the Roman archdiocese. The *Congregazione dei Confini*, which was established in 1627, protected the integrity of the Papal State; besides, it was responsible for the settlement of the local legations, the provinces and sometimes feudal estates' border disputes, and partly for the control of the public health, which was taken over by the *Congregazione di Sanità* after the plague in Northern Italy. Apart from the Residency Congregation, which controlled the bishops' obligation of residency – and the *ad hoc Congregazione di Portogallo*, which was established to handle the Church administrative results of the Portuguese politics' changes –, the *Sacra Congregazione dell'Immunità Ecclesiastica*, founded in 1626, had exceptional significance.⁵² The cardinals of this Congregation of Immunity endeavoured to solve the permanent, unusually heated canonical problems with Venice 1627–1638, with Portugal 1636–1643, with Spain 1638–1642 and with the Spanish Flanders and Naples-Sicily 1636–1642. Due to the strict actions of the dicastery, the pope imposed an interdict on Lisbon and the Republic of Lucca from August 1639 to December 1640 and from 2 April 1640 to 31 March 1643.⁵³

Concerning the governance of the Papal State, the most significant was the *Congregazione del Buon Governo*, established in 1592, which step by step evolved into the government authority of the Papal State's central administration.⁵⁴ Its gradual strengthening is

⁵¹ In Latin: *Congregatio pro consultationibus negotiorum Status Ecclesiastici*. This central administrative body: quasi internal- and judicial ministry is discussed by CAROCCI, *Lo Stato della Chiesa*, 108–112; PRODI, *Lo sviluppo dell'assolutismo nello Stato Pontificio*, 111–112; AGO, *Carriere e clientele*, 20; RE, *La Curia Romana*, 346–350.

⁵² According to its first name: *Congregatio Controversiarum Iurisdictionalium*.

⁵³ LUTZ, *Urbano VIII*, 308–309.

⁵⁴ On the institution that performed administrative duties and could be called as “internal ministry” by making decisions of great importance: ARMANDO LODOLINI, *L'Amministrazione pontificia del «Buon Governo»*, *Gli Archivi Italiani* 6 (1919) 181–236 and 7 (1920) 3–19, especially 197–215; ELIO LODOLINI, *L'Archivio della S. Congregazione del Buon Governo (1592–1847)*. *Inventario* (Pubblicazioni degli Archivi di Stato 20), Roma 1956; CAROCCI, *Lo Stato della Chiesa*, 108–112; PRODI, *Lo sviluppo dell'assolutismo nello Stato Pontificio*, 112–114; with the precise model-like presentation of the everyday life of the city- and the province administration: STADER, *Herrschaft durch Verflechtung*, 81–167, especially 115–118 and 151–167; furthermore RE, *La Curia Romana*, 351–355.

shown by the fact that it could extend its jurisdiction over all manorial territories only by the beginning of the eighteenth century, more than a hundred years after its establishment. Similarly to the Consulta, various numbers of departments, which were established according to territories, controlled the governors, the local urban and manorial governments,⁵⁵ mainly their administrative and financial activity. However, it did not have authority over Rome, the legations (Avignon, Urbino, Romagna, Bologna, Ferrara), Velletri and Castel Gandolfo, were under the sole leadership of the Roman *governatore*, the cardinal legates, the dean of the College of Cardinals and the Apostolic Palace.

The line of the similar *exemptios* could be continued with the territories related to the administration of the Camera (such as Tolfa); until 1692 with the governorships of the *nepotes* (Benevento, Borgo, the Castel Sant'Angelo); moreover, the three patriarchal basilicas (Lateran, the Vatican and the Santa Maria Maggiore) and their surroundings were also under the separate control of their cardinal archdeacons. As the number of the legations reduced by the seventeenth century (for instance, the legation of Patrimonio [Viterbo], Campagna e Marittima, Umbria and Marca ceased to exist and the one of Perugia gradually died out), the most important leaders of the provincial administration became the governors. The governorships were divided into two main groups. The most distinguished were prelate offices (*governi di prelati*). In 1701, their number was twenty-three and there was a prelate-governor at the head of Ancona, Città di Castello, Fano, Fermo, Loreto, Montalto, Orvieto, Perugia, Rieti, Spoleto and Viterbo. Thirty-five towns and their surroundings – for example, Albano, Anagni, Assisi, Castiglione del Lago, Civita Castellana, Massa, Orte, Sutri, Terni, Tivoli, Todi – were governed by only those who had a university degree. Among these so-called *governi di dottori*, those which were distinguished were given appointment in the form of papal *breve* (*governi di breve*), and those, for which the authorization could have been won from the Consulta (*governi di patente*). The latter ones were only *di cappa nera*, namely, they did not obtain the *violaceo* cassock.⁵⁶

In the line of the newer congregations, a separate dicastery was obtained by the nobility of the Papal State and their properties; by the building and maintenance of the Saint Peter's Basilica;⁵⁷ concerning the church, by the festivals and relics; by the control

⁵⁵ AGO, *Carriere e clientele*, 14 and 20.

⁵⁶ The complicated structure of the papal provincial administration is introduced by: CHRISTOPH WEBER, *Legati e governatori dello Stato Pontificio (1550–1809)* (Pubblicazioni degli Archivi di Stato, Sussidi 7), Roma 1994, 32–53 (this introduction is followed by the compilation of some thousand pages about the data of certain legations, governorships and the archontology of the legates and governors); and [IDEM], *Die Territorien des Kirchenstaates in 18. Jahrhundert. Vorwiegend nach den Papieren des Kardinals Stefano Borgia dargestellt*, Düsseldorf 1991, 17–78 (furthermore on the division of competence of the *Sacra Consulta* and the *Buon Governo* at the beginning of the eighteenth century: 92–100 and 101–111. on the ones with exempt administration: 79–91. certain territories' data: 115–392); see more PASTURA RUGGIERO *La reverenda Camera Apostolica*, 20–25. A case-study: ANDREA GARDI, *Lo Stato in provincia. L'amministrazione della Legazione di Bologna durante il regno di Sisto V (1535–1590)* (Istituto per la Storia di Bologna. Collana Studi e Ricerche, n.s. 2), Bologna 1994, on the role of the *Sacra Consulta* and the legates: 73–79 and 195–240.

⁵⁷ *Congregazione sopra i Baroni dello Stato ecclesiastico, Congregazione della Reverenda Fabrica di San Pietro*. RE, *La Curia Romana*, 370–371. 358–360. 432–434.

of the friars' conditions of life; the guidance of the Indian and Chinese missions,⁵⁸ and twice by the control of the appointments of the bishops. The *Sacra Congregazione dell'Esame dei Vescovi*, which was founded by Clement VIII, then the *Sacra Congregazione sopra l'Elezione dei Vescovi*, which was temporarily established by Innocent XI to support his reform program,⁵⁹ belonged to those congregations which were established since the already existing Consistorial Congregation could not properly perform their duties.⁶⁰

Instead of mending the set and rigid old structure, in such cases, the Curia rather preferred the establishment of a newer institution, or office. Apart from the considerable specialization, this was the other main attribute of the curial reform of the early period. However, the reason why the above mentioned two congregations could not extend their authority over their territories should be searched somewhere else: due to the lack of the infrastructural and financial conditions, due to the scale of the duty, to the fixation of the established mechanisms or to the unfortunate personal constitution of the congregation.

In spite of its original competence – it seems –, the congregation for “inspecting bishops” in the seventeenth century examined only the suitability of the bishops appointed by free papal bestowal (*libera collatio*). The meeting of the ten-thirteen cardinals and five-eight prelates (one of them conducted the task of the secretary) was usually held in front of the pope, in the Sacred Palace at a given time. In 1644, they met once a week, on Monday or Friday mornings – if the pope did not command otherwise –, as the pope wanted to listen to the nominee in person. The *elenchus* of 1644 divided the prelate members into two groups (*examinatores in Iure Canonico – examinatores in Theologia*).⁶¹

In contrast to the congregations established to control the bishop appointments, another new institution, the Sacred Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith, the *Sacra Congregazione de Propaganda Fide*, which was founded for the central guidance of the mission organization, proved to be far more lasting, moreover, it rose among the most prominent curial institutions. The new congregation was organized on 6 January 1622 and it already began its operation eight days later. (The founding bull *Inscrutabili Divinae Providentiae* was only issued by Gregory XV on 22 June 1622.) In its structure, it slightly resembled the Buon Governo, since certain cardinals dealt with the missionary problems of the given regions of the world. Their congregational membership was not confined to render on the letters and reports from their territories, or to participate in the decision making but it included the activity of experts, moreover patrons. The in-

⁵⁸ *Congregazione delle Indulgenze e delle Reliquie, Congregazione della Visita Apostolica, Congregazione sullo Stato dei Regolari, Congregazione della Cina e delle Indie Orientali*. On these RE, *La Curia Romana*, 367–369. 376–379. 364–366. 374–375. 380–381. On the contemporary Italian problems of the Church immunity: AGOSTINO LAURO, *Il Giurisdizionalismo pregianniano nel Regno di Napoli. Problema e bibliografia (1563–1723)* (Sussidi eruditi 27), Roma 1974.

⁵⁹ The curial *elenchi* did not mention it, neither its members.

⁶⁰ RE, *La Curia Romana*, 356–357 and 403–404.

⁶¹ WEBER, *Die ältesten päpstlichen Staatshandbücher*, 195. 238. 272. 289. 338. 483–484.

stitution of thirteen cardinals, two prelates and a secretary, acquired authority over the guidance of the pastoral, missionary activity among partly the overseas natives, partly among the European Protestants, as well as among the Catholic fragments – mainly by monks but usually by secular priests. Out of the thirteen regions, eight were European. The control of certain regions was entrusted to the nuncios or to the patriarchal vicars, which made the maintenance of relations with the missionaries easier.⁶²

After the initial thorough inquiry, the Propaganda established new Church hierarchy in a rather short while, where the traditional Church organization either did not operate or not efficiently enough. Its elements were the missionary stations, prefectures, and moreover apostolic vicariates. Under certain circumstances, the apostolic administrators, who were consecrated (titular) bishops, directed the pastoral work. The only superior of the monks and secular priests, who participated in the mission organization, was the congregation. Their superiors in the order, the diocesan bishops, could not, or could only by the approval of the Propaganda, give orders to them. It caused several conflicts, mainly during the first decades of the century, however, according to the original aim of the Roman missionary highest authority it strove to rely on the existing local authorities – if there were any –, moreover, the initial reception was remarkably favourable.⁶³

The Propaganda was obliged to collaborate with other curial institutions in certain cases. In the field of the spiritual authorization of the missionaries, it had to consult with the Holy Office, concerning the establishment of new bishoprics and the new bishops' entering service, with the Consistorial Congregation; in the event of legal and disciplinary problems, with the Congregation for Bishops and Regulars. Its authority was absolute in the respect that no other dicasteries of the Holy See could freely practice their jurisdiction over the territories under mission organization without its permission.

⁶² This congregation belongs to the most researched institutions of the Holy See (cf. the content of the *Introduction*). On the establishment METZLER, *Foundation of the Congregation „De Propaganda Fide”*, 79–111; on its activity in Western Europe for instance: B. JACQUELINE, *La Sacrée Congrégation „De Propaganda Fide” et la France sous le pontificat de Grégoire XV*, RHE 66 (1971) 46–82; on its activity in Central and Northern Europe especially: HERMANN TÜCHLE, *Acta SC de Propaganda Fide Germaniam spectantia. Die Protokolle der Propagandakongregation zu deutschen Angelegenheiten 1622–1649*, Paderborn 1962; GEORG DENZLER, *Die Propagandakongregation in Rom und die Kirche in Deutschland im ersten Jahrzehnt nach dem westphälischen Frieden. Mit Edition der Kongregationsprotokolle zu deutschen Angelegenheiten 1649–1657*, Paderborn 1969; HERMANN TÜCHLE, *Die Protokolle der Propagandakongregation zu deutschen Angelegenheiten 1657–1667. Diasporasorge unter Alexander VII*, Paderborn 1972; KOLLMANN, *Acta Sacrae Congregationis*, op. cit.; the prefects and secretaries of the congregation: NIKOLAUS KOWALSKY, *Serie dei cardinali prefetti e dei segretari della Sacra Congregazione «de Propaganda Fide»*, *Euntes docete* 15 (1962) 161–197; in conclusion and with further literature: RE, *La Curia Romana*, 185–203 and 584–591; *Sacrae Congregationis de Propaganda Fide memoria Rerum*, I 1, XVII–XXII; another outline: PIZZORUSSO, *Agli antipodi di Babele: Propaganda Fide*, 489–495.

⁶³ Cf. AMADEUS REUTER, *De iuribus et officii Sacrae Congregationis „De Propaganda Fide” noviter constitutae seu de indole eiusdem propria*, *Sacrae Congregationis de Propaganda Fide memoria Rerum*, I 1, 112–145. The congregation directly after its establishment required information and suggestions from the local hierarchies about the religious situation and the possibilities of missionary work. (The answers can be found in volume 6696 of the *Vaticani Latini* series in the Vatican Secret Archives.)

The congregation, which at first had a session three times a month in front of the pope (*coram Sanctissimo*), assembled only twice according to the curial *elenchus* of 1629. These sessions were held by turns at the residence of the pope and in the palace of the cardinal prefect, at a given time. At that time, the congregation had fifteen cardinals and beside the secretary, three other prelates (a protonotary apostolic and two *referendariū*), apart from them, there was also a Carmelite.⁶⁴ However, one and a half decades later, even twenty cardinals could consult on the actual questions of the mission organization; on Monday in the papal residency, on another occasion in the impressive palace of the congregation – built by Bernini then enlarged by Borromini, nearby the Spanish embassy, on the Piazza di Spagna. The participation rate was never complete, as well as the papal presence – comparing to the beginning – grew rare. Among the prelates, the prevailing *assessor* of the Holy Office had appeared by this time, who was to ease the work relations between the two offices. Throughout the century, the thirteen regions were altered; certain important territories sometimes obtained two cardinal *relatores*.

The number of the Propaganda's cardinals was at its peak in 1657. At this time, it had thirty members, though, by the end of the century it reduced to twenty – twenty-two, which later became stable. The number of the prelates basically did not change, in the second half of the century the *index sacrae congregationis* appeared, which indicates that the congregation's jurisdictional character over the missionaries developed.⁶⁵

The question is what explains the success of the individual missionary highest authority in opposition to numerous other newly founded congregations? Why was it established only in the course of the Baroque Papacy and why could it gain such influence in the Curia so as to call its cardinal prefect as the “red pope” from the end of the seventeenth century? (The *elenchi* of the seventeenth century indicated the name of the prefect only in the case of this congregation.) Apart from the idea of the defence of faith, represented by the Roman Inquisition, the spread of Catholicism was also a central notion of the Tridentine reform Papacy. The background of this idea was created by the theoretical and practical missionary activity of the new and reformed orders, especially by the Jesuits, Capuchins, Carmelites, the Minorites and Observant Franciscans, etc. In this respect, we could hardly speak about a radically new challenge. By the pressure of the Jesuit general, Francesco Borgia, Pius V established two cardinal committees in 1568 to convert the German Protestants and the people in the Indies; however, their activities lasted only until 1569. Similarly, the appointed cardinal delegations of the following decades were not lasting. The committees, which were led by the well-known committed Giulio Antonio Santoro,⁶⁶ established for the advancement of the orthodox

⁶⁴ REUTER, *De iuribus et officiis Sacrae Congregationis „De Propaganda Fide”*, 112–145; WEBER, *Die ältesten päpstlichen Staatshandbücher*, 201–202.

⁶⁵ WEBER, *Die ältesten päpstlichen Staatshandbücher*, 250. 274. 293. 343. 488–489.

⁶⁶ The illuminating biography of the prelate in high esteem who had the chance to accede to the papal throne: G. CUGNONI, *Autobiografia di monsignor G. Antonio Santori cardinale di S. Severina*, ASRSP 12 (1889) 327–372

union – the one founded for the direction of the Abyssinian missions in 1594 and the ones established for the control of the Greek Rites in 1599 – also proved to be ephemeral. However, the congregation – called *De Propaganda Fide*, which was founded in 1599 to the control of every mission: North-European, American, African, Indian and Japanese – was of institutional character. Its cardinals, though, assembled on 14 August 1600 for the last time. Until 1622, only the missionary secretariat, organised on its ruins in 1604, worked on. Its legal successor could variously employ its experience and data.⁶⁷

The failure of the attempts to establish a central Church administrative body to control the missions is rooted in many reasons. Undoubtedly, the opposition of the Roman centres of the religious orders and the Holy Office, which had already been in charge of the missionary work, played a role in this, which had to be faced also after 1622. Contrary to other orders, the Propaganda could not seize control over the Jesuit missions, and led to frequent conflicts with the Inquisition, especially in the first decades. Not only did the Office adhere to its licences, but due to its character, it represented a more apologetic attitude than the Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith, which was far more flexible and much better aware of the local relations.⁶⁸

The opposition of the biggest Catholic colonizer monarchy, Spain, is regarded as the other reason for the failures. On the basis of the earlier received authorizations from Rome, the Spanish Monarchy could supervise not only the traditional hierarchy but the majority of the overseas missions, as well. Its opposition, however, did not reduce in the seventeenth century. The Propaganda had to deal with many conflicts with the colonial powers – together with Portugal which had, in the meantime, become independent again – as well as with the Austrian Habsburgs, concerning the Church administrative affiliation of the Hungarian territories under Turkish rule.⁶⁹

The reason for the successful establishment and undiminished curial central role of the Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith in the seventeenth century should be searched for in the change of the Papacy's relations with the States. The traditional Church structures could not have been withdrawn from the secular control, not even after Trent. At the beginning of the disintegration of the collaboration, for the sake of

and 13 (1890) 151–205; furthermore [IDEM], *Gli scritti del cardinale Giulio Antonio Santoro († 1602) penitenziere maggiore ed inquisitore generale*, AHP 36 (1998) 107–136; FILIPPO TAMBURINI, *Giulio Antonio Santoro cardinale penitenziere ed inquisitore generale. Ricerche sulla sua biblioteca*, RQ 95 (2000) 54–93.

⁶⁷ JOSEF METZLER, *Wegbreiter und Vorläufer der Kongregation (Vorschläge und erste Gründungsversuche einer römischen Missionszentrale)*, *Sacrae Congregationis de Propaganda Fide memoria Rerum*, I 1, 38–78; several sources on the mission organizations to America before the formation of the Propaganda: *America pontificia primi saeculi evangelizationis 1493–1592. Documenta pontificia ex registris et minutis praesertim in Archivio Secreto Vaticano existentibus I–III* (CAV 27 1–2 et 38), ed. by JOSEF METZLER, Città del Vaticano 1991–1995.

⁶⁸ GIUSEPPE METZLER, *Controversia tra Propaganda e S. Uffizio circa una commissione teologica (1622–1658)*, *Pontificia Universitas Urbaniana Annale* 1968–1969, Romae 1969, 47–62.

⁶⁹ IGNACIO TING PONG LEE, *La actitud de la Sagrada Congregación frente al Regio Patronato*, *Sacrae Congregationis de Propaganda Fide memoria Rerum*, I 1, 353–438; METODIO CAROBBIO DA NEMBRO, *Patronato e Propaganda nel Brasile*, *Ibid.*, I 2, 667–690; METZLER, *Päpstlicher Primat als pastorale Verantwortung und missionarischer Auftrag*, 373–386.

the first signs of the tendency to the development of a national State Church controlled by a secularized power, Rome immediately launched the establishment of a Church administration which was subordinated only to it.⁷⁰ According to its first instructions, through the institution which emphasised the exemption from politics and violence the Papacy could comply with its pastoral commitment more freely and completely.⁷¹ The opportunities of the Church administration's reformation given by the program of Trent had already been exhausted by the beginning of the seventeenth century; new constitutional frameworks were needed for the further period of the Catholic reform. It should be highlighted that the establishment of these was not foreign to the curial way of thinking, at all.

Our picture of the congregations would be incomplete without analysing the system's drawbacks, as well. The congregations with administrative licences and proper apparatus undoubtedly enhanced the efficiency and performance of the State- and Church administration. Like in every bureaucratic system, the risk of the endless division was also present here, since the above mentioned offices were the only important and more stable ones. The curial *elenchus* of 1629 lists more than sixty, the directory and register from 1644 list more than seventy congregations! This data represents a bewildering number, even if we know that many of them were not of institutional character, which is proved by the fact that there is no document maintained about them, moreover, their function was based exclusively on other institutions' infrastructure.⁷² They usually dealt with only an exceptionally narrow field, such as with the control of the Camera's or the Penitentiary's functioning, the granting of smaller Church benefices, the collection of the *spolioms*, the issue of the *monti*, with the supervision of the minting, the prisons and the Johannites.⁷³ While the existence of the chosen and detailed congregations can be revealed in the seventeenth century, contrary to the earlier ones, the committees, dealing with the unique order of knighthood of early modern period, the *Militia Christiana*, with the reform of the Camaldoleses (and other orders), or with the Spanish affairs

⁷⁰ The change in the political situation is also highlighted by: PIETRO CHIOCCETTA, *Il mondo politico e religioso all'inizio del sec. XVII*, Sacrae Congregationis de Propaganda Fide memoria Rerum, I 1, 3–14.

⁷¹ The history of the European and overseas mission organization: Sacrae Congregationis de Propaganda Fide memoria Rerum, I 2, 3–374 (*Attività della Sacra Congregazione in Europa*) and 377–795 (*Attività della Sacra Congregazione nell'Oltremare*).

⁷² In his so often cited work NICCOLÒ DEL RE does not even mention them among the dissolved offices (*dicasteri sopresi*).

⁷³ *Computorum Cameralium Congregatio*, *Rationum Cameralium Congregatio*, and in 1644 the *Cameralis Congregatio*; *Signatura Poenitentiarie Congregatio* (this also had *generalis* and *particularis* versions); *Concursus Parochialium et Aliorum Ecclesiarum Beneficiorum Congregatio*, *Spoliorum Congregatio*, *Montium Congregatio*, *Monetarum Congregatio*, *Visitatio Carcerum Congregatio*, *Religionis Sancti Ioannis Hierosolymitarum Congregatio* etc. WEBER, *Die ältesten päpstlichen Staatsbandbücher*, 187–209 and 210–265. The system resulted in dual control in many cases. The congregations that controlled economic activities were mainly made up of clerics of the Camera, which meant that the old system efficiently resisted the attempt to alter and cut its authority. WEBER, *Senatus Divinus*, 219.

and with the Patriarchy of Aquileia, could not be found in the papal “State calendar” in 1644. However, the body, which discussed the problems of the Electorate of the Palatine during the Thirty Years’ War, was still functioning at this time.⁷⁴ In the place of the extinct offices, newer and newer ones were established under the Barberinis, including the arrangement of the orphans, etc.⁷⁵ Naturally, these congregations are considered consultative bodies, which prepared the decisions and did not make them. Despite their names, they were such committees that should be called *commissios*. In the sixteenth century we had already seen examples of them; for instance, the *Congregatio Germanica*, which followed the German religious affairs with attention, or the less-known *Congregazione d’Ungheria*, which supervised the allocation and employment of the military subsidies against the Turks in Hungary at the turn of the sixteenth and seventeenth century.⁷⁶

In the second half of Urban VIII’s pontificate, literally, there was not a papal decision which previously would not have been discussed by a committee. If need be, concerning political as well as Church administrative affairs, for the solution of a concrete task a particular (*particularis*) congregation within an already functioning congregation was designated. These are not mentioned by the curial *elenchi*, neither do they speak about the most influential quasi-council of State, which was constituted by a couple of cardinals and was occasionally summoned to discuss the most important foreign and inner affairs, i.e. about the *Congregazione dello Stato*, which was founded for the sake of the protest against the Peace of Westphalia and existing from the pontificate of Clement VIII, noted. By 1630–1640, the overgrowing system had slowed down the decision making mechanism to such an extent that it reached the limits of its functioning. Sometimes certain cardinals were members of even ten or twelve congregations. It is true that many out of the smaller congregations held their meeting with only one or two cardinals, some of them, like the one dealing with the Spanish affairs, with the *monti* and minting were constituted only by prelate members.

Under all circumstances, it is obvious that the cardinals could not effectively participate in all their congregations. Therefore, it often happened that – due to the changes of the participating members – the same dicastery made its decision in an absolutely different personal constitution, which hardly served the consistent decision making.

Naturally, it was rare when a cardinal – perhaps prelate – was a member of every important congregation; there were only four or five such cardinals among them. (Usually, this closer circle of the popes was invited to the *Congregazione dello Stato*.) For example, the former nuncio of Vienna, Giovanni Battista Pallotto was a member of nine congrega-

⁷⁴ *Militiae Christianae Congregatio, Camaldolensium Haeremitarum Congregatio* (and *Reformationis Fratrum Minorum de Observantia Congregatio*), *Hispaniarum Negociorum Congregatio, Aquileae Patriarchatus Congregatio, Palatinatus Congregatio*. Cf. WEBER, *Die ältesten päpstlichen Staatshandbücher*, 187–209 and 210–265. On the *Militia Christiana*: E. SASTRE SANTOS, *Un memorial sobre la orden de la Milicia Cristiana en el Archivo de Propaganda Fide*, *Hidalgía* 29 (1981) 1025–1064.

⁷⁵ *Orphanorum utriusque sexus Congregatio* etc. WEBER, *Die ältesten päpstlichen Staatshandbücher*, 246 and 251.

⁷⁶ Of the latter one I came across only the Italian name variant in the sources. On the German Congregation see more, KRASENBRINK, *Die Congregatio Germanica*, *op. cit.*

tions in vain, since he could not join the Holy Office. Even if it was not exclusively typical, it often happened that certain cardinals made their way only in the congregations responsible for Church administration (despite the fact that they often owed their careers to their venal office),⁷⁷ the others in the State administration. The six congregations of Girolamo Colonna, who was not celebrated by the Hungarian bishops, were all of Church function: he was the member of the Council and Rites from 1629, then from 1644 the Ceremonial, the Bishop and Regulars, and of the Segnatura di Grazia, finally from 1657 until his death in 1666 he was a member of the Inquisition, as well. (He could not, however, become a member of the Propaganda.⁷⁸)

The closer circle, which participated in the important decision making, can be easily identified in every pontificate. Under Gregory XV, for example Giovanni Battista Agucchia secretary of State, who came from Bologna, from a patrician family, Cardinal Scipione Cobeluzzi (secretary of Briefs, the member of the Inquisition and the Propaganda), who lived in the Sacred Palace, Cardinal Francesco Sacratì datary, Giovanni Battista Bandini (the prefect of the Congregation for Bishops and Regulars), Aloysio Capponi, Pietro Donato Cesi, Domenico Ginnasi and Roberto Ubaldini (the prefect of the Congregation of the Council) could be mentioned.⁷⁹ In the early years of Urban VIII's pontificate, the members of this closer circle were Millino, Ginetti, Borromeo and Cardinal Bandini and Zacchia.⁸⁰ Under Alexander VII, besides Rospigliosi secretary of State, Cardinal Corradi, the datary and the prefect of the Congregation of Immunity, Giulio Sacchetti and the Jesuit Pallavicini, furthermore – on an informal basis – two other monks: the Jesuit general Oliva and the Oratorian Virgilio Spada,⁸¹ under Clement IX, only Azzolini and Ottoboni had an advantageous role.⁸² Under his successor, Cardinal nephew Paluzzo Albertoni-Altieri and apart from the two other following secretaries: Federico Borromeo and Francesco Nerli, the pope's friend, Gaspare Carpegna datary and Camillo Massimo, then Alessandro Crescenzi chief major-domo influenced the decisions, as far as the strong nephew allowed.⁸³ Under Innocent XI – perhaps due to the lack of a family background – the body that could enforce its claims was far larger. There were among them Agostino Favoriti, from 1682 Lorenzo Casoni *ciffre*-secretary, Johann Walter Slusius secretary of Briefs, the often mentioned Giovanni Battista de Luca as (also) the head of the memorial-secretariat, then Alderano Cybo secretary of State – who unusually enjoyed French pension –, Giovanni Maria Lancisi datary, furthermore Gregorio Barbarigo bishop of Padova (especially at the beginning of his pontificate), the Oratorian monk, Mariano Sozzini, who was considered to be the soul of the general reforms, the disalced Carmelite general, Carlo

⁷⁷ WEBER, *Senatus Divinus*, 20–21.

⁷⁸ WEBER, *Die ältesten päpstlichen Staatsbandbücher*, 136 and 102.

⁷⁹ KOLLER, *Gregorio XV*, 296.

⁸⁰ HOOK, *Urban VIII.*, 229–230. The members of the *Congregazione dello Stato* in 1633: Bernardino Spada, Zacchia, Gessi, Pamphili, Verospi, Antonio Barberini; in 1641: Spada, Pamphili, Pallotto, Francesco Barberini, Antonio Barberini, Sacchetti, Lanti, Bentivoglio, Roma. A striking fluctuation among the members is noticeable in the meantime. KRAUS, *Das päpstliche Staatssekretariat*, 282–283.

⁸¹ ROSA, *Alessandro VII*, 342–343.

⁸² OSBAT, *Clemente IX*, 353.

⁸³ OSBAT, *Clemente X*, 364.

Felice da Santa Teresa, the papal confessor, Ludovico Marracci and his chamberlains: Sante Fiamma, Tiberio Quadri (also his barber), Camillo Muggiaschi and Carlo Antonio Properi. All of them were nearly absolutely new in the central Church administration, most of them remained in the background, at least they did not collect splendid titles.⁸⁴ Under Innocent XII, the situation is similar, only the person of the officials changed in most cases. Fabrizio Spada embodied the secretary of State, Bernardino Panciatichi the datary, Giovanni Francesco Albani the secretary of Briefs (all of them were cardinals), the secretary of the royal letters became Mario Spinola, the *cifras*' Vincenzo Ricci, the *memoriale*'s Agostino Fabroni; the *sottodattario* was Giuseppe Sagripanti, the papal auditor was Ansaldo Ansaldi, the chief major-domo Ercole Visconti and the chief chamberlain became Baldassare Cenci. Most of them were unknown names, without a patron or a relational background to be supported.⁸⁵

As a result of the cardinals' over-employment, the role of the secretaries who coordinated the effective activity – in many cases not even from the background – was more appreciated. While they were from the pope's vassals in the first half of the century, and their prestige was supported by their titles in the Sacred Palace, as a protonotary, referendary, from 1650s they were rather from the titular bishops or archbishops. However, pluralism can be detected also in their case. For example, Francesco Ingoli, who played an important role in the creation of the Sacred Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith's profile – certain assumptions say that the survival of the repeatedly established institution is considered on his merit, which is an obvious exaggeration – and performed also in the trial against Galilei, from 1629 to 1649, until his death, was also the secretary of the *Sacra Congregazione del Ceremoniale*.⁸⁶ The secretary of the Congregation for Bishops and Regulars, Prospero Fagnani worked as the prelate member of the Consistorial Congregation and the actual referendary of the Signature in 1629.⁸⁷ The record among the congregational secretaries is held by Francesco Paulucci, who apart from being the *secretarius* of the Congregation of Immunity and the Council between 1629 and 1657, he also engaged in the work of the Consistorial Congregation and the Inquisition as a prelate from 1644.⁸⁸ In order to become indispensable in many fields, one did not necessarily have to be a cardinal or a secretary. Pietro Francesco Rosso, who expressed his opinion also in the questions of nepotism, was at the same time the advocate of the consistory, the Camera – at the preparation of the canonisations – and the “devil”. Between 1620 and 1674 he called on twenty-three institutions, including the Holy Office. It often

⁸⁴ MENNITI IPPOLITO, *Immocenzo XI*, 372.

⁸⁵ AGO, *Immocenzo XII*, 396. The majority's dates of the tenure of office can be found in the *Appendix*.

⁸⁶ WEBER, *Die ältesten päpstlichen Staatshandbücher*, 120. Apart from the above cited works, on the life and key role of Ingoli, who started his real career as the tutor of the Ludovisi Pope's nephews: JOSEF METLZER, *Francesco Ingoli, der erste Sekretär der Kongregation*, *Sacrae Congregationis de Propaganda Fide memoria Rerum*, I 1, 146–196; GRISAR, *Francesco Ingoli über die Aufgaben des kommenden Papstes*, 289–292.

⁸⁷ WEBER, *Die ältesten päpstlichen Staatshandbücher*, 109. On the life of the secretary who was one of the most noted contemporary canonists: PALAZZINI, *Prospero Fagnani segretario*, 361–382. His fundamental work: *Ius canonicum seu commentaria absolutissima in quinque libros Decretalium*, Romae 1661.

⁸⁸ WEBER, *Die ältesten päpstlichen Staatshandbücher*, 138.

happened that he had a title in five or six congregations at the same time; above all, he had also time to question the rights of the Hungarian kings concerning the filling of the bishoprics in lengthy essays.⁸⁹

In the “old curial” structure, not only can we find examples of pluralism spanning over generations, mainly to increase prestige and incomes among the families of the popes and cardinals, but also in the line of the congregational officials. One of the typical prelate-dynasties was the Bottonis. Prospero Bottini, who worked in the papal court from 1659 to 1712, until his death, belonged to the decisive body of the *Annona*, as well as of the *Congregazione dei Baroni, dei Monti, delle Visite alle Carceri, dell’ Immunità, della Riforma degli Statuti del Clero Romano* (of the former one, only in 1676–1679); from 1670 he was a member of the Consistorial Congregation and the canonizing division of the Rites (1674–1679). Apart from these, from 1676, as a cameralistic auditor he visited the sessions of the *Congregazione Criminale, dei Conti, dei Confini, dei Parrochi, della Prefettura Cittadina, della Riforma dei Tribunali, degli Spogli, delle Reliquie, della Visita Apostolica, di Avignone, del Governatore Criminale dell’Urbe, del Criminale del Vicario* and as a proper prelate member, the sessions of the *dei Riti*. From 1682, he participated in the sessions of the Inquisition and the congregation dealing with the examination of the bishops and from 1701 with the case-crimes (*cause criminali*). In addition, he was the canon of the Lateran and the Saint Peter, the legal counsel of the Camera and the titular archbishop of Mira. His nephew, Giovanni Battista Bottini, who died in 1708, earlier than Prospero, won admission to almost all of these offices as the assistant of his uncle. Even Lorenzo Prospero Bottini, who was born in 1737, could become a consistorial counsel and the referendary of both Signatures under Clement XIII. The other typical case is of the Cencis, the Azzolini-clients. Between 1640 and 1740, through four generations, they held administrative and judicial offices in the government of Rome, and had cameralistic clerical positions.⁹⁰

The decision making, which became more and more complicated accompanied by the troubles of the Pamphili period, resulted in the change, according to which the decisions of great importance were sometimes made by evading the competent congregations, which could have supplied useful information. As a result of the criticism coming from outside and inside, the simplification and correction of the system became urgent by the middle of the seventeenth century. One of the main elements of the institutional reform, which was urged by the members of the *squadron volante*, was the dissolution of the smaller congregations. According to the register and directory of the papal officials, published more often from the 1660s, the number of the congregations was around forty.⁹¹ However, as a consequence the number of cardinals of certain congregations was significantly swollen, in general to twenty-five persons. Although, by the 1680s there was

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 147.

⁹⁰ MENNITI IPPOLITO, *Il tramonto della Curia nepotista*, 152.

⁹¹ See the registers and directories of the curial officials from 1657, 1661, 1667, 1668, 1670, 1674, 1676, 1679, 1682, 1684, 1686, 1688, though, they were more succinct than the earlier *elenchi* from 1629 and 1644: WEBER, *Die ältesten päpstlichen Staatsbandbücher*, 266–544.

a reduction in the number of members in some cases, the institutional pluralism could not have been eliminated in case of either cardinals, or the prelates, as it is perfectly illustrated by the example of the Bottinis.

Apart from the restoration of the congregations' actual and effective role, the other emphasised factor was to enhance the quality of work. Alexander VII's apostolic decree, published on 16 June 1659, regulated all those moral, practical and educational (for instance, he enlarged the number of such offices that required a doctoral degree in both laws) preconditions that were essential to hold an office in the Holy See. The inner working system and inwardness of the curial offices, along with the circumscription of the prelate's career, remained determinant century-long, like the reforms of Sixtus, as well as Innocent.⁹²

There is a positive effect of the Barberini period's over-bureaucratisation up to this day. Urban VIII established the archives of the College of Cardinals beside the Vatican Secret Archives, founded by Paul V; he terminated the validity of the mentioned (*vivae vocis oraculo*) papal regulations; moreover, he commanded that only such cases could have been discussed by the consistories that had earlier been presented, furthermore the high-ranking officials also had to deliver the official documents. These regulations called way more favourable sources into existence for the present historical research than the previous decades.⁹³

The Papal Secretariat of State

It is a matter of a crucial question how the well-known absolute papal power and authority could become effectual in the congregational turmoil after Trent. Several congregational assemblies were held in front of the pope, where the heads of the prominent offices gave an account of their work in an audience on a weekly or monthly basis. It is obvious that the popes were able to control their decision-making only with the help of a direct personal apparatus. If we recollect those prelates, who gained determining decision-making influence in the course of certain pontificates, not only could we see that there were more and more heads of diverse papal secretaries occurring among them, but these positions were filled by more and more prestigious people.

⁹² RODÉN, *Cardinal Decio Azzolino and Squadron Volante*, 47 and 91–92.

⁹³ Prímási Levéltár [The Archives of the Primate], Esztergom, Archivum Ecclesiasticum Vetus, n. 154/5 (The original decree of Urban VIII of 11 December 1631: *Revocatio concessionum vivae vocis oraculo*); and REMIGIUS RITZLER, *Die archivalischen Quellen der „Hierarchia Catholica“*, Miscellanea Archivistica Angelo Mercati (ST 165), Città del Vaticano 1952, 51–74; [IDEM], *Per la storia dell'archivio del Sacro Collegio*, Mélanges Eugène Tisserant V (ST 235), Città del Vaticano 1964, 299–338, 303–308. The regulation meant an outbreak concerning mainly the documents of a charter character that was verified by a notary. As we can see later related to the Secretariat of State, only a slow and gradual evolution occurs concerning various files and governmental documents. – On the details of the procedure of the consistory, see below, the related sections of Chapter VI.

Absolutism, as a form of administration, could not depend on the strength or weakness of the monarch, since there did not exist other functional system in the early modern period. As a consequence, such a governmental system had to be evolved which could, if need be, replace or help the work of the monarch. The “minions” emerging from the inner struggles of the State assemblies proved to be dead ends of the development, moreover their legacy remained to be unsettled. That Cabinet, which could deal with foreign affairs without being controlled by other State offices, had the future throughout Western Europe, namely diplomacy was the monarch’s royal prerogative since the Middle Ages. The chief secretaries – later the secretary – of the flourishing offices leant on this central administrative background and by using their position of trust they extended their influence on other parts of the State affairs. As a result of this process, a new, indispensable title was born, the so-called *primus minister*.⁹⁴

The Establishment of the Personal Administration of the Popes

This sort of development took place at the earliest time and in the clearest form in the papal court. In the Roman Curia the title of *secretarius*, who arranged the secret correspondence of the pope and headed an individual office, independent even from the Chancery in the course of the rule of Pope Pius II (1458–1464), appeared in 1338.⁹⁵ In relation to the development of the diplomatic representations and permanent legations, the scope of duties of the differently called officials and institutions (*segretarii segreti-domestici*, *segretarii in capite*, *segretarii maggiori*, *segretario nelle cose di Stato*) started to thrive by the sixteenth century. The specialization in the relations of certain countries was noticeable already under Leo X.⁹⁶ By 1605, when the term of *Segreteria di Stato* first appeared, the secretary of this office and other secretaries were already the higher prelates of the Curia, notwithstanding their state as officials and their commitments. On the wage scale they strictly followed those officials who had the title of cardinal.⁹⁷

⁹⁴ The general European tendency is detailed and illustrated by more examples: ANDREAS KRAUS, *Der Kardinal-Nepote Francesco Barberini und das Staatssekretariat Urbans VIII.*, RQ 64 (1969) 191–208, 191–195. In KRAUS’S interpretation the Western European attributive does not cover the German territories, since the secret council that led the imperial diplomacy did not have a separate apparatus so the diplomatic documents were expedited by the Imperial and the Austrian Court Chancery. *Ibid.*, 195.

⁹⁵ ANDREAS KRAUS, *Die Sekretäre Pius’ II. Ein Beitrag zur Entwicklungsgeschichte des päpstlichen Sekretariats*, RQ 53 (1958) 25–80.

⁹⁶ Cf. ANDREAS KRAUS, *Secretarius und Sekretariat. Der Ursprung der Institution des Staatssekretariats und ihr Einfluß auf die Entwicklung moderner Regierungsformen in Europa*, RQ 55 (1960) 43–84, 63–78. Here KRAUS presents a more detailed picture about the parallels between the Middle Ages (43–63) and the early modern period (78–84). See more PRODI, *Lo sviluppo dell’assolutismo nello Stato Pontificio*, 115–127.

⁹⁷ LUDWIG HAMMERMAYER, *Grundlinien der Entwicklung des päpstlichen Staatssekretariats von Paul V. bis Innozenz X. (1605 bis 1655)*, RQ 55 (1960) 157–202, 165, note 15.

The salary of the papal officials between 1605–1655 is constant: the cardinal nephew's "official" salary was 87,50 *scudi*, the cardinal's, who supervised the Secretariat of Briefs, was 80, the cardinal secretary of the Consulta was 40, the same amount as that of datary's and the cardinal secretary of State's was 29. Only for comparison: the secretary of the Ritus got 3 *scudi*, the secretary of the Congregation of the Council got 7 and the secretary of the Propaganda got 6. This sum was granted from the *spese del maggiordomo*. The operating cost of the Secretariat of State, including the vice secretaries' salary (*sostituti*), was monthly 100–110 *scudi*, which was covered by the *depositeria generale*.

The position of the cardinal secretary of State was absolutely confidential. He had free access to the pope, nonetheless, he was not obliged to accept the command of anybody but the Pontiff's, moreover, the secretary was let into all the State secrets. On the basis of the abstracts, his task was to report on the accounts of the nunciatures to the pope. In addition, he was to open the letters coming from the monarchs, the prelates and the noblemen addressed to the pope. In many cases, he made decision on the future of the arriving data and cases whether they had to be announced to the pope or directly forwarded to one of the congregations, or offices. According to the significance of the case, the measures towards the answer containing the decision were taken by himself or by the order of the pope, be it a letter of the Secretariat of State signed by the cardinal-nephew, or a *breve*. Not only did he make notes on the papal audiences but on those congregational assemblies, as well, where the pope was the chairman. Moreover, on a regular basis he negotiated with foreign deputies and delegations. As the secret correspondence (*ciffre*), which was utilized more and more often by the congregations and other offices (especially by the Dataria), was only operating through the Secretariat of State, the cardinal secretary of State had a wider and wider view on the mechanism of the decision making of the Curia. On the other hand, he did not have the right to order the congregations, with the exception of owning a direct command of the pope. He could only influence the decisions of the "ministries", if he was a prelate member. In the *Congregazione dello Stato* his duty was only to take the minutes until the end of the seventeenth century, he did not have the right to vote.⁹⁸

The role of a technocrat in the papal decision making involved the development and strengthening of a central, powerful position within the Curia, which depended only on the pope. There were several circumstances in Rome which contributed to this rapid development in Western European relation, for example, the relative advancement of the central office, led by the papal secretary, is not negligible. The Secretariat of State, due to the various Church administrative tasks of the papal diplomacy, could play a coordinating part in the offices and congregations of a religious as well as secular character, owing to the reports of the Papal State's legations. Even if the congregations could directly keep in touch with the deputies and provinces.

⁹⁸ KRAUS, *Secretarius und Sekretariat*, 63–78; HAMMERMAYER, *Grundlinien der Entwicklung des päpstlichen Staatssekretariats*, 159–166; KRAUS, *Der Kardinal-Nepote*, 191–195; and on the basis of the knowledge gained by the introduction of the Secretariat of State's function.

Above all, owing to the withdrawal of the consistory, there was a lack of a State assembly within the papal administration, which could oversee all the fragments of the State affairs. A ministerial governmental system was established, where all the competences were shared. The establishment of this system, occurring in the early times of the Curia, was not only based on the realisation of a more efficiently functioning structure; in spite of the growing dominance of the Italian factor, the Curia had always been and remained an international institution; some of the cardinals had international relations, nonetheless, interests. The need for a modern papal absolutism and sovereignty naturally resulted in the elimination of its risk. As the Papacy was partly an elective monarchy, based on universal grounds, the structure and development of the Roman court – despite the similarities – differed from the structure of the other European States. Apart from their “more natural” organization, in the case of the Holy See the diversification was more considerable according to the liaison with other countries. Consequently, in the new system the cardinals were able to see only the little fragments of the whole picture; the information to the trustworthy cardinals was often provided by the new centre: the Secretariat of State.⁹⁹

The development of the secretary of State’s independent power position was threatened only by the cardinal nephew. Comparing to the Western-European offices’ colleagues, he was in a favourable situation since the cardinal nephews were not hardened in political battles like the French, English, Spanish or Viennese “favourites”. Their selection relied on relational basis; one of their functions – as we saw – was to establish a papal dynasty. Although both of them had free access to the pope, but the nephew, who usually held the vice-chancellor title lived in the Palace of the Chancery, the secretary of State in the Sacred Palace, or in the Quirinal. If the cardinal nephew personally wanted to report on a certain case to the pope – for which he had the right –, he could do it only on the basis of the extract made by the Secretariat, and as we highlighted, a command to the secretary of State could have been given only by the pope, consequently, the nephew could not, though, he was the formal leader of the papal diplomacy. However, in contrast to his Western-European colleagues, the nephew had legally entrenched functions. A firm nephew, under his less active uncle’s reign, could fill his rather theoretical authority with actual meaning and could create an individual decision making position.¹⁰⁰

The pope – the cardinal nephew – the secretary of State: they head the power, they form the heart of the decision making. If the cardinal nephew became the *alter-ego* of the pope, similarly the secretary of State became the *alter-ego* of the nephew; and if the cardinal nephew was the primary official of the Curia, then the secretary of State became the second in rank, as well.¹⁰¹ Their prevailing relation, whether they were working for or against each other, was of determinant significance.

⁹⁹ KRAUS, *Secretarius und Sekretariat*, 63–78; VISCEGLIA, *Fazioni e lotta politica nel Sacro Collegio*, 43.

¹⁰⁰ KRAUS, *Der Kardinal-Nepote*, 191–195.

¹⁰¹ MENNITI IPPOLITO, *Il tramonto della Curia nepotista*, 30–32 and 42–50.

The absolute papal exercise of power could have been completely autonomous, only if the pope had examined the incoming letters personally. It is obvious though, that none of the popes could become absorbed in every detail of the sea of official documents.

Paul V, who was elected at the age of fifty-three, read the files until the end of his life, naturally only the most important ones. The sixty-seven-year-old ill Gregory XV – as one can deduct from the poor data of his short pontificate – basically, had to rely on his colleagues. His handwriting never occurs on the authentic documents. In the first decade of his pontificate Urban VIII, who acceded to the throne at the age of fifty-eight, got involved in the procedure actively, however, between 1635 and 1644, there is no note by him on the drafts of the Secretariat of State. Innocent X, who was crowned at the age of seventy, controlled the cases with unique energy; however his men were entrusted with the arduous daily work of the documents.

As a consequence, even with variable significance the role of the direct colleagues: their influence, qualification, preferences and the analysis of the concrete procedure is essential to acquaint and get acquainted with the papal decision making. Yet, the conditions of research are not too favourable. Several aspects of the personal relations cannot be reconstructed; there no official regulations remained; apart from some retrospective descriptions of the plan of work, the most important source-bank is supported by the Secretariat of State's documents. The identification, categorisation and statistical analysis of various manuscripts, though through laborious work, supply useful information.¹⁰² This method helps to get to know the function of the institution that could influence – by means of its coordinating role in the legations, nunciatures and the Curia – the governing of the Papal State as well as the development of the European politics and the formation of the regional aspects of Catholicism in the early modern period.¹⁰³

¹⁰² HAMMERMAYER, *Grundlinien der Entwicklung des päpstlichen Staatssekretariats*, 159–166 and 178–181. – As follows, I am dealing only with the relations in the seventeenth century in more detail, in fact, by focusing on its first half due to the opportunities given by the secondary literature; therefore, the later period has to be shown only as an outlook. A rather trustworthy, however sketchy picture is available about the secretariat of Clement VIII. Its data go far to support the above mentioned, though, the situation was more complicated to a certain degree owing to the two cardinal nephews (Pietro and Cinzio Aldobrandini: *Il Cardinale di San Giorgio*). See on all: JASCHKE, „Das persönliche Regiment“ Clemens' VIII, 133–144; JAITNER, *Die Hauptinstruktionen Clemens' VIII.*, I, XLII–XLIX; and ZDENEK KRISTEN, *Intorno alla partecipazione personale di Clemente VIII. al disbrigo della corrispondenza politica. Contributo alla storia della segreteria di Stato pontificia*, Bolletino dell'Istituto Storico Cecoslovacco in Roma I (1937) 29–52.

¹⁰³ No information on the organizational function of the Secretariat of State can be gathered from the reports of the nuncios – which has become the focus of research for a long time – and from the content of the instructions. The principles of the unique method, relying upon a graphological basis, were elaborated by KONRAD REGEN (*Die Hauptinstruktion Ginettis*, 250–287). However, it should be mentioned that ZDENEK KRISTEN, in his previously cited work, drew his conclusion by a similar method about Clement VIII's extensive governmental techniques. – On the significance and opportunities of the research of the Secretariat of State: KRAUS, *Zur Geschichte des päpstlichen Staatssekretariats*, 5–16; and GEORG SCHREIBER, *Das päpstliche Staatssekretariat*, HJ 79 (1960) 175–198, 177–186. On the indispensability of the continuation of the research which came to a standstill in the 1970s, in special consideration of the Secretariat of State's key role in the central

The Secretariat of State in the Borghese and Barberini Era

When Paul V was crowned, in 1605, it seemed that the position of the secretary of State finally became firmly established, since one of the first provisions of the relatively young pope was to create Cardinal Erminio Valenti as the head of the Secretariat. Gregory XIII and Leo XI had already abandoned employing the nephew and the position was filled by a cardinal, true, under the latter pope's short pontificate, only for three weeks. (Tolomeo Gallio was the secretary of State of Gregory XIII, not only did Leo XI not appoint his nephew as cardinal, but – on his death-bed – his confessor, who urged him to do so, was changed, as well.¹⁰⁴) The Borghese Pope, however, quickly restored the old, tried and trusted tactics of power division. There were two offices within the Secretariat from August 1605 to 1609, both of which were controlled by the cardinal nephew, Scipione Caffarelli-Borghese. The office led by Lanfranco Margotti dealt with the cases of the Italian legations and the Latin countries, while Marzio Malacrida's handled the "Northern territories". Flanders, Switzerland, the Empire, Hungary and Poland belonged to these.¹⁰⁵ Naturally, not only did the division of tasks concern the processing of the incoming letters, but also the outgoing commands and answers. The operation of the two offices was sharply separated. There is no trace of intervening in each other's competences, or employing the other's staff.¹⁰⁶

Malacrida left the Secretariat in 1609, his scope of duties was taken over by Giovanni Battista Confalonieri, though, already in an inferior position. Margotti headed both divisions in one person. In 1610, he became a cardinal, with which he again attained the strengthening of the secretary of State's position within the Curia. However, Margotti died in 1611.¹⁰⁷ Under the successors, Porfirio Feliciani and Giovanni Battista Perugino, the double system was restored, though, with not an effectual result at this time. The offices elaborated on the Northern and Latin documents together. Graz, Cologne, Prague, Vienna, Turin, Florence, Naples and Malta were under Perugino. Around his

control of the Catholic Confessionalisation: ANDREAS KRAUS, *Die Geschichte des päpstlichen Staatssekretariats im Zeitalter der Katholischen Reform und der Gegenreformation als Aufgabe der Forschung*, RQ 84 (1989) 74–91.

¹⁰⁴ SANFILIPPO, *Leone XI*, 275–276.

¹⁰⁵ This rather mapped the division of work of the Aldobrandini period, where Cinzio managed the control of the German States, Sweden, Poland, Transylvania, the Switzerland and Italy; while Pietro Aldobrandini France, Spain and Savoy. Cinzio formally kept a check on his section in the Secretariat of State even after November 1598, when the proper licences of the cardinal nephew were already Pietro's. Nevertheless Clement VIII did not vest them with real authority of decision making. JASCHKE, „*Das persönliche Regiment*“ *Clemens' VIII*, 133–144; JAITNER, *Die Hauptinstruktionen Clemens' VIII*, I, XLII–XLIX; KRISTEN, *Intorno alla partecipazione personale di Clemente VIII*, 29–52. BORROMEO, *Clemente VIII*, 253–254.

¹⁰⁶ JOSEF SEMMLER, *Beträge zum Aufbau des päpstlichen Staatssekretariats unter Paul V.*, RQ 54 (1959) 40–80, 40–52.

¹⁰⁷ Many of the documents of his function as the secretary of State were unprecedentedly published some one and a half decades later: *Lanfranco Margotti: Lettere scritte per lo più nei tempi di Paolo V a nome del Signore Cardinale Borghese, raccolte e pubblicate da Pietro de Magistris*, Romae 1627.

death, in 1613, there was a common complaint about the chaos of his department.¹⁰⁸ Paul V learnt from this case, therefore, until 1621, he entrusted only Feliciani – who is mainly called *monsignor Vescovo di Foligno* in the sources – with the leadership of the Secretariat.¹⁰⁹

All through the Borghese pontificate, the personal work of the secretaries was characteristic. Between 1605 and 1609, Margotti, himself, wrote the 80% of the outgoing letters, which percentage obviously reduced under Malacrida's leaving, and the controlling function strengthened, like also under Feliciani. There often occur the interpolation and correction of Paul V on the files. The pope especially revised a great many of the *ciffré*-minutes, moreover, partly he himself wrote them. The handwriting of Scipione Borghese mainly occurs on the letters coming from legations of Papal State, mostly in 1605–1609. He did not take part in the elaboration of the answers, in fact, after 1612 he was almost completely compelled to relinquish actual leadership of the office.¹¹⁰

As opposed to him, Ludovico Ludovisi actively got involved with the work of the Secretariat. Despite his youth, he always enjoyed satisfactory prestige in the Curia. In company with Giovanni Battista Agucchia, he arranged almost everything. His scope for action was limited by their occasional, though more and more vivid rivals, furthermore by the fact that he could never make a decision of real importance without the pope's approval.¹¹¹

In the second half of Urban VIII's pontificate, a quite unique situation arose. Pope Barberini regularly participated in the work of the Secretariat between 1623 and 1632, the most important documents were examined by himself. The office was led by the meticulous Lorenzo Magalotti between 1623 and 1628, then by Lorenzo Azzolini until 1632. Urban VIII was aware of the significance of this position; Magalotti became a cardinal already in 1624. At first, the young Francesco Barberini stood aside from the cases. Until 1626, the nuncios addressed their report to the brother of the pope, to the elder Antonio. According to the Venetian legates, in the first year, the young cardinal nephew could not speak on any subjects on the papal audiences. However, afterwards, he livened

¹⁰⁸ SEMMLER, *Beträge zum Aufbau des päpstlichen Staatssekretariats*, 56–63; STEFAN SAMERSKI, *Das Päpstliche Staatssekretariat unter Lanfranco Margotti 1609 bis 1611. Das Provinzprinzip als notwendiges strukturelles Fundament zur Etablierung des Kardinalstaatssekretariats*, RQ 90 (1995) 74–84.

¹⁰⁹ SEMMLER, *Beträge zum Aufbau des päpstlichen Staatssekretariats*, 64–80.

¹¹⁰ JOSEF SEMMLER, *Das päpstliche Staatssekretariat in den Pontifikaten Pauls V. und Gregors XV. 1605–1623* (RQ Supplementheft 33), Rom–Freiburg–Wien 1969, II–44. 47–48; [IDEM], *Beträge zum Aufbau des päpstlichen Staatssekretariats*, *loc. cit.*; and in conclusion, with many false statements that can be corrected on the basis of SEMMLER: HAMMERMAYER, *Grundlinien der Entwicklung des päpstlichen Staatssekretariats*, 166–168. The archontology and detailed biography of the officials and employees can be found also at SEMMLER: *Das päpstliche Staatssekretariat*, 108 (Feliciani: 115; Malacrida: 118; Perugino: 121; Margotti: 119); the full analysis of the Secretariat of State's documents from the Borghese period: EMICH, *Bürokratie und Nepotismus*, 54–115.

¹¹¹ SEMMLER, *Das päpstliche Staatssekretariat*, 47–48 (On Agucchia 109); and JAITNER, *Die Hauptinstruktionen Gregors XV*, 185–221.

up. There were some occasional clashes with Magalotti.¹¹² Intriguingly, the more and more active cardinal nephew could smoothly collaborate with Azzolini. The sweeping change was realised in 1632, when Pietro Benessa, the former *sostituto*, came to be the director of the office for two years. He was the man of Barberini. Owing to him, the nephew became not only the titular, but actual head of the Secretariat. The reinforcing process – through the activity of Margotti-Magalotti and Feliciani-Agucchia – which tended towards the nephew's loss of power and the strengthening of the secretary of State immediately broke. Barberini threw himself wholeheartedly into official work. One third of the drafts were written by him (almost five hundred) and he himself corresponded with a string of European princes.¹¹³

Urban VIII, however, did not want to let the leadership go, to lose the direct supervision of the cases and he was not willing to depend on his nephew, either. Therefore, despite the wish of his nephew, he appointed Francesco Ceva as secretary of State in 1634. At the same time, the positions that Barberini obtained between 1632 and 1634 could not have been shaken. He employed the two years, when he dominated the correspondence with the nuncios, princes and prelates, to establish his own secretariat, from where he arranged the correspondence directly, *in proprio*.

This type of correspondence is not new. The *lettere di proprio pugno* was the established form of diplomacy in the early modern period. In this way, sovereign princes or their representatives could write to sovereign princes. (Sometimes even to their dependants, however, conversely not.) The diplomatic “private correspondence” meant that the letters reached the monarchs with the circumvention of the administration. They were usually holographic or written by a personal secretary; they did not have a countersign from the chancellor, but only the seal of a signet ring. They were always delivered even without a separate note or mark.

In practice, the addressee of the letters to the Secretariat was always the cardinal nephew. While it did not result in any special processes in the case of royal private consignment, however, in the case of nuncios with smaller apparatus, it did. They furnished the letters, addressed to the “cardinal patron” with a separate marking instead of distinctive formal signs. This was the proper *in proprio* classification mark indicated on the outside. Naturally, not only could they appeal to him in this way, but the cardinal nephew, himself could employ his own secretariat in official cases. The addressee, later duly had to answer also *in proprio*.¹¹⁴

¹¹² On the unique techniques of Magalotti to exclude the young nephew: ANDREAS KRAUS, *Das päpstliche Staatssekretariat unter Urban VIII. 1623–1644* (RQ Supplementheft 29, Forschungen zur Geschichte des päpstlichen Staatssekretariats 1), Rom–Freiburg–Wien 1964, 10–12.

¹¹³ KRAUS, *Der Kardinal-Nepote*, 197–205; HAMMERMAYER, *Grundlinien der Entwicklung des päpstlichen Staatssekretariats*, 168–171; on the secretaries of State of the Barberini period: KRAUS, *Das päpstliche Staatssekretariat*, 62–70 (on the situation of the cardinal nephew and his relation to the Curia and the secretaries of State more 9–19, and on the relations of Urban VIII to the nephew and the secretaries of State: 2–8).

¹¹⁴ For instance, on the private secretaryships of Scipione Borghese see: EMICH, *Bürokratie und Nepotismus*, 263–332. A certain rivalry already occurred between them and the Secretariat of State, though, the division

Not only is the increase of such letters the new feature under Francesco Barberini, but the secret correspondence received an individual form. The border between the Secretariat and the private office was completely merged between 1632 and 1634. Barberini kept both under his control, the administrative head of the Secretariat, Benessa directed the private office, as well. It changed in 1634, since the *proprio*-office evolved into an independent office. Rota-auditors, congregational secretaries took part in its work. However, Barberini through the *ciffre*-secretary, Antonio Feragalli – who actually organised the *proprio*-secretariat – could still oversee the Secretariat.¹¹⁵ Above all, it also greatly contributed to the liberation that the private office of the nephew, beside the private secretaries, it had had an official division earlier (*secretario d'ambasciate o de memoriali*), which primarily coordinated the nephew's functions in the administration of the Papal State.¹¹⁶

What was the proportion and relationship that the sharply different *in proprio* process bore to the *per la secretaria* process? With full knowledge of the contrasts, it is a naive idea that there was any division of duties between them. In 1634–1643, the *proprio*-secretariat drafted 8,400 letters, out of which 4500 were written by Barberini himself. Ceva's office did only 3,000. The *proprio*-secretariat partly was parallel in connection with the correspondents of the Secretariat, partly it exclusively had contacts with all the monarchs, noblemen and prelates over the Alps: like with the Habsburg court in Vienna and Hungary, or with Malta and the English papal agent. Special attention was dedicated to the extraordinary legates, the last representatives of the “Capuchin diplomacy”¹¹⁷ (Alessandro d'Ales, Arsenio dell'Ascensione). Moreover, the *in proprio* correspondence with legates and the extraordinary legates sent out in connection with the peace congress of Cologne is lengthy, of which crux was in the relations and peace policy with the European powers.¹¹⁸

The purpose was, obviously, to keep certain information secretly from Ceva. Mazzarin, extraordinary nuncio of Paris, was often commanded to report on problems of substance only to Barberini and not to Ceva. It is still a matter of question whether this duality, namely Barberini's detailed, Ceva's incomplete informing, occurred in every nuncio alike. The double guidance apparently caused troubles, the unsettlement of the cases and their untraceable character. The diplomats of the Holy See, for instance, started to write their reports in two copies, or it also happened that if Ceva's order proved to be

of duties would have been the original goal as it is shown by the regulation and division of the correspondence with the clients in official function (“*Patronagekorrespondenz*”) in 1616. *Ibid.*, 290–303 (more detail, analysis: 333–393 and 396–414).

¹¹⁵ On the function, staff of the *proprio*-secretariat with thoroughness, KRAUS, *Das päpstliche Staatssekretariat*, 29–37 and 224–245; cf. more [IDEM], *Amt und Stellung des Kardinalnepoten*, 242–243. The dual purpose of the “Latin secretariat”, which concerned mainly the foreign affairs and belonged to the Secretariat of State, is being discussed later.

¹¹⁶ Cf. with note 114.

¹¹⁷ The zenith of the Capuchin's political role was represented by the secret legations of P. Giacinto da Casale at the beginning of the 1620s. Cf. ALBRECHT, *Die auswärtige Politik Maximilians*, 22–25, 66–69, 73–76, 94–101, 110–113 etc.; [IDEM], *Die deutsche Politik Papst Gregors XV.*, 19–31, 49–82, especially 20–21.

¹¹⁸ KRAUS, *Das päpstliche Staatssekretariat*, 29–37 and 224–245.

adequate, Barberini's was not sent by Feragalli, etc. The intervention of Urban VIII, however, meant a temporary division of competences in 1638–1639, yet it proved to be only a short interlude.¹¹⁹ One of the further causes of the papal decision making's slackening in the 1630s can be found in this doubling of the Secretariat.

The two secretariats working beside each other remained until 1643, the death of Ceva. He was succeeded by Barberini's own obliged man, Giovanni Battista Spada. Apart from Ceva's – to be sure – his cardinal appointment was also hindered. Spada exclusively worked according to the commands of his patron. All these were made possible by the decline of the pope's health. In his last year, his nephew was the sole leader of the curial decision making. The tried and trusted stopgap measure, the independent form of the *proprio*-secretariat became unnecessary.¹²⁰

The Strengthening of the Cardinal Secretary of State's Position

Camillo Pamphili, the nephew of the new pope, did not possess the energy, nor the willingness of Barberini. Innocent X, as a result of the general protest against the nepotism's overgrowth, officially returned to the earlier – and from that time continuous – traditions, embodied by Margotti and Magalotti. Giovanni Giacomo Panziroli, who was created cardinal in 1643, was placed to the head of the Secretariat. Although the office nominally remained under the control of the nephew, Camillo Pamphili caused few difficulties. In January 1647, when he resigned and got married, the influence of the secretary of State was not hindered any more. From this time, the nuncios and legates, besides, princes and prelates directly addressed their letters to him, and the commands and answers were always provided by his own signature. Mainly due to his illnesses, Panziroli, however, could not live up to the opportunities given by the office. The actual part of the work was entrusted to his deputies: Gaspare Simeoni, Francesco Nerli and the *ciffre*-secretary Decio Azzolini. Moreover, in the autumn of 1650, the appointment of the newer nephew, Camillo Astalli-Pamphili, was partly due to his advice, plainly because he could hardly bear the brunt of total responsibility. From late 1650, Panziroli was hardly active, his death in September 1651 liberated the Secretariat from a year-long crisis.¹²¹

Instead of the ambitious Decio Azzolini, Innocent X chose Fabio Chigi who had far-reaching diplomatic experience. His relations to Astalli were without problems, in fact when the new nephew fell victim to intrigues in 1654, he attempted to save him. After Astalli was deposed, the system of 1647–1650 was restored; Chigi was the addressee

¹¹⁹ On numerous official practices and what attitude Ceva had to them, KRAUS, *Der Kardinal-Nepote*, 197–205.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*

¹²¹ HAMMERMAYER, *Grundlinien der Entwicklung des päpstlichen Staatssekretariats*, 171–178; the career of the main officials *ibid.*, in the notes; and ALBERTO SERAFINI, *Le origini della pontificia segreteria di Stato e la «Sapienti Consilio» del B. Pio X*, *Apollinaris* 25 (1952) 168–239, 202–203.

of the letters, what is more, he filled his office with more content than his predecessor. He established a well-operating system for arranging the documents with an excellent staff, which, though, did not work fast but reliably. Everything was supervised by the secretary of State. From August 1652, all the reports of the nunciatures had his remarks, notes, answer-drafts and commands to other competent offices. His election to pope gave an entirely new light to his office.

When his successor, Giulio Rospigliosi was not even a cardinal, the nuncios still addressed their letters to him, this time he was not named by his name or his ecclesiastical title, but by the title of the *segretario di Stato*.¹²² In 1667, Rospigliosi acceded to the throne of Saint Peter, as the second secretary of State, which meant the final stabilization of this position. Cardinal nephew Flavio Chigi had absolutely no influence on the control of the central papal decision making, neither had his successor, Giacomo Rospigliosi. Under Clement X, Pauluzzo Albertoni-Altieri's attempt to restore the power of the cardinal nephew caused only a temporary halt. In spite of the fact that not only did Albertoni-Altieri obtain the titular licence of control, but he also widely practiced it – ignoring the shaping rights of the secretary of State –, in the person of Decio Azzolini, then Federico Borromeo and Francesco Nerli, the position of the secretary of State was always filled by a cardinal. On the other hand, Alderano Cybo, as we saw, did not have to tackle such problems, the activity of secretary of State Giovanni Battista Rubini as a nephew proved to be an *intermezzo*.¹²³

Similarly and in connection with the abolition of nepotism, the arrangement of the cardinal secretaries of State's judicial state in 1692 did not confirm a steady¹²⁴ but an irresistible process. From that time on, the existence of the modern cardinal secretary of State's position – who had a key role in the papal administration, sometimes accomplishing crucial acts – was undiminished in the legal sense. Its birth was attributed to the result of a development having had a sudden change after the Barberini pontificate due partly to the functional troubles of the Pamphili-nepotism.¹²⁵ The essence of this could be summarized by the fact that to assure the functional activity of this curial top office, neither a nephew, nor a system of clients was necessary, like in the earlier decades.¹²⁶

¹²² *Ibid.* and ANTONIO MENNITI IPPOLITO, *Note sulla segreteria di Stato come ministero particolare del Pontefice Romano*, La corte di Roma tra Cinque e Seicento, 167–187, 180–183. On the earlier discussed diplomatic and curial career of Chigi also separately: ALBERT, *Nuntius Fabio Chigi und die Anfänge des Jansenismus*, 9–48; REPGEN, *Die Finanzen des Nuntius Fabio Chigi*, 230–231.

¹²³ SERAFINI, *Le origini della pontificia segreteria di Stato*, 203–205; the archontology of the secretaries of State: WALTER WAGNER, *Die Bestände des Archivio della Nunziatura Vienna bis 1792*, RHM 2 (1957–1958) 82–203, 83–84; MENNITI IPPOLITO, *Il tramonto della Curia nepotista*, 39–57; and in the *Appendix*.

¹²⁴ HAMMERMAYER, who deals with the question, puts the emphasis on the evenness of development from the middle of the century, while MENNITI IPPOLITO – in many of his related works and in the cited places – on the dynastical crisis of the Pamphili, and he regards the strengthening of the secretaries of State as only a temporary occurrence. His viewpoint is adopted by SIGNOROTTO, *The Squadrone Volante*, 194–198; and RODÉN, *Papal Nepotism*, 131–132.

¹²⁵ MENNITI IPPOLITO, *Note sulla segreteria di Stato*, 183–187.

¹²⁶ EMICH, *Bürokratie und Nepotismus*, 414–432.

The Official Procedure

A similar tendency could be noticed concerning the establishment of the Secretariat's official structure, its plan of work. The main characteristics had already crystallized by the first half of the century and consolidated from the secretariat of Chigi. (Considerable reorganization became due only at the beginning of the nineteenth century.¹²⁷) The staff of the office was created by some ten-twelve members, four deputies in general and secretaries and scribes.¹²⁸ Under Paul V, when there were two secretaries of State, the apparatus was halved, Margotti had all in all six subordinates, out of which two were *sostitutos*. (The *proprio*-secretariat, contrary to this, doubled the number of its members.) The staff could deal only with a narrow domain, only the secretary of State had an overall view of the cases.

The high-ranking officials of the Secretariat of State could make progress in the echelon from the clients of the nephew, a nuncio or a cardinal, and they came usually from a Central or Northern Italian patrician family. There are quite a few exceptions, the Dalmatian Benessa was from Ragusa, Lanfranco Margotti was from a poor family from Parma, while Panziroli was the son of a Roman tailor. The high-ranking officials could be the canons of the Saint Peter Basilica and the Santa Maria Maggiore, until the beginning of the seventeenth century, there were few bishops and cardinals among them. One could not join the episcopate from here in the earlier times, neither to the world of diplomacy. However, the fact that one was a member of the pope's family meant a great prestige itself. (At that time, the nuncios were from such families that had some sort of relationship with the target countries.) The only exception might be Agucchia, who became the nuncio of Venice under Urban VIII for a short period of time. In many cases, there is little to know about the subordinate officials, the registers hardly mention their names; sometimes they have only a marking number according to their handwriting. They must have been glad if they survived a shift of the secretary of State, since in each pontificate the whole apparatus was changed from the mercenary pen-pushers to the secretary of State, as well.

The role of the clerks was only of a technical nature, according to Feliciani, it was nothing else but "scribbling and producing copies" (*scrivere le lettere e fare le copie*). The most important task of the *sostitutos* and secretaries was the assistance to the secretary of State at the abridgement of the incoming letters. The aim of the extract, the *estratto*, was twofold: the oral information of the pope, and the supply of the useful and small details to the other curial offices, congregations, which took over the case. Its significance was that in the later practice, only this abstract was used not the original text. Therefore, the role, the personal initiatives and practical common sense of the persons who made

¹²⁷ Cf. JOSEF GELMI, *Die Minutanten im Staatssekretariat Benedikts XIV. (1740–1758)*, Papsttum und Kirchenreform, 537–562; LAJOS PÁSZTOR, *Per la storia della Segreteria di Stato nell'Ottocento. La riforma del 1816*, Mélanges Eugène Tisserant V (ST 235) Città del Vaticano 1964, 209–272.

¹²⁸ HAMMERMAYER, *Grundlinien der Entwicklung des päpstlichen Staatssekretariats*, 195.

the abridgement could not be negligible; however, the whole procedure was imbued with improvisational circumstances. Within the *estratto* – written on the covering or on a separate slip that was attached back to the letter, which was the method mainly under Paul V –, there were the notes on the case's pursuance, arrangement and the remarks of the offices. Not only did the data, names contain useful information but their written form, as well. Apart from the drafts, it could be traced back from these papers who, which official, secretary of State, or the pope himself dealt with the content of the letter. These documents were important even if they were only *estratto in capite* extracts, which indicated only the time and place of the dating and the person and rank of the sender. The same could be spared on the *ricevuta* note, which indicated the date of the arrival, and the *risposta* note, which outlined the content of the answer containing the decision, notes.¹²⁹

What was a typical procedure like? As it was already mentioned, the *dispaccio* addressed to the pope and the cardinal nephew was received by the secretary of State. He, or by his command the official answered for the given region and nunciature prepared the *estratto* – in the Barberini era, there was not such division of competence among the *sostitutos* and secretaries, since everybody dealt with everything –, the secretary of State, often in pencil, composed the main points of the probable command and answer. Then, on the daily audience he orally reported to the pope. After the decision making, the competent official, or – depending on the emphasis of the case – the secretary of State completes the answer in the form of a draft (*minuta*). In certain cases the secretary of State presented it to the pope or to the cardinal nephew, if they demanded or could demand it. Afterwards, a subordinate prepared the fair copy. The finished document was always signed by the nephew, naturally, if the necessary number of documents was collected. Magalotti and Feliciani employed a messenger, whereas Agucchia always visited Ludovisi personally. Finally, the sheaf of papers were returned to the Secretariat, and every secretary put the command and answer completed by them into an envelope without getting an insight into the others'. The elaborate procedure was immediately simplified, when the secretary of State obtained the function of the nephew: he received the letter, opened it and made the necessary decisions, reported them to the pope then signed the answer.¹³⁰ The more organised administration of the second half of the sev-

¹²⁹ SEMMLER, *Das päpstliche Staatssekretariat*, II–44; KRAUS, *Das päpstliche Staatssekretariat*, 186–200; HAMMERMAYER, *Grundlinien der Entwicklung des päpstlichen Staatssekretariats*, 181–186. – The staff of the papal Secretariat of State, their concrete duties are known mainly from the time of Urban VIII. On the *sostituti*: KRAUS, *Das päpstliche Staatssekretariat*, 105–109. on the secretaries 109–126. on the notaries 127–137. A contemporary description of the secretaries' duties: ANDREAS KRAUS, *Die Aufgaben eines Sekretärs zur Zeit Urbans VIII. (1623)*, RQ 53 (1958) 89–92.

¹³⁰ SEMMLER, *Das päpstliche Staatssekretariat*, II–44; KRAUS, *Das päpstliche Staatssekretariat*, 186–200; HAMMERMAYER, *Grundlinien der Entwicklung des päpstlichen Staatssekretariats*, 187; and also KRAUS, *Das päpstliche Staatssekretariat im Jahre 1623*, 112. The secretaries of State could sometimes sign if, for instance, the nephew was ill. Obviously, the *Proprio*-office, which was directly controlled by the nephew, meant a simplified procedure, which, however, could not eliminate the drawbacks of the rivalry with the Secretariat of State.

enteenth century relied upon this change. Naturally, if the pope or the cardinal nephew personally got involved in the paperwork, the tasks were accomplished faster also in the earlier years.

The correspondence with the nunciatures during the period went almost exclusively in the form of *ciffre*. The letter was first sent to the *ciffre*-secretariat, which was subordinate to the Secretariat of State, to be deciphered. The fair copy signed by the nephew was nothing but a long row of a combination of numbers; therefore, if he had not joined the procedure of the decision making, he could not have gained useful information from these. On the other hand, the *ciffre*-secretary, who received the prebend of Saint Peter's Basilica and performed the encryption with two subordinates, had knowledge of many State secrets. However, he could not intervene in the cases – until the middle of the seventeenth century –, the official documents always had to be returned to the secretary of State. From the second half of the 1500s to Paul V, the position was in the hand of the Argentis, under Urban VIII in the hand of the Feragallis.¹³¹

The letter sent to the Secretariat of State, of which the language was not Italian, had a different way. In the subordination of the office, there were two divisions to accomplish this task. As the monarchs and prelates of the Mediterranean countries wrote in their mother tongue, the abridgement was the duty of the *segreteri traduttori delle lettere e scritture Francese, Spagnuole e Portugese*. In addition, they translated – into Latin – the other letters of importance to the papal politics, for instance the French royal edicts, the resolution of the parliament, laws and Gallican publications. The letters in Latin addressed to the pope and the cardinal nephew (from the emperor, the Polish monarch, the ecclesiastical Electors, from the prelates, noblemen of the transalpine countries: German States and Hungary, etc.) were processed by the *segreteria delle lettere latine*.¹³² The replies, written in Latin and signed by the cardinal nephew, of the Secretariat of State – based on the draft of the secretary of State in the cases of great importance – were also processed here, whether they be personal letters or only an enclosed letter of a papal *breve*. In many cases, these “official copies” did not contain information of substance either, their conveyance was entrusted to the nuncio, who conducted the delivery. If we glance back to the operation of the *proprio*-office, we can see that this duty was shifted to there, while after their dissolution – under the cardinal secretaries of State – these subdivisions did not revive. Their tasks were accomplished by the staff of the Secretariat of State.¹³³

Especially in the case of the “secretariat of the Latin letters” it can be stated that its separation was not necessary concerning work organization, since the *sostitutos* always had a good command of Latin. The reason rooted obviously in the unique role of the

¹³¹ KRAUS, *Das päpstliche Staatssekretariat im Jahre 1623*, 113–114; HAMMERMAYER, *Grundlinien der Entwicklung des päpstlichen Staatssekretariats*, 187–189; KRAUS, *Das päpstliche Staatssekretariat*, 146–168 and 201–217.

¹³² On the maintained documents from the Borghese period: EMICH, *Bürokratie und Nepotismus*, 152–179–199.

¹³³ KRAUS, *Das päpstliche Staatssekretariat im Jahre 1623*, 114–116; [IDEM], *Das päpstliche Staatssekretariat*, 138–145.

nephew. The letters from the nunciatures were clearly addressed to the pope, the nephew was only a titular addressee. Why? We have already expressed the answer: the pope was a sacred person, not only his manifestations, but the opportunities to reach him were also limited, formalized. Partly, this is the case also with the letters from the monarchs to Rome. The pope received a more solemn letter, often with a reference that the important details were mentioned in the letter to the cardinal nephew. Actually, this also served the information of the pope, the letter was handled by the Secretariat of State. In many cases – for instance, a smaller wish or grace –, however, through official channels, though not *in proprio*, the personal assistance, intervention of the nephew is asked. (As a reminder, he was truly the most influential cardinal in the Curia due to his other functions. That is another matter that despite his theoretical authorities, he could not achieve independent full powers next to the pope.) The separation of the official letters addressed indeed to the nephew could be settled by the secretary of the Latin letters. In a way that he always had to be from the closer clients of the cardinal nephew as well as he had to follow the commands of the secretary of State.¹³⁴ While Margotti and Magalotti – though, they led the Secretariat of State as cardinals – never received an enclosed letter, Panziroli, Chigi and their successors did, even if there was a cardinal nephew, in which case, they received a similar letter. By the second half of the seventeenth century, the “Latin secretariat” was not at the nephews’, who had fallen almost absolutely into the background, disposal any more, which unambiguously shows the altered power relations.¹³⁵

The last and purely technical stage of the procedure was the dispatch of the documents. The open and coded instructions, letters, *breves* or other documents sent to a nuncio – sometimes to the other addressee – composed together a so-called *pieghi*. Until 1623, a separate outgoing register was composed about these parcels, however, from that year on, only the lists preserved with the documents maintained.¹³⁶ The sheaf of docu-

¹³⁴ “...servitore non dal segretario in capite, al quale è subalternato, et al quale manda a rivedere tutte le sue minute, ma dal sig. cardl. nepote del Papa...” KRAUS, *Das päpstliche Staatssekretariat im Jahre 1623*, 114–116.

¹³⁵ The Latin secretariat, which might have been reorganized only in the eighteenth century, had absolutely different duties: response-*breves*, drafts of the papal manifestations, moreover between 1762 and 1852, the evaluations of the Congregation of the Council about the episcopal reports were prepared here. *Ibid.* and PÁSZTOR, *Guida delle fonti*, 125–127.

¹³⁶ The process is not equivalent to the registration of the content of the documents which was a task of distinct scribes and usually differentiated from the daily procedure. The drafts were prepared and arranged as registers only under Paul V. (HAMMERMAYER, *Grundlinien der Entwicklung des päpstlichen Staatssekretariats*, 187). The deficiencies of the registration and the filing of the original drafts and documents are circumstantially written about by KRAUS (*Das päpstliche Staatssekretariat*, 250–259). The principle means the main problem, according to which the document is the possession of the official who prepared it, – though its validity decreased and the papal regulations more and more prohibited it – could not be completely eliminated in the seventeenth century. Moreover, under certain pontificates the governmental files were considered as private by the family of the Pope and the majority of the documents went to the archives of the family – like under the Borgheses and Barberinis – and remained there until the twentieth century, since the “family was above the State”. Due to the insufficiency of the registration this sometimes caused severe difficulties; to find out the antecedents of certain questions the papal administration had to ask for the permission of the former pope’s family. This situation gradually improved from the middle of the century, since more and more original documents, especially the arriving ones, can be found in the fond of the Secretariat of State in the

ments was dispatched by the secretary responsible for the forwarding from the Secretariat of State to the *maestro delle Poste*. The postmaster had earlier announced the exact time of the departure, by which time the *pieghi* had to be ready. The parcels – to which the consignment of other offices, congregations were attached or at the Secretariat of State or at the post – were dispatched on definite routes to the nunciatures. Papal couriers run between Rome and Ferrara, they covered the distance in approximately four days. Letters were sent partly to Florence, as well, though, the customary postal service was employed which ran between Rome–Genoa–Milan–Lyon. Therefore, certain letters to Florence arrived sometimes within two, three, four or even five days. The Rome–Lyon line reached also Turin, the route took fifteen days. The courier of Naples required one day, whereas the post three or four.

Venice had a unique situation. It took the couriers four–five days to go through the direct route, then from here the parcels were sent to Vienna, Warsaw, Cologne and the Flanders by the local nuncio. The consignment reached Vienna within seventeen – twenty-one days, Warsaw within twenty-five – thirty-five days, although, in winter it took more than forty days. The way to Cologne took in general twenty-four days, sometimes seventeen–twenty, in winter about thirty-five; yet in 1624, when a direct courier was also employed here, it took only twelve–thirteen days. Apart from the weather, military activities played an important role. The route to Brussels took thirty-four days. Correspondence to the Switzerland was through Milan, through its Roman agent and it did not take more than two weeks. The dispatch of the documents to Paris was naturally through Lyon, from here the French royal post brought the letters to the capital every five days. From Lyon back, one week the post went from Milan to Rome, on the other week from Venice to Rome. Consequently, Rome received letters from here, as well as from Vienna, every week. The distance between Rome and Paris could be covered within three, in winter, four weeks.

While there was a post and courier sent to Lyon and Venice on every Tuesday, providing the regular weekly correspondence with the nunciatures – more often with the Italians –, to Spain only two times a month. In case of necessity, the sea route of Genoa was used. Depending on the weather, it could take nineteen, but seventy-nine days, as well, in general it was twenty-five – thirty days. Towards Portugal and the Iberian collectors the nunciature of Madrid mediated.

In case of emergency, *corriere espresso* was employed, mainly for the networking with the extraordinary nuncios. The expenses of this type of dispatch were really high, the employment of an express messenger between Rome and Paris cost 360 *scudi*, not that

Vatican Archives. Cf. EMICH, *Bürokratie und Nepotismus*, 100–115; on the proper archives of the Secretariat of State, for instance: PÁSZTOR, *Guida delle fonti*, 73; apart from the Borghese and the Barberini collections, which are located in the Vatican, on the important documents about the Secretariat of State in the seventeenth century, see STEFAN SAMERSKI, *Akten aus dem Staatssekretariat Pauls V. und Gregors XV. im Archiv des Kardinals Alderano Cybo (1613–1700) in Massa*, AHP 33 (1995) 303–314; WOLFGANG REINHARD, *Akten aus dem Staatssekretariat Pauls V im Fondo Boncompagni-Ludovisi der Vatikanischen Bibliothek*, RQ 62 (1967) 94–101.

the usual post-, or the courier service would have been much cheaper. The employment of the extraordinary messengers was limited due to the doubled postal issue.

According to the contemporary customs, it was a tried and trusted matter to send the copies on another route; they used code-addresses, however, in the midst of wars they could not avoid the loss of the letters, or their fall into the hands of the enemy. The collaboration with the delegates of the foreign countries was regular; they mutually used each other's couriers, which enabled the parties to gain profound insights, not necessarily through legal means.¹³⁷

The Relations with the Secretariats of Briefs and Other Curial Offices

The activity of the "Secretariat of Briefs to Princes" (*Segreteria dei Brevi ai Principi*) was closely and functionally linked to the Secretariat of State. As opposed to its name, it led the conventional papal correspondence not only with the monarchs, but also with everybody else. Its leaders were well-known Latinists all over Europe. Under Paul V, Pietro Strozzi, under Gregory XV and Urban VIII Giovanni Ciampoli, Francesco Herrera, then Gaspare Simeoni and under Innocent XI, Mario Spinola filled this position. They were usually the canons of Saint Peter's Basilica.¹³⁸ The *breves*, which were written on a fine film, sealed with a ring of the fisherman (*sub annulo piscatoris*) and starting with the name of the pope, though, signed by the countersigning secretary, were sometimes based on the draft of the secretary of State. Mainly if they reported on the substantial papal decisions, be political, ecclesiastical or the comment on a congregational resolution. If their content shrouded in solemn tone did not contain more than sheer formality (congratulations, acknowledgement, recommendation, condolence), the smooth Latin asserted itself without limits.¹³⁹

According to description, which was prepared for the information of Magalotti, of Cristoforo Caetano, the former *sustituto*, the *breves* sealed with a ring of the fisherman were merely formal. The phrasing of the *in proprio* papal letters was the task of the secretary of State. These letters "to the emperor, monarchs, cardinals, princes and others were written by the pope himself in urgent and severe cases". According to the description of Caetano, the signature of the pope was not on these *breves*, either, however, it is distinguished from the *lettere di complimenti* in the way that this was not sealed with the ring of the fisherman, but with the seal having the papal coat of arms on it (*il sigillo*

¹³⁷ KRAUS, *Das päpstliche Staatssekretariat*, 246–250; PIERRE LOUIS SURCHAT, *Die Nuntiatur von Ranuccio Scotti in Luzern 1630–1639. Studien zur päpstlichen Diplomatie und zur Nuntiaturgeschichte des 17. Jahrhunderts* (RQ Supplementheft 36), Freiburg–Rom–Wien 1979, 30–32; KRAUS, *Das päpstliche Staatssekretariat im Jahre 1623*, 112 and 115–119. The detailed account of the expenses spent on extraordinary nuncios under Gregory XV (within two years it swallowed a sum that was equivalent to the yearly budget of the nunciature of Paris, that was the largest such institution): JAITNER, *Die Hauptinstruktionen Gregors XV*, 231.

¹³⁸ Their rather incomplete archontology from Sixtus V until the second half of the eighteenth century: SERAFINI, *Le origini della pontificia segreteria di Stato*, 215–217; and in the *Appendix*.

¹³⁹ KRAUS, *Das päpstliche Staatssekretariat im Jahre 1623*, 113.

è piccolo d'acciaro coll'arme del papa).¹⁴⁰ From Urban VIII this formal distinction ceased to exist. From this time, the *epistulae ad principes* sealed with the ring of the fisherman also contained papal statements – for instance details related to the Thirty Years' War – and informed about Church decisions – which were mainly favourable events – made by the pope or by a congregation. Especially, if the significance of the case and the interests of the person made it expedient, or there was already a request originally titled to the pope.¹⁴¹

Under Paul V, except the first years, the Secretariat of Briefs to Princes was completely dependent on the staff of the Secretariat of State. Later it received independent personnel, yet in 1653, when Decio Azzolini – who headed the *ciffre*-secretariat from 1644 – seized also this secretariat, then he became a cardinal the following year, which meant a rivalry between him and the secretary of State, Chigi. After having been elected to pope, Chigi abolished the relative independence for good.¹⁴²

Despite the close relations, the publishing office of the central papal administration controlled by a cardinal prefect,¹⁴³ the Secretariat of Briefs (*Segreteria dei Brevi*) never belonged to the bonds of the Secretariat of State. The documents were countersigned and the work was controlled by the secretary of Briefs (under Paul V, it was Cardinal Scipione Cobeluzzi – called “*il Cardinale di Santa Susanna*” after his title; under Urban VIII it was Volpiano Volpio, then Marco Aurelio Maraldi from 1627 to 1651) with the assistance of a deputy and six-seven scribes in 1623.¹⁴⁴ The plenary indulgences and altar privileges (to let the one travelling bring a mobile altar); the exemptions from the obligation of residence; furthermore, the permissions to transfer the pensions and to free wills, and to ordain faculties *extra tempora* were issued here.¹⁴⁵ Namely, all those legal papal documents, which had less solemn form than the apostolic charters, bulls¹⁴⁶ and were issued

¹⁴⁰ A papal “private letter” written with his own hands, in the same form as the other *breves* from Pius V: JOSÉ IGNACIO TELLECHEA IDÍGORAS, *El papado y Felipe II. Colección de breves pontificios. I: 1550–1572. II: 1572–1598*, Madrid 1999–2000, I, 199–206. According to the evidences of the enclosed *facsimile*, there is truly a paper headed seal with the family coat of arms.

¹⁴¹ KRAUS, *Das päpstliche Staatssekretariat im Jahre 1623*, 113, and on the basis of my own research.

¹⁴² KRAUS, *Das päpstliche Staatssekretariat im Jahre 1623*, 107–108; HAMMERMAYER, *Grundlinien der Entwicklung des päpstlichen Staatssekretariats*, 189–191; KRAUS, *Das päpstliche Staatssekretariat*, 169–185; The documents of the Secretariat of Briefs to Princes from the sixteenth century were already published in the form of a short regesta: *Epistolae ad principes. I: Leo X – Pius IV (1513–1565). II: Pius V – Gregorius XIII. (1566–1585). III: Sixtus V – Clemens VIII. (1585–1605)* (CAV 28–29 et 41), ed. by LUIGI NANNI, Città del Vaticano 1992–1997.

¹⁴³ The title, with some exception, was regarded as an entail of the nephew. In the 1670s such appropriation ceased to exist, and from the end of the century all three *Segretaria Palatina* (namely besides the Secretariat of Briefs, the “Secretariat of the Letters”- and “Requests”) were headed by a cardinal, by a *cardinale prosegretario*. The development is parallel to the secretary of State. SERAFINI, *Le origini della pontificia segreteria di Stato*, in some places.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 210–214; see the *Appendix*.

¹⁴⁵ Their list in the memorial of Caetano: KRAUS, *Das päpstliche Staatssekretariat im Jahre 1623*, 108–109.

¹⁴⁶ In form they hardly differ from the *Epistulae ad Principes*, there is often the greeting of the addressee at their beginning, in other cases the form of the *Ad futuram (perpetuam) rei memoriam*. Their thorough diplomatic description: FRENZ, *Die Kanzlei der Päpste*, 58–68; and KARL AUGUST FINK, *Untersuchungen über die päpstlichen Breven des 15. Jahrhunderts*, RQ 43 (1935) 55–86; and with more literature (especially from PAU-

on the supreme level with minimal or negligible dues in the course of the appeal to the successor of Saint Peter.¹⁴⁷

The competence of the Secretariat of Briefs, developed by the second half of the sixteenth century, like the Dataria's, linked to the conferring of the "ordinary papal graces" (*grazie ordinarie*), and with the exception of the questions related to the non-consistorial benefices, it often got involved in them. Its administration was more simple, faster and cheaper, since it did not employ the mass of the venal office owners. (Apart from the registers, kept from 1586, the dues of the Secretariat of Briefs are preserved by the volumes of the *libri di cassa*.¹⁴⁸)

While under Clement VIII, the secretary of State dealt with the easiest appeals, issued according to the rules of the *stylus curiae* and required formal procedure,¹⁴⁹ at latest, by the Barberini era this duty was shifted to a separate secretariat (*Segreteria dei Memoriali*). The head of this office either gave an account on the contents of the document to the pope and after his approval, the Secretariat of Briefs could issue the related *breve*, or forwarded the case to the competent congregation, or to the Dataria depending on the content of the request and the person of the petitioner. As a consequence, he acted in the same way like the secretary of State did, concerning the letters without the form of a request. However, we cannot have doubts, the records – written in the form of a memorial and were important in terms of diplomacy – still stayed under the authority of the secretary of State.¹⁵⁰

LIUS RABIKASKAS) primarily on the contemporary more spread use of the "bull": MICHAEL F. FELDKAMP, *Bullen von Nuntien und Legaten: Zum Sprachgebrauch des Terminus „Bulle“ in der Frühen Neuzeit*, RHM 34–35 (1992–1993) 133–138. See more the outstanding book of THOMAS FRENZ: *I documenti pontifici nel medioevo e nell'età moderna* (Littera Antiqua 6, a c. d. Sergio Pagano), Città del Vaticano 1998.

¹⁴⁷ PÁSZTOR, *Guida delle fonti*, 44–46.

¹⁴⁸ The problems of competence were arranged only in 1745 – quite similar to the Index-Inquisition – by Benedict XIV. *Ibid.*, 44–46.

¹⁴⁹ "Secretario nostro intimo et libellorum supplicum sive memorialium relatori", was the address of Statilis Paulini *secretario domestico* in a papal *ruolo*. JASCHKE, *Das persönliche Regiment*, 136. – The "curial style's" characteristics of the form and content – in the case of incoming as well as outgoing documents –, which were firm in the fifteenth century and will be mentioned later, are detailed by FRENZ, *Die Kanzlei der Päpste*, 58–68.

¹⁵⁰ The official character of the "Secretariat of the Requests" was strengthened only by the beginning of the eighteenth century (cf. n. 143). On its function briefly: PÁSZTOR, *Guida delle fonti*, 122–124; KRAUS, *Das päpstliche Staatssekretariat*, 42; and on the archontology of the secretaries SERAFINI, *Le origini della pontificia segreteria di Stato*, 206–210; and more in the *Appendix*. – SERAFINI calls the attention to the important difference between the more ancient *supplicatio* – which was more defined in its form and subject; besides, it was legally prepared by the curial officials and with the knowledge of the process, it was to be handled to the Datary – and the *memoriale* – which was more informal and varied in its terminology and subject; besides it related not only to religious but to secular matters. The *memoriale* officially requested not only a legal act but sometimes political and Church administrative decisions (206–207), as a consequence, at the same time the *memoriale* could be a simple request, or a *memorandum* finishing with a demand or a claim. (This latter's version without a request is the *discorso-opinio*.) The analysis of the request form's role in the early modern period especially in respects of the diverse congregations (*Buon Governo, Sacra Consulta*), with

Also in such cases, which were sent to and from the congregations and demanded papal legal acts, the Secretariat of Briefs prepared the letter.¹⁵¹

The draft of those *breves*, which meant the end of the congregational decision making, formed a considerable part of the Secretariat of Briefs' drafts of more than a thousand volumes. At the back of these documents, the complete procedure was usually indicated and the congregational resolutions and the notes of the congregational secretaries could be found in the supplement. Through the thorough analysis of this material that has not been accomplished yet, a more precise picture could be given about the popes' personal participation in the Church administration, since on the *breve*-drafts – as opposed to the diplomatic documents and bulls –, the signature of the pope can always be found, moreover, from 1625 in a rather unique form: the popes used the initial letter of their previous name. For example, Urban VIII: *Pl. M. [Placet Maffeus]*, Innocent X: *Pl. Io. [Placet Ioannes]*.¹⁵²

Concerning the cases belonging to the competences of the Dataria – if the issue of a bull was not necessary – the papal *breve* was composed originally by the *segretari apostolici*. In 1678, their body was incorporated into the Dataria by Innocent XI.¹⁵³

It is understandable that also the private petitioners – with the exception of the non-consistorial benefices' granting, which constituted the bulk of the compositional taxes – tried to avoid the Dataria's expensive and complicated mechanism. Namely this was the following. The *spedizioneri apostolici* rewrote the petition according to the right curial form, the *datarius* then the *prodatarius* signed it and presented to the pope. After an oral *concessum*, the *Ufficio delle Date* indicated the proper form of grant on the supplication, the *datarius* and the *prodatarius* then two auditors signed the document, the *praefectus missarum* indicated the tax paid for the granting of the benefice, then after having paid this sum, it was forwarded to the *Ufficio del Registro* to have it registered. Finally, the petition was sent back to the *spedizioneri apostolici*, who upon certain conditions started to arrange the issue of the *breve* or bull through the Chancery or the *segretari apostolici* led by the *magister brevium*.¹⁵⁴

some typological, administrative relations: IRENE FOSI, *Sovranità, Patronage e Giustizia: Suppliche e lettere alla corte Romana nel primo Seicento*, La corte di Roma tra Cinque e Seicento, 207–241.

¹⁵¹ JASCHKE, *Das persönliche Regiment*, 138; PÁSZTOR, *Guida delle fonti*, 112–119; PAULIUS RABIKAIUSKAS, *Die Gründungsbulle des lateinischen Bistums Smolensk und andere diesbezügliche Papsturkunden (1636)*, AHP 12 (1974), 207–233, 221–222.

¹⁵² *Ibid.*

¹⁵³ On the *segretari apostolici*: PÁSZTOR, *Guida delle fonti*, 71–73. The *breves*, which were prepared by them, constituted a separate series, these are called *Brevi Lateranensi*. *Ibid.* 54–56. On the other characteristics of such *breve*-expedition FRENZ, *Die Kanzlei der Päpste*, 164–180. Apart from this so called *brevia gratiosa*, the “*spectant ad Iustitiam extra Curiam*”, namely the ones that were issued by the (both) Signature and of which drafts were formed by the *praefectus brevium Signaturae Iustitiae*, should be mentioned. WEBER, *Die ältesten päpstlichen Staatsbandbücher*, 219.

¹⁵⁴ STORTI, *La storia e il diritto della Dataria Apostolica*, 243–247; FRENZ, *Die Kanzlei der Päpste*, 97–103; PRITZ, *Supplikensignatur und Briefexpedition an der römischen Kurie*, 7–32 and 50–94. – The mechanism of the latter one will be seen in detail in Chapter VI with reference to the bulls of the consistorial benefices.

The significance of the *Segreteria dei Brevi* in the papal administration was not only supported by the fact that, due to the less tight competence limits, the cases of routine won immediate action, depending on the decision of the pope, on Church administrative and pastoral aspects, or that they meant the final stage of the congregational decision making in many cases. The permissions (*indulta*) given to the cardinals and others and the ecclesiastical and secular authorizations (*brevi di facoltà*) of the papal legates, nuncios and other officials were issued here.¹⁵⁵ Not only the *motu proprio*s, which were formally similar to the *breves*, can be found in the register-volumes of the Secretariat of Briefs but also the drafts and copies of the bulls issued from an own initiative. (The technical formation of these documents was the task of a separate official, the *abbreviatore di Curia*.¹⁵⁶) The essence of the *per viam Curiae* expedition of bulls was the safety, simplicity and promptness. The most solemn papal initiatives of general Church administrative and theological importance could not have been compiled at the Chancery, which employed a populous crowd of officials, and did not need to jolt through the stages of the traditional procedure. The papal decision making could not have been the captive of its own bureaucracy. Another circumstance explains why the bulls of the papal relatives, cardinals, nuncios, titular and missionary bishops, archbishops – as well as others' that had papal permission – were registered at the Secretariat of Briefs. At the so-called *per viam secretam* procedure, apart from the promptness, the main aspect was the evasion of the duties, namely to hinder the Curia from imposing a tax on itself. It is not accidental that in the preparation of such documents only a special official from the *Dataria Apostolica* (this office collected the bull-fee of the consistorial benefices), the *scrittore segreto* participated.¹⁵⁷

Consequently, there is a rather close connection between the *per viam Curiae* and the *per viam secretam* procedures, the genuine difference was not in the manner of the mechanism but in the row of the issue of the documents. Whereas in the first case, the dispositional, constitutional papal bulls were issued, in the second case, the ones with some kind of priority were presented. The course of the simplified procedure was the following. After the *abbreviatore* or the *scrittore segreto* prepared the draft according to the criteria of the bull, it was registered at the Secretariat of Briefs, then after the signature of the vice-chancellor (*cardinale summatore*) – in the first case – and the deputy of the vice-chancellor (*cardinale sottosommatore*) – in the second case – as well as of their representative, only the task of the preparation of the draft with a typical majuscule, leaden seal and its supervision remained to the Apostolic Chancery. (On the original version, there were only the signatures of the vice-chancellor or his deputy, and of the *abbreviatore* or the *scrittore segreto*, whereas on the bulls, which announced the appointment of a cardinal, all the present cardinals on the consistory had to sign the document.¹⁵⁸) We will

¹⁵⁵ Also on basis of the Caetano list of 1623. KRAUS, *Das päpstliche Staatssekretariat im Jahre 1623*, 108–109.

¹⁵⁶ On the *abbreviatore di Curia*: PÁSZTOR, *Guida delle fonti*, 57–62; FRENZ, *Die Kanzlei der Päpste*, 227–228.

¹⁵⁷ On the *scrittore segreto*, PÁSZTOR, *Guida delle fonti*, 62–64.

¹⁵⁸ On these two simplified processes RABIKAUSKAS, *Die Gründungsbulle des lateinischen Bistums*, 213–215; FRENZ, *Die Kanzlei der Päpste*, 162–164; PRITZ, *Supplikensignatur und Briefexpedition an der römischen Kurie*,

examine how big relief these procedures meant comparing to the normal proceeding in the next chapter, where we analyse the bull-issue of a consistorial benefice. After having been published by means of the printing press of the Apostolic Camera, the fair copy of the by own initiatives as decrees issued papal *breves* and bulls, was placed in the traditional repository of the papal charters, in the Castle of Saint Angelo (*Archivum Arcis*). As the contemporaries met these papal documents only in this form, moreover, the outside marks of form disappeared, the use of the *breve* and bull rather merged. The only difference was the initial form of *Servus servorum Dei* and the final *sub annulo piscatoris* phrase's lack, above all, there was a strong blend of the two genres also within the Secretariat of Briefs.¹⁵⁹

Therefore, it is not accidental that the documents sent to the Secretariat of State often bore the *rescritto* ("*a mons. Maraldi, parlì a Sua Santità*") indicating their forward to the Secretariat of Briefs. It often happened that the papal decision was directly forwarded to the secretary of the papal *breves* with the document (*Sua Santità inclina alla grazia*). The issue of the mentioned authorisation of the nuncios meant a more official connection; in case of illness, the secretary of the papal *breves* often substituted the secretaries of the Briefs to Princes (never the other way around), furthermore, the *breves* were forwarded to the important addressees through the Secretariat of the State and the nunciatures.¹⁶⁰

Apart from the Secretariat of Briefs, on the *estrattos*, most of the references – in connection with the questions concerning the Church benefices, the different kind of marriage and ordination dispensations – were to the Datary; then in regard to its close relations to the nunciatures and the Propaganda; furthermore to the Holy Office, the Congregation of the Council, of Immunity, for Bishops and Regulars and partly to the Rites and the Consistorial Congregations; in connection with the State administration, to the Consulta and the Confini. Furthermore, the Secretariat of State supplied – besides the congregation dealt with State affairs – the background apparatus of the occasional cardinal particular congregations (of which most prominent members got involved directly into the work of the office) that worked out all the important papal manifestations, like concerning the bull *In eminenti*, which first denounced Jansenism in 1643.¹⁶¹

227–250; the concise synthesis of the curial processes and expeditions of bulls: [IDEM], *I documenti pontifici*, 71–91. See the information in Chapter VI.

¹⁵⁹ Cf. FELDKAMP, *Bullen von Nuntien und Legaten*, 133–138; RABIKAUSKAS, *Die Gründungsbulle des lateinischen Bistums*, 215; FRENZ, *Die Kanzlei der Päpste*, 58–68.

¹⁶⁰ Obviously not all the private petitioners' were forwarded, only those into of which preparation one of the nunciatures or the Secretariat of State got involved, or special Church administrative interests required it. KRAUS, *Das päpstliche Staatssekretariat im Jahre 1623*, 109–111; HAMMERMAYER, *Grundlinien der Entwicklung des päpstlichen Staatssekretariats*, 199–200; KRAUS, *Das päpstliche Staatssekretariat*, 40–42 and 55–57.

¹⁶¹ That is why the handwriting of the cardinals Gessi, Pamphili, Sacchetti, Bagno, Durazzo, Pallotto, Verospi, Ginetti and Bernardino Spada from the second half of Urban VIII's pontificate could survive on the files. Spada – the uncle of the secretary of State – could keep his influence later as well, as a matter of fact Chigi owed his appointment as a secretary of State to him. (See the cited places in the following note.)

It has already been mentioned that all curial offices and congregations dispatched the non-enciphered (*in piano*) letters in their own names, and the answers were also directly forwarded to them. However, this does not mean that the Secretariat of State would not have played the role of a mediator in such cases, at least towards the nunciatures. As it has often come to light, there were numerous letters sent to the Secretariat of State from the nuncios, princes, prelates – partly addressed to the cardinal nephew, later to the secretary of State, partly directly to the pope –, the subject of which partly or wholly belonged to the competence of other offices, or of which they should have been aware. How could they solve the problem then, if the case – after the necessary consultations – could not have been settled locally and “immediately”: by an order given to the nuncio, by a letter, note of the nephew or the secretary of State, by a letter and/or a papal *breve*?

At the beginning they forwarded the original letter, though, with the note that it should be returned. However, Magalotti sent only copies. Yet, occasionally the sending of the original letter was necessary to enable the given office to take the measures – often after having it consulted with the pope. The secretary of State often required only the sketching of the answer, or a representative of his asked for an oral report. Moreover, it often happened that the secretary of the given office was employed to prepare the draft of the Secretariat of State’s answer, or also the papal reply *breve*. Therefore, one can find many drafts of the Secretariat of State written, for example, by Francesco Ingoli or Francesco Paolucci. The above listed congregations could be identified most often according to the references to their secretaries.

Similarly to the congregational secretaries, the handwriting of the auditors of the Rota often occurs on the drafts of the Secretariat of State, like Cornelio Arrigo Motmann’s, who also composed a *breve* written to the emperor. This, however, did not mean a formal connection to the tribunal. The auditors were employed as legal experts. Concerning the relations to the other offices, a unique tendency could be noticed. While the first secretaries of State of Urban VIII, Magalotti and Azzolini endeavoured to settle more and more cases, Benessa and Ceva more often forwarded the letters to the congregations, moreover, the act of replying was also entrusted to them. As a consequence, the role of the congregations in the 1630s strengthened partly due to the weak secretaries of State and the time of the decision making was lengthened. As opposed to the inner logic of the bureaucracy, the Secretariat of State accomplished the limitation of its own influence, endeavouring to share its responsibility. However, this tendency paradoxically increased its coordinating role among the curial offices.¹⁶²

¹⁶² KRAUS, *Das päpstliche Staatssekretariat im Jahre 1623*, 109–111; HAMMERMAYER, *Grundlinien der Entwicklung des päpstlichen Staatssekretariats*, 196–199; and the fullest picture of all the offices: KRAUS, *Das päpstliche Staatssekretariat*, 38–61.

The Apostolic Nunciatures

The strings of the Roman Curia's complicated administration were pulled by one power: by the pope and his direct colleagues, who constituted a uniform, well-operating unity in the period. What is more, not only did they govern a State but the universal Church, as well. The nuncios – who were accredited to the Catholic States and superintended the local Churches as papal “lateral-legates” (*legatus a latere*) – represented the Papal State and the Apostolic See at the significant powers in the important provinces of the “spiritual empire”, in one person. Their role was multifunctional: it was rather of mediatory and executive character than decision making. However, they had a certain influence on the central decision making with their information, though; they were rather suitable for the enforcement of Rome's statement and for the representation of its interests. They enjoyed more independence through their Church administrative licences: jurisdiction, visitations and dispensations. They shared the characteristic feature of the early modern Papacy: the indivisible duality of the “one body, two souls”. They were diplomats and prelates at the same time.¹⁶³

In the historical development of the nunciatures, there are five separated phases. Firstly, the founding phase in the first decades of the sixteenth century. The first permanent nuncio, Angelo Leonini, was accredited in 1500 in the court of the Doge of Venice. In this period, the French, Spanish and Italian nunciatures were established. Only occasional legations were sent to the Switzerland, to the imperial court, to Hungary, to Poland and to Portugal, these cannot be regarded as genuine legations yet.

The strengthening of the new administration was owed to Leo X, who, by following the mercantile example of Florence, made an effort to spread the representative system throughout Europe. His endeavour was supported by the development of the economical relations and by the ideal of the anti-Turkish European union. A new motif was that the authority of the nuncios did not cease to exist with the death of the pope, but they continued to work as the legates of the Apostolic See. Such cessation of the personal linkage implies explicitly the institutional character. This process was realized by the middle of the sixteenth century, already under Paul III, the nuncios had a key role in maintaining the contact with local Churches, which was mainly due to the papal effort to preserve religious unity.

The main task of the nunciatures after Trent was the encouragement of the practical realization of the Tridentine reform-regulations. In the early developed State Churches: in Spain, France and Venice mainly with the continuous influence on the central power;¹⁶⁴ in the German States, with the establishment of the Jesuit college system, with arrang-

¹⁶³ Cf. LUTZ, *Glaubwürdigkeit und Gehalt von Nuntiaturberichten*, 273–276; PRODI, *Lo sviluppo dell'assolutismo nello Stato Pontificio*, 128–137.

¹⁶⁴ It should be noted that the newer researches, already in Spain, emphasise the direct role of the nuncios, namely they were keen on reforming the women's and men's orders, rather than the local episcopacy, moreover with great efficiency. AGOSTINO BORROMEO, *La nunziatura di Madrid, la Curia romana e la riforma posttridentina nella Spagna di Filippo II*, Kurie und Politik, 35–63.

ing councils and announcing the regulations, with the reform of the chapters and orders and with the establishment of priests' seminars. It was until the moment when the restored German episcopacy, which was the key of the reforms' durability, took over their quasi-*ordinarius* duties at the beginning of the seventeenth century. The reform-nuncios initiated the education of the relevant works of the canon law at universities and colleges. As a consequence Rome's legal claims became known and accepted in a wider circle. They closely collaborated with the Jesuits, however, later, the Franciscans and Capuchins came to the fore.¹⁶⁵

The fourth phase is characterised by the dominance of the political role in the first half of the seventeenth century; namely the role of the bigger nunciatures (Vienna, Madrid and Paris) in the power loss of the popes during the Thirty Years' War, or the peace conferences and the lot of the extraordinary nuncios sent to mainly these courts for the sake of mediation. For example, the reform-nunciature of Graz's scope of duties was restricted mostly to the defence against the Turks and to the handling of the Uskok's problem at the Adriatic and to the protection of the archducal line's interests in Graz on the field of the Habsburg dynastical politics.¹⁶⁶

Decades after the Peace of Westphalia, the political activity, with the exception of the organization of the anti-Turkish union, fell into the background; however, the Church administrative functions – without the elements of the confessionalisation – came to the fore again. There was no substantial change until the Congress of Vienna of 1815,¹⁶⁷ yet it should be mentioned that from the beginning of the seventeenth century, the Italian nunciatures (Florence, Naples, Savoy and Venice) had already operated in the tension

¹⁶⁵ Two other examples that have not already been cited, though, they are closer to us: JOCHEN KÖHLER, *Der Beitrag der Prager Nuntiatur zur Festigung des Katholizismus in Ostmitteleuropa*, HJ 93 (1973) 336–346; and partly GEORG LUTZ, *Die Prager Nuntiatur des Speciano 1592–1598. Quellenbestand und Edition seiner diplomatischen Korrespondenz*, QFIAB 48 (1968) 369–381.

¹⁶⁶ JOHANN RAINER, *Die Grazer Nuntiatur 1580–1622*, Kurie und Politik, 272–284.

¹⁶⁷ Apart from ANTON PIEPER's pioneering work (*Zur Entstehungsgeschichte der ständigen Nuntiaturen*, Freiburg im Breisgau 1894, the most lasting are the first two chapters, 1–64) the first two comprehensive and still classical monographs of the history of the nunciatures with the archontology of certain nuncios: HENRY BIAUDET, *Les nonciatures apostoliques permanentes jusqu'en 1648* (Annales Academiae Scientiarum Fennicae B II 1), Helsingfors 1910, 14–38, 39–66 and especially 110–246; LIISI KARTTUNEN, *Les nonciatures apostoliques permanentes de 1650 à 1800* (Annales Academiae Scientiarum Fennicae B V 3), Genève 1912, the continuation of the archontology until 1690: 1–60; recently, from the aspect of canon law: KNUT WALF, *Die Entwicklung des päpstlichen Gesandtschaftswesens in dem Zeitabschnitt zwischen Dekretalenrecht und Wiener Kongreß (1759–1815)* (Münchener Theologische Studien III, Kanonistische Abteilung 24), München 1966, especially 76–86 and 110–186; and PIERRE BLET, *Histoire de la Représentation Diplomatique du Saint-Siège des origines à l'aube du XIX^e siècle* (CAV 9), Città del Vaticano 1982, especially 175–384. On the reform nunciatures separately: BURKHARDT SCHNEIDER, *Die Jesuiten als Gehilfen der päpstlichen Nuntien und Legaten in Deutschland zur Zeit der Gegenreformation*, Saggi Storici intorno al Papato (Miscellanea Historiae Pontificiae 21), Roma 1959, 269–303; REINHARD, *Katholische Reform und Gegenreformation in der Kölner Nuntiatur*, 8–65; WITSTADT, *Attilio Amalteo*, 695–711; HUBERT JEDIN, *Nuntiaturberichte und Durchführung des Konzils von Trient*, QFIAB 53 (1963) 180–213, especially 210–213; BURKHARDT ROBERG, *Das Wirken der Kölner Nuntien in den protestantischen Territorien Norddeutschlands*, RQ 84 (1989) 51–73.

of the sharpening relations of the State and the Church, which became a general characteristic within a century.¹⁶⁸

The number of the nunciatures reduced to eleven, after Gregory XV dissolved the nunciature of Graz in 1622 – considering that the archducal court ceased to exist there and it mostly completed its reform-mission –, which had been established by Gregory XIII in 1580. The number twelve was restored only in 1670 due to the development of the *Collettoria di Portogallo* into a nunciature. According to their geographical distribution, there were four papal legations in the territory of Italy and there were eight in the other States of Europe, not including the similar offices of the inquisition of Malta and the legation of Avignon.¹⁶⁹

The strengthening of the inner structure of the papal diplomatic legations may be reckoned at the first decades of the last and longest phase. However, one cannot mention total standardisation owing to the different traditions, licences and tasks. The nunciature of Paris, for instance, never had a separate chancellor (or *abbreviator*), since his tasks were accomplished by the *uditore*, and in France the papal legates could never exercise judicial – appellate – functions.¹⁷⁰ In the second half of the seventeenth century, a typical papal foreign representation had the following structure (the numbers refer to the ranks of the employees, the ones marked with a star did not belong to the proper staff):¹⁷¹

¹⁶⁸ STEFANO ANDRETTA, *Le nunziature in Italia nei secoli XVI e XVII*, Kurie und Politik, 17–34.

¹⁶⁹ KOLLER, *Gregorio XV*, 294–295; AGO, *Carriere e clientele*, 19–21.

¹⁷⁰ Cf. MICHAEL F. FELDKAMP, *Eine Verwaltungsreform an der Nuntiatur in Wien Ende des 17. Jahrhunderts*, QFIAB 71 (1991) 482–508, 486–490.

¹⁷¹ The table is on the basis of the works of MICHAEL F. FELDKAMP, *Die europäischen Nuntiaturen in der frühen Neuzeit unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Luzerner Nuntiatur*, Zeitschrift für schweizerische Kirchengeschichte 88 (1994) 27–48, 45 and URBAN FINK, *Die Luzerner Nuntiatur 1586–1873. Zur Behörden- und Quellenkunde der päpstlichen Diplomatie in der Schweiz* (CAV 40 = Luzerner Historische Veröffentlichungen 32), Luzern–Stuttgart 1997, 125. The nunciature of Madrid significantly differed from this model due to the integration of the collectory. Its graph: MICHAEL F. FELDKAMP, *Die Tribunal- und Gebührenordnung der Nuntiatur Madrid aus dem Jahre 1611*, AHP 30 (1992) 363–384, 368. – While the reports of the nuncios early on became the focus of historiography, the research of the nunciature itself started only in the past few decades, therefore many questions are unsolved. On all of these in detail, by emphasising the knowledge of the inner procedure: HELMUT GOETZ, *Die Nuntiaturberichte des 16. Jahrhunderts als Komplementärquelle zur Geschichtsschreibung*, QFIAB 53 (1963) 214–226, 214–216. Some newly published case-studies that supplemented and solved many problems: MICHAEL F. FELDKAMP, *Die Erforschung der Kölner Nuntiatur: Geschichte und Ausblick. Mit einem Verzeichnis der Amtsdaten der Nuntien und Administratoren (Interimsverwalter) der Kölner Nuntiatur (1584–1794)*, AHP 28 (1990) 201–283; SURCHAT, *Die Nuntiatur von Ranuccio Scotti*, op. cit.; FINK, *Die Luzerner Nuntiatur*, op. cit.; MICHAEL F. FELDKAMP, *Die Rechnungsbücher aus der Abbreviatur der Kölner Nuntien Lucini, Bellisomi und Pacca*, Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte 78 (1991) 81–96. A systematic research related to institutional history has launched concerning certain nunciatures. MICHAEL F. FELDKAMP (Hrsg.), *Studien und Texte zur Geschichte der Kölner Nuntiatur. I: Die Kölner Nuntiatur und ihr Archiv. Eine behördengeschichtliche und quellenkundliche Untersuchung. II: Dokumente und Materialien über Jurisdiction, Nuntiatursprengel, Haushalt, Zeremonielle und Verwaltung der Kölner Nuntiatur (1584–1794). III: Inventar des Fonds „Archivio della Nunziatura di Colonia“ im Vatikanischen Archiv* (CAV 30–32), Città del Vaticano 1993–1995; GIUSEPPINA ROSELLI, *L'Archivio della Nunziatura di Venezia 1550–1797* (CAV 42), Città del Vaticano 1998; and from earlier: JOSE MARIA MARQUES, *Indices del archivo de la nunciature de*

NUNCIATURE		
NUNCIO		
TRIBUNAL (<i>Tribunale – Signatura</i>)	CHANCERY (<i>Abbreviatura – Archivum</i>)	COURT (<i>Famiglia</i>)
1. <i>Uditore</i>	3. Chancellor 4. Personal secretary 6. Vice-chancellor	2. Chief-chamberlain (<i>maestro di camera</i>) 5. Chaplain 8. Major-domo (<i>maestro di casa</i>) 9. Chamberlain 10. Servant 11. Messenger 12. Cook 13. Coachman 14. Stablemen 15. Cleaners 16. Purchasers
	7. Notary Scribe	
<i>Iudex commissarius</i> *	Copyists*	
Lawyers, agents*		

The office was headed by the nuncio as the sole-leader of all responsibilities. The basic rules of the secular diplomacy applied to him as well, namely, he had to operate according to the detailed instruction that he received at the beginning of his function; he had to send a report every week, after his average four-year-long service, he had to report on his experience gained during his service in a closing-relation (moreover, he had to prepare a long-winded survey also at the beginning of his actions to prove the validity of his instructions); and he would not accept any personal favour in the target country.¹⁷² Comparing to the secular legations, it is a striking difference that due to the lack of the dynastical continuity, the new pope usually changed the nuncios, who belonged to the important officials, to his own confidants, therefore, there was a more significant rotation among them than among their secular colleagues. The pope chose them; the nephew had only the right of suggestion.¹⁷³ The diplomats of the European powers were from the string of the aristocrats, their origin and their

Madrid. I: 1664–1754, Roma 1975–1976 (Instituto español de historia eclesiastica). According to the information of the colleagues of the Vatican Secret Archives, such elaboration of the nunciature of Vienna is in progress, which is unavoidable since WALTER WAGNER's earlier work (*Die Bestände des archivio della nunziatura Vienna, 82–203*) is hardly complete. In case of the nunciature of Graz, the continuation of the engrossed and thorough research is hindered by the fragmentary character of the sources. JOHANN RAINER, *Quellen zur Geschichte der Grazer Nuntiatur 1580–1622*, RHM 2 (1957–1958) 72–81.

¹⁷² Cf. RAINER, *Die Grazer Nuntiatur*, 289.

¹⁷³ KRAUS, *Amt und Stellung des Kardinalnepoten*, 242–243.

previous way of life supported their orientation in politics and in the court life, furthermore, their wealth provided the establishment of the necessary representation. It rarely happened concerning the nuncios, at least from the seventeenth century. Legal studies, then curial official work behind a desk, legation to an ecclesiastical province were not exactly diplomatic schools, apart from the inner curial plots. The nunciatures belonged to those few offices of the Holy See of a secular character that were not venal.¹⁷⁴

Another peculiarity was that only a small part of the nuncios were from the territory of the Papal State. In many cases, the representatives of the given pontificate's politics abroad were such diplomats who were born either in Milan or in South Italy and considered to be Spanish subjects, or their family estates and benefices were out of the Papal State. Consequently, they were more partial towards a local party than the pope who represented neutrality *ex officio*. This was, however, inevitably interwoven into the tone and emphasis of their reports. An aristocrat from Venice, for instance, could never be the representative of his State in such country, where he had interests. On the other hand, from Paul III, the nuncios were consecrated bishops heading their own diocese, besides, from the seventeenth century, they were more and more solely titular archbishops. Namely, they were members of the hierarchy; therefore they were totally at the mercy of their patron, the pope, not only in their office but in social and economic respects. This defencelessness obtained legal approval under Pius IV in 1565, when the pope forbade the nuncios, under pain of excommunication, from having benefices, titles, or especially accepting recommendation for the red hat. This, however, remained to be only a dead letter. Moreover, as it is going to be seen, an absolutely opposite tendency became noticeable. The nuncio returning to Rome rendered a great deal of service to his former post, especially if he entered the College of Cardinals by the recommendation of a monarch. The experience, impressions gained there proved to be determining for his whole life, like it is shown by the striking example of Ippolito Aldobrandini, who had a very successful Polish legation behind him or of Maffeo Barberini, the former nuncio of Paris, who became pope.¹⁷⁵ (It also became symbolic later that the young prelate Barberini could not travel to Hungary – where as a *commissarius generalis*, he should have controlled the spending of the papal aids given to the anti-Turkish war – in November 1595 due to the illness of his protonotary uncle, who paved the way for his career.¹⁷⁶)

The nuncios were directly subordinate to the Secretariat of State, from where they received the key of a cipher used during their missions, the direction of their activities, the most important agendas and the chief-instruction, which indicated the strategy to

¹⁷⁴ LUTZ, *Glaubwürdigkeit und Gehalt von Nuntiaturberichten*, 262–265. A thorough analysis of a complete pontificate's bench of nuncios with certain careers: JAITNER, *Die Hauptinstruktionen Gregors XV*, 222–231 and 232–334.

¹⁷⁵ LUTZ, *Glaubwürdigkeit und Gehalt von Nuntiaturberichten*, 265–266. An excellent analysis with the prosopography of 50 ordinary nuncios, who were active in Paris in 1514–1700, with introducing their career before and after their legation: BERNARD BARBICHE, *La nonciature de France aux XVI^e et XVII^e siècles: les nonces, leur entourage et leur cadre de vie*, Kurie und Politik, 64–97.

¹⁷⁶ LUTZ, *Urbano VIII*, 298.

be followed and covered the most essential information about the target post. Its preparation was the task of the *Congregazione dello Stato* in the seventeenth century.¹⁷⁷ The chief-instruction was usually amplified by several smaller discussions on a partial problem. The orders of certain offices and congregations constituted other appendixes, after 1622 permanently written by the Propaganda.¹⁷⁸ As opposed to the Secretariat of State, the nuncio was not obliged to keep in touch with these offices weekly. The frequency of the contacts depended on the number and gravity of the timely cases. There were numerous cases of such character, since certain nuncios' authority usually surpassed the domain of the diplomatic accreditation. The jurisdiction of the nuncio of Warsaw covered Prussia, Lithuania, Russia, the Baltic States and the whole Scandinavia; the Viennese covered Austria, Bohemia and Hungary (and Croatia), as well as Transylvania, Moldova and Wallachia; the Venetian Krajina and Gorizia. The territorial jurisdiction was increased by the role in the mission-organisation given by the Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith. As a consequence, the nunciature of Venice, for instance, was in touch with Dalmatia and the whole Balkan.¹⁷⁹

The preparation of the reports and the administration of the nunciature's correspondence with the target country's secular and ecclesiastical persons, besides, with other nunciatures were the duty of the chancellor. The personal paperwork of the nuncio was arranged by the personal secretary. (Until the middle of the seventeenth century, the two positions were normally filled by one person.) In the *dispacchi* sent to the Secretariat of State, obviously the political programme was dominant; however, in the judgement of the nuncios' role it could easily lead to disproportion, since the direct contacts with other curial offices. Several documents relating to Church administration and finance should be sought in the archives of the Congregation for Bishops and Regulars, the Propaganda and the Dataria.¹⁸⁰ The most important fundamental rule of the composition of

¹⁷⁷ The significance of the chief-instructions concerning the given nuncio or pontificate is shown by their systematic publication and thorough methodological elaboration that has started lately. However, their critical study emphasises that the nuncios obtained the delicate political commands especially orally. Mainly GEORG LUTZ calls the attention to this: *Das Papsttum, die Christenheit und die Staaten Europas 1592–1605*, IX–XXII (*Vorbemerkungen des Herausgebers*) and *Le ricerche internazionali sulle nuntiature e l'edizione delle istruzioni generali di Clemente VIII. (1592–1605)*, L'Archivio Segreto Vaticano e le ricerche storiche (a c. d. P. Vian), Roma 1983, 167–180. I have cited the published volumes of the chief-instructions many times.

¹⁷⁸ See for instance the supplements of Gaspare Mattei's, nuncio of Vienna, instruction of 1639: REPGEN, *Die römische Kurie und der Westfälische Friede*, I 1, 400–401.

¹⁷⁹ Not only the southern part of the present Austria (Styria and Carinthia) belonged to the nunciature of Graz until 1622, but also Krajina (present Slovenia) and the coast of the Adriatic which was under Habsburgian rule. On the territorial authority of certain nunciatures: ALMUT BUES, „Acta Nuntiaturae Poloniae”. *Zur Erschließung einer Quellengattung für die osteuropäische Geschichte*, Zeitschrift für Ostforschung 41 (1992) 386–399; on the nunciature of Warsaw separately: JAN KOPIEC, *Zur Geschichte der Apostolischen Nuntiatur in Polen*, RQ 88 (1993) 134–155, 135–137 and 138–147.

¹⁸⁰ The statement does not hurt the truth of the declared thesis, namely the role of the nunciatures in the confessionalisation more and more withdrew from the turn of the sixteenth and seventeenth century.

the nuncios' reports was that in order to ease their Roman processing – similarly to the instructions, orders of the Secretariat of State – about each case a separate letter had to be written. The other element is that it was forbidden to convey news from the territory where another papal legation operated.¹⁸¹

The mechanism of obtaining information was regulated by a general order in 1639, according to which, only trustworthy news could be forwarded to Rome. It was the task of the secretary of the nunciature to go to the court every day and gather current news from ministers and their confidants, yet also the nuncio was obliged to participate in this activity more and more often. The secretary had to collect the circulating newsletters (*avvisi*), newspapers in the court; one should spare no pains – announced the caution of the Secretariat of State. Special attention had to be paid to the military actions and on the events happening in the army, where it was advantageous to keep a personal informant. This was hardly a difficult goal to attain, since in the early modern period numerous Italian officers served in every European army.¹⁸² Not to mention the postmasters, who could occasionally supply rather useful information and not just about the arrival and departure of the messengers. There was an accurate list of the informants at the nunciatures, they weekly compiled the news and filtered the recurrences. Even if every mistake and distortion could not be corrected, they tried to supply precise details: names, dates.¹⁸³

The fact that the nuncios were members of the hierarchy supplied such an information background and communicational channel that it was beyond the secular diplomatic representations' reach. Usually a special relation linked them to the confessors of the monarchs. The all-round opportunity of command to the local Church and its information was the characteristic of the papal diplomacy. Nevertheless, the reports of the nuncios – despite their well-informed sender –, comparing to the report of the legate of Venice, were hardly informative. They had a particular, solemn, rhetorical style; their drafting was impersonal. The nuncio did not only represent the defence of the political interests, like his secular colleagues. His spiritual role, similarly to the pope, fettered his manoeuvring and the style of his drafts.¹⁸⁴

¹⁸¹ KONRAD REPGEN, *Zur Diplomatie der Nuntiaturberichte. Dienstvorschrift für das Abfassen von Avvisi aus dem Jahre 1639*, RQ 49 (1954) 123–126; GOETZ, *Die Nuntiaturberichte*, 215–216; FELDKAMP, *Studien und Texte*, I, 90–96. 106–115. 127–128; FINK, *Die Luzerner Nuntiatur*, 132–135 and 141–143; SURCHAT, *Die Nuntiatur von Ranuccio Scotti*, 27–29 and 39–40; furthermore FELDKAMP, *Die Tribunal- und Gebührenordnung*, 378–383.

¹⁸² Cf. BRUNELLI, *Soldati del papa*, 71–80.

¹⁸³ See the literature cited in note 181.

¹⁸⁴ This ideological factor always has to be considered in the utilization of the nuncios' reports as historical sources and one has to read between the lines more than in case of the secular diplomatic documents which were more clear and plain. LUTZ, *Glaubwürdigkeit und Gehalt von Nuntiaturberichten*, 267–273; GOETZ, *Die Nuntiaturberichte*, 225–226. On the historiography of the reports' publication, on their methodological problems, the places of the nunciatures' documents and their diplomatics, latest: GEORG LUTZ, *Die Nuntiaturberichte und ihre Edition*, Das Deutsche Historische Institut in Rom 1888–1988 (BDHIR 70, hrsg. v. Reinhard Elze–Arnold Esch), Tübingen 1990, 87–121; HENRICUS DAMIANUS WOJTYSKA, *De fontibus eorumque investigatione et editionibus. Instructio ad editionem. Nuntiorum series chronologica* (Acta Nuntiaturae Polonae 1), Roma 1990, 3–82 and 173–190. On the most significant national publication series from Hungarian point of

Not only did the nuncio have to follow the events locally, but at home, as well. He was obliged to take care of his estates, benefices, especially if he was a diocesan bishop. Through his Italian relations, relatives and agents he was up-to-date concerning the affairs of Rome, which was required and necessary for his own career.¹⁸⁵

Apart from the preparation of the reports, the chancery also performed the consular duties of the nunciature. There were money transfers arranged not only for the papal subjects but also for other Italians, furthermore, orientation and recommendation was given here. In Vienna, for example, usually the officials, musicians of the imperial court, soldiers and merchants employed the services of the papal legate and sometimes returned them with precious news.¹⁸⁶

view, see HEINRICH LUTZ, *Nuntiaturberichte aus Deutschland. Vergangenheit und Zukunft einer „klassischen“ Editionsreihe*, QFIAB 45 (1965) 274–324; and the bibliography of certain volumes, see KOLLER-SCHMIDT's bibliography quoted in the *Introduction*. The other stands up of a couple of volumes which are the result of the Czech researches between the two world wars: *Jobannis Stephani Ferrerii nuntii apostolici apud imperatorem epistulae et acta. I 1: 1604 Ian.–Iul.* (Epistulae et acta nuntiorum apostolicorum apud imperatorem 1592–1628, 3), ed. by ZDENĚK KRISTEN, Prague 1944; *Antonii Caetani nuntii apostolici apud imperatorem epistulae et acta. I: 1607. II: 1608 Ian.–Mai. III 1: 1608 Mai.–Aug.* (Epistulae et acta nuntiorum apostolicorum apud imperatorem 1592–1628, 4), ed. by ELENA LINHARTOVA, Prague 1932–1937–1940. (This series has got a mysterious volume that is quoted by KRISTEN as well as LINHARTOVA without its date of publication, though, I have not come across it anywhere else: *Philippi Spinelli nuntii apostolici apud imperatorem epistulae et acta 1598–1603 I* [Epistulae et acta nuntiorum apostolicorum apud imperatorem 1592–1628, 2], ed. by C. STLOUKAL.) The bibliography of the German and other reports of the nuncios until 1978 is referred to by the dissertation of FELICITAS ROTTSTOCK: *Studien zu den Nuntiaturberichten aus dem Reich in der zweiten Hälfte des sechszehnten Jahrhunderts. Nuntien und Legaten in ihrem Verhältnis zu Kurie, Kaiser und Reichsfürsten* (Minerva-Fachserie Geisteswissenschaften), München 1980, II–42. A complete analysis – with statistics and diagrams – on the basis of the cited bibliography in the *Introduction*: PETER SCHMIDT, *100 Jahre Forschung zur päpstlichen Politik und Diplomatie (1500–1800). Ein wissenschaftsgeschichtliches Panorama*, Kurie und Politik, 395–412. – Lately, WOLFGANG REINHARDT gave voice to his conspicuous pessimism concerning the historical utility of the reports: *Nuntiaturberichte für die deutsche Geschichtswissenschaft? Wert und Verwertung einer Editionsunternehmens*, Kurie und Politik, 208–225.

¹⁸⁵ On the role of the nuncios' own Roman agents, not only related to the private but also the official relations (the financing of the legation, gaining affirmation, correspondence to certain congregations): FINK, *Die Luzerner Nuntiatur*, 138–140; FELDKAMP, *Studien und Texte*, I, 125–126; REGEN, *Die Finanzen des Nuntius Fabio Chigi*, 230–232. The representative of Chigi, the later secretary of Briefs Stefano Ugolini's example shows that despite the random payments, how a successful career can be attained by the curial representation of certain nuncios.

¹⁸⁶ With numerous examples about the mid-1630s: ROTRAUT BECKER, *Aus dem Alltag des Nuntius Malatesta Baglioni. Nichtdiplomatische Aufgaben der Wiener Nuntiatur um 1635*, QFIAB 65 (1985) 307–341, 323–340; on the archontology of the important officials from the seventeenth and eighteenth century: FELDKAMP, *Eine Verwaltungsreform an der Nuntiatur in Wien*, 504–508. On the nunciature of Vienna ALEXANDER KOLLER, *Le diplomazie Veneziana e pontificia presso la corte imperiale nella seconda metà del Cinquecento* (Centro Tedesco di Studi Veneziani Quaderni 52), Venezia 1998; DONATO SQUICCARINI, *Die Apostolischen Nuntien in Wien*, Vatikanstadt 1999; IMTRAUT LINDECK-POZZA, *Das Gebäude der Apostolischen Nuntiatur in Wien*, Beiträge zur Neueren Geschichte Österreichs 20 (hrsg. v. H. Fichtenau–H. Koller), Wien 1974, 160–175.

The nuncio practised his faculties through his deputy, the *uditore*, who acted as a temporary agent at a change of legate.¹⁸⁷ He had a threefold scope of duties. On the one hand, by means of the authorizations of the nuncios as a papal side-legate, he delivered the dispensations from Church regulations for the petitioners. The nuncio adopted ten such faculties, which were originally within the competence of the Holy Office: 1. absolution of the sin of heresy, 2. the permission of the prohibited books' reading, 3–5. dispensation from various marital obstacles (kinship, impotency, violence), 6. various irregularities (for example obstacles of consecration) and the dispensation of the *delictum occultum*, 7. dispensation from the vows, 8. absolution of the excommunication on account of the realization of what in the bull *In Coena Domini* consisted, 9–10. permission of the *extra tempora* priest ordination and the ordination that was performed one year earlier as it was ordained.¹⁸⁸

After Innocent XI's reform of the taxes, at the nunciature of Luzern an ordination of dispensation of age cost twenty-eight forints, an *extra tempora* sixteen, a marital dispensation five forints, while the latter one cost ten forints at the local bishop that possessed these faculties. If the poverty was proved, the fee was ignored.¹⁸⁹

The *uditore* also concluded the legal actions taken to the nunciature. At the exempt cases, namely at the Church institutions, bodies withdrawn from the authority of the diocesan bishop, in the first instance; otherwise after the court of the ordinary and the metropolitan, in the third instance. These latter ones were usually settled via an acting judge (*iudex commissarius*), which meant in practice that an episcopal court or an archiepiscopal chief-court – which had not participated in the process yet – was appointed to judge the case.¹⁹⁰

The third task of the *uditore* was to conduct the examination of the national Churches' bishop nominees' suitability, the so-called – already mentioned concerning the curial centralisation – canonical proceeding (*processus informativus*). The decrees of the Council of Trent,¹⁹¹ then the constitution of Gregory XIV (1591)¹⁹² and the amplification of

¹⁸⁷ Cf. FINK, *Die Luzerner Nuntiatur*, 126–127 and 128–131; FELDKAMP, *Studien und Texte*, I, 95–106; on the various “classifications” of the papal legates (*legatus missus, ordinarius, de latere, natus, and nuntius ordinarius-extraordinarius, pronuntius, internuntius etc.*), and on their contemporary authority and relations with the local ordinaries and secular powers in terms of canon law: WALE, *Die Entwicklung des päpstlichen Gesandtschaftswesens*, 187–202. 203–211. 211–275.

¹⁸⁸ FINK, *Die Luzerner Nuntiatur*, 103–107; FELDKAMP, *Studien und Texte*, I, 68–73.

¹⁸⁹ Cf. MAIER, *Die Luzerner Nuntiatur*, 530–532. The researches have not solved the problem – as far as I am concerned – why the locals turned directly to Rome for dispensation, mainly in the case of marital affairs, though, the nuncio did have a faculty for such matters.

¹⁹⁰ FELDKAMP, *Studien und Texte*, I, 97–106. 120–122; FINK, *Die Luzerner Nuntiatur*, 128–131. Not only does the secondary literature not explain it clearly, but – as we are learning it in Chapter VI – the criteria of the appeals to the nunciatures and directly to Rome were also unobvious.

¹⁹¹ Sess. XXIV, *decr. de reform.*, cap I: *Norma procedendi ad creationem episcoporum et cardinalium.*

¹⁹² *Onus Apostolicae Servitutis*... 15 May 1591 *Bullarium Romanum*... [*Bullarium*... *Romanorum Pontificum*... *collectio*] I–XIV, Romae 1739–1744, IX, 419–424.

Urban VIII of 1627¹⁹³ were not new. They developed an already existing tradition. The compulsory questions raised to the witnesses bore great similarity to the medieval antecedents.¹⁹⁴ One part of them related to the nominee's birth, origin, age (points 2–4.), consecration as a priest, his pastoral work, belief, morals (5–8.), knowledge and academic qualification (9–10.) and his Church administrative suitability (11–13.).¹⁹⁵ In case of the transfer to another diocese, in ten points his main pastoral work was examined. The other set of the questions were pointed to the size of the episcopal see, its inhabitants, parishes and spiritual life (1.10.), the state of the cathedral, its equipment (2.5–7.), the chapter's and other benefices, the incomes and residence of the bishop (4.8–9.), furthermore, to the seminar, the metropolitan see to which the diocese belonged, its extension and the duration of the vacancy (3.11–13.). The verbals mark the place, the time of the examination, the age, the occupation of the witness and his relationship to the nominee and the origin of his information. In the supplement, there is the creed signed by the new bishop, the text of the oath and often the documents of birth, education, ordainment and appointment.¹⁹⁶

The Council of Trent and the papal orders brought changes concerning the merits of the content's punctuality, form and execution. The results of the examination had to be certified in the form of a notarial document, and the conduct was usually the duty of the local papal nunciatures. The competence of the metropolitan and provincial council was mentioned at the Council, but the canonical process conducted for the filling up of the episcopal sees remained the right of the Curia.¹⁹⁷

It seems, the conciliar idea of conducting the process locally was not only a theoretical opportunity. In France, under Henry III and IV, mainly the archbishops and bishops of the diocese conducted the process that obviously was not regarded as acceptable by the Holy See, since the canonical examination of the royal appointment was also in the hands

¹⁹³ *Si processus... Bullarium Romanum*, XIII, 581–588.

¹⁹⁴ The outline of the medieval antecedents with the related literature and the detailed review of a Hungarian related early trial: PÉTER TUSOR: *Eszterházy Károly kánoni kivizsgálási jegyzőkönyvei a Vatikáni Levéltárban* [*The Verbals of Károly Eszterházy's Canonical Investigation in the Vatican Archives*], Eszterházy Károly Emlékkönyv (ed. by Béla Kovács), Eger 1999, 23–42, 23 and 39, note 6.

¹⁹⁵ The thirteen points were increased with a fourteenth, which related to the providence worthy of a bishop. The addendum was needed for the sake of the titular bishops who could not enjoy the benefices of their diocese. Such a survey of 14 points is published by LUDWIG LITZENBURGER, *Der Informativprozess des Münchener Hofbibliothekars Casimir Haeffelin*, RQ 50 (1955) 239–240.

¹⁹⁶ The question points can be found at the beginning of most of the verbals. See their publication at the above cited papal decrees. Due to the variety of the questions, the verbals can serve as an excellent source for historical research. Only an example: PÉTER TUSOR, *Pázmány Péter processus inquisitionis az Aldobrandini bercegek frascati levéltárában* [*The Processus Inquisitionis of Péter Pázmány in the Archives of the Aldobrandini Princes in Frascati*], *Egyháztörténeti Szemle* 4 (2003) 1, 3–21.

¹⁹⁷ ALFRED A. STRNAD, *Processus inquisitionis Ecclesiae Viennensis. Materialien zur Geschichte des Fürstbistums Wien aus dem Vatikanischen Gebeimarchiv*, Festschrift Franz Loidl zum 65. Geburtstag I–III (Sammlung „aus Christentum und Kultur“ Sonnerband 1–3, hrsg. v. Viktor Fiedler – Elisabeth Kovács), Wien 1970–1971, III, 267–290, 267–268.

of the bishops appointed by the crown. In 1610, the French clergy itself proclaimed the unreliability of the verbals fabricated like this.¹⁹⁸

By all means, the fact, that unlike in the Middle Ages, there was a chance to the conduct of the process even from outside Rome – with the exception of mainly Italian or missionary bishops, who received papal donation – contributed to a great extent to the wide spread of this practice. The cases, technically arranged by the *uditores*, became the field of the regular formal relations between the nunciatures and the local Churches, though, with many problems.

In the inner hierarchy of the nunciature the *uditore* was not followed by the chancellor, who performed administrative duties, but by the chief-chamberlain, who directed the household of the nuncio. This shows how essential the representation was, of which contemporary requisites were applied, including the practice of the diplomatic bestowing. The full board and lodging of the papal legation of twenty-three persons was provided for by the major-domo. According to the Viennese data of the 1630s, the dress materials, as well as the majority of the food were transported from Italy – for an inconceivably abundant number, for some eighty persons.¹⁹⁹

This solution seems illogical only for the first glimpse. As we have seen, the sum from the central budget assigned to the sustenance of the papal legations can hardly be considered high. Apart from his superior, only the *uditore* received a salary from the Apostolic Camera, the supply of the staff was the task of the nuncio, which, however, was not covered even by the taxes from the dispensations. The proportion of the representative needs depended on the person, the lack was retrieved by the incomes and harvest of the benefices and estates at the nuncio's disposal. The investment evolved remunerative by a lucrative bishopric or the red hat, therefore, in the best possible case, the debts, received from home or locally, could be paid off by the end of the service. The indebtedness was not rare at all. Neither was the bankruptcy of the nuncio due to an unexpected disfavour or a change of pontificate.²⁰⁰ The nunciature of Paris had the biggest annual budget, under Gregory XV; it was some annual 3,600 *golden scudi*, which was followed by the Viennese of 2,400.²⁰¹

The unique financing explains that the staff of the papal legations was not only of Italian origin almost with no exception, but from the *uditore* to the stablemen they were the people, confidants of the nuncio, who appeared in many posts by following their superior. Due to this fact, the staff of the nunciatures, belonging to two groups (the *famiglia nobile* or the *alta* and the *famiglia bassa*), could participate in the diplomacy

¹⁹⁸ JOSEPH BERGIN, *The Making of the French Episcopate 1589–1661*, New Haven–London 1996, 62.

¹⁹⁹ BECKER, *Aus dem Alltag des Nuntius Malatesta*, 312–317.

²⁰⁰ LUTZ, *Glaubwürdigkeit und Gehalt von Nuntiaturreportagen*, 266–267; GOETZ, *Die Nuntiaturreportagen*, 214–215; FINK, *Die Luzerner Nuntiaturreportagen*, 108–123; FELDKAMP, *Studien und Texte*, I, 73–79; the detailed analysis of the nuncios' budget and organizing techniques: REPGEN, *Die Finanzen des Nuntius Fabio Cbigi*, especially 232–234.

²⁰¹ JAITNER, *Die Hauptinstruktionen Gregors XV*, 230.

of the Holy See in possession of essential foreign service experience. Not only did they perform through politics, but also through Church politics and Church administration, furthermore by the connections with the local Churches.²⁰²

²⁰² FELDKAMP, *Die europäischen Nuntiaturen in der frühen Neuzeit*, 33–35; FINK, *Die Luzerner Nuntiatur*, 136–137 and 144–150; FELDKAMP, *Studien und Texte*, I, 85–87 and 116–120; SURCHAT, *Die Nuntiatur von Ramuccio Scotti*, 38–39; the contemporary presentation of the nunciature's staff's duty from 1611, true, about the papal nunciature of Madrid which differed from the usual in its structure: FELDKAMP, *Die Tribunal- und Gebührenordnung*, 370–377.

VI

The Roman Church Administration, Church Politics

Some Theses and Examples

As compared to the official Church structure and life of the late Middle Ages, the undeniable and impressive success of the execution of the reforms laid down by the Council of Trent and the heated theological debate of the turn of the century, the reform of the traditional orders and the establishment of newer ones, furthermore, the synchronisation of the folk religion and the cult of the saints with the Roman regulations created some incredible vitality in Rome as well as in the local Churches.¹ The gradual breaking of the impetus, which became striking under Urban VIII, left a deep mark on the life of the Church. The vigorous formalization; the force of the believers to adhere to the disciplines; the limitation of the religious life to legal and ritual dimensions and the refusal and suppression of external and internal criticism began with the exclusive effort to “preserve”, which was accompanied by the rejection of every innovation.² The rigidity of the Church’s inner life and spirituality – at least in relation to the Church administration – is most spectacularly symbolized by the adversities of today’s so-called Institute of the Blessed Virgin Mary.

It was founded by Mary Ward in 1609. The realization of the “lay apostolate” was its aim, in a way that the order avoided every type of the enclosure in its life style. In the 1620s, the stormily spreading “female Jesuit” order – which was settled besides Italy, also in England, France, in the German States, moreover, in Hungary (Pozsony) – experienced a firmer and firmer refusal from the Curia. In the 1620s, Rome was unable to integrate such a radically new initiation. The reason for this was rooted in the traditional conception of a woman and in the clinging adherence to the traditional judgement of the woman’s part, which could picture a proper role for them only in the household or behind the enclosed walls of the cloister. The other reason can be found in the decision mechanism of the Roman Curia, which could make final decisions

¹ LUTZ, *Rom und Europa*, 142–143.

² LUTZ, *Rom und Europa*, 142–143.

even on the basis of one-sided and incomplete information. On the other hand, many denunciations about the nuns arrived in the Eternal City. In Italy, the communities of the order were suppressed by the Congregation for Bishops and Monks already in 1625, in the other territories of Europe the decision of the Propaganda in 1630 reached the same result. Francesco Ingoli, who regarded the destruction of the female Jesuits as his moral obligation, played an important role in the creation of the Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith's decree.

This decision meant that in the 1620s the highest Church authority unhesitatingly stifled the initiation that was not only bearable but also necessary in the life of the Church. Apart from its novelty, the main fault of the initiative was the reinterpretation of certain social conventions. The permission of the order in 1642 was realised only in a less effective form of an enclosure. The suppression proves that an inflexible way of thinking, which stuck to the legal regulations, dominated in the Roman congregations.³

The consequence: the impossibility of the personal religious practice within the Church unavoidably involved the development of Jansenism in the seventeenth century, which endeavoured to fulfil the natural spiritual needs, then the Quietism and the confrontation with them. While this latter did not, for some two centuries Jansenism became one of the gravest inner problems of the Church after Trent. Catholicism, which was increasingly confined to a defensive position, could less and less represent an independent point of reference or have the initiative in the religious-spiritual processes which emerged in the age of confessionalisation. In the seventeenth century a new and great crisis of the European spirit occurred.⁴ The sentence of Galilei was exemplary in this respect. The conviction of the scientist in 1633 shows the general climate change.

The Roman Inquisition put the book of Copernicus, which outlined heliocentrism, on the Index already in 1616; however, Cardinal Bellarmino only personally warned Galilei not to represent the theory of the Earth's motion. By 1633, the action which was not more than a personal notice at the time – of which sting was tried to be taken out by Paul V with a long, restful conversation – became a trial commenced with the impeachment of heresy and the force to withdraw the theory.⁵

³ The detailed history and evaluation with supplying the important sources by JOSEPH GRISAR: *Maria Wards Institut vor römischen Kongregationen (1616–1630)* (Miscellanea Historiae Pontificiae 27), Rom 1966, on the Propaganda's process: 227–448.

⁴ LUTZ, *Rom und Europa*, 142–143.

⁵ The publication of the trial's material is of outstanding significance (ASV Misc., Arm. X, vol. 204): *I documenti del processo di Galileo Galilei* (CAV 21), a c. d. SERGIO M. PAGANO–ANTONIO G. LUCIANI, Città del Vaticano 1984, 61–216, and the introduction: 1–50. On the latest explored detail with the latest literature: FRANCESCO BERETTA, *Un nuovo documento sul processo di Galileo Galilei. La lettera di Vincenzo Maculano del 22 Aprile 1633 al cardinale Francesco Barberini*, Nuncius. Annali di Storia della Scienza 16 (2001) 629–639; [IDEM], *Galileo Galilei und die römische Inquisition (1616–1633)*, Inquisition, Index, Zensur. Wissenskulturen der Neuzeit im Widerstreit (hrsg. v. Hubert Wolf), Paderborn 2001, 151–158.

It is a sheer accident, though a symbolic coincidence, that the first volumes of Galilei's work *Dialogo sopra i due massimi sistemi del mondo* arrived to Rome in the same days when the Barberini pontificate experienced its deepest political crisis due to the Borgia protest. Urban VIII, as a cardinal, belonged to the admirers of Galilei. They were in continuous correspondence from the beginning of their relations, from 1611. During the procedure of 1616, Barberini did his utmost to protect him. It is partly due to his help that heliocentrism, which was incompatible with the teachings of the Holy Bible, was declared heretic during the procedure, Galilei was only to avoid the theory of the Earth's motion. Barberini, who had a literary vein, praised the astronomical discoveries of the expert in his panegyric, published in 1620, and in return, three years later, Galilei – by being generally approved – offered his polemic work *Saggiatore* to the newly elected pope.

Urban VIII was at ease in the company of the scientists. It happened, for instance, that he undertook astronomical researches with Tommaso Campanella in a sealed room of the Quirinal, however, the pope issued condemnatory regulation against those astrologers who he regarded incompetent, for example against Orazio Morandi in April 1631. Galilei was seen at least six times in the spring of 1624, which might have encouraged him to examine again the theory of Copernicus, however, only from a mathematical point of view and with regard for the orders of the Church. In this spirit and with the consent of Urban VIII, Galilei presented his work *Dialogue* to the strict censors of Rome in 1631. He received permission – after having included a passage about the omnipotent power of God over the rules of nature and universe by the earlier request of the pope – in July 1631.

After all these, it was a great surprise that the pope had the circulating volumes of the *Dialogo* published in July–September 1632 confiscated, moreover, Galilei was called before the court of the Roman Inquisition. It is still a matter of question what the reason for this sudden turn was. Urban VIII might have been hurt by certain ideas of the book, or he was more likely to be convinced: the sole purpose of the work had been nothing else but to popularize the already condemned heliocentrism. It seems he gave credit to the document from the papers of the trial of 1616 – which was not legally valid, in fact it could have been forged – that categorically forbade the expert to insist on the question in any form.

During the trial, by the encouragement of the previously more open and curious pope, the Holy Office pronounced disbelieving Galilei's "new science", which rested upon empiric bases, and strengthened the exclusively traditional attitude which enjoyed determining superiority on a philosophical as well as a theological level in the post-Tridentine Church.

This case shows plainly that at the time of the Catholic reform's halt, due to the intransigent protection of the absolute papal authority and the less circumscribed papal infallibility (*infallibilitas*), a split occurred between the immanent, scientific and the religious, transcendent way of thinking for centuries. The opposition of theology and the secular sciences; of faith and knowledge formed an unbridgeable gap between the laymen and the clerics for a long time. Not only did it cut off the way of the Protes-

tant intellectuals, who were more and more unsatisfied with their Church's chaotic circumstances, towards Catholicism, but it also led to the extreme anticlericalism of the "Enlightenment".⁶

The fate and survival of the Tridentine reforms in the seventeenth century are characterised by – apart from the stabilizing of the Church life's spirituality and mental horizon – the interference of the decisions related to the inner life of the Church and the political-financial interests. Those aspects won a determining role which had hardly anything to do with the field of faith. The actions could influence the course of events positively as well as negatively. As it was discussed in wider connections, thanks to the successes of the Counter-Reformation the Catholic secular princes – mainly in Central Europe – strengthened their power basis through their military and political actions. However, in parallel, Rome's universal claims revived in Church as well as political fields, moreover they increased. Yet, these two ways of mutual and complementary development obviously involved the possibility of clashes. As for the European powers, the main lines of force and impulses of the conflicts were the demand of the inner and external sovereignty's maintenance as opposed to the Church, which constituted a State within a State, and the universal papal claims, which threatened their State sovereignty; as for the local Churches, they were the enforcement and protection of the traditional privileges against the secular States and the advowees. In Rome's view, the protection and enforcement of its universal authority had weight: not only over the secular States and advowees, but also over the Church hierarchy within certain countries.⁷

The clashes between the State and Church, the Papacy and the European States were primarily of judicial nature and derived from the Church and secular legal aspects, which competed with each other. They originated mainly from the codification of the ecclesiastical rights, privileges against the State and the Church doctrine of the late sixteenth century. Despite the obvious change, there was certain continuity in the history of Papacy, this is true for the relations with the States and local Churches even more. In spite of the radically new traits of the Catholic confessionalisation in the early modern period, the elements of the legal development of the late Middle Ages are determining throughout the early modern period.⁸

It cannot be denied that the enforcement of the State interests was considered anti-curial manifestations in Rome. As far as the secular side was concerned, the efforts of the popes were regarded as unbearable extravagance and unbounded abuses. On the occasion of the clashes concerning secular law and canon law, the Holy See often found itself in a precarious position, especially when it had to face the State and the local Church's

⁶ LUTZ, *Rom und Europa*, 142–143; MATTEUCCI, *Il papato di fronte all'assolutismo*, 696–697; LUTZ, *Urbano VIII*, 307.

⁷ LUTZ, *Rom im 17. Jahrhundert*, 542; JAITNER, *Die Hauptinstruktionen Gregors XV*, 64–66.

⁸ This means the necessary outline of the concordats written in the conciliarist period and the legal customs which were not laid down in detail. On the relations of the canon and secular law: PRODI, *The Papal Prince*, 59–78.

close coalition of interests, like in France.⁹ It is obvious that these conflicts affected the field of politics, moreover, they strongly influenced Rome's political and diplomatic relations to the European States and the national Churches, however, they never caused such an exclusive result for which they could be held as exclusive and significant reasons. The relations were rather determined by the mutual influences and the result of the interests and values' temporary state, like it is shown by the occasional changes of Richelieu's Gallican politics. The clashes concerning constitutional law and canon law never touched upon religious questions, neither did they have consequences on the religious life itself. The State influence, intervention into the Catholic teachings, into the preaching, services and the liturgy were a really sporadic occurrence in the seventeenth century.¹⁰

The Inner Life of Papacy and the Church

The transition between the quiet standstill of the spiritual confessionalisation during the pontificate of Clement VIII and its break under Urban VIII – similarly to the papal politics – shows an uneven picture. The cessation of the reforms' impetus became more and more visible by the 1610s. The continuation of the non-fading debate over grace – in public or in publications – was forbidden by the decree of the Holy Office on 1 December 1611.

The *de auxiliis* debate was already generated by Luis Molina († 1600) in his writing *Concordia liberi arbitrii cum gratiae donis*, which was published in 1589. In this work, the Spanish Jesuit – who was supported by Francisco Suárez and Miguel Vázquez – proclaimed the reconcilability of human liberty and divine foreknowledge in contrast to the Calvinist predestination. According to Molina's doctrines, at the moment of human decision, which is foreseen by God, the “previously bestowed preventive grace evolves into helping grace, the sufficient grace turns into efficient grace, or not” – in particular, depending on the choice of the human being. After Saint Thomas, his opponent, the Dominican Domenigo Bañez († 1604) – and along with him most theologians – believed that through the helping grace God himself provoked the human free will to reach the given free action from the state of possibility. This does not restrict the liberty of the human being, since God, besides the action, provides its liberty, as well. This question was not solved even by the long row of public Roman debates. It almost happened once, though, Clement VIII's sudden death hindered Molina's sentence. In the summer of 1607, Paul V tried to finish the theological controversies by a – useless – *modus vivendi*,

⁹ Or in Savoy: ACHILLE ERBA, *La Chiesa sabauda tra Cinque e Seicento. Ortodossia Tridentina, gallicanesimo Savoiaro e assolutismo ducale (1580–1630)* (Italia Sacra. Studi e Documenti di Storia Ecclesiastica 29), Roma 1979, 23–32, 33–53, 261–282.

¹⁰ LUTZ, *Rom im 17. Jahrhundert*, 543; the important data of the Church administration, politics and religious life: PETROCCHI, *Roma nel Seicento*, 92–134.

according to which both parties could profess their teachings without accusing the other of being a heretic.¹¹

The pamphlet of Giacomo Antonio Marta, which was published in London in 1613, was neither permitted to circulate.¹² By the order of the Secretariat of State, the nuncios collected the volumes with unbelievable effectiveness by proving the refinement of the censorship's techniques in parallel to the printing. The promptness was not accidental, since the pamphlet was the gravest attack against Camillo Borghese's Papacy. Neither his, nor Clement VIII's election was considered legal by Marta, namely two other cardinals, Toschi and Santoro had already gathered the majority of the votes. Moreover, the Italian authors called Paul V a heretic. In his view, the pope abused the incomes of the Dataria in favour of his nephews, which is nothing else – in his argumentation – but simony, the inner form of heresy. Moreover, he urged the convocation of an ecumenical council, since he was of the opinion that the pope scandalized and upset the Church. That is to say, Paul V hurt Venice, Milan, Florence, Lucca and Naples, he let the bishops pay the debt of their families from their benefices, he overlooked the corrupt practices of most cardinals and their brothers, furthermore, he bestowed most of the benefices to his nephew, not to mention the fact that he appointed mainly young and ignorant cardinals with the hope that they would support their establishing dynasty for long. In particular Marta named, for instance, Maffeo Barberini.¹³

Although, the well-built up work supported by many quotations was practically forgotten by 1615, due to the efficiency of the censorship, it bears eloquent testimony to the reform spirit's perceptible course of fermentation. This change was also felt by the papal court, nevertheless Paul V, as an answer to the criticism of Cardinal Baroni and especially Cardinal Bellarmino about the slackening of the reforms, considered the canonization of Carlo Borromeo (1 November 1610),¹⁴ the ideal prelate of Trent; furthermore, the conclusion of the Roman rites' reform, which derived from Trent. The constitution *Apostolicae sedi* – which was published in 1614 and controlled the order of the administration of the sacraments, funerals, blessings and processions – can actually be reckoned the close continuation of Clement VIII's *Pontificale Romanum* of 1596 and the

¹¹ MATTEUCCI, *Il papato di fronte all'assolutismo*, 679–682. A brilliant summary of the debate over grace with thorough international bibliography in Hungarian: MIKLÓS ÓRY, *Pázmány kegyelemvitája a grazi egyetemen [The Debate over the Grace of Pázmány at the University of Graz]*, Pázmány Péter emlékezete. Halálának 350. évfordulóján (ed. by László Lukács –Ferenc Szabó), Róma 1987, 9–98, 10–14.

¹² *Supplicatio ad Imperatorem, Reges, Principes, super causis Generalis Concilii convocandi contra Paulum Quintum...* WOLFGANG REINHARD, *Papst Paul V. und seine Nuntien im Kampf gegen die „Supplicatio ad Imperatorem“ und ihren Verfasser Giacomo Antonio Marta 1613–1620*, ARG 60 (1969) 190–237.

¹³ The author (1559–1629), who was from Naples and studied law in Padua, had lived earlier in Rome as the agent of the English government with annual charges. He belonged to the strict critics who cultivated good relations with Venice and worked behind the scenes without publicly breaking with the Curia. After the publication of his work, he was cajoled to Rome and to Cologne by Nuncio Albergati, and they tried to arrest him there. They did not succeed. Marta did not return to Italy until the death of Paul V, he was called to Pavia or Mantua in vain; he died in 1629 during the bloody siege of the latter town. *Ibid.*

¹⁴ REINHARDT, *Paolo V*, 288–289.

Caeremoniale Episcoporum of 1600.¹⁵ The Borghese Pope found the effective cure chiefly in the increase of the inner controlling mechanisms. In his regulation *Rituale Romanum* of 20 June 1614 he ordered the Roman parish priests to lead the *status animarum*. It is true, the survey, which was handed down at the secretariat of the cardinal vicar, about the believers taking the Eucharist at Easter became general in all the Roman parishes only from the middle of the century, similarly to the increased control over science, culture and everyday life.¹⁶

Under the circumstances of the reform spirit's languishing at the beginning of the century, the vigour of Gregory XV, who was the first to succeed Saint Peter from the alumni of the Jesuits, seems unbelievable. There were more proofs for this during his short pontificate – he was mainly driven by the consideration of Church policy – such as the thirteen ordinary and eight extraordinary nuncios' appointment; important and symbolic canonizations; furthermore the establishment of the Propaganda – regardless of the grudge of the Secretariat of State, the Congregation for Bishops and Regulars, the Inquisition, the Spanish and Portuguese crown. The Ludovisi Pope also inscribed his name upon the pages of the Curia's history and of Church history with acknowledging the Piarists as a religious order with solemn vows (18 November 1621)¹⁷ and with the regulation of the order of the conclaves.

The interference of the great powers, especially Spain and France, into the course of the papal elections was already tried to be hindered by Cardinal Federico Borromeo and Roberto Bellarmino with many plans. According to their notion the bull of 15 November 1621, *Aeterni Patris Filius*, permitted three methods of election: 1. *per scrutinium*, namely the election twice a day in writing, until gaining two-thirds of the votes; 2. *per compromissum*, which meant the decision of a certain group of the cardinals in case the scrutiny was not successful; 3. *per quasi inspirationem*, which meant the election without previous agreements in a spontaneous way by acclamation. In this way, the pope forbade certain cardinals' exclusion from the *papabiles*. However, with not much success, as it is shown by Azzolini's handwritten pamphlet of 1670, *Aforismi sul conclave*.¹⁸ All the same, the process that was regulated – also in its ceremonial details – by the bull of 12 March 1622, *Decet Romanum Pontificem* remained fundamentally unaltered until Pius X.¹⁹

¹⁵ MARON, *Die nachtridentinische Kodifikationsarbeit*, 114–115.

¹⁶ REINHARDT, *Paolo V*, 290–291; EUGENIO SONNINO, *Le anime dei romani: fonti religiose e demografia storica*, Roma, la città del papa, 329–364.

¹⁷ MATTEUCCI, *Il papato di fronte all'assolutismo*, 687–692; KOLLER, *Gregorio XV*, 294–295–296.

¹⁸ The work, which introduces the personality of Azzolini and voices some good advice and regularities, describes the contemporary nature of the papal conclaves. Consequently, if one was excluded from the candidates by the cardinals, he would be excluded all the while, since it could not be easily forgotten, especially if he became a pope after all. Furthermore, the candidate who had been too close to the former power's men had to be excluded, especially if they had gained many enemies during their reign, yet that candidate also had to be disregarded who was too young or he had not been a cardinal for long, no matter if his friends and supporters would take his omission as an offence. SIGNOROTTO, *The Squadrone Volante*, 203.

¹⁹ The last significant modification is related to John Paul II, who repealed the *per compromissum* as well as the *per quasi inspirationem* processes with his regulation of 22 February 1996, *Universi Dominici Gregis*.

In the course of these years, the more and more self-contained deepening of the disciplinary actions – via the strengthening of the papal central power accompanied by rigid severity – in the religious life could hardly be experienced. However, by the middle of the decade its smaller signs could be noticed; for instance in the regulations (1623–1626) that resulted in increasing the severity of the obligation of residence. The clearly political dimensions, namely the removal of the inner curial opposition, were achieved by the bull *Sancta Synodus Tridentina* (18 December 1634), then by the establishment of the Congregation of Residence in the middle of the 1630s. Besides the already discussed symptomatic cases, further negative examples could be listed (like the unfair persecution and humiliation of the Piarists by the Holy Office in 1642), however, efforts of rationalization can also be noticed in many regulations, even though they possessed certain drawbacks of over-regulation.

Such examples were the revision and unification of the various authorizations given to the nuncios and missionaries, whose chief means were the part-congregation (*super facultatibus missionariorum*) within the Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith. Besides, Urban VIII recomposed in detail the Roman breviary and the martyrology during 1629–1631. A considerable part of the corrections was constituted by setting the ancient hymns to the classical style and metre in almost a thousand places. The pope ordered the universal Church to use them in April 1643. The revision of the Roman missal (1634) and pontifical (1643) was in so far as notable. The Congregation of the Index and Rites regulated the worship of the saints with decrees: they banned the local cults that could not have been confirmed sufficiently and they made the conditions of canonization significantly severe, of which first motions were bound to the Curia's permission. The execution of certain canonizations for such small national Churches, like the Hungarian, became equal to impossible. It is by no surprise that under Urban VIII, there were only two canonizations. The thirty-eight beatifications were only seemingly high: twenty-six of them were constituted by the missionaries who died as martyrs in Japan at the same time.²⁰

The fact that the Barberini Pope cancelled fifteen feasts from the liturgical calendar with his bull of 22 December 1642 by no means can be described as a self-contained endeavour. While this regulation of his quickly became practice, another one, which was issued in March of the same year (though it was made public only in June 1643), brought about graver consequences and left a heavy heritage to his successors. The bull *In eminenti* condemned Cornelius Jansen's, the bishop of Ypres, work of *Augustinus*, which appeared in 1640. The focus of his treatise fell on the doctrine of grace. He showed an inclination towards the Protestant *sola gratia*, he believed in the limitedness of free will. He was char-

AMBROGIO M. PIAZZONI, *Storia delle Elezioni Pontificie*, Casale Monferrato 2003, 208–211; KOLLER, *Gregorio XV*, 294–295; cf. also NUSSDORFER, *Civic Politics in the Rome*, 228–252 and [IDEM], *The Vacant See: Ritual and Protest in Early Modern Rome*, *The Sixteenth Century Journal* 18 (1987) 173–198.

²⁰ LUTZ, *Urbano VIII*, 308; FABIJAN VERAJA, *Le cause di canonizzazione dei Santi. Commento alla legislazione e guida pratica*, Città del Vaticano 1992, 21–22.

acterised by strong rigorousness, rare communion, and at the same time, by deep piety. However, the *In eminenti* did not list theological arguments. He was content only with citing the revised (during 1625–1641) papal regulations, which forbade the earlier debates on the doctrine of grace.²¹

The most significant Church investments of the age are to be linked to mission organisations. The Propaganda could move into its own palace in November 1633, where a separate printing office was set up (*Typographia Poliglotta*). The college (*Collegio Urbano*), which was founded by the pope in August 1627, also operated here; its main task was to educate the priests coming from and returning to the missionary territories. Between 1637 and 1639, due to the generosity of the pope's brother, the Capuchin Antonio, some thirty-five novices lived in this institution, to which a church designed by Bernini was added in the meantime. It was led by the Theatines from 1641. Its role was outstanding, even if the majority of the missionaries were not taught within the bounds of the institution but in the colleges of certain States and in the central institutions of the orders.²²

In spite of the great investments, in the 1630s, Rome had to face serious difficulties in the rather blooming missionary fields. Despite the twenty-one papal regulations, the Spanish and Portuguese did their utmost to prevent the activities of the Propaganda in Latin America and Asia. For instance, in 1634, the pope divested the Spanish crown's so-called *vicariato reale* of all of its spiritual authority and he appointed apostolic vicars who depended directly on Rome. Urban VIII had more opportunity to restrict the monarchs' adwosons after the split of the Spanish and Portuguese crowns in 1640. They were approved only in the fully colonized territories, and the pope more and more favoured the activities of the French missionaries (especially the Capuchins), mostly in North America and Africa. However, the Portuguese independence bred disadvantageous consequences for the Apostolic See, since the steady Dutch expansion in Asia from 1636 cut off the former Portuguese colonies from its missionaries.

The increasing rivalry of the orders also did damage to the mission work. Due to their closer relations to certain European Catholic States, the rivalry was partly of political origin (for instance, the Dominicans were the followers of the Spanish, the Capuchins of the French crown), and it had partly natural basis. It sharply emerged in the Far East, where after the monopoly of the Jesuits, all the other orders won a chance of missionary work from 1630–1633. Already by 1641, the healthy competition turned into a sharp theological

²¹ ALBERT, *Nuntius Fabio Chigi und die Anfänge des Jansenismus*, 49–84. 85–204 and *passim* (on the *In eminenti* 166–202); KONRAD REPGEN, *Francesco Barberini, Hugo Grotius und die römische Vorgeschichte der Bulle In eminenti*, RQ 58 (1963) 105–132; COGNER, *Das kirchliche Leben in Frankreich*, 26–63; PIERRE BLET, *Louis XIV et les Papes aux Prises avec le Jansénisme*, AHP 31 (1993) 109–192 and 32 (1994) 65–148 [abstract in Latin]; MATTEUCCI, *Il papato di fronte all'assolutismo*, 699–702.

²² In more detail: GIOVANNI ANTONAZZI, *La sede della Sacra Congregazione e del Collegio Urbano*, Sacrae Congregationis de Propaganda Fide memoria Rerum, I 1, 306–334; VILLY HENKEL, *The Printing-office of the Congregation*, Sacrae Congregationis de Propaganda Fide memoria Rerum, I 1, 335–349; MAKSIMILIJAN JEZERNIK, *Il Collegio Urbano*, Sacrae Congregationis de Propaganda Fide memoria Rerum, I 1, 465–482; PIZZORUSSO, *Agli antipodi di Babele: Propaganda Fide*, 495–518.

and pastoral conflict between the occasional Dominican-Franciscan coalition and the Society of Jesus owing to the “enculturative” liturgical methods – which let the local tradition have free scope – of the successors of Saint Francis Xavier that were applied in China. The conflict can also be traced back to that general problem, which – despite the continuous endeavour – developed from the insufficient preparation of the missionaries about the language, habits and tradition of the target area. This not only covers the overseas cultures and ethnic groups but also the contemporary European “borderlines”. In these territories, namely in Dalmatia, Hungary, Ireland, Moravia and Bohemia, the modernisation of Catholicism under the pontificate of the Barberini Pope achieved noticeable results, which were due to the existence of the local hierarchies and their activities. As opposed to this, the lack of the bishops in the overseas territories hindered the completion of confessionalisation or threatened its durability.

Finally, the last obstacles in the way of mission work also occurred at the border of Europe where Catholicism met the orthodoxy. The several ritual, liturgical, etc. similarities between the ones united with Rome (Ukraine, Ruthenian, Serbian) and the autocephalous communities caused permanent doubts about theology, which resulted in the constant interference of the Holy Office. There was a special confession of faith which meant an effective aid. This was prepared for the unified priests, bishops and metropolitans by Urban VIII and later adopted his name.²³

By the middle of the century, there occurred important and favourable changes – though they did not show new dimension – in the more and more disadvantageous trends. For this once, one should not reckon the expansion of the missionary work, though, under Innocent X, the activities of the Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith carried on spreading,²⁴ of which the most lasting example is the settlement of the Capuchins in Congo and Angola. It is more striking that the political defensive ensuing during the Thirty Years’ War – in parallel to the appearance of the *squadron volante* – was replaced by an increasing Church administrative inclination to act. After having given up the possibility of the lost bishoprics, benefices’ retrieval in the territory of the Imperium, Innocent X concentrated on the increase of the inner Church life’s intensity. In his encyclical letter of 4 April 1652, the pope encouraged the German bishops to summon councils where they could deepen the adoption of Trent’s regulations. His endeavour was acknowledged by successes like the Catholicisation of the Duke of Hesse in the same year, which could, to a certain degree, make him forget the lack of Ferdinand III’s support. The emperor got involved in a long debate with the Apostolic See concerning the establishment of the bishoprics of Litoměřice. Namely, the Consistorial Congregation did not approve of the monarch appointing the bishop of the new diocese on his founder’s rights.²⁵

²³ LUTZ, *Urbano VIII*, 307–308.

²⁴ PONCET, *Innocenzo X*, 331–332.

²⁵ PONCET, *Innocenzo X*, 331–332; DENZLER, *Die Propagandakongregation in Rom*, 133–144 and 165–172.

The Jubilee, which was announced by the bull of 4 May 1649, *Appropinquat dilectissimi filii*, can be also interpreted in relation to the Thirty Years' War. It cast light on the celebration of the warfare's end as the spiritual antithesis of the Holy See's political protest. The last Jubilee of the early modern period met with undeniable success. The mass of the pilgrims in Rome proved that the Papacy for the Catholic believers remained a primary reference point even after Westphalia.

On the other hand, with numerous regulations, the Pamphili Pope strove to rationalize the activity of the religious orders that were accounted the spearhead of Catholicism. He circumscribed the abbots' order of succession in the monastic orders, besides, united many societies and dissolved others. His most enduring reform, which concerned the Italian religious communities, was led by Prospero Fagnani and an extraordinary congregation. The pope tried to make their activity fruitful by many *breves* and bulls (*Inter Caetera*, 17 December 1649, then *Instaurandae regularis disciplinae*, 15 October 1652). The some 24–26% of the 6238 Italian monasteries was dissolved (according to the data from 1650). The majority of them were mendicant orders. The efforts of rationalization crossed the border of Italy, since they made their influence felt in Poland and Spain by the contribution of the Polish primate and the nuncio of Madrid. However, in Italy the pope was to withdraw due to the opposition of the orders, and many States, especially Naples and Venice, and he left some cloisters (*Ut in parvis*, 10 February 1654). The orders, though they were unavoidable, present well the obstacles of the regulation, which was realized in a legal way concerning the inner life of the Church. The pruning of the overshoots finally hindered the further developments of the orders. The members of the orders, who substituted for the insufficiency of the pastoral work in many parishes, mostly became estranged from the circulation of the dioceses' life.²⁶

Innocent X had to face such a considerably greater resistance in Flanders, in the homeland of Jansenism, that in the enforcement of the *In eminenti* he had to ask the collaboration of the secular power. However, he rejected Philip IV's suggestion of deploying the force of arms, just like he felt the *placet*, which was issued in the form of a decree by the governor Archduke Leopold Wilhelm. Finally, the Holy Office's reproving resolution of 6 October 1650 proved to be enough for the withdrawal of the Flemish Jansenist prelates (Jacques Boonen, the archbishop of Malines and bishop of Gand).

The book of Antoine Arnauld about frequent communion (*De la fréquente communion*) generated greater commotion in France. The heart of the debates over the doctrine of grace located in Paris at the Sorbonne. For examining the Jansenist theses, the pope established a committee of cardinals on 12 April 1651. Among its members, there was datary Cecchini, his loyal man, and as an expert Albizzi, the *assessor* of the Holy Office. The more known experts like Maculano and Lugo, however, were not invited. As a result of the committee's work, which held a session twice a week, the bull of 9 June 1653, *Cum Occasione* was published. This strongly dogmatic treatise wanted to put a full end to the harmful influence of Jansenism within the Church and five theses of Arnauld were condemned heretical.

²⁶ PONCET, *Immacenzo X*, 331–332.

Although all the Catholic monarchs supported the pope: the French, the Spanish monarch and also Ferdinand III, the Holy Office then censured a bulk of Jansenist works with its resolution of 23 April 1654, the bull did not attain its goal, moreover, it became a source of conflicts for centuries. It is true however, in the course of the following decades – apart from the written defence of Arnauld from March 1654 – the Jansenists employed only passive resistance,²⁷ from which Rome tried to profit.

Along with the contribution of his two most immediate colleagues, Albizzi and Palavicini, Alexander VII endeavoured to eliminate the undesirable doctrines from the life of the Church with two further bulls (*Ad sanctam beati Petri Sedem*, 16 October 1656 and *Regiminis apostolici*, 15 February 1665). Yet, the second treatise expressly added oil to the flickering flames and gave rise to repeated debates over the infallibility of the pope among the followers of the thesis who increasingly moved from the Low Countries to France. The publication of the *Index* in 1664 – which collected the censured and illicit works published between 1601 and 1662 – also served the repression of the Jansenist publications and partly the Gallican.²⁸

The strict resolutions of the Chigi Pope were counterbalanced by the undiminished successes on the fields of mission organisations. As opposed to his predecessor he was inclined to reconsider the standpoints of the Jesuits in China. In his resolution of 23 March 1656 he approved certain elements of the Chinese rite, for instance the ones related to the veneration of the ancestors. Although, his regulations were announced on the assembly of the missionaries in Canton in 1668 and were confirmed by his successor, Clement IX in 1669, in point of principle he did not take a stand on the actual judgement of the Chinese rite adjusted to the local peculiarities. As a consequence, the problem reappeared a few decades later and the enculturation attempt did not become a model, but it was forbidden at the beginning of the eighteenth century.

The case of the Chinese rite also raised the question of the liturgical language. Already Paul V permitted the translation of the Holy Bible into Chinese and other Far-Eastern languages and their use during the services in his decree of 27 June 1615, *Romanae sedis antistes*. Yet, the privilege did not become practice due to the complete lack of the native clergy. Alexander VII ignored the decisions of his predecessor and he entrusted a congregation, led by Albizzi, with the re-examination of the question. Personally, he would have showed an inclination towards the concessions, though, he confirmed the decision of the committee with his *breve* of 12 January 1661. The resolution – focusing especially on the European territories – described the translation of the Bible and ritual books as undesirable, at the same time, it maintained the pope's earlier dispensation, which was to be renewed every seven years (*Super Cathedram*, 9 September 1659). Fortunately, the concession let the native clergy in China pray certain parts of the breviary in vernacular. The proportion of the locally born priests remained negligible, yet the increase of their

²⁷ PONCET, *Innocenzo X*, 332–334.

²⁸ ROSA, *Alessandro VII*, 339–340.

number was of strategic importance. All three apostolic vicars of the Far-Eastern missionary hierarchy, which was established in 1658, were of French origin.²⁹

Despite the occasional inner problems of the missionary work and the complications caused by the spreading Jansenism, the Church administration of the Chigi Pope was determined by a silent and precise bureaucracy and the same moderation characterised his two successors. In their case, the consolidation within the new trends which prevailed around 1620–1630 might be mentioned. Clement X continued the reform of the religious orders introduced by Innocent X. With his constitution of 11 April 1668, *Iniuncti*, he reorganised the *Congregazione sullo stato dei Regolari*, of which task was to observe the religious disciplines and to control the financial basis of the cloisters. Concerning the preaching and the administration of the sacraments, the relations between the regulars and the ordinaries of the dioceses were regulated by his successor with his constitution *Suprema magni patris-familias* (21 June 1670) to prevent growing local conflicts. Louis XIV's interests to deal with the question contributed to the birth of the regulation in 1669. The pope proclaimed the absoluteness of the highest Church forum in vain, the French monarch, with the support of the French parliament, rejected the employment of Clement's regulations in France.

The *Congregazione delle Indulgenze e delle Reliquie* was established by Clement IX's *In ipsius pontificatus nostri primordiis motu proprio* to revise the indulgences granted by the Apostolic See and to check the genuineness of the relics representing the object of the cult, furthermore to ensure the worthy satisfaction of the requests for relics coming from the Catholic world. The Altieri Pope also tried to prevent the abuses related to the relics by circumscribing the certifications' order of publication (*Ex commissae nobis*, 13 January 1672).³⁰ His predecessor's resolution of 17 June 1669 also aimed at the elimination of the irregularities. This treatise forbade the missionaries, or rather all clergymen living on the missionary fields, from pursuing any mercantile activities. There were concessions made only in the case of extreme peril of subsistence.³¹

The Church administration of the two Clements was not only characterised by reorganisations and prohibitions but also by exemplary conduct, in the spirit of which one should mention the beatification of Rose of Lima and Peter of Alcantara, then their and Francis Borgia, Pius V and John of the Cross's canonisations.³² The same can be told about the acts done in favour of handling the crisis caused by Jansenism. Namely, Alexander VII's bull *Regiminis apostolici* ordered the French bishops and all members of the clergy to certify the adoption of the Roman statement with their signature. Louis XIV helped to enforce the regulation, mainly in order to enlarge the unity of the French Church and by means of which to exercise power over it. As many bishops (of Alet, Pamiers, Angers and

²⁹ ROSA, *Alessandro VII*, 340–341; on the history of mission organisation in the second half of the seventeenth century: JOSEF METZLER, *Die Kongregation in der zweiten Hälfte des 17. Jahrhunderts*, Sacrae Congregationis de Propaganda Fide memoria Rerum, I 1, 244–305.

³⁰ The wider aspects of the Baroque cult of relics: GENOVEFFA PALUMBO, «L'assedio delle reliquie» *alla città di Roma. Le reliquie oltre la devozione nello sguardo dei pellegrini*, RMC 5 (1997) 377–399.

³¹ OSBAT, *Clemente IX*, 355–356; *Clemente X*, 364.

³² *Ibid.*

Beauvais) were willing to fulfil the obligation of signature only with reservations, after having carried on long negotiations and an examination of a cardinal committee, instead of excommunication, on 2 February 1669 Clement IX addressed an indulgent *breve* (*pax Clementina*) to them. His motion, however, did not yield the expected result; although it was given a tremendous reception in France, at the same time it was regarded as the sign of the Apostolic See's weakness.³³ Under all circumstances, the debates over Jansenism under Clement X did not begin again mainly due to this gesture.

In the course of the above mentioned events, Miguel Molinos, the most successful spiritual leader of Rome, started his career by enjoying the support of such clergymen and laymen as Benedetto Odescalchi and Christina, Queen of Sweden, who did not foresee how dangerous consequences their protégé's activities would have in the near future.³⁴ His earlier patron, also as a pope, proved to be quite patient with Quietism, which was linked to the Spanish priest. This mainly Italian trend was related to Jansenism to some extent, though, its followers believed in contemplation tending to asceticism and in the primacy of the prayers, in contradiction to the partaking of the sacraments and penitential practices. On the one hand, Molinos's work *Guida spirituale* published in 1675 achieved a roaring success, on the other hand, it drew the Jesuits' attention, who were the primary experts of the spiritual exercises after Saint Ignatius of Loyola. In his treatise,³⁵ Paolo Segneri thoroughly and severely criticised Molinos's doctrines. However, the positions of the Spanish priest seemed firm for a lengthy amount of time. In his book, recommended to Cardinal Secretary Alderano Cybo, Pietro Matteo Petrucci – the bishop of Iesi from 1681 – protected Molinos to such a degree that Segneri's work was soon put on the Index.

Finally, Molinos's fall came to pass quite unexpectedly for all. As a result of the denunciations of his moral behaviour, the Holy Office committed him for trial on 18 July 1685. Although, neither the pope, nor Cardinal Azzolini believed in his guilt, after having examined more than a thousand letters addressed to his disciplines, in 1687 the Inquisition declared sixty-eight of his theses heretical, which Molinos was to solemnly renounce on 3 September. Then, Innocent XI – who was reluctant up until that moment and expressed his sympathy by appointing Petrucci as cardinal in 1686 – also condemned his doctrines. The bull was published on 20 November 1687. Neither could Petrucci, the confidant of the pope, escape his fate. A committee of cardinals adjured him to ask for absolution of his erring, which he satisfied on 17 December 1687 and retired from his offices. Under Alexander VIII, he could not either lead the diocese of Iesi, his partial rehabilitation was realised in 1695.³⁶

During the evaluation of the cycle of events, which stirred up the inner life of the Roman court, the possible inexperience of the Odescalchi Pope in theology was raised,

³³ OSBAT, *Clemente IX*, 355–356; MATTEUCCI, *Il papato di fronte all'assolutismo*, 703–706 and 707–711.

³⁴ OSBAT, *Clemente X*, 364.

³⁵ *Concordia tra la fatica e la quiete nell'orazione...*, Firenze 1680.

³⁶ The monographic analysis of the subject: MASSIMO PETROCCHI, *Il quietismo italiano*, Roma 1948.

but it was also speculated that Molinos as well as Petrucci did not inform the pope about their genuine views, or the advisers of the pope, Favoriti and Casoni were not on top of things. However, in the background of the process against Quietism Albizzi and Ottoboni, namely the conservative wing, which centred round the Holy Office and was openly against the personal and curial reforms of the pope, can be suspected. Thanks to their experience gained from the Northern Italian Pelagian heretics in the middle of the century, they steadily discovered the unuttered theological obstacles of the Quietists' methods. By digging rather deep with the examination of the correspondence's material, they could present a front not only against them but indirectly against the pope, as well. It is by no surprise that around 1680, rumour often had it that the Inquisition founded a committee for controlling the religious views of Innocent XI.³⁷

Surprisingly, on the field of theology the pope did not endeavour to solve the problems radically, neither in the case of Quietism. He was said to take the cardinal appointment of Antoine Arnauld into consideration to keep the Jansenists within the community of the Church.³⁸ His most direct colleagues openly sympathized with the French and perhaps with his doctrines, as well. It was hardly accidental that Innocent XI immediately condemned sixty-five Laxist theses for the request of the University of Leuven. Outlawing the marginal trend, which professed the radical free will, also indirectly favoured the Jansenists. Namely, in contrast to Laxism that considered the obedience of the laws ommissible even in case of the smallest doubt, they stood up for the strictest interpretation of the rules in the field of moral philosophy. However, Rome never announced its standpoint related to the moral probability's doctrine represented mainly by the Jesuits, which allowed the disregard of the rules only in well-grounded cases.³⁹

The Odescalchi Pope proved more active on the field of propagation of faith than in theological questions. The regular-missionaries, who used to be subordinated only to their superiors in the order, were obliged to vow obedience also to the apostolic vicars who represented the missionary hierarchy. At first Louis XIV forbade the French missionaries this, namely it was against the Gallican liberties, however, later he agreed for them to take the oath as long as they mentioned that the act was realised by royal permission. The French were not the only to cause trouble. In Canton, the Franciscans as well as the Dominicans refused the papal regulation. The Spanish regulars regarded the oath to a French vicar expressly as betrayal. The Portuguese also shared this opinion. As a consequence, the extension of the Propaganda's jurisdiction had to be reduced. They simplified the formula of the oath, besides; they tried to create such missionary regions where the regulars were

³⁷ MENNITI IPPOLITO, *Innocenzo XI*, 385–386; GIANVITTORIO SIGNOROTTO, *Inquisitori e mistici nel Seicento italiano. Eresia di Santa Pelagia* (Annali dell'Istituto storico italo-germanico, Monografia 11), Bologna 1989, 247–278 and 305–321 (*La politica dell'inquisizione nel secolo XVII*).

³⁸ That is actually a fact that the secretary of State of the pope corresponded with the French. RENATO MORI, *Il cardinale Alderano Cibo e il suo carteggio con A. Arnauld*, SR 12 (1964) 34–50.

³⁹ Cf. latest PIETRO STELLA, *Dibattiti dottrinali e giubileo dall'antilassismo al benignismo alfonciano (1650–1825)*, RMC 5 (1997) 501–521.

from the same order. Yet, the disadvantages of the double – congregational as well as orderly – control could not be done away with, they could be only moderated.

For the sake of the development of the missionary work, beyond structural reforms, the pope endeavoured to cultivate good relations with the monarchs of Congo and Persia, furthermore with the leadership of Tonkin and Siam. From the latter country, an official delegation visited the Eternal City in 1688, where they were welcomed solemnly. In addition, the pope took measures to the advancement of the orthodox union, to the elimination of the Angolan slave-trade and the initiation of the mission among the Egyptian Copts. The establishment of the Manilan and Guatemalan Dominican universities became the most lasting and the foundation of the new Brazilian dioceses.

The basis of the enormous expansion of the papal mission organisation under Innocent XI was the grandiose report made by the secretary of the Propaganda, Urbano Cerri in 1678, which depicted the religious situation of certain regions in detail.⁴⁰ During the global extension of the propagation of the faith, naturally, also the European territories attracted attention. According to the statistics of Cerri, out of 128 million inhabitants there were 74.7 million Catholic, 27 million Schismatics and 23 million were Protestant. For the reduction of the latter group's number, the pope saw a chance especially in Germany; though, in order to attain this goal he was loath to make any concessions, neither dogmatic nor moral.⁴¹

Innocent XI demonstrated sternness, which could be compared with his genuine political statements, only in the deepening of the clergy's inner discipline. He bestowed time and energy on the selection of the Italian bishop nominees, furthermore, on the determination of the consecration's criteria as a priest and on the control of their observance. He also proved to be adamant towards the regulars. He had Cardinal Barbarigo visit the convent of the Franciscans, which was located on the Roman Aracoeli and served as the field for various abuses and misbehaviour, besides, he paid special attention to the Lombard and Tuscan Dominicans and to the Polish Cistercians.⁴² He laid emphasis also on the stopping of the pension's renewing spreading, on the reinterpretation of the bishops' function, on its strengthening, which temporarily became weaker as a result of the more and more severe conflicts with the local secular powers. The limitation of the pensions' practice had already launched under Alexander VII, under Clement IX a part-congregation examined the possibility of the bull *In Coena Domini's* restriction, which provided the basis of the conflicts around the Church immunities and privileges. Formally, the content of the bull was never accepted by the secular powers. In the second half of the seventeenth century, there existed the danger that it would be completely abolished, especially in the territories of Naples and Milan. This problem concerned the role of the bishops as well

⁴⁰ *Relazione dello stato della Congregazione, e Missioni di Propaganda Fide, fatta alla San. Mem. di PP. Innocenzo XI...*

⁴¹ MENNITI IPPOLITO, *Innocenzo XI*, 386–387; cf. more METZLER, *Die Kongregation in der zweiten Hälfte des 17. Jahrhunderts*, 244–305.

⁴² MENNITI IPPOLITO, *Innocenzo XI*, 384.

as the nuncios' interests, especially their role in protecting the Church-estate.⁴³ The part-congregation, however, did not make decisions on the merits which led to the further deepening of the crisis by the 1670s, partly as a result of the French regale-extension's enforcement and partly of the publications criticising Rome. The Curia was accused of not aiding the prelates in the fulfilment of the extreme expectations. (In this topic, Antonio Gaeta wrote his *Discorso* which was published in Milan in 1671.⁴⁴)

These problems, along with the dysfunctional elements within the Curia, were straining to be solved by the reformer *zelanti*, the well-known G. B. De Luca, who was regarded as the inspirer and later leader of the cardinals. After having analysed and methodised the existing situation in various works, the outstanding canon lawyer, with great determination embarked on the efficient reformation of the Curia's inner structure by adjusting to the altered circumstances of the previous century.⁴⁵ The Holy Office and the former *squadrons*, who were called the "Cardinals of the Curia" (*cardinali di Curia*)⁴⁶ at that time, rigidly opposed his *In Coena Domini*'s reform, moreover they tried to repel the attack against the so-called *patentati* in 1680. They were those laymen, who enjoyed such privileges from the Inquisition as the carrying of arms. De Luca's work about these men highlighted the unavoidable cutting of the Inquisition's influence and tribunal authority in the territory of the Papal State.⁴⁷

The work of the pope's confidant in the *Congregazione particolare della regalia* was explicitly branded as pro-Gallican by the Ottobonis, since it had leanings towards the division of the secular and spiritual jurisdiction, which had been inconceivable in Rome a couple of decades earlier.⁴⁸ However, these attacks did not dampen De Luca's spirits. His reform activities covered the dissolution of the unnecessary bodies⁴⁹ and the reform of justice⁵⁰, apart from the question of the diplomatic immunity, the fiscal duties and abuses, such as being in default on the allocations for repairing the roads.⁵¹ (We have already met many of these elements.) Some of the reforms achieved immediate success, such as the dissolution of

⁴³ On the Church reforms: SIGNOROTTO, *The Squadrone Volante*, 206–207; CLAUDIO DONATI, *Roma pontificia ed episcopati d'Italia nella seconda metà del XVII. secolo: aspetti e problemi*, Gregorio Barbarigo patrizio veneto vescovo e cardinale nella tarda controriforma, 107–127.

⁴⁴ SIGNOROTTO, *The Squadrone Volante*, 207–208.

⁴⁵ See the content of Chapter V.

⁴⁶ By the 1670s only Azzolini, Ottoboni, Imperiali, Borromeo, Omodei and Gualteri were alive of them, Albizzi temporarily withdrew. The two leaders were still Azzolini and Ottoboni, they had powerful influence and routine, their activities were characterised by political independence again. By the pontificate of Innocent XI, there remained only three of them; they also had determining positions, though with striking anti-reformism. SIGNOROTTO, *The Squadrone Volante*, 201–203 and 204–206.

⁴⁷ The title of his writing: *Sopra l'uso de' Patentati e Ministri del S. Offizio nello Stato Ecclesiastico...* On his work *Congregazione particolare per la riforma dei patentati*: LAURO, *Il cardinale Giovanni Battista de Luca*, 523–712.

⁴⁸ SIGNOROTTO, *The Squadrone Volante*, 209–210.

⁴⁹ LAURO, *Il cardinale Giovanni Battista de Luca*, 411–453.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 265–345; and in conclusion, with the comprehensive description of De Luca's activities: ALDO MAZZACANE, *Giambattista de Luca e la «compagnia d'uffizio»*, Fisco, religione, Stato nell'età confessionale, 505–530.

⁵¹ LAURO, *Il cardinale Giovanni Battista de Luca*, 349–408.

the *segretari aposolici*, while others succeeded only after a long decade, like the question of nepotism, which could be looked upon as the veterinary horse of the Innocentian reforms.

Not only did Innocent XI and De Luca strive to obtain the Church's spiritual restoration but they also tried to transform the State itself. Beyond the institutional reforms, they wanted to replace the virtues of the Humanist "good governor" with the autocracy of the *iustitia*, which did not tolerate any abuses, any unwarranted privileges. The clash between the reformers' "virtues" and the *establishment's* "corruption" was not individual at all, namely it caused vehement political conflicts in numerous European capitals at the end of the seventeenth century. In the Roman court, the sacred character of the power gave a unique accent to this feud.⁵²

Naturally, the circumstances were not so simple, since the guiding principle of the Conservatives was none other than the complete intransigence in the protection of the Church's teachings and discipline. The attitude of Alexander VII was not of a moralist, nor of a doctrinaire, but of a jurist, who intended to fully preserve the ancient, precious heritage. Under these circumstances, his utterance – which remained in the interpretation of the French delegate, the Duke of Chaulnes: "he disapproves everything that happened under Innocent XI and he would reprove them" –⁵³ became totally understandable, like the significant increase of the Inquisition's influence under the flying two years of the Ottoboni Pope. Apart from the total neglect of Petrucci, not only a lot of newer Laxist teachings were put on the Index on 24 August 1690, but the teachings of the theologians at the University of Leuven, which were in the context of penance, justification, baptism, the Church authority and the cult of the Virgin Mary, were destined for the same lot on 7 December.⁵⁴

In contrast to this, Innocent XII continued where his second predecessor had to stop, for instance in the work of the clerical and religious life's regulation. In the course of the process, led by many dicasteries (*Congregazione della Disciplina Regolare, del Concilio, sulla Disciplina Ecclesiastica, dei Vescovi e Regolari*), besides the refinement of the liturgical rules, the smallest details of the way of life, public behaviour and appearance were circumscribed; compulsory and regular spiritual exercises were ordained for the clergy of Rome, then the whole of Italy. The special attention was demanded by the considerable increase of the priests in the second half of the seventeenth century, yet, as a result of the regulations the *numerus clausus*, which was initiated by Innocent X for the regulars, could be rescinded.⁵⁵

⁵² AGO, *Hegemony over the Social Scene*, 242–246.

⁵³ SIGNOROTTO, *The Squadrone Volante*, 210–211.

⁵⁴ PETRUCCI, *Alessandro VIII*, 392.

⁵⁵ GISONDI, *Innocenzo XII*, 103–110; AGO, *Innocenzo XII*, 399–402. – Certain works attribute the increase of the clergy – of which data were already seen – to the intensified demand of the lower circle of the society for local prestige. As a consequence, the turn of the course from the late eighteenth century to the early nineteenth century is explained not only by the dechristianisation or by the changed standard of living after the Industrial Revolution, but also by the change of the ecclesiastical prestige's social sympathy. STELLA, *Strategie familiari e celibato sacro*, op. cit.

The completion of the clergy's – and the nepotistic Curia – reform and the dissolution of the unnecessary tribunals made the pope's gently pragmatic but deeply penetrating reorganisations widely trustworthy in the Roman society. Besides its obvious advantages, the significance of the social institutions' development can be found here, as well. The extension and modernisation of the hospital system, directed by the Oratorian Francesco Marchesi and the Jesuit Baldigiani – whose most noteworthy venture was the construction of the apostolic hospital next to the Lateran – were also preceded by a serious theoretical establishment, of which results were published in 1693.⁵⁶

Similarly to his predecessors, Innocent XII also had to face the problems of the mission organisation and Jansenism. His attitude was determined by the manner of shunning the conflicts. When the apostolic vicar of Fukien, Charles Maigrot upset the question of the Jesuits' "Chinese rite" with his report, the pope was satisfied only with issuing an elevated answer *breve*, which encouraged the maintenance of mutual understanding. Yet, he did not support Malines's anti-Jansenist archbishop's effort, either, who wanted to increase the severity of the vow's text that was imposed by Alexander VII on the French and Dutch clergy. As far as the Roman Inquisition was concerned, Cardinal Girolamo Casanate – who was famous for his library – dealt with this question in 1694. Similarly to the debate over grace in the previous century, he thought it more prudent to command silence in this matter.

The Jansenist debate moved also within the walls of the Apostolic Palace to a certain extent. Tyrso Gonzalez Jesuit general – who expressed his strict moralist opinion in his treatise *Fundamentum theologiae moralis* – was attacked by who else, but by Paolo Segneri, as the court preacher of the pope. The debate evolved into a discord within the order, namely despite their general, the majority of the Jesuits opposed all such utterance that could be related to Jansenism. In 1694, the committee of five cardinals, which was to examine the question, finally took Gonzalez's side, who by the way, enjoyed the support of Vienna and Madrid, as well.⁵⁷ The temporary dissension of the Society of Jesus was hardly the last act of the spiritual tempest generated by the bishop of Ypres for fifty-four years. The foreseeable future brought about the most implacable papal refusal ever.

The Relations with the National Churches, States

Crown-cardinals and the "Royal Patronage and Supremacy"

Beyond all questions, throughout the seventeenth century concerning the issue of Jansenism and the more successful mission organisation, owing to its more adaptable statements the Papacy had freer scope to meet the various challenges, than in the next decades. However, the restructuring of the relations with the States and national Churches

⁵⁶ *Istruzioni e regole degli ospizi generali; La mendicizia provveduta coll'ospizio pubblico...* GISONDI, *Innocenzo XII*, 95–102. 131–140. 179–199; AGO, *Innocenzo XII*, 397–399.

⁵⁷ AGO, *Innocenzo XII*, 402; GISONDI, *Innocenzo XII*, 103–110.

meant an unsolvable problem not only due to the new trends indicated by “reason” and secularisation, marginalisation of power but to the deeper historical roots of the connections. The majority of the cases in Rome’s contact to the local Churches involved political dimensions: the appointment of the national cardinals and the bishops, the granting of benefices and pensions, the Church taxes paid to the Holy See, furthermore the bestowal of dispensations and spiritual empowering, the reform of the regulars and priests and the maintenance of the local liturgical characteristics can be listed here. The most acute problem was obviously the appointment of the national cardinals⁵⁸ and the filling of the episcopal sees.

Just like every important question, the method of the non-curial cardinals’ appointment – being still valid in the early modern period – was rooted in the late medieval Conciliarism. On the so-called reform councils, Konstanz, Basel-Ferrara-Florence (1431–1449), there were strong efforts to have the College of Cardinals institutionally control the papal authority.⁵⁹ The body was coveted to be divided into a minor permanent council, which would have represented all the particular Churches according to their members. At the Council of Constance the concordats, reached with the important States (Spanish, French, German), said that the number of the cardinals could cross the limit of twenty-four, only if the new cardinal was from such country that did not yet have a representative in the papal conclave. The Council of Basel declared the internationalism of the College of Cardinals in a separate resolution (*sess. XXIII*). To increase the efficiency of the Church administration, it stated that every State should be represented in it and the number of the cardinals having the same nationality could not surpass the one third of the college’s number.⁶⁰

In practice, these regulations did not restrain the popes from creating the cardinals, though; Eugene IV acknowledged and broadened the licences of the body in his bull (*Non mediocri*). Moreover, they strengthened the influence of certain countries (and not the local Churches) over the selection of the College of Cardinals. There are data already from the thirteenth century about what role certain significant Christian countries played in the appointment of new cardinals. In 1294 Celestine V (1294) might have been the first to create two cardinals upon Charles II of Naples’s (1285–1309) recommendation. In the fourteenth century, this habit was gradually spreading, in direct ratio with the withdrawal of the medieval papal universalism and certain States’ strengthening. The struggle between Boniface VIII and France, chiefly the latter’s victory, meant the actual turning point. At first, France had the most determining influence over the selection of the College of Cardinals, as well as over the Papacy itself. In addition, in the fourteenth century, other monarchs’ roles can be revealed, such as the emperor’s, the Ara-

⁵⁸ About the lacks of the international research in this field: WEBER, *Senatus Divinus*, 12–13.

⁵⁹ On the Conciliarism recently: ALDO LANDI, *Concilio e papato nel rinascimento (1449–1516)*. *Un problema irrisolto*, Torino 1997.

⁶⁰ In more detail with further literature: TUSOR, *A magyar koronabíborosi és bíboros protektori „intézmény”* [The “Institution” of the Hungarian Crown-cardinal and Cardinal Protector], *op. cit.*; [IDEM], *Purpura Pannonica*, *op. cit.*

gon, English and Hungarian monarchs', furthermore the Dukes of Mantua and Bavaria. At that time, however, the popes of stronger character, like Urban V (1362–1370), could completely emancipate themselves from the secular pressure. The influence over the cardinals' appointments of the States, or with contemporary terminology, the "crowns" widened by the fifteenth-century, especially from its second half. From this time onwards, besides the above mentioned States, the Crown of Portugal, Aragon, Castile (later Spain) and Poland, and the Dukes of Burgundy and Milan, moreover a republic, Venice's constant efforts could be detected. What is more, from the turn of the fifteenth and sixteenth century on, apart from the great powers there were newer ones, especially Italian duchies, who claimed the nomination of cardinals, like Tuscany, Urbino, Savoy, Ferrara, moreover Scotland, furthermore in the sixteenth century certain non-ruling dukes (Doria, Guise, Bourbon) and the Swiss cantons also appeared. Naturally, the selection of the unfittest's danger was coded in the institution of the "crown-cardinals".⁶¹ The pope could exclusively choose from the national nominees, if he had choice at all, in particular, the Church and secular interests rarely met.

The parallel between the spread of this practice – which became general from the 1400s – and the development of the "Royal Patronage and Supremacy" (*ius supremi patronatus*) over certain dioceses is striking. (After the occasional attempts to control the papal granting, the capitular elections became general from the Gregorian times and based on the papal reservations.⁶²) Its establishment was also partly due to the Conciliarism. The right of patronage – this became the *terminus technicus* of the secular law – practiced in the filling of the bishoprics enabled the States to control certain dioceses' heads (and incomes).⁶³ Yet, the creation of the papal conclave's selection directly enabled the influence over the central Church administration and the formation of the Holy See's

⁶¹ *Ibid.*

⁶² Their development is discussed by: KLAUS GANZER, *Papsttum und Bistumsbesetzungen in der Zeit von Gregor IX bis Bonifaz VIII. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der päpstliche Reservationen* (Forschungen zur Kirchlichen Rechtsgeschichte und zum Kirchenrecht 9), Köln–Graz 1968.

⁶³ On the historical periods of the filling of the bishoprics: RICHARD POTZ, *Bischofsernennungen. Stationen, die zum heutigen Zustand geführt haben*, Zur Frage der Bischofsernennungen in der römisch-katholischen Kirche (hrsg. v. Gisbert Greshake), München–Zürich n.d., 17–35; GERHARD HARTMANN, *Der Bischof: seine Wahl und Ernennung. Geschichte und Aktualität* (Grazer Beiträge zur Theologiegeschichte und Kirchlichen Zeitgeschichte 5), Graz–Köln–Wien 1990, 13–25; HANS JÜRGEN BRANDT, *Zwischen Wahl und Ernennung. Zu Theorie und Praxis der mittelalterlichen Bischofsbestellungen im Spannungsfeld von regnum und sacerdotium*, Papsttum und Kirchenreform. Historische Beiträge. Festschrift für Georg Schwaiger zum 65. Geburtstag (hrsg. v. Manfred Weitlauf – Karl Hausberger), Erzabtei St. Ottilien 1990, 225–233 (further analysing literature in these summaries); and ADOLF KINDERMANN, *Das landesfürstliche Ernennungsrecht*, Leitmeritz 1933, 85–91; and PÉTER ERDŐ, *Egyházjog a középkori Magyarországon [Canon Law in Medieval Hungary]*, Budapest 2001, 200–213 (The relations of Hungary and the Apostolic See under Sigismund); [IDEM], *Allam és egyház jogi kapcsolata a Mohács előtti Magyarországon [The Legal Relations Between State and Church in Hungary Before the Mohács Disaster]*, Útjaidon. Ünnepi kötet Jelenits István 70. születésnapjára (ed. by Sándor Bazsányi–Ferenc Horkay Hörcher–Endre Tózsér *et al.*), Budapest 2002, 569–578. Cf. the regulations (sess. XII; sess. XXIII) of the Council of Basel about the elections of the chapters and the papal reservation, *Conciliorum Oecumenicorum Decreta*, 504–505.

policy. From another perspective: from the fifteenth century, the secular powers did not only enforce their authority to make the suitable (for them) persons prelates, but they could hinder the pope to favour their subjects with the highest dignities as well as to influence the inner power relations. Moreover, the monarchs themselves tried to strengthen their confidants' national and international positions by obtaining the cardinal appointments.⁶⁴ This dual – inner and foreign political – attempt of the secular powers occurs in the selection of their nominees. Among the crown-cardinals there were some who lived in Rome as well as in the given country, who travelled to the Eternal City only in case of important events, like conclaves.

The Holy See could not help agreeing to the secular filling of the Church benefices in written agreements. It assigned the right of the bishoprics' filling to certain monarchs in concordats⁶⁵ negotiated and concluded at reform councils, then in the fifteenth-sixteenth century. Already in the fifteenth century, apart from obtaining the control of these Church benefices, these monarchs could increase their authority in more fields, for instance in the State permission over the announcement of the papal regulations (*placetum regium*), and concerning the restriction of the appeals sent to Rome, of the *annates* and other Church fees. At the end of the fourteenth century, England and in the 1400s Sicily, France, Castile, Naples and Hungary introduced the *placetum regium*. Already in the fourteenth century, there were English parliamentary resolutions that set limits on the Roman appeals, the payments, the papal granting of the English benefices and the activities of the papal tithe collectors were restricted by other acts.⁶⁶ Above all, there were many monarchs who acted as main initiators and main forces of the Church life and the religious orders' long reformation at the end of the Middle Ages.⁶⁷

However, the Papacy, more or less, consistently enforced the gradually forming statement of the canon law that the royal establishment and providence – especially in the case of the dioceses, let alone the smaller benefices – could not go with the right of patronage, since the bishoprics could not have an advowee. According to the canon law, the secular factor could play a part only in the first out of the three stages of the benefices' filling – designation of the person, the concession and the installation into the benefice (*designatio personae, concessio tituli, introductio in possessionem*). The others are part of the *institutio canonica*, the ecclesiastical filling of the given benefice. In case of advowson, the patron has absolute competence in designating the person and only has to present

⁶⁴ For example, the cardinalate of George d'Amboise, Thomas Wolsey, Melchior Klesl, Armand-Jean de Richelieu, Giulio Mazarino, Giulio Alberoni, André de Fleury and other "chief ministers" had two advantages in the political point of view: their title placed them behind the monarch, therefore they got rid of the everyday problems of the usual rival of the aristocracy; *in persona* only the pope administered justice over them, which served as a certain safety in case of their fall. REINHARD, *Le carriere papali e cardinalizie*, 271–272.

⁶⁵ See the content and literature of the *Introduction*.

⁶⁶ BIRELEY, *The Refashioning of Catholicism*, 73.

⁶⁷ The most recent on this by MANFRED SCHULZE, *Fürsten und Reformation. Geistliche Reformpolitik weltlicher Fürsten vor der Reformation* (Spätmittelalter und Reformation [n.R.] 2), Tübingen 1991. While Rome only resigned to it, the Protestant solution expressly sanctified the State influence.

(*praesentatio*) the nominee to the higher ecclesiastical authority. Besides all these, apart from the maintenance commitments, he has other rights, such as the utilization of the vacant benefice's incomes.

In case of a bishopric, or a consistorial benefice, the pope has the sole privilege; by a concordat, or by *indultum*, the secular factor could only gain the privilege of nomination (*nominatio*). Yet, obviously, not everybody had it, only the sovereign monarchs could possess this right and only over their territory. In justified cases, the nominee could be rejected by the pope. The *nominatio regia* is a personal privilege, which is not the due of the State but the prevailing monarch. From the ecclesiastical point of view, not only does the successor of Saint Peter give a confirmation to the royal appointment, but, like in the case of the *libera collatio*, he is responsible for the filling of the bishopric (*provisio*) and allows the secular authority's assistance only at the designation. Only in case of capitular election (*electio*) with certain canonical validity could one talk about the papal confirmation in case of consistorial benefice.⁶⁸

The canonical position became definite by the end of the sixteenth and the beginning of the seventeenth century. Prior to that, Julius II and Clement VII acknowledged the presentational rights of Charles V (1516–1556) over the Spanish bishoprics, yet the pope refused it from Henry VIII (1509–1547).⁶⁹ The still existing uncertainty, concerning the canon law offered a large scope for the strengthening of the secular opinion, based on the philosophy of the patronage. There were supporters of this idea already in the Council of Trent, however, they defined their position against those prelates, who regarded the royal assistance explicitly as an abuse (*abusus*) despite the papal privileges. The disadvantageous consequence of the two counter-legal opinions was that not only did the opposing parties encumber the filling of the already existing bishoprics, but they also threw obstacles in the establishment of new bishoprics' way, as it is proved by the example of the re-catholicized Bohemia (besides the already mentioned Leitmeritz (Litoměřice), also Königgrätz (Hradec Králové) and Graz.⁷⁰ Here, after the long lasting negotiations, a *modus vivendi* came into existence, which stated that the right to appoint the new bishops was in the hand of the emperor, though he could practice this by the grace of the Apostolic See and not by his own right.⁷¹

⁶⁸ KINDERMANN, *Das landesfürstliche Ernennungsrecht*, 27–40. 87–94; POTZ, *Bischofsernennungen*, 34–35; HARTMANN, *Der Bischof: seine Wahl, und Ernennung*, 28–30. The analysis of the ecclesiastical and secular legal development in connection with the advowson in the early modern period: JÖRN SIEGLERSCHMIDT, *Territorialstadt und Kirchenregiment. Studien zur Rechtsdogmatik des Kirchenpatronatsrechtes im 15. und 16. Jahrhundert* (Forschungen zur Kirchlichen Rechtsgeschichte und zum Kirchenrecht 15), Köln 1987, 53–126 and 127–222. In case of smaller benefices – where the sovereign existence was not questioned by the Church –, the discussion was mainly about the degree of the *circa spiritualia* certificates of the advowee.

⁶⁹ The popes' inconsistency – determined by political powers – with its negative effects are reminded by BRANDT, *Zwischen Wahl und Ernennung*, 233.

⁷⁰ Cf. JOHANN RAINER, *Projekte zur Errichtung eines Bistum Graz*, RHM 6–7 (1962–1964), 113–136; DENZLER, *Die Propagandakongregation in Rom*, 122–152.

⁷¹ KINDERMANN, *Das landesfürstliche Ernennungsrecht*, 104–133; TRISCO, *Debate on the Election of Bishops*, 270–275; and in the former noted places. Between 1592–1667, there were only twenty-three establishments

In the case of cardinal promotions, similarly concrete concession cannot be found for long. There were only a couple of instances in the eighteenth century, when the right of recommending a cardinal was put on record by the Apostolic See's acknowledgement. This happened in accordance with the modern absolutism's extension, which, by this time, had succeeded in employing its own view in relation to the bishoprics and expressed its statement the most extremely ever.

Although, soon after Konstanz King Sigismund of Luxembourg (1387–1437) endeavoured to fill the related passages of the concordats – which spoke in general terms and were created on the Council – with real content, yet despite the plans of the reform councils of the fifteenth century and their resolutions, formally and *de iure* there was nothing to control the papal competence in creating cardinals. The utterance of the demand for the College of Cardinals' internationalism – within the frame of the legal practice's development that was implicitly noticed and *de facto* acknowledged by Rome (despite its occasional prohibitions and protests), furthermore gradually prevailing at latest from the pontificate of Pius IV – led to the crystallization of the secular powers' influence. The sporadic effectiveness of the legal practice, namely whether the pope satisfied a royal recommendation for the appointment of a cardinal (*commendatio*, which is called *nominatio* in the seventeenth century, similarly to the appointments of the bishops), or not, depended especially on the Italian and European political relations. This contingency became the source of the marked conflicts and the more lasting problems than the debates around the right of patronage.

The related paltry literature uses the term of law accepted from the fifteenth century in the case of the emperor, France, Spain, Portugal and Venice, though, the expression of “consolidating legal practice” better suits the reality. Note that, as opposed to the right of patronage, the popes were “in possession” at the appointment of cardinals. Although, in practice, they did have to yield to the more and more firming formal framework that was not yet compulsory for them, until the eighteenth century, they succeeded in declining the – occasional – canonical reception of the legal custom that were to be codified and interpreted as common law. Also in this case, they acknowledged it only as a “new” privilege.

However, it should be emphasised that the Holy See, concerning the filling of the Church benefices, legally accepted the *nominatio* in the form of *supplicatio-commendatio-postulatio* and in the form of appeal (*ad instantiam*). In compliance with the secular legal attitude, this *nominatio* was practiced more and more as *praesentatio*, the presentation of the patron. Henceforth, Rome rarely denied the *institutio canonica*. On the other hand, within the framework of the *commendatio-supplicatio-postulatio* and practiced as *ad instantiam*, the (until the age of absolutism) non-accepted “right” of appointing a cardinal

taking place, mainly in Italy. HC IV, 389. Another case study on the process and obstacles of the dioceses' foundation: MATTEO SANFILIPPO, *Tra curia di Roma e corte di Francia: la fondazione della diocesi di Québec (1631–1674)*, La corte di Roma tra Cinque e Seicento, 481–507.

always prevailed as *nominatio*. Namely, in the field of the appointment of cardinals, the popes' free right of deliberation remained, yet, as a matter of fact, it was more than the fulfilment of an appeal. It is clearly proved by the Habsburgs' practice of appointing a cardinal; by surpassing the earlier practices, from the middle of the seventeenth century, they differentiated between the "official" *nominatio* and the "extraordinary" (*extra ordinem*) *commendatio*, which was handled parallel in favour of another person or persons, though it could not express prejudice against the primary nominee.⁷²

As a consequence, the secular powers could not achieve the positive law for long. However, they could force on of their wills: Rome was not able to create their subject a cardinal without their contribution. The development and nature of the crown-cardinals' appointment's legal practice show a rather close connection with the so-called right of exclusion (*ius exclusivae*). That is to say, although, the European States, more precisely the great powers could not succeed in making their nominees popes on the conclaves, they could effectively bar the undesired person from being elected from the seventeenth century up to 1903.⁷³

Naturally, the constitution of the cardinal factions at the conclaves was greatly determined by the political background of the cardinals, namely to which monarch they owed their *galerus*. Moreover, the secular influence over the central Church administration within the scope of the crown-cardinals' legal practice obviously culminated on the conclaves. After all, the organization of the cardinals' factions was a remarkably complex process, motivated by certain interests.⁷⁴

The development of the well-known *in petto* appointments, which were practiced several times in the discussed period, is also closely related to the crown-cardinals' legal practice.⁷⁵ Certain States, notably, constantly pestered the popes with their nominees. Their boundless demands, though, had to be limited; every party (including also the curial apparatus) was to be regarded. In many cases, this was, naturally, impossible therefore occasionally the popes had to appoint the cardinals in secret – to avoid diplomatic complications.

The fact that the secular monarchs could totally control the Church career of their subjects led to a unique consequence. Politically absolutely independently, the popes could appoint cardinals only from their own subjects. This circumstance fully contributed to the Sacred College's Italianisation of the early modern period.⁷⁶

⁷² TUSOR, *A magyar koronabíborosi és bíboros protektori „intézmény”* [The "Institution" of the Hungarian Crown-cardinal and Cardinal Protector], *op. cit.*; TUSOR, *Purpura Pannonica*, *op. cit.*

⁷³ On the development and use of the *ius exclusivae*, which was never accepted by the canon law: LUDWIG WAHRMUND, *Das Ausschließungsrecht der katholischen Staaten Österreich, Frankreich und Spanien bei den Papstwahlen*, Wien 1888, certain cases' outline until the end of the seventeenth century: 50–167, on the development of law: 190–217.

⁷⁴ VISCEGLIA, *Fazioni e lotta politica*, 37–91.

⁷⁵ Cf. P.A. KIRSCH, *Die reservatio in petto bei der Cardinalscreation*, AKK 81 (1901) 421–432.

⁷⁶ TUSOR, *A magyar koronabíborosi és bíboros protektori „intézmény”* [The "Institution" of the Hungarian Crown-cardinal and Cardinal Protector], *op. cit.*; TUSOR, *Purpura Pannonica*, *op. cit.*

While the crown cardinals' legal practice became general through centuries in the midst of permanent political-legal disputes, the legal and consolidated form of the national interests' representation – as a *modus vivendi* – was realised by the so-called cardinal protectors. The institution of the protectorate, which spread after some preliminaries in the fifteenth century, afforded the possibility for certain States to officially entrust an already existing member of the College of Cardinals with espousing their Church (and often political) affairs within the Curia. The person of the cardinal protector was not necessarily equal to the ones who, besides often being away from Rome, were appointed at the monarchs' desire, however, the secular powers wanted to achieve this goal and sometimes they could. After the initial prohibition, their State commission was officially acknowledged by the Holy See in the second half of the fifteenth century. In contrast to the crown-cardinals, the cardinal protectors – who meant to obtain this position to increase their influence in the Curia – owed less loyalty towards their secular employer. Their activity became an organic part of the curial process, for instance in the obtainment of the papal confirmation of the appointed bishops (more precisely their provision) and in conducting the canonical investigations of late Middle Ages.⁷⁷

The possibility of recommending a cardinal concerned the person of the monarch and not his country or countries. (Plainly speaking, one monarch always had only one “credit to appoint” – even if he recommended more persons – apart from the fact that he ruled two, three, etc. such States that separately had been able to take the opportunity of this legal practice.) This was the sole reason that the Hungarian monarchs' “right” of cardinal nomination – which was even claimed by Ferdinand I (1526–1564) vanished after the personal union of the imperial and the Hungarian crown in 1556. After long debates, the restoration of this question was managed under Maria Theresa (1740–1780), who being a woman, could not become an emperor.

There was another practice that almost became as fixed as the previous; at first the new pope managed the appointments according to his interests, and then the second occasion was the “crowns”, when the political balance was taken notice. Afterwards, the creations happened in a mixed way, depending on the actual power relations: an obvious curial promotion was usually followed by a process where the State nominees were also taken into consideration. The foreign political orientation of certain popes could result in the complete upset of the proportions. The occasional negligence, especially if it was coupled with the one-sided support of other States, caused the

⁷⁷ The monographic analysis of the protectorate's institution with the archontology of the cardinal protectors: JOSEPH WODKA, *Zur Geschichte der nationalen Protektorate der Kardinäle an der römischen Kurie* (Publikationen des ehemaligen Österreichischen Historischen Instituts in Rom 4 I), Innsbruck–Leipzig 1938; on the question recently: MARTIN FABER, *Frühneuzeitliche Kardinalprotektorate. Ein Projekt*, RQ 94 (1999) 267–274; OLIVIER PONCET, *The Cardinal-Protectors of the Crowns in the Roman Curia during the First Half of the Seventeenth Century: the Case of France*, Court and Politics in Papal Rome, 158–176; PLATANIA, *La Polonia nelle carte del cardinale Carlo Barberini Protettore*, 38–60. – The protectors' right of conducting a process remained also in the discussed period, though its measure decreased.

gravest diplomatic conflicts in the second half of the seventeenth century, under the pontificate of Clement X, Innocent XI and their two successors. At present time, it is unbelievable how the baroque monarchs handled the given appointments beyond their interests, they treated these cases as personal matters of prestige and as the measure of their international representation. After having won the assistance of their monarch, certain nominees had had to wait and have their nomination renewed for decades long, by the time the popes – as opposed to other nominees of the same nationality – decided on them. However, there are many examples for such instances when the ambitions were not accomplished.

This was caused by the fact that certain countries frequently nominated Italians to strengthen the curial representation of their interests. They were often inclined to fight a long struggle of prestige for the promotion of the nuncios, staying in their country. In significant nunciatures – like Vienna, Madrid and Paris – this became regular from the middle of the seventeenth century. Yet, among the cardinals, who became appointed by the force of the State, one can find many papal descendants, curial officials. If the given effort appealed to Rome, it gave free way surprisingly fast, though, if not, Rome gave the stiffest and steadiest answer of denial and paradoxically national nominees were required to be put up from the Curia. Until the pontificate of Urban VIII, this was often published in the form of a *breve*; or they wrapped themselves up in deep silence. In the case of the nuncios, such persons were entrusted with the mission, who had already been chosen for promotion, and in this way, the monarchs' "limits" were filled with papal nominees, true, some rapport with the recommending State evolved also in this way.

This also shows that the College of Cardinal's nationality ratio of five to one for the Italians in the early modern period does not coincide with the crown-cardinals'. Here the rate was more considerable; it might have been 5:2 or even more, especially if one considers that more Italian States played a role in this field.

Finally, another unique paradox is notable. The increase of the crown-cardinals' rate under certain pontificate did not necessarily mean the weakness of the given pope. On the contrary, it proved the stability of the pontificate, its wide European horizon and the firmness of the Papal State's international position; namely it could present such numerous gestures to certain secular monarchs as Gregory XV and Innocent XI. In the seventeenth century, the least crown-cardinals were appointed around the Peace of Westphalia, when Rome lost its influence over the European politics. However, the former statement is not valid for the eighteenth century at all. After the War of the Spanish Succession, the Holy See had hardly any scope of action among the European powers, which interpreted their influence over the selection of the College of Cardinals distinctly as a privilege (*praerogativa*).⁷⁸

⁷⁸ TUSOR, *A magyar koronabíborosi és bíboros protektori „intézmény”* [The “Institution” of the Hungarian Crown-cardinal and Cardinal Protector], *op. cit.*; TUSOR, *Purpura Pannonica*, *op. cit.*

The Threads of Connections

In the chapter dealing with the nunciatures, we could already observe that the legates, which had a role of crucial importance in the relations between the Holy See and certain States in the early modern period, did not only administer Rome's representation in the diplomatic field, but they also got involved in the organisation of the particular Churches with their Church administrative licences. As we are seeing some concrete examples, the smooth collaboration was greatly hindered by the fight of competence between the local hierarchies and the nuncios. Further tensions were generated by the fact that the papal legates also often took a hand in the management of the local clergy's troublesome Roman businesses. Moreover, they wanted to more and more control the connection between the national Churches – like the German, French and Spanish – and the central Church administration. However, in those cases which required petty or more complicated official work and did not reach the higher level of decision making the nuncios also themselves avoided the official way, since they employed their own Roman clientele, the services of their private agents.⁷⁹ As a result, the establishment of an individual, direct curial representation – which played as important a role in the relations with the Holy See as the nunciatures – was not only the national States' but the particular Churches' rudimentary interests.

This purpose was already served by the institution of the cardinal protectorate; then in parallel to the nunciatures, certain States' diplomatic missions at the Holy See gradually developed. Their scope of duties was mainly of Church policy character. The concrete administration: the delivery of their letters and appeals, the obtainment of permissions, absolutions, privileges – in the form of bulls, *breves* and congregational resolutions –, the necessary money transfers, etc. had to be solved by the local hierarchies. The form of these was various. Similarly to the medieval times, occasional legates or temporarily or permanently employed Italian or home agents – sent to Rome – were engaged. Only in case of necessity, the professional solicitors of the Dataria or the Chancery were occasionally employed. The positions of the college of hundred administrators, the so-called *gianizzari*, belonged to the venal offices, out of which twenty-five were sold by the vicar of Rome.⁸⁰

The most developed variant was naturally the permanent agent. In return for salary, not only did he accomplish the administration work of one or more bishops, but he almost constantly reported on the important curial, Roman and Italian events, as well. His role, curial integration and his circle of acquaintance were of primary importance. He pursued his activities in cooperation with the given curial officials (mainly with the Rota's traditionally non-Italian auditors), with the delegate at the Holy See and the cardinal protector. The numerous unsolved questions are not rooted in politi-

⁷⁹ Cf. LUTZ, *Glaubwürdigkeit und Gehalt von Nuntiaturberichten*, 267–268.

⁸⁰ MENNITI IPPOLITO, *Il tramonto della Curia nepotista*, 153.

cal-legal-Church administrative matters, but in the tiny but significant obstacles of this collaboration.⁸¹

The most essential and painstaking, revolving task of the local Churches' Roman representation was obviously the procuring of the papal provision related to the consistorial benefices, especially the filling of the episcopal sees. The process can be recognizable not only regarding the Roman court, but for instance in the case of France it was also specific to States. The complicated structure of the Curia became more tangible via these phases of the process.

The first step had to be done by the State. Beside the royal "granting" document, a uniform letter was composed for the pope. According to canon law, this was a proper nomination or presentation before the pope. The document, which was signed by the monarch and completed with the addressed letters to the cardinal nephew, to the Secretariat of State, to the cardinal protector of France and sometimes to relevant curial prelates, was forwarded to the common French agent of the Bench of Bishops. These were forwarded to the French delegate, who also received an official notice, in special cases a separate recommendation or instruction about his duties, how to solve the oc-

⁸¹ Already HUBERT JEDIN called the attention that the exploration of the agents' reports and the instructions sent to them is essential for understanding the mechanism and problems of the relations. In contrast to the nunciatures, the launch of the systematic researches can hardly be mentioned due to the adverse sources, at least in the sixteenth-seventeenth century. (The same is true for the function of the legates of the Holy See and the cardinal-protectorates; see the cited literature.) HUBERT JEDIN, *Propst G.B. Barsotti, seine Tätigkeit als römischer Agent deutscher Bischöfe (1638–1655) und seine Sendung nach Deutschland (1643–1644)*, RQ 39 (1931) 377–425, 377–379; HERMINE KÜHN-STEINHAUSEN, *Die Korrespondenz Wolfgang Wilhelms von Pfalz-Neuburg mit der römischen Kurie* (Publikationen der Gesellschaft für rheinische Geschichtskunde 48), Köln 1937, 1–83; ALESSANDRO BASTIAANSE, *Teodoro Ameyden (1585–1656). Un Neerlandese alla corte di Roma* (Studiën van het Nederlands Historisch Instituut te Rome 5), 's-Gravenhage 1967, 99–135, especially 100–110 (*Agente giuridico del re cattolico e dei principi tedeschi*); WILFRID BRULEZ, *La crise dans les relations entre le Saint-Siège et les Pays-Bas au XVII^e siècle (1634–1637)*, Bulletin de l'Institut Historique Belge de Rome 28 (1953) 63–104; the documents of the agents are frequently used by FRIEDHELM JÜRGENSMEIER, *Jobann Philipp von Schönborn (1605–1673) und die Römische Kurie. Ein Beitrag zur Kirchengeschichte des 17. Jahrhunderts* (Quellen und Abhandlungen zur Mittelrheinischen Kirchengeschichte 28), Mainz 1977; sometimes BERGIN, *The Making of the French Episcopate*, *op. cit.*; T.A. BIRREL's article almost completely rests on the reports of the Roman English agents: *English Catholics without a Bishop 1655–1672*, *Recusant History. A Journal of Research in post-Reformation Catholic History in the British Islands* 4 (1958) 142–178 (vol. 4, n. 4, Jan. 1958); on the question of the Roman representation in the Hungarian relation, a preliminary outline: PÉTER TUSOR, *A magyar püspökök első római ágensei [The First Roman Agents of the Hungarian Bishops]*, *Vigilia* 67 (2002) 338–342. On the characteristics of the Roman *avvisi*, which served as a basis for the communication of the agents: MARIO INFELISE, *Gli avvisi di Roma. Informazione e politica nel secolo XVII*, *La corte di Roma tra Cinque e Seicento, 189–205*; furthermore, on the diaries, which were similar to them, and about Rome's role as a centre of the news: TULLIO BULGARELLI, *Il giornalismo a Roma nel Seicento*, Roma 1988; S. M. SEIDLER, *Il teatro del mondo. Diplomatiscbe und journalistiscbe Relationen vom römischen Hof aus dem 17. Jabrbundert* (Beiträge zur Kirchen- und Kulturgeschichte 3), Frankfurt a. M. 1996; and with further literature PIERETH, *Bericht aus Rom*, 324–326. – The latest international researches emphasise the importance of such researches and they deal with the problems at least on phenomenological level. IRENE POLVERINI FOSI, *A proposito di una lacuna storiografica: La nazione tedesca a Roma nei primi secoli dell'età moderna*, *RMC* 1 (1993) 45–56; LUTZ, *Roma e il mondo germanico*, 449–456.

curing problems. As long as the delegate did not handle the *nominatio* to the pope on his audience, the case could not be discussed by the consistory.⁸²

From the 1600s, almost every document of nomination – or presentation – was accompanied by an appeal for the decrease of the annates, which could be attained rather easily with the corruption of the royal secretaries. However, Rome constantly denied the allowances' granting to the French. Already in 1607–1608, Paul V cited the exhaustion of the papal treasury as a reason. The endeavour to increase the reduced Church revenues was already palpable.⁸³

In parallel, the nominee had to ask for the conducting of the canonical examination at the nunciature. Until the middle of the century, the prepared verbal had to be overseen and signed by the oldest cardinals of the three orders of the College of Cardinals.

They formed a distinct congregation (*Capitulum Ordinum Congregatio*); the dean and chamberlain of the College of Cardinals, the first cardinal priest, the first cardinal deacon, the *camerlengo*, the vice-chancellor and the chamberlain of the College were its members. The background apparatus was formed by the secretary and chief auditor (*racionator*) of the College of Cardinals. According to the *elenchus* of 1629, its sessions were held in the Sacred Palace, in the rooms beside the consistory, "*dum fit dictum Consistorium*". There are same data from 1644, though, instead of *racionator* the *procurator* is indicated, and besides the oldest members of the two lower orders, the name of the "*praesens in Urbe*" also occurs. Namely, occasionally there were different persons asked to verify the process.⁸⁴

Afterwards, the abstract of the process was composed in the protector's secretariat of the office, and before the first consistorial presentation (*praeconisatio*) its copies were to be sent to all cardinals who stayed in Rome.⁸⁵ One of the copies was examined by the

⁸² FREDERICK J. BAUMGARTNER, *Change and Continuity in the French Episcopate. The Bishops and the Wars of Religion 1547–1610* (Duke Monographs in Medieval and Renaissance Studies 7), Durham 1986, 27–28; BERGIN, *The Making of the French Episcopate*, 64 and 431–435.

⁸³ *Ibid.*

⁸⁴ WEBER, *Die ältesten päpstlichen Staatshandbücher*, 191–192 and 233–234.

⁸⁵ It cannot be precluded that the cardinals' confirmation of verbals was only based on the previously prepared abstract. The *institutio canonica*'s Roman process until the expedition of the bulls is thoroughly introduced in much detail by HIERONIM FOKCIŃSKI's fundamental work: *Le relazioni concistoriali nel Cinquecento*, AHP 18 (1980) 211–261. FOKCIŃSKI primarily focuses on the system before Trent, when it was the task and absolute right of the cardinal protector to conduct the process and not only to prepare the consistorial presentation on the evidence of the abstract about the hearing of the witnesses. FOKCIŃSKI elaborates these summaries (*relationes consistoriales*) – not only did the relations have a resource value in case of a lost process, but the ones from the earlier period speak volumes – with diplomatic profoundness. It seems, however, that with regard to the formal criteria he unfoundedly sharply differentiates between these relations and the documents of the *praeconisatio-propositio* (after Trent, it was the basis of the double presentation), which were prepared from the verbals of the canonical examination. As it has already been mentioned, the majority of these examinations were conducted at the nunciatures. Those from the second half of the sixteenth century which had Polish relations were also published by setting an example for the Hungarian research. Cf. *Propozycje konsystorialne w XVI. wieku (Omówienie. Teksty polskie)* (Studia Ecclesiastica 18, Historica 11,

pope's personal auditor. He was the one from whom the pope could gather information about the qualities of the nominee and about the state of the vacant diocese.

The existence of the "*uditore di Nostro Signore*" can be traced back from Gregory XIII, its role was distinguished at the *liberae collationis* and the *in partibus infidelium* appointment of the bishop, and after the regulation of Innocent X of 1650 in both. His gaining ground shows the tendency among the popes to directly control the nominees' examination. While in the seventeenth century, it meant to be a great honour if the presentation was done by the pope himself and not by the cardinal protector (or at the appointments of *liberae collationis* or the *in partibus infidelium* the appointed cardinal from the Propaganda, for instance, if the case was related to the missions), in the eighteenth century this became general. The additional task of the auditor – in consultation with the secretary of the consistory – was to put the *praeconisatio* and the *propositio* on the list of the succeeding consistory's agenda. In accomplishing its tasks, its deputy, who was specialised to these sorts of cases, the *sostituto del concistoro*, assisted more increasingly.⁸⁶

The sophisticated and by the 1620s more and more stable mechanism was truly suitable for sifting the occurring problems. These could be routine: for instance, the supporting of the bishop from the pension, namely from the allowance, or other benefices' maintenance, the nominee's exemption from hindrances of qualification or origin; or they could be extraordinary: for instance, the legal or formal objections to the nomination. The intervention of the Consistorial Congregation became appropriate only in such cases. As a result, the procedure slowed down, or even vanished.⁸⁷ If the preconisation was conducted without any complication, the competent cardinal (*protector*) could make the second proposal (*propositio consistorialis*), already on the following consistory, by giving a reading of the process's summary. The acceptance – accompanied by signing the date – of this proposal meant the papal provision's confirmation. The decision was recorded by concise consistorial decrees filed in various registers, namely by verbals (*acta*).⁸⁸

Fontium Textus 2), Rzym 1994. – I reflect on FOKCIŃSKI'S certain statements and assumptions (for instance, exactly who prepared the abstract, whether the agent participated in it, or not), furthermore on the question how the verbal got to Rome from the nunciatures, etc. in my monograph about the history of the Hungarian representation in Rome.

⁸⁶ LAJOS PÁSZTOR, *Il sostituto del concistoro ed il suo archivio*, AHP 5 (1967) 355–372; [IDEM], *Guida delle fonti*, 185–192.

⁸⁷ „Sanctissimus dixit alias solere dari memorialia per diem antequam ecclesiae praeconizentur, et hoc fuisse decretum antiquum et renovatum a felix recordationis Gregorio XIII. suo praedecessore. Ideo adverterent, ut darentur praedicto tempore statuta memorialia, alias non permetteret reverendissimis dominis protectoribus et aliis reverendissimis dominis cardinalibus, ut praeconizzarent, et multo minus ut proponerent ecclesias, quarum memorialia praefata non tradiderunt.” See the below cited consistorial sources.

⁸⁸ PRITZ, *Suppliken-signatur und Briefexpedition an der römischen Kurie*, 150–156. There are three such series remaining in the archives of the Sacred College: *Acta Vicecancellarii* (the verbals of the consistories were officially prepared by the vice-chancellor); *Acta Camerarii* (the series of the college's chamberlain); *Acta Miscellanea*; in addition, there was the *Acta Congregationis Consistorialis* which was compiled for the Consistorial Congregation (these should not be mistaken for the *actas* of the congregations' sessions), and the *Acta Consistorialia* kept by the *sostituto del concistoro*. Their various copies can be found among many cardinal families'

On 17 September 1625, Urban VIII ordered the establishment of the Sacred College's archives, and prior to this on 15 August, he took measures to bring the processes, propositional and other documents here.⁸⁹ According to his resolution of 2 December 1626, the propositional cards had to be signed by the reporting cardinal, and its text had to be forwarded to the pope and the cardinals two days before the consistory.⁹⁰ As this hardly became practice, he applied sanctions on 22 March 1627: "*Sanctissimus decrevit, ut de caetero propositiones pridie praeconizationis transmitterentur, alioquin ecclesia minus proponeretur.*" On the other hand, he ordained that any supplementary cases (various graces, absolutions) had to be discussed in the Consistorial Congregation and not on the consistory, which was confirmed on 5 July 1627 by calling the cardinal *relators*' attention to focus only on the state of the diocese and the nominee in the presentation.⁹¹ The other source, which presents the consistorial decree of 22 March 1627, talks about the revival of the older papal regulations.⁹²

After the consistorial actions, the *cedula consistorialis*, which was composed by the utilization of the propositional script's data, served as a basis for the issue of the bull of appointment – more precisely the *litterae consistoriales* –, which was verified by the cardinal-vice-chancellor's transcription (*controcedula consistorialis*).⁹³ The above mentioned steps were followed by the preparation of the provisional bulls' draft; these bulls were addressed to the nominee, the community, the clergy and the cathedral chapter of the diocese, furthermore, to the metropolitan, the bishops who served the consecration, the local representative of the secular authority and the monarch who made the nomination. No matter how surprising it is, this was not the assignment of the Apostolic Chancery but of the *spedizioneri apostolici*, who functioned subordinated to the Apostolic Dataria.⁹⁴

documents, such as in the Barberinis'. The majority of the original consistorial decrees and verbals are in the *Miscellanea* of the Vatican Archives (Ar. XII–XIII. XV). GERMANO GUALDO, *Sussidi per la consultazione dell'Archivio Vaticano* (CAV 17), Città del Vaticano 1989, 348–353 and 359–361.

⁸⁹ Archivio Segreto Vaticano (ASV), Archivio Concistoriale, Acta Miscellanea, vol. 28, fol. 17v and 19r; REMIGIUS RITZLER, *Die archiepiscopalen Quellen der „Hierarchia Catholica“*, 51–74; [IDEM], *Per la storia dell'archivio del Sacro Collegio*, 303–308.

⁹⁰ ASV Arch. Concist., Act. Misc., vol. 28, fol. 62v–63r.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, fol. 65r and 70v.

⁹² *Ibid.*, fol. 69v.

⁹³ The analysing representation of this type of source: LAJOS PÁSZTOR, *Le cedole concistoriali*, AHP II (1973) 209–268. By the help of graphology, Pásztor implies that these documents were also prepared by the office of the cardinal protector and the agents sometimes took part in this, as well. I will touch upon the problems again in the Hungarian relation. I would like to put emphasis only on the fact that the basis of the *cedula*'s content could not only be the propositional document but – if there was – the decree of the Consistorial Congregation, which allowed the pluralism, the pension, etc., since the bulls, in contrast to the remarks of the consistory, mention these questions, as well.

⁹⁴ In contrast to the current researches, from the eighteenth century, not only did the *per viam secretam/Curiae* go through the Dataria, but the normal process (*per viam Cancellariae*), as well, which is clearly shown in the conference material of the bench of bishops in Nagyszombat, 1639 (see Századok 134 (2000) 434 and cf. PÁSZTOR, *Guida delle fonti*, 46). The reason may be found in the fact that the incomes of the Church were treated in this office, a considerable amount of which was from the consistorial benefices. As the practical paper work – which earned less profit, but more smaller benefices' donations –, namely, the composition of

Then, the draft was sent to the Chancery, where the *scrittori apostolici* made the fair copy, which was checked by the *Ufficio del Computatore e Rescribentario* and registered in the *Ufficio del Registro*. The *Ufficio del Tassatore* defined the duty of the issue. The sum of it was made up of the definite fee of the done stages and the ones in progress. Their payment – together with the *annates* – went in the Dataria. The signature of the vice-chancellor and one of the *abbreviatori del Parco maggiore*'s prelates could not be put onto the bulls – again in the Chancery –, until, the *prefetto delle componende*'s confirmation had not been shown to the authorized *spedizionere apostolico* and the *revisore dei conti degli spedizioneri* had not accomplished the examination of the bills.⁹⁵ Only after the signing could the document be provided with the pendent leaden seal in the *Ufficio del Piombo*. However, the procedure did not come to an end with this. The ready-made bull was sent back to the Dataria, to the authorized *spedizionere apostolico*, who had to ask the issue of the official duplicate, which was countersigned by the *sottodatarario* in the *Ufficio dei Trasunti*.⁹⁶ The forwarding of the documents, which canonically enabled the consecration of the bishop and his inauguration to the benefice – to which the vow of obedience taken to the monarch always belonged – could only happen after this process.

The consignment of the bulls was the task of the agent, just as was the coordination of the procedure running between the offices and the administering of the payments. This latter one was ranked as especially well-organised in the French relation. In France, there were more banks which specialized in such cases (*banquiers expéditionnaires en cour de Rome*). With an institutional nature, they provided the financial background of the process in the curial filling of the Church benefices. Among others, in Paris, Lyon and Toulouse they were at the French clergy's disposal. The newly appointed bishop used a Parisian banker of solid capital, moreover, from the middle of the seventeenth century, he had the bankers compete for the better offer. They prepared a detailed contract. They made rules for possible events, such as what would have to be done if the actual expenditures differentiated from the previous plan. The bishop repaid the unique loan with interest from his diocese's incomes. Before the papal provision, namely, he did not

the donation certificate was accomplished here, it was obvious that the bulls of the consistorial benefices, which required more attention – though, it was not in their competence – were also phrased by the trained officials of the Apostolic Dataria. On the other ways of forwarding the bulls (for example, the *expeditio per Cameram* – whose foundation was necessary to avoid the publicity of the Chancery and to save expenses – and the *per viam correctoris*): FRENZ, *Die Kanzlei der Päpste*, 132–161; [IDEM], *I documenti pontifici*, 71–91. (All of these procedures are related to the stages of the long preparation and the phrasing. In case of consistorial benefices, – which required special knowledge of calligraphy – the parchments with majuscule were finally composed in the Chancery.)

⁹⁵ In case of bulls of non-consistorial benefices, the signed bull was again checked by the *custode delle suppliche* and the *maestro del registro*, whether there was a difference between the contents of the bull and the licensed request. As in the case of consistorial benefices, the basis of the phrasing was not the supplication but the *controcedula consistorialis*. The bull could be compared with this document, however it is not mentioned by the secondary literature.

⁹⁶ The process is described by: SORGE, *La storia e il diritto della Dataria*, 244–247; and the *per Cancellarium* section in more detail: FRENZ, *Die Kanzlei der Päpste*, 105–132.

enjoy the benefices of his diocese and the sums paid for the Curia were much higher than he could have paid from his already existing smaller benefices. There was not always a private fortune, either.

For instance, in 1645, Henri de Béthune de Maillezais who was appointed to the archiepiscopal see of Bordeaux, also invited tenders for covering his expenses of his papal provision and keeping the abbey of Mauléon. According to the contract of January 1647, the sums were estimated at 26,960 *livres*, and finally the actual expenditures became about 22,000 *livres*. He had to pay 12,507 *livres* only for expediting the bulls of appointment to the archiepiscopal see of Bordeaux, including the *annates* and the duties. The other considerable part of the sum was spent on the expenses of the banker and the agent, furthermore on the duty of the cardinal protector. The latter cost the 15% of the *annates* in the French relation, namely at the beginning of the 1620s, the *propina* – of which legitimacy was questioned also by the Gallic Church – was approximately 2,400–3,900 from the tax of 27–30,000 *livres*.⁹⁷

Similarly to the above mentioned, the obtainment of the archiepiscopal pallium was a particular procedure where such a simplified process, like in the case of bulls, the *per viam secretam* expedition, was not provided by a legal option. The “secret way” was favoured by the nominees, not only due to its inexpensiveness, but to its speed. Owing to the counter-interests of the curial officials – until the middle of the century – this advantage was granted only in a very justified case.⁹⁸

Apart from the appropriate financial background, the clue to the smooth conduct of the *institutio canonica* was the Roman representation: the establishment of the synchronised collaboration of the agent, the cardinal protector and his office, as well as of the State delegate. Naturally, this can true for the other fields of the relations of the particular Churches and the Apostolic See. Despite the strict, fiscal view of the Curia in the 20s, 30s of the seventeenth century their activities were not without problems. However, one can witness a lasting consolidation also in this field thanks to the inner professionalization from the 1650s, to the gradual reforms, which shaped the compliant Curia on the basis of the Sistine system by purging it from the functionless, archaic elements. Even if the events of Rome’s relations to the important State Churches do not support this statement in all cases.

⁹⁷ BERGIN, *The Making of the French Episcopate*, 64–65; CLERGEAC, *La Curie et les bénéfices*, 213–223 (and 225–243); the French cardinal protectors’ consistorial tasks are shortly summarised by: PONCET, *The Cardinal-Protectors of the Crowns*, 167; a not too detailed, but comprehensive case study: STEFAN SAMERSKI, *Die Ernennung Richelieus zum Bischof von Lucon: ein „kurialer Normalfall“ oder die Stilisierung eines politischen Genies*, RQ 89 (1994) III–132, on the process itself: 120–124. 129–131.

⁹⁸ I am going to deal with the donation of the pallium, which embodied the plenitude of pontifical office, and with the other details of the secret papal confirmation in another essay, in connection to the publication of the canonical examination’s verbals of Péter Pázmány. A short historical outline from the Ancient times to the donation of the palliums to the metropolitans of the Eastern rites: GIORGIO ORIOLI, *La collazione del pallio*, Nuntia (Pontificia Commissio Codici Iuris Canonici Orientalis Recognoscendo) 3 (1976) 88–96; and CLERGEAC, *La Curie et les bénéfices*, 208–212 and 279–280, n. 26.

Rome and the Spanish, French, German Catholicism

The purest Catholic State Church formation of Western Europe developed in Spain.⁹⁹ The *Patronato Real* over the Spanish Church as well as other manifestations of the royal control over religion, like the Spanish inquisition, rooted rather in the *reconquista* than in the Conciliarism and were realised under the Catholic monarchs, Ferdinand V (1479–1516) and Isabella I (1474–1504). In the year of the inquisition's establishment, in 1478, the two monarchs summoned the Council of Seville, which against Rome's will adhered to the State control over the greater benefices of the country. The reasons were political: the public role of the prelates, their social influence and the doubtful and exposed situation of the Church estates by the borders. Sixtus IV, however, did not accept the new situation legally, but in practice he did so if he agreed with the royal nominees.¹⁰⁰

While in Seville, the question of advowson was not dealt with in connection with the filling of the benefices only the royal right of supplication, in 1493, both terms appeared. Four years later, in 1497, the royal legal claims, the *Patronato* and the *Presentación*, which comprised all Spanish benefices, were phrased by the legal generation living in the euphoria over Granada's surrender.¹⁰¹ As a matter of fact, in connection with three dioceses, Granada, Canarias and Puerto Real, this had already been acknowledged by Innocent VIII in his bull *Orthodoxae fidei* by using the term of *plenum ius patronatus et praesentandi personas idoneas Sedi Apostolicae* ("the full right of the advowson and the suitable persons' introduction to the Apostolic See") on 13 December 1486.¹⁰² A comprehensive concordat was drafted only under Charles V, in 1523 and 1530. The compromise, as it had already been mentioned, allowed Spain the legal practice of advowson over all bigger Church benefices. In the meantime, in 1508 – after the first bishop appointments of 1504 – Julius II guaranteed the *Patronato Real de las Indias*, namely the legal institution of advowson over the colonies, in his bull of 28 July, *Universalis Ecclesiae*. In return, the Spanish crown provided the financial background of the Church system in the Indies.¹⁰³

Only the *Consejo de Indias* was competent in the appointments and founding colonial bishoprics, which established all in all twenty-nine bishoprics in America until 1620.¹⁰⁴ Due to the tardiness of the Roman procedures, similarly to the Hungarian one, a prac-

⁹⁹ ALDEA, *Iglesia y estado*, 57–63.

¹⁰⁰ BIRELEY, *The Refashioning of Catholicism*, 74–75; see also A. M. ROUCO-VARELA, *Staat und Kirche im Spanien des 16. Jahrhunderts*, München 1965.

¹⁰¹ ALDEA, *Iglesia y estado*, 65–105, especially 98–105; the monographic elaboration of the Spanish "royal patronage and supremacy": MARTIN L. GUTIÉRREZ, *El privilegio de nombramiento de obispos en España*, Roma 1967; cf. also CLEMENS BAUER, *Studien zur spanischen Konkordatsgeschichte des späten Mittelalters. Das spanische Konkordat von 1482*, Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Kultur-Geschichte Spaniens II (1935) 43–97.

¹⁰² ALDEA, *Iglesia y estado*, 99, more quotations from the bull: n. 107.

¹⁰³ KINDERMANN, *Das landesfürstliche Ernennungsrecht*, 89–90 and 97–104; ENRIQUE DUSSEL, *Die Bischofs-ernennungen in ersten Jahrhundert des Patronats in Latein-Amerika (1504–1620)*, Concilium 8 (1972) 538–542; in more detail: PEDRO LETURIA, *Der Heilige Stuhl und das spanische Patronat in Amerika*, HJ 46 (1926) 1–71.

¹⁰⁴ DUSSEL, *Die Bischofsernennungen*, 539.

tice spread: before obtaining their bulls, the bishops appointed by the monarch could take possession of their dioceses and some pastoral functions by showing the royal document of appointment (*Real Cédula de ruego y encargo*) to the viceroy.¹⁰⁵

The preparation of the Spanish appointments was the task of the *Consejos para Castilla* and the *La Cámara del Real Patronato*. The document of nomination for the pope, the so-called postulate, was issued after the royal decision making. The disapproved nominees had to be filtered out by the nuncio, who was even in the second half of the seventeenth century reluctant to conduct the canonical examination (where the witnesses were selected without much attention).¹⁰⁶

Owing to the compromise, formally the Spanish Church was free from the State taxes; however, under Philip II 20% of the State revenues were of Church sources; partly from the *cruzada*, from the tax imposed by the popes in the fourteenth century for sake of the *reconquista* then the anti-Ottoman wars. This tax was the Spanish version of the papal tithe taken over by the State. The other source was the *subsidio*, which had to be paid after almost all the Church benefices. The third source was the *excusado*, which was established by the confirmation of Pius V in 1567 and was paid off by every parish for aiding the battles in the Low Countries. In 1574, the archbishop of Toledo complained that Philip II appropriated the half of the Church revenues and he did not differ from the Lutheran princes at all in this field.¹⁰⁷

The Church immunity and the privileges could not be totally enforced in Spain, either. In civil and criminal proceedings the monarch had jurisdiction over the clergy and the crown was allowed to supervise the verdicts of the Church tribunals. The administration had already invalidated the Church cases' appeals to Rome.¹⁰⁸ The lack of political conflicts in the age of the Tridentine reform Papacy did not mean that the violation of the Church privileges would not cause disagreements. In Milan, for instance, a rather tense relation evolved between the archbishop of the city and the Spanish governor.¹⁰⁹ If we remember, in the first half of the seventeenth century, the Congregation of Immunity had a lot to do in the Italian Spanish territories, which did not change in the next decades, either. The degree of the church asylum's practice was in the centre of the conflicts of Milan and Naples. The secularizing Spanish State in the decline more and more often attacked the bull of Gregory XIV, which circumscribed the right of asylum (*Cum alias*, 24 May 1591). The decisions of the part-congregation, which was convened

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, 540 (the sociography of the bishops: 540–541); see on the development of the American Church system also JOSEF METZLER's *Introductio, America Pontificia*, I, 9–45.

¹⁰⁶ JOSÉ MARÍA MARQUES, *La Santa Sede y La España de Carlos II. La negociación del nuncio Millini 1675–1685*, *Anthologica Annua* 28–29 (1981–1982) 138–398, 220–226. The practice of Lombardy considerably differed from the Hispanic system. AGOSTINO BORROMEO, *La corona spagnola e le nomine agli uffici ecclesiastici nello Stato di Milano da Filippo II a Filippo IV*, *Lombardia Borromaica, Lombardia Spagnola 1554–1659 I–II* (Biblioteca del Cinquecento 63, a c. d. Paolo Pissavino–Gianvittorio Signorotto), Roma 1993, 553–578.

¹⁰⁷ BIRELEY, *The Refashioning of Catholicism*, 74–75.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁹ BORROMEO, *Clemente VIII*, 257.

by Clement X to examine the Spanish objections, were not found satisfactory in Madrid, as a consequence the local clashes, naturally, affected the higher connections, as well.¹¹⁰

In 1678, under Innocent XI the relations cooled to such an extent that the pope took the breaking of diplomatic relations into account due to the series of disregard of the clergy's rights. In 1687, he did not dare to excommunicate the officials of Naples on account of introducing the so-called *Monarchia Sicula* privileges, the century-long abuses in terms of canon law. Later Innocent XI backed down because of his cardinals' advice, in return for which the collection of the tithes (*decima Turca*) imposed on the Spanish clergy became possible for the Holy League. A more significant result was generated by the Spanish inquisition's subordinating under the Holy Office in 1681, which inquisition had degraded almost into one of the executive bodies of the secular administration.¹¹¹

The multiplying infringements of the law was supported by the fact that in Spain the ideology and practice of the direct and indirect royal *potestas* over the Church had already developed, namely the subjects of the crown could turn to the Apostolic See without limitation solely in spiritual matters. It was a result partly of Urban VIII's hostile policy, the papal nepotism and the curial fiscality of the first half of the seventeenth century, and partly of both parties' uncompromising attitude to protect their own interests.¹¹² True, Spain's statement, which was proclaimed under the Thirty Years' War and aimed at "protecting religion and maintaining the fellowship with the Apostolic See despite State interests", was not without propagandist elements, and the relations with the emperor weighed more despite the inner and external problems. The ambiguous neutrality of Urban VIII in the European Church politics inflicted a wound on the Spanish Catholicism's loyalty to Rome.¹¹³

It also made matters worse that the grievances of the Spanish Church were not nursed even after repeated negotiations (*Gravamina Ecclesiae Hispanae*). The long memorandums, which were handed in by the bishop of Cordoba, Domenico Pimentel, who negotiated in Rome in 1634–1636, and by Juan de Chumacero, councillor of State, demanded the suspension of the Dataria's "abuses". They raised objections on three main fields, against matrimonial dispensations, the granting of the Spanish Church benefices and the issue of the necessary documents and their burden with pensions. There were also complaints against the nunciature of Madrid, since it had taken many diocesan jurisdictions.¹¹⁴

In spite of these unsolved questions, the State positions obtained under the Spanish hegemony proved to be unswerving in the Iberian Peninsula and in the Italian Spanish territories in the seventeenth century. The case was somewhat different overseas. The root of the problem was the same as had already been mentioned – and not only under Urban VIII – the Spanish claimed all the Church appointments and any papal decree,

¹¹⁰ OSBAT, *Clemente X*, 364.

¹¹¹ MENNITI IPPOLITO, *Innocenzo XI*, 384.

¹¹² ALDEA, *Iglesia y estado en la España*, 209–214.

¹¹³ The three fundamental pillars of the Spanish politics in a rather different interpretation: *ibid.*, 11–54.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 112–206, especially 122.

including the decisions concerning the mission organization, could be enforced only in agreement with the Spanish royal council. Rome could not question the right of nomination and presentation, acknowledged in the concordats over the American and Philippine bishoprics; however, it often rejected the royal nominees by referring to personal objections and incompatibility. It is typical data: between 1511 and 1620, out of 292 nominees there were 243 who received their bulls. On the other hand, the non-Spanish subjects, who led missionary works, faced obstacles. As we could experience in connection with the Propaganda, the situation strained by almost continuously heated debates – despite the occasional attempts to arrive at an agreement – did not become settled, neither at the time, nor in the future. It would have had a boomerang effect for Rome, if it had bestowed any right to control the well-built missionary system on the Spanish crown. The problem was eased by the temporary lessening of the missionary work in the second half of the eighteenth century.¹¹⁵ Basically, the same difficulties occurred with Portugal, which formed a separate circle of questions after the dissolution of the personal union.¹¹⁶

In contrast to Spain, the French relations were characterised by a developed ideological background. The bases of Gallicanism were laid down by the *Pragmatica Sanctio* of Bourges (1438) by Charles VII (1417–1461) with the effective collaboration of the University of Paris. This already characterised the so-called liberties of the French Church from Rome. The concordat rested on conciliar foundations, it proclaimed the superiority of the ecumenical council over the pope. It greatly restricted the judicial appeals and the measure of the taxes paid to Rome, furthermore it reduced the influence of the Holy See over the Church appointments, finally, it settled the rights of the capitular electors and the patrons in filling the benefices. The renaissance French-papal relations were also enlivened by the Italian inner politics. After their Italian invasion of 1494, the French employed the weapon of Conciliarism even more vividly. With the support of Louis XII (1498–1515), a council – which failed soon – was summoned in Pisa in 1500.¹¹⁷

The consolidation of the relations was signified by the Concordat of Bologna in 1516 between Leo X and Francis I (1515–1547). It was in force until the French Revolution and it supplied the Papacy a kind of bulwark against the movements broken out in Germany. Francis I renounced the conciliar point of view stated in the contract of Bourges, with which the threat of the French schism vanished.

¹¹⁵ DUSSEL, *Die Bischofsnennungen in ersten Jahrhundert des Patronats in Latein-Amerika*, 540–541; for further details LEE, *La actitud de la Sagrada Congregación frente al Regio Patronato*, 353–438.

¹¹⁶ On this and especially on the negotiations between 1675 and 1678 with their documents: GIUSEPPE SORGE, *Santa Sede e Corona Portoghese. Le controversie giuspatronali nei secoli XVII e XVIII* (Occidentale e Oriente Christianità 1), Bologna 1988. In his introductory work, SORGE intensively studies the papal privileges of the sixteenth century, which established the Portuguese *Padroado: La polemica giuspatronale tra la S. Sede e la monarchia Portoghese nella seconda metà del secolo XVII* (15–65, 15–21).

¹¹⁷ BAUMGARTNER, *Change and Continuity in the French Episcopate*, 10–26; BERGIN, *The Making of the French Episcopate*, 44–56.

In 1516, the French king received the right of appointment over 93 bishoprics out of 113 and over 527 abbeys. (Henry IV tried to increase their number with Metz, Toul and Verdun in vain.) Additionally, they were coupled with the advowson over several smaller benefices on the basis of various privileges and tradition. Naturally the bulls for the consecration, the taking possession of the benefices and the canonical institution were to be applied from Rome. The monarch was obliged to arrange the succession within six months. However, the Pope could deny the confirmation of the appointment, if he had objections to the nominee's age, way of life and his studies – according to the regulation, one had to be a magistrate or licentiate in theology and canon law. It sometimes happened, for instance in the case of René Benois, who was appointed to the bishop of Troyes in 1593 by Henry IV, though, he had been the author of a Bible translation condemned by the Church. The concordat gave another three months for the further royal nomination. In this case, however, the Curia never rejected the nomination. In the sixteenth century, the pope himself appointed only fourteen French bishops. In the course of the civil war, there were capitular elections here and there, as well.¹¹⁸

In Bologna, the French Church administration was totally and legally controlled by the crown. In 1594 Pierre Pithou rightly claims that, in practice, the French king is rather the head of the French Church than the pope. The influence of the monarchs was limited only by the popular institution of the *resignatio in favorem* and the *permutatio*, namely the swap among the bishops of the dioceses. This was more or less true for the system of the coadjutor-appointment (usually, the employment of a deputy with right of succession), which was bound by a royal confirmation. Besides, it delayed the personal residing of the diocesan bishops before it had become general, it already had the new monarch's hands tied in enforcing his personal policy, and moreover, it constantly generated the disapproval of Rome until the 1630s. The influence of the local land lords in filling the episcopal sees can be sometimes observable. They acquired the possibility partly through medieval privileges, partly through royal transfer of rights. As the concordat did not provide the benefices of the French prelates who died in the Curia, if they had not obtained the *de non vacando in Curia* exemption, in accordance with the canon law, the Holy See filled these dioceses, like in Lyon in 1626. Paris prevented these occurrences by limiting the French clergy's way to Rome.

As a result of the compromise, the French bench of bishops evolved into a royal clientele already in the sixteenth century. The monarchs practiced their right of appointment with the so-called *Conseil de Conscience's* interpolation. The "granting document", the *brevet de nomination* was prepared here, of which uniform text was amplified by the short praise of the nominee. Until 1620, it was also often indicated, through whose good offices (*en faveur de*) the promotion was obtained.¹¹⁹ Despite the contribution of the "Council of

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*; and PIERRE BLET, *Le concordat de Bologne et la réforme tridentine*, *Gregorianum* 45 (1964) 241–279.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*; and J. M. HAYDEN, *The Social Origins of the French Episcopacy at the Beginning of the 17. Century*, *French Historical Studies* 10 (1977) 27–40; M. GREENGRASS, *Aristocracy and Episcopacy at the End of the Wars of Religion in France: the Duke of Montmorency and the Bishoprics of Languedoc*, *Miscellanea Historiae*

Conscience”, the decision did not always lie upon salutary grounds, which is proved by the string of shameful and scandalous appointments; for instance, in 1648 Beaumanoir de Lavardin’s, who became the bishop of Mans though he was a known atheist.¹²⁰

Francis I made the concordat acceptable for the Holy See by allowing in a separate concession the payment of the annates annulled by the Council of Basel and the *Pragmatica Sanctio* of 1438, which did not become popular among the French clergy in the early modern period, yet, it was regularly settled after an attempt to stop in 1561. The question of the annates became one of the central topics of the French-papal relations’ crisis of the 1639–1640s. The bishops did not demand the cancellation of the duties, but their moderation. They proclaimed that the French Church benefices were estimated more considerable than, for instance, the Spanish. The essence of the problem was that the curial officials did not impose this unique tax on the basis of the real incomes, but on the registers of the Apostolic Camera, which reflected medieval conditions.¹²¹

The French-papal relations in the early modern period were not only burdened by problems of practical nature. In spite of the agreement of 1516, the concept of the independent Gallican Church occasionally reoccurred. This could be the reason why the regulations of the Council of Trent were pronounced in France only in the clergy’s assembly of 1615, which had been preceded for half a century by certain plans favouring a reform that would have been realised within selective, local frames and with royal assistance. After the issue of the Edict of Nantes in 1598 – which guaranteed the free practice of religion for the Huguenots –, the year 1615 was the provisional triumph of the ultramontane Catholicism. Its preparation was aided by the papal legates of Paris. In 1611, for instance, by the command of Paul V, Nuncio Ubaldini took measures to improve the French bench of bishops’ selection.

After the civil wars, the time for stabilization came. In exchange for Henry IV’s absolution, Clement VIII obtained guarantees to the Catholic upbringing of the heir to the throne, to the “restoration” of the Catholic cult in more places (around 1600, it was attained in 300 towns and in some thousand parishes) and to the return of the Church benefices. Finally, in 1603, the authorization of the Jesuits’ return was also achieved, however, only in return for a loyalty oath sworn to the monarch that Clement VIII agreed, despite the resistance of the Jesuits. (In 1595, the followers of Saint Ignatius were expelled on the pretext of the assassination of Henry IV.¹²²) In addition, the diocesan councils and the episcopal visitations became more frequent, though, the standard of the local clergy gradually improved due to the slowness of the seminar establishments.¹²³

Ecclesiae 8 (Colloque de Strasbourg Septembre 1983) (Bibliothèque de la Revue d’Histoire Ecclésiastique 72, ed. Bernard Vogler), Bruxelles–Louvain–Louvain-la-Neuve 1987, 356–363.

¹²⁰ LOUIS COGNER, *Das kirchliche Leben in Frankreich*, Die Kirche im Zeitalter des Absolutismus, 3–119, 6–7.

¹²¹ BERGIN, *Cardinal de la Rochefoucauld*, 81–82; BLET, *Correspondance du Ranuccio Scotti*, 20–40.

¹²² BORROMEO, *Clemente VIII*, 254–255.

¹²³ BAUMGARTNER, *Change and Continuity in the French Episcopate*, 182–195; BERGIN, *The Making of the French Episcopate*, 431–435 and 457–459.

The mental establishment of Gallicanism, which hindered the launch of the Catholic modernisation, was created by Pierre Pithou's work, *Les libertés de l'Église gallicane* from 1594. The volume concluded the Gallican fundamental liberties in 84 points. Relying upon this, the canonists and theologians of the so-called Parisian school of the beginning of seventeenth century emphatically expressed the canonical independence of the diocesan authority. Apart from the episcopalist interpretation of Trent, not only did they endeavour to limit the papal primacy, but they also wanted to extend the royal rights. They share the view that the monarch did not have spiritual authority over the Church, yet, he is responsible for the benefit of the Church. By divine rights, his "crown" bears the prestige to be independent from the pope in every respect.¹²⁴

Richelieu so unscrupulously used Gallicanism as pressure against the Papacy that the moderation and backing of Gallicanism inseparably followed the political relations towards the Holy See. Until 1626, he set no restrictions upon the anti-Rome meetings. However, in the course of the conflicts of Mantua, where the pope supported – almost openly – the French, he did so. After 1632, then especially after 1635 the relation worsened. It was marked by Urban VIII's deeds: he refused the red hat of father Joseph, the Grey Eminence; he had Mazarin wait until 1641;¹²⁵ in 1634 he prevented Richelieu's bishoprics of Speyer, with which he would have had the chance to win a German ecclesiastical electorate.¹²⁶

Richelieu's actions were influenced by his conflict with Cardinal Berulle, which ended by the end of the 1620s. Berulle solely wanted the triumph of Catholicism over Protestantism, while Richelieu desired to establish the French monarchy on sound foundations and to gain the European hegemony. Berulle died in 1629, therefore Richelieu – who in his Protestant inner and foreign politics practically followed those principles that were later put down in the Peace of Westphalia – could freely and fully realise his ideas.¹²⁷

The regulation on the basis of the Concordat of Bologna, according to which for the canonical institution of the benefices the French clergy had to obtain a bull from Rome, was always extremely unpopular, though – in close connection to the political events – it especially led to numerous protests at the end of the 1630s. At that time Richelieu contemplated renouncing the rules of the concordat as an inconsistent regulation with former Church disciplines, and restoring the chapters' right of electing a bishop. Shortly afterwards, the idea of summoning a national council arose, on which the monarch would have resigned his *iura regalia* practiced over the dioceses. In return, he would have obtained the right to fill the Church benefices without the contribution of the Holy See. Later, it was

¹²⁴ MARC VENARD, *Ultramontaine or Gallican? The French Episcopate at the End of the Sixteenth Century*, *The Jurist* 52 (1992) 142–161; PIERRE BLET, *Jésuites et libertés gallicanes en 1611*, *AHSI* 24 (1955) 2–26 [an abstract in Latin]; furthermore [IDEM], *Jésuites Gallicans au XVIIe siècle?*, *AHSI* 39 (1960) 55–84.

¹²⁵ Cf. BLET, *Correspondance du Ranuccio Scotti*, 40–52.

¹²⁶ COGNER, *Das kirchliche Leben in Frankreich*, 14–15 and 69–73; BIRELEY, *The Refashioning of Catholicism*, 91–95.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.* and FRITZ DICKMANN, *Rechtsgedanke und Machtpolitik bei Richelieu. Studien an neuentdeckten Quellen*, *HZ* 184 (1963) 265–319; ERICH HASSINGER, *Das politische Testament Richelieus*, *HZ* 173 (1952) 485–503.

also brought up that Richelieu would have been the patriarch of Gallia or the West, with similar rights as the Eastern patriarchs. Apart from the theological questions, this would have meant that the French Church system would have been completely independent from Rome, of which primate would have regarded only as honorary.¹²⁸

With the support of the cardinal, the Gallican publication activity was resumed again at the end of the 1630s. In 1639, the Dupuy brothers questioned the papal privileges, moreover the privileges of the clergy, in their bulky volumes provided by rich documentation.¹²⁹ In the company of eighteen bishops, Cardinal La Rochefoucauld and Nuncio Bolognetti enforced strict censorship against the book, which was allowed by Richelieu, however, he let the authors escape. In parallel, in connection with the canonical processes, the parliament of Paris raised objections to the papal activities on the territory of the country and found the practice of the papal authority realized in the examinations conducted by the nuncio unacceptable. As Richelieu did not want to get involved into this question, the Holy See could defend its statement, namely, the examination was not a matter of jurisdiction, but a simple information gathering to enable the pope to decide upon the royal nominees' canonical institution in the possession of this knowledge. True, the nuncios – not like in Spain – hardly ever took a part in the appointments. Mostly, they supported the suitable nominees only with recommendations; therefore the procedure could be conducted in Rome faster and with moderated expenses. On the basis of other informal information, the selection of the nominees sympathising with the Gallican and Jansenist views, along with the refusal of the confirmation, was the task of the Curia. The practice of turning to the State courts instead of the local Church tribunals (*appel come d'abus*) on account of abuses was also a problem in connection with the jurisdiction of the nuncio.¹³⁰

The crisis did not involve graver consequences owing to the activity of the congregation, which was entrusted in 1640 with the aversion of the attack against the nunciature of Paris and with the management of the royal declarations related to the questions of Church life, such as the matrimonial rights and the observance of the regulations of Trent. The schism was avoided, and a series of *breves* had Louis XIII keep the regulations of canon law.¹³¹

¹²⁸ COGNER, *Das kirchliche Leben in Frankreich*, 69–73.

¹²⁹ *Traité des droits et libertés de l'Église gallicane* and *Preuves des libertés de l'Église gallicane...*

¹³⁰ COGNER, *Das kirchliche Leben in Frankreich*, 69–73 and BLET, *Correspondance du Ranuccio Scotti*, 11–20; BERGIN, *The Making of the French Episcopate*, 62; cf. also PIERRE BLET, *Le nonce en France au XVII^e siècle. Ambassadeur et délégué apostolique*, *Révue d'Historie diplomatique* 88 (1974) 223–258. The monographic analysis of the appeals to the secular tribunals: P.G. CARON, *L'appello per abuso* (Raccolta di Studi della Rivista «Il Diritto Ecclesiastico» 3), Milano 1954. – The earlier long wrangling concerning the accreditation of the nuncio of Brussels cannot be connected with the question of jurisdiction. The cardinal infant who ruled the Low Countries gave the following answer to Urban VIII, who forbade – by referring to the bull of residence – the Habsburg cardinal's Roman agent's being a bishop. BRULEZ, *La crise dans les relations entre le Saint-Siège et les Pays-Bas*, 63–104.

¹³¹ The French proposals to avoid openly breaking the relations often occurred in the meetings of the congregation (*Optati Galli de cavendo schismate*). PIERRE BLET, *La Congregation des Affaires de France 1640*, *Mélanges Tisserant* IV, 59–105.

Although, the manifestations of the French hegemony over the Papacy lacked all the theoretical background in the second half of the century, after some two-decade long silence, the Gallican publication activity revived in the 1660s. The movement of Sorbonne elicited Rome's prohibitive and negative reaction (the bull *Cum ad aures*, 1665), similarly to the one towards Jansenism. The practical measures of the French crown did not wait long. In 1673, then in 1675, Louis XIV extended the force of the regales, besides the ones in Northern-France, over a further sixty bishoprics. In practice this meant the treasury use of the vacant dioceses' incomes and, except the parishes, the right of conferring smaller benefices which belonged to the bishoprics. Moreover, the Sun King required the right to appoint all the bishops of his country.

His efforts generated heated legal and theological debates, which divided the French clergy, as well. While the two Clements, by learning from Alexander VII's humiliation, tried to avoid the clash with the king's strong personality, besides, the Altieri Pope did not bestow attention on the problem of the regales, Innocent XI proved to be obstinate also in these matters. When two French bishops – who actually leant to Jansenism –, Nicolas Pavillon and François Caulet resisted the royal decrees and asked the help of the newly elected pope, the Odescalchi Pope immediately wanted to abolish the French monarch's regulations. However, the part-congregation, which was set up to examine the case (Agostino Favoriti was the secretary, its members were Cardinal Ottoboni, Carpegna and Albizzi), warned the pope against too determined a demeanour.¹³² Yet, their worry just delayed the reaction of Innocent XI. In January 1679, then in March 1680 the pope protested against the French monarch's motions against the canon law in harsh *breves*. Louis XIV, though after the compliance of Clement X he took the pope's steadfastness as a personal offence, was satisfied only with a polite evasive answer. However, on 13 January 1681, when the pope again castigated the French Church abuses on a consistory, Louis XIV summoned the French clergy's assembly in Paris for the purpose of preparing a national council, which was followed by another meeting in greater strength in October 1681.¹³³

In the next February–March, the Gallican theses, codified by Jacques-Bénigne Bossuet, were recognised here. The *Declaratio Cleri Gallicani* stated: 1. The pope had only spiritual jurisdiction over the secular monarchs and monarchs – whose power was derived directly from God – and did not have either direct, or indirect *potestas*. 2. His rights practiced over the Church of the French monarch's country should be interpreted as expansible; however, in spiritual matters the pope had full authority, yet he was subject to the ecumenical council. 3. Furthermore, the pope's authority was also limited by the canons, laws accepted by the Church, moreover, in France by the ancient Gallican customs, as well.

¹³² The term of *congregatio particularis* has already appeared with reference to De Luca's role. The events: M. DUBRUEL, *Innocent XI et l'extension de la régale d'après la correspondance confidentielle du cardinal Pio avec Léopold I*, *Revue des Questions Historiques*, n. s. 37 (1907) 101–137; [IDEM], *Les congrégations des affaires de France sous le pape Innocent XI*, *RHE* 22 (1926) 273–310 and 23 (1927) 44–64 and 502–522; ROSA, *La «scarsella di Nostro Signore»*, 842–844; MATTEUCCI, *Il papato di fronte all'assolutismo*, 711–717.

¹³³ On the basis of Nuncio Varese and *uditore* Lauri's correspondence, the crisis of 1681–1682 is discussed in detail by: PIERRE BLET, *La nonciature de France et la crise gallicane*, *Kurie und Politik*, 98–115.

4. The papal decisions related to the faith were infallible only if they had been recognised and approved by the whole Church.

The printed versions of the resolutions, which were made unconditionally obligatory on everybody in France, were widely circulated already in April.

Innocent XI indignantly learnt the events and regarded the resolutions as invalid. After all, for the sake of his successful anti-Ottoman plans, he found the publication of the bull *Cum primum*, which was prepared by the experts of the Holy Office, advisable to be postponed.¹³⁴ Moreover, after a longer pause, he sent a nuncio (Angelo Ranuzzi) to the French capital in April 1683, which was kept putting off due to his righteous indignation about the unworthy burial of Pompero Varese, the former legate of Paris.¹³⁵ The total restoration of the diplomatic relations, however, could not moderate the tense in the Church politics, which was increased by the cold Roman reception of the Edict of Nantes's revocation of 1685, since Rome saw in this action the further strengthening of the State Church's tendencies.¹³⁶ The direct answer of the pope to the Gallican clauses was only that he refused the newly appointed bishop, who participated in the meeting, in the canonical institution. In return, Louis XIV did not let the others turn to Rome for their bulls. By 1688, there were some thirty-five bishoprics vacant.¹³⁷

Alexander VII, who as the secretary of the Inquisition dealt severely not only with the quietists, but at the beginning also with the regalists, who saved the royal rights of the French monarch, in spite of the gestures made to the Sun King, followed the behaviour of his predecessor at the beginning of his pontificate. As a result of his political isolation and in consideration of the fact that due to the lack of consecrated bishops, the social positions of the Gallicans further strengthened, the pope finally, after long hesitation, gave the canonical confirmation to several nominees of Louis XIV. In return, the monarch withdrew his support for the articles of 1682, which enabled their papal annulment (*Inter multiplices*, 31 January 1691).¹³⁸ The other sign of the French-papal relations' consolidation was that Innocent XII, immediately at the beginning of his pontificate, in 1692–1693, confirmed all the bishops – even those who signed the four Gallican articles –, moreover, he handled the archbishop of Cambria's right of appointment over the Sun King, with which he legitimated the conquest during the wars in the Low Countries. They could

¹³⁴ In contradiction to the Gallican theses the Hungarian clergy, more precisely Primate György Szelepcsényi personally stood up for the pope in his pastoral letter. GÁBOR ADRIÁNYI, *Die angebliche ungarische Nationalsynode von 1682*, *Annuaire Historiae Conciliorum* 27–28 (1995–1996) 841–851.

¹³⁵ The published documents of his nunciature: BRUNO NEVEN (éd.), *Correspondance du nonce en France Angelo Ranuzzi (1683–1689). I: 1683–1686. II: 1687–1689* (Acta Nuntiaturae Gallicae 10–11), Rome 1973, the analysis of the Gallican "peak crisis" under his service: 47–171.

¹³⁶ MENNITI IPPOLITO, *Immacenzo XI*, 382.

¹³⁷ PIERRE BLET, *Innocent XI et l'assemblée du clergé de France de 1682. La rédaction du bref „Paternae Charitatis"*, *AHP* 7 (1969) 329–377 [abstract in Latin]; [IDEM], *Louis XIV et le Saint Siège à la lumière de deux publications récentes*, *AHP* 12 (1974) 309–338 [abstract in Latin]; COGNER, *Das kirchliche Leben in Frankreich*, 74–80.

¹³⁸ PETRUCCI, *Alessandro VIII*, 391–392.

not come to an agreement only in connection to the regales. Until the French Revolution, in this respect, a *modus vivendi* developed, which favoured the French monarchs.¹³⁹

In the German States, there did not evolve a national Church, like in France or Spain, but numerous territorial Churches developed. They were headed by bishops and archbishops, who had ecclesiastical and often sovereign secular authority. On German soil, the opposition to the Roman centralism was deeply rooted already since the Council of Constance. This also became one of the sources of the Protestant confessionalisation, and it did not disappear completely from the Catholic territories, either. The antipathy against the papal centralisation revived at the beginning of the seventeenth century. However, such a strong mental background that the Gallicanism offered to France never occurred. The episcopalist interpretation of the program of Trent found a breeding ground owing to the individual bishop-landlord territories, true, this evolved into a somewhat consistent movement, the so-called Febronianism, only in the eighteenth century. On the other hand, the Papacy could avoid the main danger, the election of a Protestant emperor and was able to keep the vital Catholic State structures in the *Imperium*, even if these were shaken by the Peace of Westphalia in many places.¹⁴⁰

The basis of the German Catholicism in the early modern period was laid down by the Concordat of Vienna (1448) by Frederick III (1440–1493). The election of the bishops, including the imperial ecclesiastical electors, remained mostly the right of the cathedral chapters. Yet, the pope could interpose his veto here as well, if the nominee did not meet the necessary requirements. The chapters' right to fill the episcopal sees became firmly established for centuries in the German States. In contrast to the appointed bishops of the monarchs (*episcopi nominati*) – according to canon law, they were only nominees –, the elected bishops of the chapters (*episcopi electi*) had certain rights even before the canonical institution: their election could be annulled only by the pope and they could use their non-liturgical insignia even before their consecration. Above all, they could practice all those spheres of authority, with which the chapter owned at the time of vacancy: namely, except for the spiritual and liturgical functions that required the episcopal consecration, the ecclesiastical (*in spiritualibus*) and the secular (*in temporalibus*) jurisdiction.¹⁴¹

¹³⁹ AGO, *Innocenzo XII*, 403.

¹⁴⁰ Cf. FRITZ VIEGNER, *Gallikanismus und episkopalistische Strömungen im deutschen Katholizismus zwischen Tridentinum und Vaticanum. Studien zur Geschichte der Lehre von dem Universalepiskopat und der Unfehlbarkeit des Papstes*, HZ III (1913) 495–581, 503–435; HANSGEORG MOLITOR, *Die untridentinische Reform. Anfänge katholischer Erneuerung in der Reichskirche*, *Ecclesia Militans* I, 499–512; HEINRICH LUTZ, *Die Konfessionsproblematik außerhalb des Reiches und in der Politik des Papsttums*, ARG 56 (1965) 209–227.

¹⁴¹ All in detail: KONRAD REPGEN, *Der Bischof Zwischen Reformation, Katholischer Reform und Konfessionsbildung (1515–1650)*; and HERIBERT RAAB, *Bischof und Fürst der Germania Sacra zwischen westfälischen Frieden und Säkularisation (1650–1803)*, *Der Bischof in seiner Zeit, Bischofstypus und Bischofsideal im Spiegel der Kölner Kirche. Festgabe für Joseph Kardinal Höffner, Erzbischof von Köln* (hrsg. v. Peter

The concordat of 1448 let the Holy See keep the direct right to appoint the owners of several German benefices. Rome could reserve the filling of those benefices with full powers, of which bearer died in the Curia; of which owner was displaced, deprived or replaced by the pope; or whose election was invalidated. The same held for the cardinals, legates, internuncios, papal officials' German benefices, for those Germans who were in curial service or who died on the way to Rome and those who got into possession with papal permission since any incompatibility. In return, the Apostolic See renounced the granting of the capitular senior dignitaries' right of conferring benefices.¹⁴²

The contract with Frederick III did not limit the influx of the Church taxes and annates into Rome. In the course of the Protestant reformation, much more money went to Rome from the German States than from Spain or France, which the Germans were well aware of. In parallel, the German secular princes gained significant influence over certain local Churches already before Luther. In 1446, Frederick III, for instance, obtained the right of appointment of six bishoprics and some hundred smaller benefices in the hereditary provinces. This circle increased further on. The possibility of numerous cloisters' visitation and reformation was also the result of the compromise. The concordat of 1447 with the Elector of Brandenburg relinquished three bishoprics' privilege of filling along with numerous canonicates. The Elector of Saxony also acquired similar privileges.¹⁴³

Luther's aim was to radicalise and elaborate an already existing practice; to realise the reform of the Church by the emperor and the secular princes. The principle *cuius regio eius religio* of the Peace of Augsburg in 1555 fully entrusted the princes with their territories' religious regulation. The pope neither confirmed this, nor did he reject it, however, he urged the princes to make use of their rights to regulate the religion and to consolidate Catholicism in their principality. It should be noted that in the Protestant

Berglar – Odilo Engels), Köln 1986, 245–314 and 315–347; finally comprehensively BIRELEY, *The Refashioning of Catholicism*, 75.

¹⁴² AUGUST FRANZEN, *Eine Krise der deutschen Kirche im 17. Jahrhundert?*, RQ 49 (1954) 56–III, 67; KINDERMANN, *Das landesfürstliche Ernennungsrecht*, 86–89.

¹⁴³ On certain concordats and the practice in the early modern period *ibid.*, furthermore (with the data of numerous sub-studies) JOHANN RAINER, *Die Politik der Bischofsernennung in Österreich 1648–1803*, RQ 85 (1990) 225–235, 225–232; PETER GRADAUER, *Fragen um das Patronatsrecht in Österreich unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Diözese Linz*, Österreichisches Archiv für Kirchenrecht 18 (1967) 164–177. The elaboration of the Austrian relations with positivist profoundness: LUDWIG WAHRMUND, *Das Kirchenpatronatsrecht und seine Entwicklung in Oesterreich. I: Die kirchliche Rechtsentwicklung. II: Die staatliche Rechtsentwicklung*, Wien 1894–1896. A case study – among many – on the problems of the filling of the bishoprics from the seventeenth century: JOHANN RAINER, *Die päpstlichen Provisionen für Bremen und Magdeburg im Jahre 1628*, Römische Kurie. Kirchliche Finanzen. Vatikanisches Archiv II, 727–740. On the problems of the imperial Catholic confessionalisation a still exemplary elaboration: AUGUST FRANZEN, *Der Wiederaufbau des kirchlichen Lebens im Erzbistum Köln unter Ferdinand von Bayern Erzbischof von Köln 1612–1650* (Reformationsgeschichtliche Studien und Texte 69–71), Münster 1941. – On the difficulties of the dioceses' foundation, also JOHANN RAINER, *Die Entwicklung der Diözesaneinteilung Innerösterreichs*, Die Gegenreformation in Innerösterreich, 267–278; and *Projekte zur Errichtung*, 113–136.

parts the Church had even more State control than in the Catholic territories, as it is shown by the limited but legal results of the agreement signed by the duke of Bavaria – for that matter, it was the last in the series of the early concordats – in 1583.¹⁴⁴

The supposedly solved questions of 1448 constituted the source of the general problems of the German-papal relations, still in the seventeenth century. In the case of smaller benefices – if it was supported by law – Rome always endeavoured to enforce the reservations. Yet, the imperial bishops spared no money and energy to obtain the right of conferring benefices of their diocese-dioceses (*indulta conferendi beneficia per Dioeceses curae meae commissas* – said the related phrase of the petitions) in the form of personal papal *indultum*. Besides, the papal intervention to the election of bishops was regular. The gravest incident was the filling of the bishoprics of Paderborn in 1659–1661. Alexander VII, against the canons, managed the election of a locally residing bishop.¹⁴⁵ Above all, the Holy See firmly forbade the accumulation of benefices: neither the bishoprics', nor the canonries' and abbeys'. These happened already in the spirit of Trent, yet, since the curial practice was also characterised by many abuses, the strenuous protests of the German clergy, who had counter interests, were understandable to a certain degree.¹⁴⁶

The other field of the conflicts was constituted by the dispensations. It was never accepted in the German Church that in “external forum” dispensation could be given exclusively by the Apostolic See. On the basis of the early medieval tradition, the German bishops continuously employed this privilege. (Until the twelfth century the metropolitans and bishops could indeed give dispensation to disobey Church rules; from Innocent III [1198–1216] the Curia maintained this right.) In the first half of the seventeenth century, Rome tried to solve the problem by automatically bestowing the faculties on the German bishops for the usual five-year-long term. Despite the resilience of the Curia they normally failed to apply for prolongation. Mainly due to this unique practice of dispensations, the sharpest fight of jurisdiction with the papal nuncios – who also lived with these faculties – developed in the German territories.

In addition, there were also heated debates on the appeal to higher tribunal concerning the trials of the ecclesiastical courts. The bishop of Lüttich, for instance, did not know, or did not want to know whether the appeals had to be forwarded to the metropolitan court, to the nuncio or directly to Rome. His case was hardly anomalous. The justification of the nunciatures' jurisdiction was roughly accepted in ecclesiastical cases, though, the civil affairs (enforcement of last wills, the administration of a will) were followed by strives. The nuncios' efforts to extend their jurisdiction were based on the tradition of the Tridentine reform nunciatures and on several exempt insti-

¹⁴⁴ BIRELEY, *The Refashioning of Catholicism*, 76–77.

¹⁴⁵ FRANZEN, *Eine Krise der deutschen Kirche*, 67–69; on the crises of the middle of the seventeenth century, more: JÜRGENSMEIER, *Johann Philipp von Schönborn (1605–1673) und die Römische Kurie*, 209–288.

¹⁴⁶ On the various types and techniques of the German benefice-accumulation: RUDOLF REINHARDT, *Die Kumulation von Kirchenämtern in der deutschen Kirche der Frühen Neuzeit*, Papsttum und Kirchenreform, 589–512.

tutions, namely those which were free from the jurisdiction of the diocesan bishop. The other reasons for the conflict between the hierarchy and the papal legates can be found in the lack of a central authority, which threw hindrances upon "State interests". In the case of Luzern, for instance, the urban magistracy, belligerent towards the bishop, proved to be the effectual ally of their accredited nuncio.¹⁴⁷

In concert with each other the three ecclesiastical electors raised objections to the jurisdiction of the nuncios at Urban VIII, already in 1643. Their protest was renewed in 1653. The episcopal tendency started to spread after Westphalia. In 1660, the archbishop of Cologne entertained the thought of summoning a German national council. The bishop of Strasbourg, Franz Egon von Fürstenberg, who was regarded as the follower of the French orientation, thought about to establish an all-German, independent (from Rome) system of conferring benefices.

The opposition of Church politics, however, was not to the Papacy and the Church, there were only sub-problems. After *Tridentinum* the unity of the Church and the Papacy proved to be rather strong. This community could not be assaulted by the movements of the seventeenth century against the papal centralism, even in the German principalities, they were practically episodic. The idea of the united imperial Church (*Reichskirche*) headed by the emperor, in the frame of the *Germania Sacra*'s idea, occurred seriously only in the eighteenth century.¹⁴⁸

The relations of the Papacy and the particular Churches were even more eventful and richer than the above detailed ones; not to mention the fact that Ireland, the Spanish-Low Countries, Portugal and Poland for instance were not mentioned and in the previous chapters they were just sporadically cited. Yet, it might be unnecessary to list the data like in an encyclopaedia: hopefully the main courses, processes and characteristics are well demonstrated in all the chosen fields of the history of the Baroque Papacy.

¹⁴⁷ *Gallikanismus und episkopalistische Strömungen*, 520–523; FRANZEN, *Eine Krise der deutschen Kirche*, 61–67; MAIER, *Die Luzerner Nuntiatur und die Konstanzer Bischöfe*, 513–536; BRAUN, *Der Lausanner Bischof*, 59–84. On the monographic positivist elaboration of the faculties' problems: LEO MERGENTHEIM, *Die Quinquennial-fakultäten pro foro externo. Beitrag zur Technique der Gegenreformation* (Kirchenrechtliche Abhandlungen 52–53), Amsterdam 1965². The fights with the nuncios and the exempt monastic congregations were abundantly recorded by the *ad limina* reports sent to Rome: AUGUST FRANZEN, *Die Romberichte der Kölner Erzbischöfe im 17. Jahrhundert*, RQ 53 (1958) 185–220, 194–196. An early example for the debate with the nuncios of Vienna over jurisdiction: HERMANN TÜCHLE, *Die Wiener Karfreitagskommunion von 1630. Zugleich ein Beitrag zum Früh-Episkopalismus*, Festschrift Franz Loidl, I, 396–413. In parallel to the spread of the Church administrative legal claims, the elaboration of any Catholicising programs of comprehensive nature regarded as a rare bird among the imperial nuncios. An outstanding exception – true, in the Hungarian relation – was Gaspare Mattei's, the nuncio of Vienna. PÉTER TUSOR, *A pápai diplomácia javaslatai 1639-ben a Szentszék részvételére a magyarországi katolikus restaurációban* [*The Proposals of the Papal Diplomacy in 1639 for the Holy See's Participation in the Catholic Restoration of Hungary*], A Ráday Gyűjtemény Évkönyve IX, ed. by Lajos Für, Budapest 1999, 19–38.

¹⁴⁸ FRANZEN, *Eine Krise der deutschen Kirche*, 72 and 108–111.

Hungary was not discussed either, which can be explained from another angle. Since, by not underestimating the results of the positivist historiography, the relations of Hungary to the Apostolic See of the early modern period are awaiting to be explored in their real profundity.¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁹ Apart from the already noted sub-studies, two preliminary outlines: PÉTER TUSOR: *A magyar Egyház és Róma a 17. században* [*The Hungarian Church and Rome in the Seventeenth Century*], *Vigilia* 64 (1999) 503–513; [IDEM], *A magyar hierarchia és a pápaság a 17. században (Problémák és fordulópontok)* [*The Hungarian Hierarchy and the Papacy in the Seventeenth Century (Problems and Turning Points)*], *Századok* 136 (2002) 527–545.

VII

Other Perspectives

Our analysis is more or less complete, as it was stated by the last sentences of the previous chapter. Naturally, the accent did not fall on completeness, since as we saw such important circumstances, like Clement VIII's deep piety and lifestyle; Clement X's humble, sympathetic and willing personality; Urban VIII, Alexander VII and Clement IX's poetic vein, lyrical poetry did not occur.¹ However, these are the complement of a holistic picture just as well as the ability to see the historical events in their entirety: in all respects, the Borghese pontificate, which formed the actual overture for our time travel, was at the same time as the period of transition and counterbalancing. There was no such reform spirit like under Pius V and Sixtus V, though, the Barberinis' loss of power and their dynastic policy were still embryonic.²

The final evaluation of the Barberini era is much more complicated than the elaboration of Paul V or Gregory XV's short pontificate. It is mainly due to the impossibility of such dissimilar categories' comparison, like the measure of the aid spent on the wars of Castro, the nepotism, or on the futile attempt of an Irish revolt (this cost 120 thousand *scudi*), and like the successes of Catholicisation in Bohemia and Moravia; or like on the one hand the suppression of the "female Jesuits", on the other hand the espousal of other orders, like the French Vincentians and the Pauline Fathers. The simultaneous handling of the repression of the Spanish influence in Italy and the defence of the sovereignty of the Ecclesiastical State, in the meantime the realistic administration of the divided – in confessionalisation and in bloody battles – Europe's problems meant an unsolvable dilemma not only in the discussed period, but also for the present day historians. However, there is no doubt that Urban VIII's traditional and strictly juridical attitude and his secret game with Richelieu in 1628–1632, which did not remain hidden from the Habsburgs, caused the most detrimental consequences; moreover they delivered the Holy See over to the French. Their effects were already felt by the Barberini Pope in the early 1640s, when that Jules Mazarin became the head of the French politics who, as Giulio, used to be the active participant of the papal foreign affairs' manoeuvres. What is more, after hav-

¹ BORROMEIO, *Clemente VIII*, 253; OSBAT, *Clemente X*, 367; AEMILIUS SPRINGHETTI, *Urbanus VIII P.M. poeta Latinus et hymnorum breviarum emendator*, AHP 6 (1968) 163–190; [IDEM], *Alexander VII P.M. poeta Latinus*, AHP 1 (1963) 265–294.

² REINHARDT, *Paolo V*, 291–292.

ing failed to approach the Spanish or German world, Urban VIII's isolation became extended by the end of his pontificate.³

Neither could his four successors break this overwhelming isolation. The Curia could make progress only in its alteration adjusting to confessional and political conditions. The role of the youthful *squadron volante* is undeniable – similarly to the other scenes of curial life – in this; despite the fact that the restructuring of the papal administration established under Sixtus V was independent from the factions of the College of Cardinals, from certain popes and cardinals; it went along the inner logic which was asserted in the long run.⁴

In addition to all, the possibility of the all-European contribution, realised under the shadow of the Ottoman threat, was more and more given shape by the beginning of the 1670s. The most outstanding pope of the seventeenth century was unambiguously Innocent XI. He set the execution of three equally urgent programs as the focus of his pontificate: 1. the rehabilitation of the budget as an answer to the unfavourable economical and financial tendencies; 2. the reorganisation of the Curia in harmony with the changed social environment, and the dissolution of useless offices and mechanisms; 3. finally the solving of international problems: namely the stopping of the Ottoman expansion and the handling of Louis XIV's aggressive politics.⁵ His strong personality could change the "old-established customs", though it opened too many fronts. At home, he was against nepotism, in foreign policy against the French who prepared for the final showdown with the Spanish, and the Ottomans. The reconstruction of finances was successful; however, he could not completely abolish nepotism yet. The expulsion of the Turkish forces from Europe succeeded ambiguously, the launch of an overall crusade failed to happen. Finally, the liberation from the French tutelage was brought about only by his pontificate, and he had to pay a huge price for every result. However, he could not lastingly restore the leading position of the Holy See in the scene of European politics; he established the central role that temporarily stopped the marginalisation of power. Innocent XI endeavoured to reconsider the place and role of the Holy See in Europe on moral grounds. His efforts fell through due to the French oppositions.⁶ Similarly to the restoration of the State budget, he succeeded in choosing his colleagues, it was emphatic when he ensured his succession in the person of Antonio Pignatelli by creating him a cardinal. After the standstill caused by the Ottobonis, Pignatelli not only strengthened the inner reforms from 1692, but continued them, as well.⁷

This successful consolidation, however, of which professionalism determined the aspect of the papal court until the twentieth century, partly until these days, was in-

³ LUTZ, *Urbano VIII*, 316.

⁴ This latter aspect is emphasised by: ANTONIO MENNITI IPPOLITO, *La Curia romana al tempo di Gregorio Barbarigo*, Gregorio Barbarigo patrizio veneto vescovo e cardinale nella tarda controriforma, 129–146, 129–134, 132.

⁵ MENNITI IPPOLITO, *Innocenzo XI*, 373.

⁶ MENNITI IPPOLITO, *Il tramonto della Curia nepotista*, 165–166.

⁷ MENNITI IPPOLITO, *Innocenzo XI*, 387.

commensurable with the pioneering development of the Catholic reform at the end of the sixteenth century. At the end of a complex political, mental, economical and social course, Rome – as well as all the confessions – could not act the role of the radical modernisation's main force. As the careful rationalisation of religion swung into an all-embracing secularisation, the economical and social – let us say – determinations, despite its superb position, deprived the Papal State also of its Italian leading role. But for this process, the unification of Italy would have been realised before the nineteenth century with the guidance of the popes.⁸ Yet, the century of the “triumph of reason and sense”, the “evolution of the modern great powers” and the “despotism and revolution”, did not yield the crown of Italy for the successors of Saint Peter, but the extreme intensification of the problems.

On the field of politics, these were represented by the War of the Spanish Succession and its heavy consequences. In the autumn of 1708 and at the beginning of 1709, the Habsburgs forced Clement XI (1700–1721) to acknowledge the greediest Habsburg, or rather Austrian, demands ever.⁹ The French problems of diplomacy and protocol in the late seventeenth century were replaced by the clashes with the Habsburgs.¹⁰ Although, this was not the period of Enlightened absolutism yet, despite the grave political tensions, there was a certain spiritual unity with the deeply religious Charles VI (III) (1711–1740);¹¹ Clement XI's dream of liberating Jerusalem created no stir at all. Eugene of Savoy's glorious victory at Belgrade and the Treaty of Passarowitz of 1718 put an end to the Ottoman expansion.¹² The French revolutionary occupation temporarily perpetrated the same on the Papal State, which did not play a single role in the great conflicts of the eighteenth century. Bonaparte wanted to lay hands also on the history of Papacy by removing the archives of the Holy See.¹³

In the economic field impoverishment, in the social field the total lack of mobilization became determining, in the papal court neo-nepotism reoccurred, however without grave consequences. Clement XI did not support his relatives; his secretary was the loyal Fabrizio Paolucci; though, by the “request of the cardinals” he appointed Annibale Al-

⁸ Cf. DELUMEAU, *Political and Administrative Centralization*, 303–304.

⁹ F. POMETTI, *Studi sul pontificato di Clemente XI 1700–1721*. I, ASRSP 22 (1899) 278–457. II: *L'ultima lotta della Cristianità contro l'Osmanesimo*, 22 (1899) 109–179. III, 23 (1900) 239–276 and 449–515, I, 293–457; NORBERT HUBER, *Österreich und der Hl. Stuhl*, Wien 1967, 27–35; MATTEUCCI, *Il papato di fronte all'assolutismo*, 722–725.

¹⁰ HUBER, *Österreich und der Hl. Stuhl vom Ende des spanischen Erbfolgekrieges*, 88–107 and 108–147.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 206–212; see also RUDOLF REINHARD, *Der Kampf der römischen Kurie gegen die nicht-königlichen Ersten Bitten in der deutschen Reichskirche (I. Hälfte des 18. Jahrhunderts)*, *Zeitschrift für Rechtsgeschichte* 86 (Kanonistische Abteilung), 282–321; LEO JUST, *Die Römische Kurie und das Reich unter Kaiser Karl VII (1740–1745)*, *HZ* 153 (1932) 389–400.

¹² PETROCCHI, *La politica della Santa Sede*, 99–100.

¹³ REMIGIUS RITZLER, *Die Verschleppung der päpstlichen Archive nach Paris unter Napoleon I. und deren Rückführung nach Rom in den Jahren 1815 bis 1817*, *RHM* 6–7 (1962–1964) 144–190.

bani cardinal in 1713. Innocent XIII's (Michelangelo dei Conti, 1721–1724) secretary of State became the experienced Giorgio Spinola, however he made his brother, Bernardo Maria cardinal at the first chance. This was the first after long decades. The threats of the rebirth of nepotism were unfounded. After his death in 1724, he was not even given a tomb in the Saint Peter's Basilica, which was a contemporary norm among the cardinals and papal family as a posthumous gratitude.

The pontificate of the ascetic pope, Benedict XIII (Vincenzo Maria Orsini, 1724–1730) is perfectly described by the phrase of Ludwig von Pastor, namely it is not enough to be a good regular for becoming a good pope. The Orsini Pope entrusted his surroundings of Benevento with the substance of governing. (Before his election, he used to be the archbishop of this place.) Niccolò Maria Lercari became his secretary of State in 1726, however the Curia was effectively led by Niccolò Coscia, the head of the Secretariat of Memorials. The continuous abuses of the "Beneventan party" harmed the prestige of the Apostolic See a lot. According to certain exaggerated estimations, they collected two million *scudi* after just a year. The judgement of their activities cannot be counter-balanced by the fact that the relatives of the pope gained no ground that time. There can hardly be drawn a line between them and nepotism. Also the public opinion of the time would have tolerated the support of the papal relatives more, which could not have appeared in such an extreme form due to the historical preliminaries. Just like the Barberinis, Coscia and his surroundings had to flee from the lynching spirits, spreading in the Eternal City. The trial against him, his excommunication and his ten-year imprisonment in the Castel Sant' Angelo recalled the examples of the Carafas from the middle of the sixteenth century.

Presumably in close connection with the events of the 1730s, the next decade was all about nepotism. Clement XII (Lorenzo Corsini, 1730–1740) could not resist the temptation of granting his nephews. He bestowed the commandership of the papal cavalry on Bartolomeo, the leadership of the Secretariat of Memorials, then the red hat on Neri Corsini. Some fifty years after the publication of the *Decet Romanum Pontificem* there were papal relatives in secular as well as ecclesiastical positions. Not only did the nepotism of Clement XII represent a gentle version – it was impossible that the control of the Secretariat of State would fall into the hands of the nephews instead of Antonio Banchieri, then after 1733 instead of Giacomo Firrao –, but it was also only an intermediate occurrence. The spirit of Innocent XI and XII returned with Benedict XIV (Prospero Lambertini, 1740–1758). The vital pope controlled every case instead of his cardinal Secretaries of State: Valenti Gonzaga and from 1756, Alberico Archinto. Exceptionally, Archinto was kept in his position by the new pope, Clement XIII (Carlo Rezzonico 1758–1769), though, shortly after he died and was succeeded by Cardinal Luigi Torrigiani in 1758.

The reign of Clement XIII proves that the cyclic character of the earlier nepotism appeared also in its more moderated type, in the neo-nepotism of the eighteenth century. After the twenty puritan years of the Lambertini Pope, as one of his first actions, he appointed Carlo Rezzonico (who had similar name) a cardinal and the head

of the Secretariat of Memorials, which could be considered the entail of neo-nepotism. The personage of the late cardinal nephew was not the only one to haunt. In 1765, Abbondio Rezzonico received the toga of Rome's senator, which formed a parallel to Taddeo Barberini's prefecture.

The successor, Clement XIV (Giovanni Antonio Ganganelli, 1769–1774) entrusted the management of the cases to a more ambitious Franciscan, to Innocenzo Buontempi instead of cardinal secretary of State Pallavicini. Pallavicini could not gain significant influence under Pius VI (Giovanni Angelo Braschi), either, just like his successor, Ignazio Boncompagni, who ceded his position to the seventy-two-year old Cardinal Zelada after four years. Pius VI, who immediately removed Buontempi from the Curia with his *motu proprio*, was the last representative of neo-nepotism. Not only did he create Romualdo Onesti-Braschi cardinal in 1786 then the head of the Secretariat of Briefs, but, according to an old custom, he also arranged the marriage of Luigi, his other nephew, with an ancient Roman family, the Falconieri. Likewise, he tried to provide the new aristocratic family. Luigi Braschi obtained the estates of the dissolved Jesuits in Tivoli and by the mediation of Pius VI he became the heir of Amanzio Lepri, the knight of Malta, who possessed a legendary fortune. This case led to an open scandal, since everybody was concerned that the sum of 1.5 million *scudi* was acquired dishonestly by Lepri's father when he was an official of the papal duties. The will was attacked by the relatives in court in 1785. The trial finally ended with the sharing of the considerable heritage between Marianna Lepri and the papal nephew in the year of evil omen, in 1789. The Palazzo Braschi raises a monument to the memory of the last burst of neo-nepotism in the eighteenth century.

In retrospect the bull of Innocent XII with dissolving the profusion of unnecessary offices and with sealing the tap of the incomes' outflow can be regarded as very effective, however, it could not supply a proper frame for the future development. Yet, it produced serious success in the sense that: the peak of neo-nepotism of the eighteenth century, Clement XII and Pius VI's pontificate was far from even the moderated manifestations of the institutionalised nepotism of the sixteenth – seventeenth centuries. Neo-nepotism, however, was absolutely dysfunctional; it restricted only to the support of the relatives, while in the earlier times, as we have seen, the cardinal nephews, for example, played important roles – which could not be filled by anybody else – in the maintenance and representation of the sovereign papal power.

On the other hand, the cardinal secretaries of State, who often replaced the nephews, could not sufficiently control the inner curial dynamics in the eighteenth century, despite their administrative experience gained through their career. The vacuum created by this lack was filled by various concerns, yet never by the relatives of the pope, however, sometimes they – for instance instead of Coscia an Orsini – would have meant a more calming guarantee for directing a less practical or contemplative pope's administration. Consequently, the proposals related to the maintenance of the very moderated and limited (especially in the field of allowances) form of the institutionalised nepotism – in the light of the post-experience – oddly were not that groundless. A role, like that of Alde-

rano Cybo, could not be filled by the cardinal secretaries of State in the eighteenth century yet. In spite of the obvious continuity, the system established by Innocent XI and XII started to function without serious troubles after a century-long gap and it was hallmarked by such names, like Consalvi, Merry del Val, Gasparri, or Eugenio Pacelli, who became later Pius XII (1939–1958) from the position of the secretary of State.¹⁴

In the field of Church life, the intended effect in the question of Jansenism, which already passed the borders of France, was not reached even by the bull *Unigenitus Dei Filius* (1713), which meant to be the final measure. Many Catholics disagreed with its content and they expected its withdrawal, especially under Benedict XIV, the most significant pope of the eighteenth century. In joint forces, Clement XI and Louis XIV had the Port-Royal abbey ruined in vain in 1710, Jansenism influenced the life of the Church more than ever in the following decades. It reached Italy, as well, where complete seminars, like the one in Padua, as well as many cardinals, like Giuseppe Sinelli – who directed the conclave of 1758 – openly sympathised with its theses. Its elements can be found both in Josephinism and in the German Febronianism, which concluded the episcopal ideas. Namely, the Jansenists strikingly bore understanding to the tremendously rationalised administration. They hoped to achieve not only theological reforms with the support of the State, but the “purification” of the Church. The more and more autarchic State expected the spiritual movement to accomplished those tasks that it wanted to impose on the Church in the organisation of the civil society and to press back the property of the Church, which in certain countries reached the 60% of the estates. The close connection between the Jansenist bench of bishops and the State power threatened the total setting the Papacy’s leading role aside, especially in France, Portugal, Naples and to a certain extent Hungary.

The absolutism of the eighteenth century, which relied on the ideology of “Enlightenment” – that imagined any modernisation out of the framework of confessionalisation – could not justify entertaining the Jansenist hopes to make any theology-related changes. The hampering of the intransigent anti-Jansenist and loyal to Rome Jesuits’ missions in Asia and South America (for instance the ban of the Chinese rite and the elimination of the so-called reductions), then their liquidation can hardly be listed here. The names of the secular ministers, the Portuguese Pombal and the Neapolitan Tanucci, who fought for their dissolution, were explicitly entwined with anti-Catholicism. Pius VI’s bull of 1794, *Auctorem fidei* delivered the fatal blow for the Jansenists, who had still triumphed on the council of Pistoia in 1786. It had close connection with the old-new perception that any reform of Catholicism without Rome was not only meaningless but impossible, as well.¹⁵

¹⁴ With further literature on the history of the Papacy in the eighteenth century: MENNITI IPPOLITO, *Il tramonto della Curia nepotista*, 154–158.

¹⁵ KARL OTMAR VON ARETIN, *The Papacy and the Modern World*, London 1970, 15–27, especially 15–20; MATTEUCCI, *Il papato di fronte all’assolutismo*, 726–727 and 728–766.

In contrast to the *ancien régime*'s absolutism, the French Revolution's civil State not only wanted to use the clergy for accomplishing certain tasks, but it wanted to completely integrate it into the system of State bureaucracy.¹⁶ Josephinism was also developed in this sense, therefore the reform of the former system under Leopold II (1790–1792) was impossible, since the Church structures had already infiltrated into the State machinery.¹⁷ However, in spite of the administrative obstacles of the local hierarchies' connection to Rome, the nuncios' limited scope for action and the graver and graver conflicts, the monarchies of the "*ancien régime*" did not fund independent State Churches. They had some sort of relations to the Apostolic See, by giving chance to a spectacular turn at the beginning of the nineteenth century, which was hallmarked by the Holy Alliance.¹⁸

Mauro Cappellari, Camaldolese monk, published his work, *Il trionfo della Santa Sede e della Chiesa* in 1799. The treatise of the later Gregory XVI (1831–1846) already foreshadowed the picture of the Church and Papacy in the age of restoration. Not only did it revive the Papal State which was suspended by the troops of the French Revolution, but it also brought the transitory renaissance of Catholicism, and then led directly to the dogmatisation of the papal infallibility at the First Vatican Council (1869–1870). However, as the political system after the fall of Napoleon became temporary, in the 1860–1870s the State of the Church could neither survive the fatal smiting of liberalism and nationalism. Nevertheless, these blows proved to be ephemeral again due to the consolidation of the Papacy – standing on only spiritual grounds – in the twentieth century.¹⁹

¹⁶ ARETIN, *The Papacy and the Modern World*, 20–21.

¹⁷ KOVÁCS, *Die österreichische Kirche*, 335–349.

¹⁸ UMBERTO DELL'ORTO, *Die Wiener Nuntiatur im 18. Jahrhundert unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Nuntiatur von Giuseppe Garampi (1776–1778)*, Kurie und Politik, 175–207.

¹⁹ In detail: ARETIN, *The Papacy and the Modern World*, 21–243; and an outstanding conclusion: FRANK J. COPPA, *The Modern Papacy since 1789* (Longman History of the Papacy [1]), New York 1998, 17–32. 33–49. 50–66. 67–258.

Appendix

I

The Archontology of the Popes and Important Curial Officials (cca 1600–1700)

Popes¹

Clement VIII

(Ippolito Aldobrandini, 30 January 1592–3 March 1605)

Coronation: 9 February 1592

Leo XI

(Alessandro de' Medici, 1 April 1605–27 April 1605)

Coronation: 10 April 1605

Paul V

(Camillo Borghese, 16 May 1605–28 January 1621)

Coronation: 29 May 1605

Gregory XV

(Alessandro Ludovisi, 9 February 1621–8 July 1623)

Coronation: 14 February 1621

Urban VIII

(Maffeo Barberini, 6 August 1623–29 July 1644)

Coronation: 29 September 1626

Innocent X

(Giovanni Battista Pamphili, 15 September 1644–7 January 1655)

Coronation: 4 October 1644

Alexander VII

(Fabio Chigi, 7 April 1655–22 May 1667)

Coronation: 18 April 1655

¹ Their accurate list of names and their data can be found in numerous clergy registers, archontologies and in the volumes of the annually published *Annuario Pontificio*.

Clement IX

(Giulio Rospigliosi, 20 June 1667–9 December 1669)

Coronation: 27 June 1667

Clement X

(Emilio Altieri, 29 April 1670–22 July 1676)

Coronation: 11 May 1670

Innocent XI

(Benedetto Odescalchi, 21 September 1676–12 August 1689)

Coronation: 4 October 1676

Alexander VIII

(Pietro Ottoboni, 6 October 1689–1 February 1691)

Coronation: 16 October 1689

Innocent XII

(Antonio Pignatelli, 12 July 1691–27 September 1700)

Coronation: 15 July 1691

Cardinal nephews² *Cardinali nipoti*

Scipione (Caffarelli)-Borghese (1605–1621)

Ludovico Ludovisi (1621–1623)

Francesco Barberini (1623–1644)

Camillo Pamphili (1644–1647)

[Francesco Maidalchini (1647)]

Camillo (Astalli)-Pamphili (1650–1653)

Flavio Chigi (1657–1667)

Giacomo Rospigliosi (1667–1669)

Paluzzo (Albertoni)-Altieri (1670–1676)

Pietro Ottoboni (1689–1691)

² I could not find their names in similar list in any archontologies. Their compilation was in accordance with the information and literature of this volume.

Secretariat of State
Segreteria di Stato

Secretaries of State

Erminio Valenti (1605)³
 Lanfranco Margotti (1605–1611)⁴
 Martio Malacrida 1605–1609
 Porfirio Feliciani (1611–1621)
 Giovanni Battista Perugino (1611–1613)
 Giovanni Battista Agucchia (1621–1623)
 Lorenzo Magalotti (1623–1628)⁵
 Lorenzo Azzolini (1628–1632)
 Pietro Benessa (1632–1634)⁶
 Francesco Adriano Ceva (1634–1643)
 Giovanni Battista Spada (1643–1644)

Cardinal secretaries of State

Giovanni Giacomo Panziroli (1644–1651)
 Fabio Chigi (1651–1655)
 Giulio Rospigliosi (1655–1667)
 Decio Azzolini (1667–1669)
 Federico Borromeo (1670–1673)
 Francesco Nerli (1673–1676)
 Alderano Cybo (1676–1689)
 Giovanni Battista Rubini (1689–1691)
 Fabrizio Spada (1691–1700)
 Fabrizio Paolucci (1700–1721)⁷

Secretariat of Briefs
Segreteria dei Brevi

Secretaries

Marcello Vestri Barbiani (1590–1606)

³ Cardinal from 1604.

⁴ Cardinal from 1610.

⁵ Cardinal from 1624.

⁶ As the confidant of the cardinal nephew without actual appointment, as an administrator.

⁷ SEMMLER, *Das päpstliche Staatssekretariat*, 109–123; KRAUS, *Das päpstliche Staatssekretariat*, 70–100; RE, *La Curia Romana*, 74–75; SERAFINI, *Le origini della pontificia segreteria di Stato*, 201–205; WAGNER, *Die Bestände des Archivio della Nunziatura Vienna*, 83–84.

Scipione Cobeluzzi (1606–1623)⁸
 Volpiano Volpio (1623–1627)
 Marco Aurelio Maraldi (1627–1651)⁹
 Francesco Gaetani (1651–1652)
 Gualtiero Gualtieri (1652–1659)
 Stefano Ugolini (1659–1666)
 Giovanni Gualtiero Slusio (1666–1686)¹⁰
 Giovanni Francesco Albani (1687–1700)
 Fabio Olivieri (1700–1738)¹¹

Secretariat of Briefs to Princes
Segreteria dei Brevi ai Principi

Marcello Vestri Barbiani (1590–1603)
 Marzio Malacrida (1603–1605)
 Pietro Strozzi (1605–1618)
 Scipione Cobeluzzi (1618–1621?)¹²
 Giovanni Ciampoli (1621–1632)¹³
 Francesco Herrera (1632–1635)
 Giulio Rospigliosi (1635–1644)
 Felice Contelori (1644)
 Gaspare Simeoni (1644–1648)
 Francesco Nerli (1648–1653)
 Decio Azzolini (1653–1654)
 Natale Rondanini (?–?)
 Mario Spinola (1670?–1697)
 Ulisse Gozzadini (1697–1711)¹⁴

⁸ At KRAUS from 1605.

⁹ At KRAUS until 1649.

¹⁰ Between Slusio, the first cardinal secretary of the Briefs and Giovanni Francesco Albani (the later Clement XI) Giovanni Battista Arrighi was a *prosegretario*.

¹¹ SERAFINI, *Le origini della pontificia segreteria di Stato*, 211–212; KRAUS, *Das päpstliche Staatssekretariat*, 276.

¹² There is also Volpiano Volpio at SERAFINI, which was the result of the division of labour becoming a habit after the occasional personal union between the two secretariats of briefs under Cobeluzzi.

¹³ At KRAUS only from 1622; the data is from JAITNER, where the predecessor of Ciampoli was Gaspare Paloni.

¹⁴ SERAFINI, *Le origini della pontificia segreteria di Stato*, 215–216; KRAUS, *Das päpstliche Staatssekretariat*, 171–176; JAITNER, *Die Hauptinstruktionen Gregors XV.*, 189.

Secretariat of Memorials
Segreteria dei Memoriali

Secretaries

Pietro Pavoni (the beginning of the seventeenth century)
 Francesco Adriano Ceva (1605–1632)¹⁵
 Angelo Geosio (Giori) (1632–1643)
 Giovanni Maria Roscioli (1643–1644)¹⁶
 Giuseppe Frenfanelli (1644–1655)
 Celio Piccolomini (1655–1656)
 Giacomo Filippo Nini (1656–1664)¹⁷
 Nicola Piccolomini (1664–1676)
 Giovanni Battista de Luca (1676–1683)
 Francesco Liberati (1683–1689)
 Raffaele Fabretti (1689–1691)
 Carlo Augusto (Agostino) Fabbroni (1691–1695)
 Giuseppe Gozzadini (1695–1700)
 Curzio Origo (1700–1708)¹⁸

Apostolic Chancery
Cancellaria Apostolica

Vice-chancellors

Alessandro Peretti (1589–1623)
 Ludovico Ludovisi (1623–1632)
 Francesco Barberini (1632–1679)¹⁹
 Pietro Ottoboni (1689–1740)²⁰

¹⁵ At KRAUS only from 1623; at JAITNER the secretary under Gregory XV was the *maestro di Camera* Pietro Pavoni.

¹⁶ Only at KRAUS.

¹⁷ In the meantime, Volumnio Bandinelli had also this office.

¹⁸ SERAFINI, *Le origini della pontificia segreteria di Stato*, 207–208; KRAUS, *Das päpstliche Staatssekretariat*, 277; JAITNER, *Die Hauptinstruktionen Gregors XV.*, 190.

¹⁹ Innocent XI did not have a cardinal nephew; between 1680 and 1689 Cesare Facchinetti undertook the tasks of the vice-chancellor, without bearing the title.

²⁰ RE, *La Curia Romana*, 290–291; HC IV, 58; HC V, 58; WEBER, *Die ältesten päpstlichen Staatshandbücher*, 174–175.

Apostolic Camera
Camera Apostolica

Camerlengos

Pietro Aldobrandini (1599–1621)
Ludovico Ludovisi (1621–1623)
Ippolito Aldobrandini (1623–1638)
Antonio Barberini (1638–1671)²¹
Paluzzo Altieri (1671–1698)
Giovanni Battista Spinola (1698–1719)²²

Apostolic Dataria
Dataria Apostolica

Dataries

Lucio Sasso (1590–1604)
Bernardino Paoloni (1604–1605)
Pompeo Arrigoni (1605–1607)
Michelangelo Tonti (1607–1609)
Aurelio Maraldi (1609–1621)
Francesco Sacrati (1621)
Volpiano Volpi (1621–1623)
Clemente Merlini (1623)²³
Giacomo Cavaliere (1623–1626)²⁴
Fabio di Lagonissa (1626–1627)
Egidio Orsini de Vivariis (1627–1644)²⁵
Giovanni Battista Pamphili²⁶
Domenico Cecchini (1644–1652)
Giovanni Bertucci (1652–1655)
Giacomo Corradi (1655–1666)
Pietro Ottoboni (1667–1670)
Gaspere Carpegna (1670–1676)
Sterano Agostini (1676–1683)
Francesco Liberati (1683–1689)

²¹ The *procamerlengos* under the “exile” in Paris: Federico Sforza (1645–1646) and Lorenzo Raggi (1650–1653).

²² RE, *La Curia Romana*, 308; HC IV, 58; HC V, 58; WEBER, *Die ältesten päpstlichen Staatsbandbücher*, 167.

²³ In the last days of Gregory XV’s pontificate.

²⁴ At KRAUS: 1623–1625.

²⁵ At KRAUS: 1626–1644.

²⁶ According to De Luca, the later pope was also the head of the Dataria for a short period of time under Urban VIII.

Bandino Panciatici (1689–1700)
Giuseppe Sagripanti (1700–1721)²⁷

Sacred Apostolic Penitentiary
Sacra Poenitentiaria Apostolica

Major Penitentiaries

Giulio Antonio Santoro (1592–1602)
Pietro Aldobrandini (1602–1605)
Cinzio Aldobrandini (1605–1610)
Scipione Borghese (1610–1633)
Antonio Barberini sen. (1633–1646)
Orazio Giustiniani (1647–1649)
Niccolò Albergati-Ludovisi (1650–1687)
Leandro Colloredo (1688–1709)²⁸

Supreme Sacred Congregation of the Roman and Universal Inquisition
Suprema Sacra Congregazione della Romana e Universale Inquisizione

Cardinal secretaries

Camillo Borghese (1602–1605)
Pompeo Arrigoni (1605–1616)
Giovanni Garzia Mellini (1616–1629)²⁹
Antonio Barberini sen. (1629–1633)³⁰
Francesco Barberini (1633–1679)³¹
Cesare Facchinetti (1679–1683)
Alderano Cybo (1683–1700)
Galeazzo Marescotti (1700–1716)³²

²⁷ STORTI, *La storia e il diritto della Dataria Apostolica*, 169–172; WEBER, *Die ältesten päpstlichen Staatshandbücher*, 168; KRAUS, *Das päpstliche Staatssekretariat*, 276–277.

²⁸ RE, *La Curia Romana*, 273.

²⁹ At KRAUS: Dionys Simon de Marquemont (–1626).

³⁰ At KRAUS: 1629.

³¹ At KRAUS: 1632–1640; then Giovanni Battista Pamphili and Giulio Roma (1643).

³² RE, *La Curia Romana*, 100–101; KRAUS, *Das päpstliche Staatssekretariat*, 278–279.

Sacred Congregation of the Council
Sacra Congregazione del Concilio di Trento

Prefects

Girolamo Mattei (1591–1603)
 Paolo Emilio Zacchia (1604–1605)
 Francesco Maria Bourbon del Monte (1605–1616)
 Orazio Lancellotti (1616–1620.)
 Roberto Ubaldini (1621–1623)³³
 Cosimo de Torres (1623–1626)
 Bonifacio Bevilacqua (1626–1627)
 Fabrizio Verospi (1627–1639)
 Giovanni Battista Pamphili (1639–1644)
 Francesco Cennini (1644–1645)
 Pietro Luigi Carafa (1645–1655)
 Francesco Paolucci (1657–1661)
 Giulio Sacchetti (1661–1663)
 Angelo Celsi (1664–1671)
 Paluzzo Altieri (1671–1672)
 Vincenzo Maria Orsini (1673–1675)
 Federico Baldeschi (Ubaldi) Colonna (1675–1691)
 Galeazzo Marescotti (1692–1695)
 Giuseppe Sagripanti (1696–1700)
 Bandino Panciatichi (1700–1718)

Secretaries

Giulio Poggiani (1564–1568)
 Achille Stazio (1565–1566)³⁴
 Giovanni Paolo Marincola (1568–1575)
 Lorenzo Frizoglio (1584–1590)
 Bruno Guarino (1590–1592)
 Giovanni Francesco Fagnani (1592–1613)
 Prospero Fagnani (1613–1626)³⁵
 Francesco Paolucci de' Calboli (1626–1657)
 Carlo de Vecchi (1657–1668)
 Stefano Brancaccio (1668–1681)
 Antonio Attovento (1681–1689)
 Ranuccio Pallavicino (1690–1696)

³³ At KRAUS: Roberto Ubaldini (1627–1632), Giovanni Battista Pamphili (1633), Verospi (1636–1639), Giovanni Battista Pamphili (1639), Carafa (1643).

³⁴ He was the deputy of Poggiani during his journey to Milan.

³⁵ At KRAUS: G.B. Marini, G. Sacchetti (1626), F. Paolucci (1628–1644).

Ferdinando Nuzzi (1696–1700)
 Giovanni Domenico Thomato (1700–1704)³⁶

The Sacred Congregation of Rites
Sacra Congregazione dei Riti

Prefects

Alfonso Gesualdo (1588–1603)
 Tolomeo Galli (1603–1607)
 Domenico Pinelli (1607–1611)
 Francesco De Joyeuse (1611–1615)
 Antonio Maria Galli (1615–1620)
 Francesco Maria Borbon del Monte (1620–1626)
 Giovanni Maria Deti (1626–1630)
 Carlo Emmanuele Pio di Savoia (1630–1641)
 Pietro Paolo Crescenzi (1641–1645)
 Luigi Capponi (1645–1652)
 Federico Cornaro (1652–1653)
 Carlo de' Medici (1653–1655)
 Giulio Sacchetti (1655–1663)
 Marzio Ginetti (1663–1671)
 Antonio Barberini (1671–1671)
 Francesco Maria Brancaccio (1671–1675)
 Ulderico Carpegna (1675–1679)
 Cesare Facchinetti (1679–1683)
 Niccolò Albergati-Ludovisi (1683–1687)
 Alderano Cybo (1687–1700)
 Gaspare Carpegna (1700–1714)

Secretaries

Giovanni Battista Stella (1588 [?]- 1602)
 Giovanni Paolo Mucanzio (1602–1617)
 Pietro Giamaricono (1617–1622)
 Giovanni Battista Rinuccini (1622–1625)
 Giulio Benigni (1625–1627)
 Fulvio Benigni (1627–1629)
 Tegrino Tegrini (1629–1632)
 Giulio Rospigliosi (1632–1635)
 Cesare Facchinetti (1635–1638)

³⁶ RE, *I cardinali prefetti della Sacra Congregazione del Concilio*, III–124; PALAZZINI, *Prospero Fagnani, Segretario*, 362–363 and 377–378; RE, *La Curia Romana*, 161–162; KRAUS, *Das päpstliche Staatssekretariat*, 279.

Giulio Cenci (1638–1642)
 Carlo Pauluzzi di Calbulensi (1642–1644)
 Marco Galli (1644–1648)
 Girolamo Boncompagni (1648–1652)
 Bernardino Rocci (1652–1654)
 Francesco Maria Febei (1654–1662)
 Bernardino Casali (1662–1689)
 Lorenzo Fieschi (1689–1690)
 Giuseppe Vallemani (1690–1692)
 Bernardino Ingherami (1692–1713)

Promotori generali della Fede

Antonio Cerri (1631–1642)³⁷
 Pietro Francesco De Rossi (1642–1673)
 Prospero Bottini (1673–1712)³⁸

Sacred Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith
Sacra Congregazione de Propaganda Fide

Prefects

Antonio Maria Sauli (1622–1622)
 Ludovico Ludovisi (1622–1632)³⁹
 Antonio Barberini (1632–1671)⁴⁰
 Paluzzo Altieri (1671–1698)
 Carlo Barberini (1698–1704)

Secretaries

Francesco Ingoli (1622–1649)
 [Francesco Albizzi (1649)]⁴¹
 Dionisio Massari (1649–1657)
 Marco Alberici (Albrizzi) (1657–1664)
 [Antonio Manfroni (1664–1666)]⁴²
 Girolamo Casanate (1666–1668)

³⁷ *Promotori fiscali*: Giovanni Giacomo Nerotti: 1595–1597; Pompeo Molella: 1600–1601 and 1608 (?); Giovanni Battista Stella: 1608–1621 and 1623 (?)

³⁸ GIOVANNI PAPA, *Cardinali Prefetti, Segretari, Promotori Generali della Fede e Relatori Generali della Congregazione*, Congregazione per le Cause dei Santi, 423–428, 423–427.

³⁹ At KRAUS: Antonio Barberini Sen. (*Sant'Onofrio*) (1623–1632).

⁴⁰ At KRAUS: 1632–1644. With the title of a vice-prefect, though with authority of a prefect during the exile in Paris: Luigi Capponi (1645–1653).

⁴¹ *Prosegretario*.

⁴² *Prosegretario*.

Frederico Ubaldini (1668–1673)
 [Urbano Cerri (1673–1675)]⁴³
 Francesco Ravizza (1673–1675)
 Urbano Cerri (1675–1679)
 [Domenico Corsi (1679)]⁴⁴
 Edoardo Cybo (1680–1695)⁴⁵

II. Currencies and Values

I. Coppers (change):

a) *Quattrino*

1 quattrino

1600–1709 = 3, 390 gram of copper

b) *Baiocco* (calculation moneys)

1 baiocco (also *bolognino*) = 5 quattrini

10 baiocco = 1 giulio (namely 50 quattrini = 1 giulio)

2. Silver:

a) *Giulio* (also *paolo*)

1 giulio

1554–1566 = 2,943 gram of silver

1566–1684 = 2,932 gram of silver

1684–1734 = 2,800 gram of silver

b) *Scudo (di moneta)* [it is used as *scudo* in this volume, sometimes as *silverscudo*]

1 scudo

1588–1684 = average 29,4 gram of silver

c) *Scudo (di conto)* (the so-called calculation money of the former) [as *scudo*, sometimes as *silverscudo* due to the concordance of value]

In summary:

1 scudo, be it a coin or calculation money – namely rudimentary paper-note –, was equivalent to 10 giulio (or paulo) or 100 baioccho (bolognino), and 500 quattrino.

⁴³ *Prosegretario*.

⁴⁴ *Prosegretario*.

⁴⁵ KRAUS, *Das päpstliche Staatssekretariat*, 277; KOWALSKY, *Serie dei cardinali prefetti*, 161–197; RE, *La Curia Romana*, 202.

3. Gold:

a) *Scudo d'oro in oro* (always mentioned as *goldenscudo*)

1 scudo

1596–1719 = average 3,077 gram of gold

(Prior to that, the *scudo d'oro del peso vecchio* contained 3,043 gram of gold.)

b) *Scudo d'oro delle stampe* (the former's calculation money)

c) *Ducato di Camera* = 3,353 gram of gold (16th century)

1 cameralistic ducat = 10 *grosso*

4. Silver-gold-copper rates

Around 1530 for 1 *goldenscudo* 10 *giulio*, or 100 *baioccho* were given, at the end of the sixteenth century the rates were already 13–13,5 *giulio* (130–135 *baioccho*), which remained until the middle of the seventeenth century (the stabilisation is just seeming, the gold content of the coins reduced to a certain degree). In 1673 it should be multiplied already by 1,5, in 1689–1690 by 1,53.

5. The rates of the *scudo*–foreign currencies

1 *goldenscudo* = cca 2,6 gulden

1 *goldenscudo* = cca 0,91 ducat

1 *goldenscudo* = cca 0,817 (Rhine) golden forint (namely 1 forint = cca 1,22 *golden scudi*)

1 (silver) *scudo* = cca 0,77–0,83 thaler (namely 1 thaler = 1,2–1,3 *silver scudi*)⁴⁶

⁴⁶ REINHARDT, *Überleben in der frühneuzeitlichen Stadt*, xviii; LUTZ, *Zur Papstfinanz von Klemens IX*, 46–47, notes 46. and 49; REINHARDT, *Kardinal Scipione Borghese*, xiv and 267–303, 279–293, 304–340 [the annually detailed rates of the silver-gold and other Italian currencies between 1605 and 1646]; LUTZ, *Rom und Europa*, 113; ALBRECHT, *Zur Finanzierung des Dreißigjährigen Krieges*, 539; CLERGEAC, *La Curie et les bénéfices*, 278–279, n. 25.

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Abbreviations

AHP	Archivum Historiae Pontificiae
AHSI	Archivum Historicum Societatis Iesu
AKK	Archiv für Katholisches Kirchenrecht
AÖG	Archiv für Österreichische Geschichte
ARG	Archiv für Reformationsgeschichte
ASI	Archivio Storico Italiano
ASRSP	Archivio della (Reale) Società Romana di Storia Patria
BDHIR	Bibliothek des Deutschen Historischen Instituts in Rom
CAV	Collectanea Archivi Vaticani
HC	Hierarchia Catholica
HJ	Historisches Jahrbuch
HZ	Historische Zeitschrift
MIÖG	Mitteilungen des Instituts für Österreichische Geschichtsforschung
MÖStA	Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Staatsarchiv
QFIAB	Quellen und Forschungen aus Italienischen Archiven und Bibliotheken
RHE	Revue d'Historie Ecclésiastique
RHM	Römische Historische Mitteilungen
RMC	Roma Moderna e Contermporanea
RQ	Römische Quartalschrift für Christliche Altertumskunde und Kirchengeschichte
SR	Studi Romani
ST	Studi e Testi
ZSSRG	Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte (Kanonistische Abteilung)

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This work leads the reader into one of the most exciting chapters of the history of the papacy. It delineates the behaviour and dilemmas of Rome in the fights against the Turks, in the Thirty Years' War, and in the struggles with the Protestants and the numerous conflicts with the Catholic States. In addition, the book describes in detail the first real example of globalisation, namely the worldwide spread of missions, in addition to providing accounts of the formation of new religious movements, Galileo's trial and the ordeals of the Institute of the Blessed Virgin Mary. Furthermore, the chapters offer insights into the nature of papal nepotism, how the Roman inquisition worked, and how the contemporary papal court, the Roman Curia and the Papal State were constructed.

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ISBN 978-88-7853-715-6



9 788878 537156 >

€ 10,00